Joseph Hoban v. Arthur Funk

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 8, 2024*
Decided February 12, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1630
JOSEPH HOBAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ARTHUR FUNK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 17-CV-1274
Colin Stirling Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
Joseph Hoban, an Illinois prisoner with knee and back pain, appeals the
summary judgment rejecting his claims that prison doctors were deliberately indifferent
to his medical needs. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-1630 Page 2
While housed at Pontiac Correctional Center in Illinois, Hoban experienced
lower back pain, presumably from an injury he sustained in an explosion while serving
in the Marines. Beginning in 2014, Hoban visited Pontiac’s medical staff for treatment.
Among the staff was Dr. Andrew Tilden, who prescribed Hoban naproxen
(a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug) and ordered x-rays.
The following year, Hoban complained of pain in his right knee. Dr. Tilden
continued to prescribe naproxen and ordered updated x-rays. Additionally, he
prescribed tramadol (a narcotic-like medication used to treat moderate-to-severe pain).
The following month, Dr. Tilden diagnosed Hoban with degenerative joint disease.
There is no cure, and pain is typically managed with medication.
For two years, Hoban was treated with naproxen and tramadol. When Hoban
needed a refill, he would submit a written request for a prescription renewal to
Pontiac’s health-services provider, Wexford Health Sources. Hoban maintained that, at
various points during this two-year period, the defendants—Dr. Tilden, Dr. Arthur
Funk (Dr. Tilden’s supervisor), attending medical personnel, and Wexford—failed to
refill his prescriptions on time and neglected to administer his last refill request,
allowing his treatment to “fall below therapeutic levels.”
Hoban brought this deliberate indifference suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting
that the defendants failed to provide medical care for his knee injury and spinal disease,
failed to administer his medication properly (by intentionally allowing his prescriptions
to lapse), and—in Wexford’s case—implemented a “blind-eye policy” toward the
defendants’ deliberate indifference.
During the discovery phase, Hoban moved for default judgment, arguing that
the defendants and their attorney intentionally interfered with his ability to access
medical records. (He specified that they produced only one document in response to his
request for all medical records from 2016 onward.) The district court denied the motion,
concluding that the defendants sent Hoban his medical records in their initial
disclosures, and further, Hoban already possessed many of the relevant records from
previous cases he had filed. And even if he did not yet have access to the documents,
Hoban had two possible ways to obtain the records on his own: by subpoena to the
non-party correctional center, or by submission of a voucher request to the Illinois
Department of Corrections.

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No. 22-1630 Page 3
Soon thereafter, Hoban moved for recruitment of counsel to assist him with
issuing a subpoena to Wexford. But the court denied this motion, stating that Hoban
could not subpoena a party to the case, and instead would have to submit to Wexford a
request for production.
The defendants later moved for summary judgment, supported by a statement of
undisputed facts that chronicled Hoban’s medical appointments and prescription
history—including recurrent examinations of the spine and knee, as well as continuous
refills of naproxen and tramadol during the relevant period.
Hoban then sought a subpoena from the court to obtain records from the non-
party correctional center. The court granted his request, but Hoban improperly served
the subpoena when he forwarded it to a family member to deliver. The district court
then issued him a second subpoena form, but he failed to fill in the portion specifying
where the materials needed to be sent. Because of these shortcomings, the court directed
Hoban to request the medical records by presenting a voucher to the Illinois
Department of Corrections. Hoban says that he submitted a voucher to the Department
and received only 30 pages of medical records in response, but this is not corroborated
by the record.
Hoban filed two additional motions for default judgment based on his belief that
the defendants’ lawyer obstructed his subpoenas, withheld discovery, blocked his
medical care, and lied about the voucher process. The court denied both motions,
explaining that Hoban did not provide evidence of the lawyer’s misconduct.
Six more times during the proceedings, Hoban sought recruitment of counsel to
assist him with discovery. The district court denied each request.
The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The court,
noting that Hoban failed to respond to the defendants’ summary judgment motion
(despite having been granted at least 13 extensions), accepted the defendants’ statement
of undisputed facts and ruled that no reasonable juror could find that the doctors had
deliberately ignored his pain. Regarding Dr. Tilden, the court found no evidence that
his treatment of Hoban’s knee-and-back pain fell below minimal professional
standards. As for Dr. Funk, the court found no evidence that he interacted with Hoban,
let alone knew of the grievances Hoban submitted, and regardless, a supervisory official
is not personally liable for subordinates’ acts under a theory of respondeat superior.

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No. 22-1630 Page 4
Finally, the court concluded that Hoban’s claim against the presiding nurse was also
unsupported by evidence.
On appeal, Hoban argues that the court prematurely entered summary judgment
for the defendants because the defendants interfered with his attempts—by subpoena
or voucher—to obtain medical records that he needed to oppose the motion. But the
federal rules do not require that discovery be underway or complete before summary
judgment can be granted. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56; see Smith v. OSF HealthCare Sys., 933 F.3d
859, 864 (7th Cir. 2019). If a party—even a pro se litigant—needs additional discovery to
respond to a motion for summary judgment, he may request more time under Rule
56(d), explaining by affidavit or declaration specific reasons why he cannot present
essential evidence at the time. See F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(d); see Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880,
886 (7th Cir. 2011). But Hoban did not seek Rule 56(d) relief, and regardless, the district
court granted him numerous extensions of time to submit his response. Discovery must
have an end point, and the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Hoban
had been allowed adequate time. See Stevo, 662 F.3d at 886. As for his insistence that the
defendants obstructed discovery, Hoban does not point to any evidence that the
defendants interfered with his subpoenas or his voucher to obtain medical records.
Second, Hoban argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
recruit counsel to assist with “discovery deadlock.” But the court appropriately
exercised its discretion to deny the motions based on its determination that Hoban
could competently litigate the case, understood the applicable legal standards, had
sufficient access to legal resources, and could research and prepare filings. See Pruitt v.
Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
AFFIRMED

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