United States of America v. Roland Black

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2659
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
R OLAND BLACK,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:18-cr-00149-3 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 21, 2024 — DECIDED J UNE 20, 2024
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, BRENNAN , and K IRSCH , Circuit
Judges.
K IRSCH , Circuit Judge. Law enforcement officers inter-
cepted a package mailed from Atlanta to a Chicago residence
because they believed it contained narcotics. Pursuant to a
warrant, officers then searched the package and found a sub-
stance containing furanyl fentanyl. They switched the fenta-
nyl with sham narcotics covered in a fluorescent powder,
wired the package to signal to them when it was opened, and

-- 1 of 12 --

2 No. 22-2659
sent an undercover officer to deliver the package to the Chi-
cago residence. A woman claiming to be the intended recipi-
ent took the package, and Roland Black arrived shortly there-
after. Once the officers received a signal that the package had
been opened, they approached the front door. The package
was then thrown out of the back of the building, and Black
fled to the top floor, where he was arrested and found with
the luminescent powder from the sham narcotics on his
hands.
A jury found Black guilty of attempting to possess with
intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Black appealed, raising four argu-
ments: (1) the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to
seize the package, and the district court should have held an
evidentiary hearing to resolve related factual disputes; (2) the
jury instruction about his requisite mens rea was erroneous;
(3) the jury’s verdict was not supported by sufficient evi-
dence; and, solely for preservation purposes, (4) the court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the court’s
treatment of furanyl fentanyl as an analogue of fentanyl. Be-
cause we find that officers had reasonable suspicion to seize
the package (and the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying an evidentiary hearing), the challenged jury instruc-
tion accurately stated the law, the jury’s verdict is supported
by more than sufficient evidence, and, as Black acknowl-
edges, his motion to dismiss argument is foreclosed by our
precedent, we affirm.
I
In February 2017, law enforcement officers began listening
to recorded jail phone calls of Millard Williams—a Georgia
inmate with a known criminal history. Specifically, officers

-- 2 of 12 --

No. 22-2659 3
were aware that Williams had multiple prior convictions for
possession of a controlled substance, officers had previously
made three controlled mail deliveries of MDMA to addresses
associated with Williams, and Williams had escaped from
state custody and fled a charge of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute in Illinois. Williams was
eventually arrested at his apartment in Georgia, where offic-
ers recovered heroin, cocaine, marijuana, MDMA, and several
opioids.
During one of Williams’s recorded jail calls, he spoke with
Roland Black, and Black told Williams to “put that other situ-
ation back in effect.” The next day, Black searched the internet
for “[l]atest drug bust, Chicago” and “fentanyl.” During an-
other phone call the week after, Williams told Black that
“there’s one calvary on hold … right now,” and Black re-
sponded that his “homie” was “ready.” Williams then told
Black that “he have to grab it from Maria.” That same day,
Black searched “carfentanyl,” “fentanyl HCL,” and “fentanyl
HCL powder” on his iPhone and accessed articles entitled
“opioids, pure fentanyl HCL, how much cut and how to do
it” and “fentanyl HCL powder manufacturers, exporters, sup-
pliers.”
The next day, Willie Alexander—another individual with
whom Williams had spoken—shipped a package from At-
lanta (that had originated in Hong Kong) to Maria Gonzalez
at North Springfield Avenue in Chicago. The package was
scheduled for delivery the following day, March 3. On the ex-
pected delivery date, another individual, Michelle Jamison,
texted Black to “be on point before 10:30.” But the package
was not delivered as scheduled. Seemingly worried about the
failed delivery, Black frequently visited the U.S. Postal Service

-- 3 of 12 --

4 No. 22-2659
website and tracked the package around 130 times. Five days
after the scheduled delivery, Black told Williams that the sit-
uation was “going south,” and Williams told Black that “un-
less that shit get returned to sender … [a] motherfucker have
to split that in half or something.” Black also stated that his
“homie” was “trying to figure out what the fuck was going
on.” Black then searched “latest drug bust Chicago” on his
iPhone and, the next day, searched “man caught with package
at post office.”
Meanwhile, suspecting that the package contained narcot-
ics in light of Williams’s suspicious phone conversations and
known criminal history (including his prior use of the mail to
ship narcotics), a law enforcement officer asked a postal in-
spector on March 6 to check for packages addressed to North
Springfield Avenue in Chicago. The officer was aware of the
package’s intended destination from an earlier phone call in
which Williams provided Alexander with the Springfield Av-
enue address. The postal inspector located and seized the
package on March 6, and officers took possession of it on
March 7 from the international mail center in Chicago. Ac-
cording to a law enforcement database, neither the purported
sender nor recipient was associated with the respective ad-
dresses listed on the package. Pursuant to a warrant, officers
then searched the package on March 7 and found an off-white
granular substance later tested and confirmed to contain
furanyl fentanyl, which had been scheduled as a controlled
substance since November 2016. Law enforcement officers
then replaced the narcotics with brown sugar covered in a flu-
orescent powder (to identify anyone who touched the sham
narcotics) and wired the package to alert them when it was
opened.

-- 4 of 12 --

No. 22-2659 5
On March 9, an officer disguised as a mail carrier deliv-
ered the package to its designated destination. A woman
claiming to be Maria Gonzalez—later identified as Janet
Vasquez—took the package from the officer. Soon after, Black
arrived at the residence and went inside. About two minutes
later, officers were alerted that the package had been opened
and moved toward the front door. Less than a minute later,
the package was tossed out of the rear of the building. An of-
ficer, who was positioned in the alley behind the building, ob-
served Black flee to the top floor residence, where he was
eventually arrested and found with the luminescent powder
on his hands.
A grand jury charged Black with attempting to possess
with intent to distribute a controlled substance—100 grams or
more of a mixture containing furanyl fentanyl (an analogue of
fentanyl listed as a Schedule I controlled substance, see 21
C.F.R. § 1308.11(46))—in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and 846. Before trial, Black moved to dismiss the indictment
based on the identification of furanyl fentanyl as an analogue
of fentanyl, which the district court denied. He also moved to
suppress all evidence derived from the seizure of the package,
arguing that the officers seized it without reasonable suspi-
cion. He requested an evidentiary hearing to resolve the mo-
tion. The district court denied Black’s motion without a hear-
ing, reasoning that the totality of the circumstances supported
the officers’ reasonable suspicion determination. Black’s case
then proceeded to trial. Close to its conclusion, the govern-
ment proposed the following instruction on Black’s requisite
mens rea: “[T]he government must prove … beyond a reason-
able doubt: … The defendant Roland Black believed that the
substance was some kind of a controlled substance. The gov-
ernment is not required to prove that the defendant knew the

-- 5 of 12 --

6 No. 22-2659
substance was actually a controlled substance.” The court al-
lowed this instruction over Black’s objection, and the jury
found Black guilty.
On appeal, Black argues that the court erred in denying
his motion to suppress all evidence derived from the seizure
of the package without holding a hearing; challenges the jury
instruction regarding his requisite mens rea; argues that the
jury’s verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence; and,
solely for purposes of preservation, claims that the district
court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss based on
treating furanyl fentanyl as an analogue of fentanyl. We ad-
dress each claim in turn.
II
Black first challenges the district court’s denial of his mo-
tion to suppress all evidence derived from the seizure of the
package. Law enforcement officers “may detain [a] package
for a reasonable length of time while investigating” it if there
is “reasonable suspicion that the package contains contra-
band.” United States v. Ganser, 315 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quotation omitted). “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not cre-
ate reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard
requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is
necessary for probable cause.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S.
393, 397 (2014) (cleaned up). While we review the district
court’s reasonable suspicion determination de novo, we con-
tinue to review its findings of fact for clear error. United States
v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 1997).
Based on “the totality of the circumstances,” Navarette, 572
U.S. at 397 (quotation omitted), we agree with the district

-- 6 of 12 --

No. 22-2659 7
court’s determination that the officers had reasonable suspi-
cion to seize the package. To begin, they knew of Williams’s
criminal history, including at least three prior convictions for
possessing a controlled substance. Officers were also aware of
at least three parcels containing MDMA that were shipped to
addresses associated with Williams. And after fleeing an ar-
rest warrant in Illinois for a drug possession charge, Williams
was arrested at his apartment in Georgia, where officers dis-
covered heroin, cocaine, marijuana, MDMA, and opioids. Fol-
lowing his arrest, officers began monitoring Williams’s phone
calls, where he used code terms when communicating with
Black—such as noting that “there’s one calvary on hold.” Wil-
liams also told Black that “he have to grab it from Maria,” and
the next day, an individual associated with Williams shipped
a package from Atlanta to Maria Gonzalez at North Spring-
field Avenue in Chicago. We agree that Williams’s known his-
tory of drug possession and sending controlled substances in
the mail, in addition to suspicious circumstances surrounding
the package addressed to Maria Gonzalez, gave the officers
reasonable suspicion that the package contained contraband.
We next turn to the duration of the seizure of the package.
Dennis, 115 F.3d at 533 (“[W]e also must determine whether
the inspector detained the package for an unreasonably long
period of time before obtaining a search warrant.”). The pack-
age was detained for around one day before the officers ob-
tained a search warrant, which we find to be “a reasonable
length of time.” Ganser, 315 F.3d at 843 (quotation omitted);
see id. at 844 (finding a four-day delay “not constitutionally
unreasonable”); United States v. Mayomi, 873 F.2d 1049, 1054
(7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a two-day detention of letters
did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights).

-- 7 of 12 --

8 No. 22-2659
Black further challenges the district court’s denial of his
request for an evidentiary hearing, which we review for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350,
353 (7th Cir. 2018). “An abuse of discretion is found only
where no reasonable person would agree with the decision
made by the trial court.” United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838,
845 (7th Cir. 2006). Black argues that an evidentiary hearing
was necessary to resolve whether law enforcement officers
knew that the package had originated in Hong Kong prior to
detaining it. He also asserts that the postal inspector’s aware-
ness that the package’s purported sender and recipient were
not associated with the respective addresses before detaining
it is a disputed fact that warrants a hearing. But, even if Black
is correct that these two facts are disputed, the undisputed
material facts outlined above supported the district court’s
ruling on Black’s motion to suppress, making an evidentiary
hearing unnecessary. Thus, under our highly deferential
standard of review, and given that “evidentiary hearings are
not required as a matter of course,” Edgeworth, 889 F.3d at 353
(cleaned up), we agree with the district court that there are no
disputed issues of material fact that would impact the out-
come of the motion to suppress.
III
Black contests the jury instruction regarding his mens rea,
which we review de novo to decide “whether, taken as a
whole, [the instruction] correctly and completely informed
the jury of the applicable law.” Huff v. Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893,
899 (7th Cir. 2007).
The jury found Black guilty of violating 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful to knowingly or inten-
tionally possess with intent to distribute a controlled

-- 8 of 12 --

No. 22-2659 9
substance. The Supreme Court has held that § 841(a)(1)’s
knowledge requirement “applies not just to the statute’s verbs
but also to the object of those verbs—‘a controlled substance.’”
McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 191 (2015) (emphasis
in original). The statute’s knowledge requirement can be met
in two ways: (1) “by showing that the defendant knew he pos-
sessed a substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not
know which substance it was”; (2) “by showing that the de-
fendant knew the identity of the substance he possessed”
even if he “does not know that [the substance] is listed on the
schedules.” Id. at 192. Section 846 imposes liability on a per-
son who, as Black did, attempts to violate § 841(a)(1), even if
the attempt fails. In that case, the defendant is guilty if he
“subjectively believes” that he is in possession of a controlled
substance, even if he is duped into possessing a fake sub-
stance. United States v. Dominguez, 992 F.2d 678, 682 (7th Cir.
1993).
We find that the challenged jury instruction accurately
captured the law. The sentence—“The defendant Roland
Black believed that the substance was some kind of a con-
trolled substance”—reflects the first example set out in
McFadden where the defendant is guilty if he knows (or, in
cases of attempt, subjectively believes) that he is in possession
of a substance listed on the schedules as a controlled sub-
stance. 576 U.S. at 192. This sentence also mirrors the Seventh
Circuit Pattern Instructions for sham narcotics cases. Seventh
Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, at 1022 (2023)
(“The sale of a non-controlled substance that the defendant
subjectively believes to be a controlled substance can consti-
tute an attempt to distribute.”). “Pattern instructions are pre-
sumed to accurately state the law.” United States v. Freed, 921
F.3d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 2019). Thus, the jury was accurately

-- 9 of 12 --

10 No. 22-2659
instructed that Black is guilty if it finds that he “believed that
the substance was some kind of a controlled substance.”
Black largely challenges the second sentence, which states,
“The government is not required to prove that the defendant
knew the substance was actually a controlled substance.”
Black argues that the instruction relieved the government of
its burden to prove his mens rea. But this argument is fore-
closed by the second example in McFadden where, to reiterate,
the Supreme Court clarified that § 841(a)(1)’s mens rea re-
quirement may be satisfied even if the defendant does not
know that the substance he possesses is in fact scheduled as a
controlled substance, so long as he knows its identity. 576 U.S.
at 192. That is because “ignorance of the law is typically no
defense to criminal prosecution.” Id. And the instruction is ac-
curate to the extent it reaffirms that Black did not need to spe-
cifically know that the package contained furanyl fentanyl (ra-
ther than its actual contents, brown sugar) because “factual
impossibility or mistake of fact is not a defense to an attempt
charge.” United States v. Cote, 504 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2007).
IV
Black also argues that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he believed the package contained a controlled
substance, and thus the government failed to show that he
acted with the requisite mens rea as set forth in McFadden. We
review the evidence “to determine only whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Web-
ster, 775 F.3d 897, 904–05 (7th Cir. 2015). “We have frequently
described this standard as ‘nearly insurmountable.’” United

-- 10 of 12 --

No. 22-2659 11
States v. Leal, 72 F.4th 262, 267 (7th Cir. 2023) (quotation omit-
ted). Black cannot meet this exceedingly high standard.
There was more than sufficient evidence that Black be-
lieved that the package contained a controlled substance (or
that it contained furanyl fentanyl). To begin, Black searched
for “Latest drug bust, Chicago,” “fentanyl,” “carfentanyl,”
“fentanyl HCL,” “fentanyl HCL powder,” and “man caught
with package at post office.” He also accessed articles entitled
“opioids, pure fentanyl HCL, how much cut and how to do
it” and “fentanyl HCL powder manufacturers, exporters, sup-
pliers.” Further, jurors heard recorded jail phone calls be-
tween Black and Williams, where Black asked Williams to
“put that other situation back in effect,” Williams told Black
that “there’s one calvary on hold … right now,” and Black re-
sponded that his “homie” was “ready.” Then the day after
Williams told Black that “he have to grab it from Maria,” an
individual associated with Williams shipped a package from
Atlanta to Maria Gonzalez in Chicago. On the package’s
scheduled delivery date, Black was told to “be on point before
10:30.” But the package was not delivered on time, and Black
persistently tracked it (around 130 times) and called Williams
to tell him that the situation was “going south,” to which Wil-
liams responded that “unless that shit get returned to sender
… [a] motherfucker have to split that in half or something.”
Once the police arrived at the residence, someone threw the
package containing the sham narcotics out of the back of the
building, and Black absconded to the top floor, where he was
found with luminescent powder from the sham narcotics on
his hands.
In sum, Black’s conversations with Williams, internet
searches, and actions all supported the conclusion that he

-- 11 of 12 --

12 No. 22-2659
believed the package contained a controlled substance. We
have no trouble concluding that the evidence is more than
sufficient for a rational juror to find that Black attempted to
possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance.
V
Lastly, Black argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss (1) by rejecting his argument that “ana-
logue” is unconstitutionally vague and (2) by treating furanyl
fentanyl as an analogue of fentanyl. But he concedes that both
arguments are foreclosed by United States v. Johnson, 47 F.4th
535 (7th Cir. 2022), where we applied the plain meaning of
analogue and held that furanyl fentanyl qualifies as an ana-
logue of fentanyl. Id. at 541–43. Instead, as he admits in his
opening brief, Black raises this issue solely for preservation
purposes. Accordingly, we uphold the district court’s denial
of Black’s motion to dismiss.
A FFIRMED

-- 12 of 12 --