United States of America v. Tyler R. Schumacher

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 17, 2024
Decided June 18, 2024
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2748
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TYLER R. SCHUMACHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 4:22-CR-40025-SMY-1
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
Tyler Schumacher pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
and to possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. The district court sentenced him to 188 months in prison and
three years of supervised release. Schumacher filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed
lawyer believes that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Schumacher did not respond to counsel’s motion to
withdraw. See C IR . R. 51(b). The Anders brief, though barebones, is adequate for our
review. See United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that an
Anders brief is adequate on its face if “it explains the nature of the case and intelligently
discusses the issues that a case of the sort might be expected to involve”). From our
review of the brief and the record, we conclude that Schumacher does not have an
arguable issue on appeal. We therefore grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
From 2019 to 2022, Schumacher bought and distributed methamphetamine in the
Effingham, Illinois area. In February 2022, a search was executed at Schumacher’s
residence, where law enforcement recovered methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia,
guns, and other illegal substances. Both Schumacher and his partner, later named at
sentencing as Molly Miller, were arrested. Upon their release on bond, they fled to
Kentucky and were re-arrested after barricading themselves in a camper. A search
warrant was also executed on the camper, and law enforcement recovered
methamphetamine, a firearm, and a digital scale. When Miller was back in custody, she
provided details about the escape to Kentucky and Schumacher’s methamphetamine
activities, saying that he traded drugs for guns as well as money. Later, Schumacher
also admitted to the charged conduct after his re-arrest, and he pleaded guilty without a
plea agreement.
Before sentencing, the parties received the presentence investigation report. The
probation office initially gave Schumacher a three-level reduction in his offense level for
acceptance of responsibility. But the government argued that he should receive a
two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice and no reduction for accepting
responsibility. For justification, it presented a recorded conversation in which
Schumacher told Miller that he needed her to “clarify” the incriminating statement that
she had made after her re-arrest about his drug and gun dealing. The probation office
accepted the government’s argument that this recording reflected an attempt to
influence a witness and was obstructive, and agreed Schumacher did not merit a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Schumacher objected to the change, arguing
that he merely tried to have Miller tell the truth, so he did not attempt to obstruct
justice, and he should receive the reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Sentencing came next. First, the district court received evidence on the
obstruction issue. The government called the agent who recorded the conversation
between Miller and Schumacher. He played the audio and testified that Miller felt
Schumacher was asking her to alter her statement. The court ruled that the

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enhancement for obstruction of justice was warranted because Schumacher was
improperly trying to alter witness testimony, and no reduction for acceptance of
responsibility was warranted. As a result, Schumacher’s adjusted offense level was 36;
with a criminal history category of I, his guidelines range was 188 to 235 months’
imprisonment. The government argued for a sentence at the bottom of that range.
Schumacher sought the statutory minimum of 120 months, emphasizing mitigating
factors of his drug addiction, attempts to build a legitimate business, and support of his
family before turning to the drug trade. Against these mitigating factors, the court
weighed aggravating factors: Schumacher had fled custody, had been heavily involved
in trading firearms while dealing drugs, and had falsely accused a state social worker
(who had checked on his children) of supplying him with drugs. The court ultimately
sentenced Schumacher to 188 months in prison and five years of supervised release.
Counsel does not tell us, as he should, whether Schumacher wants to withdraw
his plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). But we need not reject counsel’s brief because the
plea transcript shows that the district court substantially complied with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11, rendering the plea valid. After informing Schumacher that he
was under oath and could face perjury charges if he lied, the court ensured that
Schumacher understood the charges (including the maximum possible penalties). The
court also explained that Schumacher is “innocent until proven guilty … beyond a
reasonable doubt,” that he has the right to “a jury trial,” “to confront” his accusers, to
“bring in” his own witnesses, to “an attorney,” and against “self-incrimination,” all of
which Schumacher affirmed he understood. The court also explained how his sentence
would be decided if he was found guilty. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(A–K, M). Finally,
the court ensured that Schumacher was pleading guilty of his own volition and that his
plea had an adequate factual basis. See id. 11(b)(2), 11(b)(3).
We note two arguable omissions from the plea colloquy, but even if they were
deemed omissions, they would both be harmless. The first is that the court did not state
that, “if convicted, a defendant who is not a United States citizen may be removed from
the United States, denied citizenship, and denied admission to the United States in
future.” Id. 11(b)(1)(O). But nothing in the record suggests that Schumacher is not a
citizen; thus the arguable omission does not undermine his plea. See United States v.
Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 598 (7th Cir. 2016). The second is that the court did not specify that,
by pleading guilty, Schumacher would be waiving all the rights to a trial that the court
had detailed at length. F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(F). But “because the district court
explained in great detail to [Schumacher] his right to a trial and [Schumacher]

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acknowledged that he understood that right,” the omission is “harmless.” United States
v. Maeder, 326 F.3d 892, 893 (7th Cir. 2003).
Counsel considers whether Schumacher could reasonably contest the decision to
apply the enhancement for obstruction of justice and remove the three-level reduction
for acceptance of responsibility and correctly concludes that he could not. We would
review the relevant factual findings for clear error and legal interpretations de novo.
United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 378–79, 382 (7th Cir. 2022). An enhancement for
obstruction of justice is appropriate if the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded
… the administration of justice with respect to … sentencing.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The
court did not clearly err in finding that, because Schumacher does not deny that he
asked Miller to change the statement she had already provided and Miller felt
Schumacher was encouraging her to change her statement, he obstructed justice. Even
an attempt to get a witness who has already given a statement to “tell the truth” is
obstructive where, as the district court reasonably found, it is a “willful attempt” to
change witness testimony. Major, 33 F.4th at 381 (quoting United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d
440, 453–54 (7th Cir. 2014)).
Because the district court properly found that Schumacher obstructed justice, it
would be frivolous to challenge the court’s decision not to remove points for acceptance
of responsibility. Only in “extraordinary cases” would a defendant receive a reduction
for acceptance of responsibility despite an enhancement for obstruction of justice, id.,
and nothing suggests that this case is extraordinary.
For completeness, we observe that Schumacher could not mount any other
sentencing challenges. Procedurally, Schumacher received an opportunity to contest the
presentence report, see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 32(i), and after the rulings about obstruction and
acceptance of responsibility, the court correctly calculated the guidelines range as 188 to
235 months in prison. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. Substantively, we would presume that his
within-guidelines prison term of 188 months is reasonable, United States v. McGhee,
98 F.4th 816, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2024), and nothing here overcomes that presumption. The
court reasonably balanced the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by weighing
aggravating circumstances (drug trafficking, flight to Kentucky, gun trafficking, and
false accusations, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(C)) against Schumacher’s employment
and family involvement, see United States v. Holder, 94 F.4th 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2024), to
arrive at a sentence at the bottom of the range. And under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1),
Schumacher faced a potential life sentence, so his term of 188 months in prison properly
falls below the statutory maximum. Finally, Schumacher could not reasonably challenge

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his five-year term of supervised release. The district court’s adequate explanation for
the prison term also justifies the term of the supervised release. United States v. Wilcher,
91 F.4th 864, 871 (7th Cir. 2024). And because Schumacher did not object to the
conditions of release in the district court, he has waived any challenge to them on
appeal. United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019).
Thus, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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