Mikhail Tsukerman v. LAW FIRM OF BECKER, HOERNER & YSURSA and THOMAS J. HUNTER

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 17, 2024*
Decided May 21, 2024
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3045
MIKHAIL TSUKERMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LAW FIRM OF BECKER, HOERNER &
YSURSA and THOMAS J. HUNTER,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 22-cv-2666-SMY
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
After an unsuccessful suit against his state employer, Mikhail Tsukerman sued
Thomas Hunter—a lawyer who had represented the employer—and Hunter’s firm.
Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Tsukerman said the lawyers had conspired to deny his
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the
appellant’s brief and the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and
oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-3045 Page 2
constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the complaint and directed the clerk
to close the case. Tsukerman filed two motions to reconsider; this appeal concerns the
denial of the second one. Because the court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
In 2016, Tsukerman sued his employer, an Illinois school district, alleging
discrimination in the non-renewal of his teaching contract. But he voluntarily dismissed
that case with a stipulation that if he refiled, the employer could recover its costs up to
that point. Tsukerman soon refiled. When he refused to pay the employers’ costs, the
district court dismissed the case again. Tsukerman appealed twice: first, to challenge the
dismissal; second, to argue that the court should have later reopened the case when
Tsukerman accused defense counsel of fraud. We affirmed in both appeals. In the
second, we saw no evidence of fraud, adding that defense counsel “responded to
intemperate accusations with considerable professionalism.” Tsukerman v. W. Cmty.
Unit School Dist. No. 12, 851 F. App’x 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2021); see also 796 F. App’x 312
(7th Cir. 2020).
Yet Tsukerman then sued the school district’s counsel in a new federal case,
alleging that their successful representation of the school district harmed him in myriad
ways. Tsukerman asserted that the private law firm acted under color of state law by
convincing the district court to rule against him, and had intentionally inflicted severe
emotional distress, acted in “bad faith,” and unjustly enriched itself by refusing to
settle, running up fees, and questioning his Jewish heritage. The district court dismissed
Tsukerman’s complaint and directed the clerk of court to close the case.
Tsukerman then moved to reconsider and for leave to file an amended
complaint. In an attempt to establish diversity jurisdiction over his state-law theories,
he alleged that he was a Missouri citizen, and the defendants were based in Illinois. The
amended complaint did not, however, allege an amount in controversy. The district
court denied the motions.
Instead of appealing, Tsukerman moved once more to reconsider and for leave to
file a second amended complaint (which again contained no amount in controversy).
Months later, the district court denied all relief, explaining that Tsukerman had not
shown that the defendants were state actors or that the court had diversity jurisdiction
over his state-law claims. This time, Tsukerman appealed.
We start by confirming which of the district court’s orders we may review.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The court never entered a separate judgment document as required
by Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But a decision is final and appealable

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under § 1291 if it is clear that “the district court is done with the case.” See Davis v.
Advoc. Health Ctr. Patient Care Express, 523 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2008). The district
court’s first dismissal order, dated January 10, 2023, directed the clerk to close the case,
showing that the court thought it was done. See Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of
Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 518 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015) (dismissal without prejudice
final if docket entry says, “Case Terminated,” even when order dismissing complaint
did not expressly deny leave to amend complaint). So, Tsukerman could have appealed.
Yet Tsukerman’s October 2023 notice of appeal is timely only as to the district
court’s October 3 order denying the second motion to reconsider. Because the
January 10 dismissal was not memorialized in a document separate from the reasoned
order, federal law deems the judgment entered 150 days later—on June 9. See Bell v.
Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 982 F.3d 468, 488 (7th Cir. 2020). The deadline to appeal fell
30 days after that: July 10. True, Tsukerman moved to reconsider the court’s January 10
order on January 23, but that motion was denied on February 21—well before June 9—
so the deadline to appeal remained unchanged. See Borrero v. City of Chicago, 456 F.3d
698, 701 (7th Cir. 2006) (first motion to reconsider filed after final decision but before
entry of judgment does not affect appellate deadlines if denied before entry of
judgment). And Tsukerman’s next motion to reconsider, filed on March 14 and denied
on October 3, did not toll the time to appeal the original dismissal of the complaint (or
the denial of the first motion to reconsider) because it was the second such motion.
See id. at 700; Krivak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2 F.4th 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2021) (second
postjudgment motion does not toll time for appeal). We thus review, for abuse of
discretion, see O’Brien v. Village of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616, 628 (7th Cir. 2020), only the
denial of Tsukerman’s second motion to reconsider and to amend the complaint.
Tsukerman insists that the defendants may be treated as state actors under § 1983
because they allegedly conspired with the court system (or with their client) to prevent
him from pursuing his case against the school district. But nothing in his filings raised a
plausible inference of such a conspiracy. He alleged that the defendants filed
“unnecessary” responses to his motions and thus increased their fees, and that the court
incorrectly sided with them. This does not permit an inference of conspiracy, nor does it
turn the defendants into “state actors.” See Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457–58 (7th Cir.
1998). An allegation of this sort does not state a claim for relief. See Hallinan v. Fraternal
Ord. of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2009). So, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to revisit the dismissal of this proposed claim
(or reconsider whether to use this inadequate federal claim to assert supplemental
jurisdiction, per 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over Tsukerman’s state-law claims).

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Tsukerman also argues that his second motion to reconsider and to amend
showed that the parties are diverse, which he believes should trigger federal review of
state-law claims. Yet neither of his proposed amended complaints pleaded an amount
in controversy reaching $75,000—or any amount. See Page v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,
2 F.4th 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2021) (plaintiff must suggest adequate amount in controversy).
The district court did not abuse its discretion.
At all events, even if Tsukerman could cure the amount-in-controversy
problem—his appellate brief mentions $64,000 and hints at more, and his first complaint
sought hundreds of thousands of dollars in punitive damages—all three of his
proposed complaints failed to plausibly state a claim on which relief may be granted.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (describing plausibility standard);
O’Brien, 955 F.3d at 832 (denial of leave to amend complaint appropriate when
amendment would be futile). As discussed above, the allegations were inadequate to
state a claim under § 1983. Nor, contrary to Tsukerman’s arguments throughout, did
they plausibly state Illinois claims for unjust enrichment, intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress through extreme and outrageous conduct, or “bad faith.” See
generally Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 80 (Ill. 2003) (outlining elements of
intentional infliction of emotional distress); HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon
Hosp., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 672, 678–79 (Ill. 1989) (sketching Illinois unjust-enrichment
doctrine). For this additional reason, we would not remand to the district court to
revisit Tsukerman’s motions and allow further amendment.
AFFIRMED

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