Latanya Ivens v. Gk North Childcare Corp.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 31, 2024*
Decided February 1, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2586
LATANYA IVENS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GK NORTH CHILDCARE CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:21-CV-705 DRL
Damon R. Leichty,
Judge.
O R D E R
Latanya Ivens, who had been diagnosed with lupus in 2020, was furloughed
from her position as a preschool teacher at Growing Kids in March 2020 because of the
COVID-19 pandemic. She was scheduled to begin work again in May of that year, but
she did not return on the scheduled date because she was concerned about her health.
Growing Kids considered her to have voluntarily resigned. Ivens sued Growing Kids
for violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654, and
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2586 Page 2
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, alleging that
Growing Kids interfered with her right to take leave and failed to accommodate her
disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Growing Kids. Because
Ivens has not suffered any damages recoverable under the FMLA and is not a qualified
individual under the ADA, we affirm.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and take all facts in the light
most favorable to Ivens, the nonmoving party. Mahran v. Advocate Christ Med. Ctr.,
12 F.4th 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2021). Ivens began working at Growing Kids as a preschool
teacher in 2002. In 2018, she started to have symptoms of lupus, which required her to
modify how she interacted with students. She was diagnosed with lupus in January
2020 and was prescribed medications, which caused side effects like itching and
swelling in her lips and tongue. During this time, she also had symptoms from her
lupus flare-ups, including joint pain and hand stiffness.
On March 24, 2020, Ivens contacted the Human Resources Director at Growing
Kids, Angela Stearns, about taking time off because of her medication side effects and
lupus symptoms. Stearns told Ivens to wait a few days because she “may not need to
take the time off.” Two days later, Growing Kids furloughed Ivens (and nearly all other
teachers) because of low enrollment during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ivens was scheduled to return to work on May 11, 2020. On May 5, she requested
additional time off because she remained at high risk of experiencing serious illness
from COVID-19, and because she was continuing to experience lupus symptoms and
medication side effects. On May 7, Stearns purportedly mailed Ivens forms about
applying for FMLA leave, but Ivens did not receive them. Even though it received no
response to the forms (for whatever reason), Growing Kids allowed her to take
additional leave until May 26.
On May 21, Ivens requested additional time off until June 1, stating that she
continued to feel unsafe returning to work because of the pandemic and wanted time to
think through her next steps. Stearns told Ivens that if she did not return to work on
May 26, Growing Kids would consider her to be voluntarily resigning. Under pressure
from Stearns, Ivens agreed to return to work on May 26.
On the morning of May 26, Ivens still did not feel safe returning to work, and so
she did not. She did not inform anyone at Growing Kids that she was not returning to
work. Around this time, she texted the president of Growing Kids and asked to speak

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No. 23-2586 Page 3
with him about her position. When he directed Ivens to the human resources
department, she told him she would not be returning to her position at Growing Kids.
After properly exhausting, Ivens sued Growing Kids in 2021, alleging that it
violated the FMLA by interfering with her right to take leave and retaliating against
her. She also alleged that Growing Kids refused to accommodate her disability in
violation of the ADA. (The district court dismissed two claims Ivens brought under
Title VII, but she does not appeal that dismissal.) During her deposition, Ivens stated
that because of the pandemic she would not have felt comfortable returning to work on
her requested return date of June 1, 2020, or by the time of the deposition over two
years later in November 2022. She also said that, by November 2022, the side effects
from her lupus medications had not subsided to the point that she could return to work
at Growing Kids. And Ivens further stated that she was no longer interested in working
in childcare or at Growing Kids.
Growing Kids sought summary judgment. The district court granted the motion,
finding that Ivens had not suffered any damage that could be remedied under the
FMLA and was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA.
Ivens, appearing pro se on appeal, generally challenges the district court’s
ruling, arguing that she raised sufficient facts to survive summary judgment. She first
contends that Growing Kids violated the FMLA by failing to inform her about her
FMLA options and then firing her for seeking leave. Growing Kids replies that these
arguments are immaterial because the district court was correct to find that she had not
suffered damages recoverable under the FMLA.
We agree with the district court that Ivens has failed to create a genuine dispute
that she suffered harm for which the FMLA provides a remedy. To defeat summary
judgment, Ivens must present some “evidence from which a jury could conclude that
[s]he suffered damages attributable to one of [the] adverse actions for which the FMLA
provides relief.” Hickey v. Protective Life Corp., 988 F.3d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 2021). For
interfering with Ivens’s ability to take leave under the FMLA, Growing Kids would be
liable to her for “any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation” she
lost because of the violation, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I), any other monetary losses
because of the violation, id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II), and equitable relief, including
reinstatement or promotion, id. § 2617(a)(1)(B).
But Ivens does not point to any lost wages, benefits, or other monetary losses.
Indeed, her FMLA leave would have been unpaid, and she presents no evidence that

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she lost any other employment benefit or incurred an actual monetary cost because of a
denial of FMLA leave. On appeal, Ivens states, without explanation, that she suffered
the loss of “forward wage[s].” But even if she received the fullest extent of unpaid
FMLA leave, Ivens testified in her deposition that she would not have felt comfortable
returning to work at Growing Kids at the end of that leave, meaning she lost no future
wages. And although Ivens states in her brief that she is entitled to punitive damages
and damages for her pain and suffering, “FMLA damages don’t include emotional
distress and punitive damages.” Arrigo v. Link, 836 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2016).
Similarly, equitable relief, which Ivens does not seek, would be inappropriate because
Ivens is not interested in returning to work at Growing Kids. Because Ivens presented
no evidence that she suffered damages within the remedial scope of the FMLA,
summary judgment for Growing Kids was appropriate. See Hickey, 988 F.3d at 387.
Next, we agree with the district court that Growing Kids was entitled to
summary judgment on Ivens’s claim that it failed to reasonably accommodate her
disability. We understand Ivens generally to contend that Growing Kids violated the
ADA when it failed to grant her additional leave to accommodate her lupus.
To prevail on this claim, Ivens must first show that she is a “qualified individual”
under the ADA—that she, with or without a reasonable accommodation, could perform
the essential functions of her job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). If she is a qualified individual,
time off can be a proper accommodation, but an employer is not required to
accommodate a multi-month or indefinite leave of absence. See Severson v. Heartland
Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2017); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379,
381 (7th Cir. 2003).
Ivens is not a qualified individual under the ADA. During her deposition in
November 2022, Ivens stated that her lupus symptoms and her heightened risk of
serious illness if she contracted COVID-19 still made it unsafe for her to return to work.
Her requested leave, as a result, would have lasted over two years, with no definite end
date. Because the accommodation would have prevented Ivens from performing the
essential function of her job—teaching students in person—she is not a “qualified
individual” under the ADA. See Byrne, 328 F.3d at 381. And, even if she were a
qualified individual, an indefinite-leave accommodation is not reasonable. Id.; Severson,
872 F.3d at 481.
AFFIRMED

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