United States of America v. James L. Snyder

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 13, 2024
Decided March 14, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2200
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES L. SNYDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-CR-00579(1)
Manish S. Shah,
Judge.
O R D E R
James Snyder was convicted of attempting to entice a minor to engage in
prostitution or sexual activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). He completed his prison term in
July 2019 and began serving a 10-year term of supervised release. The district court
revoked Snyder’s supervised release in June 2023 for violating the conditions of his
release in four respects: possessing prohibited materials, using an encrypted messaging
service, failing to participate in sex-offender treatment, and having unsupervised
contact with a minor. It imposed six-months’ imprisonment with no further supervised
release. Snyder was released in November 2023.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-2200 Page 2
Snyder filed a notice of appeal, but because he has already served the challenged
prison term and is no longer in custody, his lawyer moves to withdraw from the appeal,
arguing that it is moot and it would be frivolous to argue otherwise. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Snyder does not have an unqualified constitutional right
to counsel in revocation proceedings, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973),
but our practice is to apply the Anders safeguards to them anyway, see United States v.
Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case
and addresses the issue of mootness. Snyder did not respond to his lawyer’s motion,
see C IR . R. 51(b), and counsel tells us that Snyder has not responded to her attempts at
contacting him. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the
subjects she discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel correctly concludes that, because Snyder has already completed his
sentence, this appeal is unquestionably moot. An appeal of an already-completed
sentence may present a live controversy if the defendant faces collateral consequences
from it. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1998). We may presume the existence of
such collateral consequences when a defendant has completed a sentence underlying a
conviction, but we make no such presumption when the completed sentence stems
from the revocation of supervised release. See id. at 8, 14; United States v. Austin, __ F.4th
__, 2024 WL 717061 at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2024) (extending Spencer’s holding about the
end of parole terms to supervised-release terms). In this latter scenario, the defendant
must demonstrate collateral consequences. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14. But we agree with
counsel that Snyder could not do that. Any possible adverse effects from the revocation
of his supervised release are contingent upon him violating the law—conduct that he is
obligated to avoid—or are too speculative to present a live controversy. See id. at 14–16;
Austin, 2024 WL 717061 at *2. And because the district court provided that no term of
supervised release would follow Snyder’s incarceration, he no longer faces custody.
Finally, counsel does not contend that supervised-release terms are always so short that
they fit within the narrow exception to mootness for cases that are capable of repetition
yet evade review. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17–18.
Because this appeal is necessarily moot, arguments on the merits are irrelevant.
We thus GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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