Nan Zheng v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 16, 2024 *
Decided January 25, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2185
NAN ZHENG,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order from the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A097-838-612
O R D E R
Nan Zheng, a citizen of China, overstayed his student visa and sought asylum
based on persecution he alleged he suffered because of his Christian faith. After a
hearing, the immigration judge made an adverse credibility determination and denied
relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Zheng’s appeal. Zheng petitions
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-2185 Page 2
this court for review, arguing that the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding
was not supported by substantial evidence. We deny the petition.
Zheng arrived in Seattle, Washington, on a student visa in mid-2006 and later
that year moved to Tomah, Wisconsin. The Department of Homeland Security
discovered that Zheng was working at a restaurant under a false identity and without
authorization. In 2011, DHS placed Zheng in removal proceedings and charged him
with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). Zheng conceded his removability
but applied for immigration relief—asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture—based on religious persecution.
His written application contained some discrepancies, particularly regarding the
genesis of his interest in Christianity and the nature of the persecution he alleged to
have suffered. For instance, on his application, in response to a question about
belonging to a religious organization in his home country, he wrote, “I was a devout
Christian in China.” But in his attached statement, he explained that he became
interested in Christianity several years after arriving in the United States, in 2011. In
response to another question about his experience with a foreign criminal justice
system, he wrote, “I was arrested, detained and mistreated by Chinese government for
my Christian faith.” But his attached statement described only an episode in 2012, in
which his parents (in the northeastern city of Shenyang) were arrested by public
security officers for possessing overseas Bibles that he had sent them. According to
Zheng, his parents were detained for eight days at a local police station, “suffered a lot
of mistreatment,” were “threatened,” and told to “convince me to go back to turn
myself in” or otherwise “they will punish me severely.” Zheng also attached a
statement from his mother attesting to the arrest and beating.
At a hearing before an immigration judge, Zheng clarified the nature of his claim.
He testified through an interpreter that he had been introduced to Christianity in 2011
through an older Chinese colleague at his workplace, that he attended Tomah Baptist
Church, that he often talked about religion during frequent video calls with his parents
in China, that he was baptized only five days before the hearing, and that he fears he
would be punished for his faith if he returned to China. On cross-examination, the
government elicited acknowledgments from Zheng that (1) his prior application for
citizenship through his ex-wife was denied because of inconsistent testimony they had
provided to an immigration officer; (2) he could not obtain a statement from the woman
who introduced him to Christianity because she had since returned to China; (3) he had
no documentation corroborating the injuries and detention experienced by his parents

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No. 23-2185 Page 3
in China; (4) he did not understand the term “Baptist” or the meaning of the “Holy
Trinity”; and (5) he was unaware of the statement on his written application that he was
arrested in China for his Christianity (he disclaimed that statement and said that the
application had been prepared by his lawyer).
The immigration judge found Zheng not to be credible and denied all relief. The
immigration judge highlighted four reasons: (1) a pattern of dishonesty demonstrated
by inaccuracies and omissions in Zheng’s asylum application, his unauthorized
employment under a false name, and inconsistencies in his I-130 application for
citizenship; (2) Zheng’s lack of familiarity with “basic tenets of the faith”; (3) the “highly
convenient” timing of his conversion, just days before the hearing; and (4) the lack of
reasonably available corroborating evidence for his claims that his parents were
arrested and assaulted in China, such as hospital records, photographs, police reports,
arrest records, or receipt for the fines assertedly paid. The Board of Immigration
Appeals upheld the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding as not clearly
erroneous and dismissed the appeal.
In his petition for review, Zheng primarily challenges the immigration judge’s
adverse credibility finding. He argues that the immigration judge, in characterizing his
conversion to Christianity as opportunistic, misconstrued and discounted his testimony
at the hearing, the testimony presented by his pastor, and records of his participation in
the church. Zheng also contends that the evidence of his fear of future persecution in
China was amply supported by his mother’s affidavit, and that the immigration judge
unreasonably demanded further evidence of persecution.
Zheng faces a steep burden. We may overturn a credibility determination only if
we conclude the immigration judge and the Board did not support their conclusions
with specific evidence, and the facts compel a different result. Alvarenga-Flores v.
Sessions, 901 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2018).
The record does not compel reversal of the adverse credibility finding. Even if
Zheng’s conversion were assumed to be sincere, the immigration judge highlighted
valid reasons to disbelieve him. The judge, for instance, pointed to one material
discrepancy between Zheng’s testimony and written submissions—over the timing of
his interest in Christianity (his signed application stated that he practiced Christianity in
China, but he testified at the hearing that he started practicing in the United States). The
immigration judge also appropriately alluded to Zheng’s “less than forthright”
interaction with immigration authorities—his use of a false name and move across the

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country to obtain work, in violation of his student visa, as well as the U.S. government’s
prior rejection of his citizenship application based on inconsistent testimony between
him and his ex-wife.
Zheng also argues that his mother’s letter was sufficient corroborating evidence
of his claim, and that it was unreasonable of the immigration judge to expect his parents
“to get evidence of their persecution from the persecutor.” But this argument dodges
the finding made by the immigration judge—that Zheng reasonably could have
supplied other forms of corroboration such as hospital records, photographs, or a
receipt for the fines allegedly paid. And even if the mother’s account corroborated some
aspects of Zheng’s testimony, it does not undermine the immigration judge’s adverse
credibility finding. Santashbekov v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2016) (generalized
letter from asylum applicant’s political-party supervisor insufficient to overcome
material inconsistencies in applicant’s testimony).
Because Zheng’s burden for obtaining asylum is less than for withholding of
removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture, his requests for these other
forms of relief necessarily fail, too. See Alvarenga-Flores, 901 F.3d at 926.
The petition for review is DENIED.

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