United States of America v. Kentrevion Watkins

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 20-2048, 20-2049, 20-2080, 20-2086, 20-2087, 20-2088,
20-2100, 20-2115, 20-2116, 20-2117, 20-2133, 20-2208, 20-2229
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
K ENTREVION WATKINS , et al.
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:18-cr-10036 — James E. Shadid, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2022 — DECIDED J ULY 8, 2024
____________________
Before R OVNER , JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and LEE, Circuit
Judges.
LEE, Circuit Judge. The Bomb Squad was a street gang that
used violence against anyone who threatened its reputation,
turf, or drug sales. Fourteen gang members were charged
with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO), along with other crimes. One mem-
ber, Jovan McCree, pleaded guilty. The remaining defendants

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2 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
went to trial and were convicted by a jury; they are Kenwan
Crowe, Lloyd Dotson, Mytrez Flora, Keith Gregory, Eugene
Haywood, Ezra Johnson, Andre Neal-Ford, Raevaughn Rog-
ers, Lance Washington, Kentrevion Watkins, Torieuanno
White, Sherman Williams, and Jahlin Wilson.
These defendants now seek to vacate their convictions on
numerous grounds. Their principal argument is that the dis-
trict judge ran afoul of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
when selecting the jury. For the reasons provided, we retain
jurisdiction of the appeal and order a limited remand to per-
mit the district court to make supplemental findings as to this
issue. As for the remaining arguments defendants raise on ap-
peal, we find no reversible error and affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The Bomb Squad street gang terrorized the Peoria area
from 2013 to 2018. Its members committed and attempted to
commit numerous murders, trafficked in illegal drugs, and
engaged in multiple robberies. Within the loose hierarchy of
the Bomb Squad, its leaders had the authority to order lower-
ranking members to rob, shoot, or murder rival gang mem-
bers. A lower-ranking member’s ruthlessness earned greater
respect and standing within the organization. Although
Bomb Squad members often identified themselves within
smaller subgroups, such as 2300, Magnolia, Harrison Homes,
Family First, Marco Movement, or Geek Team Squad, they
demonstrated their affiliation and allegiance to the larger or-
ganization through hand signals, clothing, tattoos, slogans,
and rap lyrics. What follows is a sample of the Bomb Squad’s
criminal activities the government presented at trial.

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 3
To protect their reputation and territory, Bomb Squad
members often turned to gun violence. For example, after be-
ing chased and disrespected by rival gang members in June
2013, Haywood obtained a gun from fellow Bomb Squad
member Zarmere Barnes. Within hours, Haywood and an-
other member, Johnson, rode bikes to where Haywood had
been chased. Haywood then shot at the men who had chased
him killing one of them, Eric Brown. On another occasion, just
one month later, Bomb Squad leader Raheem Wilson warned
his colleagues to be on the lookout for Antonio Scott, a rival
gangster whom Wilson had robbed. A few days later, Hay-
wood, along with fellow gang members, Dotson and Flora,
shot at Scott’s car, fatally injuring a passenger, Tyrann Ches-
ter.
Bomb Squad members retaliated aggressively against
even trivial slights. For instance, after White’s sisters were
kicked out of a party in August 2015, White shot at rival gang
member, Sam Powell, in an alley outside of the party.
The Bomb Squad also zealously protected its territory,
shooting at rival gang members on multiple occasions. In Feb-
ruary 2015, for example, Haywood shot at a suspected rival
gang member. Haywood then passed the gun to another
Bomb Squad member before the police arrived. Haywood
pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to unlawful use of a
weapon by a felon. About a year later, White and another
Bomb Squad member shot at two suspected rival gang mem-
bers in a car parked in Bomb Squad territory, hitting the
driver multiple times.
On one evening in the spring of 2016, members of Zone 4,
a rival gang, began shooting at people and buildings in Bomb
Squad territory. Later that night, McCree, who was a Bomb

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4 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
Squad leader, ordered fellow members, Wilson and Crowe, to
encroach into Zone 4’s territory and shoot Zone 4 members
“CB” and “Freebands” in retaliation.
In May 2016, Neal-Ford shot at a car that he believed was
occupied by rival gang members. This occurred near Arago
Street and Humboldt Street in Bomb Squad territory. That
same month, Wilson robbed an individual, Isaiah Richardson,
and shot him during a dice game in Bomb Squad territory.
In May 2017, White and Flora shot at suspected rival gang
members as they drove a truck past the Harrison Homes
apartment complex in Bomb Squad territory. That same
month, Gregory, Johnson, and White agreed to shoot a sus-
pected rival gang member who had just completed mainte-
nance work at a market in Bomb Squad territory. As the man
sat in the passenger seat of his co-worker’s car, Gregory shot
him multiple times.
In August 2017, Courtney Jones was walking to his aunt’s
house in Bomb Squad territory and happened to get into an
argument with a group of men. As Jones approached his
aunt’s front doorstep, a Black man with dreadlocks, later
identified as Haywood, rode up on his bicycle, asked Jones
whether his name was Courtney and said, “I heard you had
some words with my people.” Haywood then shot Jones
twice.
The gun violence the Bomb Squad perpetrated was not
confined to its own territory. Washington shot Martell Perkins
in the leg as he left a nightclub in July 2016. Perkins was affil-
iated with Moe Block, a rival gang.
That same year, Bomb Squad members made several at-
tempts to murder another rival gang member, Demoney

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 5
Coleman, in surrounding areas. Rogers shot at Coleman in
August 2016. Crowe and Neal-Ford fired numerous shots into
Coleman’s house when he was hosting relatives on Thanks-
giving Day. And Rogers and Crowe separately shot at Cole-
man on different occasions in March 2017.
After a Bomb Squad leader, Raheem Wilson (nicknamed
“Boosie”), was murdered in February 2017, Dotson retaliated
against an individual named Ryan Greenwood, because Dot-
son believed Greenwood was to blame. Dotson fired eighteen
shots at Greenwood’s car as Greenwood was picking up a
passenger in rival gang territory in May 2017. One bullet
struck the passenger in the back. Dotson was later found with
a gun that matched the one that was used during that shoot-
ing.
While at a Bradley University party in April 2018, Watkins
identified Anthony Polnitz as a rival gang member and
handed a gun to fellow Bomb Squad member Jermontay
Brock. Brock then shot Polnitz once in the face and twice in
the back, killing him. One of the bullets went through Polnitz
and killed Nasjay Murray, a Bradley student.
In addition to committing gun crimes, members of the
Bomb Squad operated numerous trap houses, where they
stored firearms and distributed crack, heroin, and marijuana.
During its investigation into the group, government agents
coordinated a number of controlled buys from Bomb Squad
members, including Dotson, Johnson, and Williams. For in-
stance, in March 2018, Dotson supplied a Bomb Squad mem-
ber with approximately 3.5 grams of crack to sell to an under-
cover federal agent. A subsequent search of Dotson’s apart-
ment revealed two digital scales and ten baggies of crack. On
another occasion, Johnson gave fellow gang member Jordan

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6 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
Timothy one gram of heroin to sell to an undercover agent.
And Williams sold fifty-eight grams of marijuana to an un-
dercover agent through Bomb Squad member Juan Faulkner
for $500. Williams advertised his marijuana sales on Face-
book.
Bomb Squad members also robbed people of their money
and property. For example, in 2016, White, Gregory, and oth-
ers accosted two individuals at gunpoint and stole a cell
phone, alcohol, and marijuana. Williams, Crowe, and others
also burglarized a house in August 2017 and stole a safe con-
taining twelve firearms that they distributed to other Bomb
Squad members.
B. Procedural History
After a seven-week trial that included over eighty wit-
nesses, the jury convicted all thirteen defendants of engaging
in a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Dot-
son, Gregory, Haywood, Johnson, Washington, White, and
Wilson were also convicted of assault with a dangerous
weapon and attempted murder in aid of racketeering activity
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) and (5), as well as bran-
dishing and discharging a firearm while committing a crime
of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii).
Additionally, the jury found White and Wilson guilty of pos-
sessing firearms while felons in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) and Dotson, Johnson, and Williams guilty of pos-
sessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance in vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). In the end, the dis-
trict court sentenced Haywood to life imprisonment, and the
other defendants received lengthy prison terms.

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 7
We first will address the common issues defendants raise,
before turning to their individual arguments.
II. Discussion
A. Jointly Raised Issues
1. Batson
We begin with the defendants’ contention that the govern-
ment improperly selected jurors based on race. In Batson,
476 U.S. 79, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to
strike a prospective juror because of the individual’s race. In
so doing, the Court adopted a three-step process for trial
courts to follow to determine whether an Equal Protection vi-
olation has occurred. Id. at 93–98.
First, a defendant must “make out a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory pur-
pose.” Id. at 93–94. To establish a prima facie case, a defendant
must indicate that “he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges to remove from the venire members of the defend-
ant’s race.” Id. at 96 (citation omitted); see Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (acknowledging Latinos as a cog-
nizable ethnic group under Batson). Furthermore, “the de-
fendant must show that these facts and any other relevant cir-
cumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that
practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on ac-
count of their race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
Second, once a defendant establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the

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8 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
government, and the prosecutor must articulate race-neutral
reasons for the peremptory challenge in question. Id. at 94.
Third, the trial court must consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances and determine whether the government’s expla-
nation is credible. Id. at 98 n.21.
Typically, “we review the district court’s Batson findings
for clear error.” United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 663 (7th
Cir. 2009). But when a defendant challenges the manner in
which the district court conducted the Batson inquiry, our re-
view is de novo. See id. Here, the defendants assert that the dis-
trict court applied the wrong legal standard at step one and
failed to make the necessary credibility determination at step
three.
All thirteen defendants are Black males, and the district
court called five panels of potential jurors.1 The first panel in-
cluded Juror 26, a Black man who recently had been em-
ployed by Peoria’s public housing authority; Juror 58, a
woman with a dark complexion who taught Spanish and Eng-
lish as a Second Language (ESL) at a private school; and Juror
154, a white female who was a retired public elementary
school teacher.2 Following voir dire of the first panel, the dis-
trict court allowed counsel to exercise their peremptory chal-
lenges, and the government struck all three individuals with-
out explanation.
1 Defendants assert that the jury consisted of all white jurors, but we
are unable to find any indication in the record of this, one way or the other.
2 Although the district court and counsel had access to the names of
the individual panel members, they were referenced by juror number to
maintain their anonymity. We shall do the same.

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 9
Citing Batson, the defendants objected on the grounds that
the government had used two of its peremptory strikes to re-
move the only non-white individuals on the panel—Juror 26
and Juror 58. As for Juror 26, the defendants observed that he
was the only Black person on the panel and that he might be
the only opportunity for the defendants to have a Black man
on the jury. As for Juror 58, defendants contended that Juror
58 was also non-white because she spoke with a heavy His-
panic accent, had a dark complexion, and taught Spanish and
ESL.
In response, the government argued it was unclear
whether Juror 58 was a member of a racial or ethnic minority.
Left with Juror 26, the government continued, the defendants
could not establish a pattern of discriminatory conduct.
The district court agreed that it could not readily ascertain
Juror 58’s race or ethnicity. The court did not address the de-
fendants’ contention that Juror 58 had spoken with a heavy
Hispanic accent, but it agreed to preserve the audio recording
of the jury selection proceedings. The court emphasized, how-
ever, that, even if Juror 58 was non-white, it still would hold
that the defendants had failed to demonstrate a prima facie
case under Batson because, even if the government had used
two peremptory strikes to exclude minority panel members,
the defendants had not established a pattern of discrimina-
tion. “I must make a determination as to whether the side
claiming racially discriminatory peremptory challenges has
carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination,” the
district court stated when discussing step one, “and I don’t
think the record would support that you have done so.”

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10 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
But a defendant’s burden at step one is “light.” Bennett v.
Gaetz, 592 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 2010). He need only indicate
“circumstances raising a suspicion that discrimination oc-
curred.” United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 512 (7th Cir.
2005). Indeed, to satisfy his burden to establish a prima facie
case under step one, a defendant is not required to “prove”
purposeful discrimination, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence or otherwise. Id. Here, the district court committed le-
gal error by requiring the defendants to do just that.3
Moreover, the district court and the government appar-
ently assumed that the defendants were relying on the exist-
ence of a pattern of discriminatory challenges to satisfy their
burden under Batson. But it is worth noting that “‘a consistent
pattern of official racial discrimination’ is not ‘a necessary
predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.’” Bat-
son, 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14 (1977)). Depending on the
circumstances, the use of a single discriminatory peremptory
strike can be enough. See Morse v. Hanks, 172 F.3d 983, 985 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“A prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
can be established where the prosecution uses a peremptory
challenge to strike the only black venireman in the panel.”);
Bohen v. City of E. Chi., Ind., 799 F.2d 1180, 1186 (7th Cir. 1986);
see also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169 (2005) (“[A]
prima facie case of discrimination can be made out by offering
a wide variety of evidence, so long as the sum of the prof-
3 The government attempts to downplay the district court’s comment
as an inartful misstatement. But that statement was the court’s only men-
tion of the defendants’ burden at step one of Batson, and so we have little
choice but to assess the court’s ruling using its own words.

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 11
fered facts gives ‘rise to an inference of discriminatory pur-
pose.’”) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 94) (footnote omitted).
Next, the defendants argue that the district court failed to
satisfy Batson’s third step by not making a finding as to
whether the government’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons
for exercising its peremptory challenges were credible. See
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. After concluding voir dire of the first
panel, the district court revisited the defendants’ Batson chal-
lenge after the lunch break. After stating that it remained con-
vinced the defendants had not met step one, the court never-
theless invited the government to provide race-neutral rea-
sons for striking both Juror 26 and Juror 58 to supplement the
record (which is good practice in the event of an appeal).
As for Juror 58, the government steadfastly declined to of-
fer any explanation, despite persistent prompting by the
court. It tries to do so now, but, having forfeited its oppor-
tunity below, the government has relinquished its right to
supply its reasons on appeal. See United States v. Gimbel, 782
F.2d 89, 91 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It is well-settled that an issue not
presented in the district court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal[.]”).
By contrast, the government presented four reasons for
striking Juror 26. It noted that Juror 26 knew a potential gov-
ernment witness. Additionally, he worked for the Peoria
Housing Authority, which managed Harrison Homes, a com-
plex where members of the Bomb Squad had trafficked drugs
and was the scene of multiple incidents alleged in the indict-
ment. Juror 26 also had a prior arrest for domestic violence.
And he himself had previously lived in the part of town
where some of the alleged events occurred.

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12 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
The defendants questioned whether these were the actual
reasons for striking Juror 26 or merely after-the-fact concoc-
tions. The prosecutor responded that the reasons were formu-
lated before striking Juror 26, at which point the district court
remarked, “I will find those are race-neutral reasons.” This
was the entirety of the district court’s third-step analysis,
which the defendants argue was insufficient.
We previously disapproved of a nearly identical statement
because it fell well short of the credibility finding Batson re-
quires. See Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019). “While
we can glean some information from this record,” we wrote,
“we have no way to know whether the attorneys were credi-
ble.” Id. at 715. As a result, we remanded the case so that the
district court could make the necessary findings and conduct
a new trial, if necessary. Id.
To its credit, the government concedes that Lisle is on all
fours with this case. Accordingly, here too, we remand this
case to the district court for the limited purpose of correctly
employing the three-step process under Batson to evaluate the
merits of the defendants’ objections to the government’s use
of its peremptory challenges as to Juror 26 and Juror 58. Of
course, we express no opinion on the outcome of the credibil-
ity issue, a matter for the district court to consider in the first
instance. Depending on its findings, the district court may or-
der a new trial, if necessary.
We shall retain jurisdiction of the appeal while the district
court makes its additional findings. See United States v. Pala-
dino, 401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2005). If the district court
deems a new trial unnecessary, the parties may file position
statements in this court seeking appellate review of the Batson
determination. If the district court deems a new trial

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 13
necessary, it should inform this court of its conclusion. We
will then issue a final resolution and the mandate.
We recognize that the remainder of this opinion may be
largely mooted if the district court orders a new trial. But be-
cause the district court may not order a new trial or, if it does,
certain issues raised by the defendants likely will be relevant
to any retrial, we proceed to the remaining issues in the inter-
est of judicial economy.
2. Disqualification of Prosecutor
Next, Flora, Dotson, and Wilson assert that the district
court should have disqualified Assistant United States Attor-
ney (AUSA) Ronald Hanna for having a conflict of interest. In
2012, Bomb Squad member Terrance Herron and thirteen oth-
ers, none of whom are defendants in the instant case, were
indicted for committing various federal crimes, including
drug trafficking, between approximately January 2009 to Feb-
ruary 2013. Herron pleaded guilty in July 2013 to possessing
a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime
and was sentenced in November 2013. Hanna had repre-
sented Herron in that case from October 2012 to September
2014, prior to joining the United States Attorney’s Office.
In June 2017, federal investigators commenced a new in-
vestigation into the Bomb Squad, and Hanna, now an AUSA,
became the lead prosecutor on that investigation in Septem-
ber 2017. This led to the indictment in this case, which was
returned in June 2018 and alleged criminal conduct starting in
about January 2013.
In the defendants’ eyes, Hanna’s prior work representing
Herron raised a clear conflict of interest, and they moved to
disqualify him on that basis. The district court disagreed.

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14 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
We generally review a district court’s denial of a motion to
disqualify an attorney for abuse of discretion. Watkins v. Trans
Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 518 (7th Cir. 2017). But where, as
here, “the district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing
or make findings of fact to which we must defer, ‘district
courts enjoy no particular advantage over appellate courts in
their formulation of ethical norms.’” Cromley v. Bd. of Educ. of
Lockport Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 17 F.3d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir.
1994) (quoting Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d
715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982), and applying abuse-of-discretion and
de novo review).
Flora and Dotson contend that American Bar Association
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 mandates Hanna’s
disqualification. (Before the district court, they relied on Illi-
nois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9, but that rule is more or
less identical to the Model Rule.) Also, they argue for the first
time on appeal that the district court’s ruling contravened Il-
linois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7, as well as the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, issues we review
for plain error. See United States v. Mikulski, 35 F.4th 1074, 1077
(7th Cir. 2022) (stating that issues raised for first time on ap-
peal are reviewed for plain error). What’s more, Wilson
adopts his co-defendants’ arguments, and because he did not
seek Hanna’s disqualification below, we review this too un-
der the plain error standard. See United States v. Lara-Unzueta,
735 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 2013).
“Most federal courts use the ethical rules of the states in
which they sit[.]” Huusko v. Jenkins, 556 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir.
2009); see C.D. Ill. Local Rule 83.6(D) (stating that the Central
District of Illinois has adopted the Illinois Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct). Federal prosecutors are generally subject to

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 15
the state’s rules of professional conduct and local federal
court rules. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a); 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(b). The de-
fendants’ contention that the district court should have dis-
qualified Hanna are unpersuasive.
First, Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 did not re-
quire Hanna’s disqualification. That rule prohibits a lawyer
from representing a client “if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest,” such as where “the represen-
tation of that client will be directly adverse to another client.”
Defendants cite Board of Managers of Eleventh Street Loftimin-
ium Ass’n v. Wabash Loftiminium, L.L.C., 876 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007). But, in that case, the law firm in question had
represented the individual defendants as well as the corpora-
tions they held at the same time. Id. at 75. By contrast, Hanna’s
representation of Herron was limited to a specific matter, and
Hanna did not represent Herron and the government simul-
taneously.
Turning to Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9, it pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a cli-
ent in a matter shall not thereafter represent an-
other person in the same or a substantially re-
lated matter in which that person’s interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed
consent.
***
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a cli-
ent in a matter or whose present or former firm

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16 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
has formerly represented a client in a matter
shall not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the repre-
sentation to the disadvantage of the for-
mer client except as these Rules would
permit or require with respect to a client,
or when the information has become
generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the rep-
resentation except as these Rules would
permit or require with respect to a client.
“Rule 1.9 is a prophylactic rule to prevent even the potential
that a former client’s confidences and secrets may be used
against him.” Havens v. Indiana, 793 F.2d 143, 145 (7th Cir.
1986).
While we are mindful of the ethical considerations in-
volved, the district court did not abuse its discretion (let
alone, commit plain error) in denying the defendants’ motion.
We recognize that the conspiracy for which Herron was in-
dicted and the conspiracy alleged here may have overlapped
in January and February 2013. But the defendants have not
presented any relationship, substantial or otherwise, between
the overt acts alleged in Herron’s case and those the govern-
ment presented at trial. Nor is there any overlap between the
defendants in the two cases, and none of the defendants in
Herron’s case testified in this case.
The defendants point out that the government did ap-
proach one of the defendants from the prior case to see if he
would be willing to assist the investigation that led to this

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 17
case. But we think this, without more, is insufficient to estab-
lish a violation of Rule 1.9.
The cases the defendants cite are of little help. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Goot, the prosecutors had previously
represented the same individual who was being prosecuted.
894 F.2d 231, 233 (7th Cir. 1990). In United States v. Volpendesto,
the defense attorney had represented an individual who was
scheduled to testify against his current client. 746 F.3d 273,
283 (7th Cir. 2014). In some of the cases the defendants cite,
the attorney in question was challenging the validity of a con-
tract against a party that he had previously advised regarding
the same contract. See, e.g., Cromley, 17 F.3d at 1063. And, in
others, the attorney faced the possibility of cross-examining
current or former clients at trial. See, e.g., Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 155–56 (1988), United States v. Turner, 594
F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2010); Hall v. United States, 371 F.3d 969,
971–72 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. O’Malley, 786 F.2d 786,
790 (7th Cir. 1986). Here, Hanna has never represented any of
the defendants or witnesses in this case.
Nor is there evidence in the record that Hanna gained any
privileged information during his representation of Herron
that was useful to the government here. Herron was not called
as a witness, and the government did not seek to admit any of
Herron’s statements at trial. That said, Herron’s name did
come up once during the trial. John Thomas, a Bomb Squad
member who was cooperating with the government, men-
tioned Herron when he was asked to identify the individuals
in a photograph. Hanna then asked Thomas whether Herron
was a Bomb Squad member and to identify the gesture Her-
ron was making with his hand.

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18 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
The defendants do not contend that this was privileged in-
formation Hanna obtained during his representation of Her-
ron, nor could they. Herron’s involvement in the Bomb Squad
and the prior case was a matter of public record. See Havens,
793 F.2d at 145 (finding no constitutional or ethical violation
where a prosecutor, who had previously represented a de-
fendant, cross-examined him about his membership in a gang
at a subsequent trial, because the prosecutor would have had
access to information about defendant’s background, includ-
ing gang membership). And the defendants can only specu-
late that Hanna must have learned from Herron that Flora
was one of the shooters that killed Chester in July 2013. But
three cooperating witnesses testified to this fact at trial, and
the defendants do not contend that any of them were involved
in Herron’s case.
For these reasons, the district court did not commit re-
versible error when denying the defendants’ motion to dis-
qualify Hanna. Nor did its ruling deprive Flora, Dotson, and
Wilson of their rights to a fair trial. That said, we do think it
advisable in the future for the United States Attorney to exer-
cise great care when assigning cases so that the impartiality of
the government is beyond reproach.
B. Individually Raised Issues
1. Williams: The Indictment
Williams contends that the Third Superseding Indictment
was so vague as to render it unconstitutional. That is why, in
his view, the jury convicted him of engaging in a RICO con-
spiracy (Count 1) and possession with intent to distribute ma-
rijuana (Count 41), but acquitted him of two other predicate
acts.

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 19
Although the government argues Williams has waived
this issue below, we address the merits because the issue is
easily dispatched under de novo review. See United States v.
Ramsey, 406 F.3d 426, 429 (7th Cir. 2005). An indictment “ade-
quately set[s] forth the elements of a racketeering conspiracy”
if it (1) identifies “a proper enterprise and the defendant’s as-
sociation with that enterprise” and (2) charges that “the de-
fendant knowingly joined a conspiracy, the objective of which
was to operate that enterprise through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.” United States v. Tello, 687 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir.
2012). A RICO conspiracy indictment need not allege “that the
defendant committed two predicate acts of racketeering” or
“that any such acts were ultimately committed by anyone.”
Id. at 792. The indictment also need not identify the specific
predicate acts or overt acts that the defendant agreed would
be committed. Id. at 795; see Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S.
52, 63 (1997).
Count 1 of the Third Superseding Indictment alleged that
(1) the Bomb Squad was an “enterprise” within the meaning
of the statute; (2) Williams agreed to conduct or participate in
the Bomb Squad’s affairs; and (3) Williams agreed that one or
more Bomb Squad members would commit at least two pred-
icate acts of racketeering—here, murder, attempted murder,
assault, robbery, arson, and drug trafficking. Nothing more
was required.
2. Dotson: Severance
Dotson argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants, an is-
sue we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jett, 908
F.3d 252, 275 (7th Cir. 2018). Dotson bears the “extremely dif-
ficult burden” of demonstrating that the joint trial caused him

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20 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
“actual prejudice.” See United States v. Maggard, 865 F.3d 960,
971 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). To do
so, he must do more than show that he “would have had a
better chance of acquittal” in a separate trial; he must demon-
strate that he was “unable to obtain a fair trial without sever-
ance.” See United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113, 1124 (7th Cir.
2016). Dotson offers two arguments to meet his burden.
First, Dotson points to the cross-examination of Amos Sti-
mage conducted by counsel for a codefendant, in which Sti-
mage expressed his belief that Dotson was cooperating with
the government to avoid prosecution. According to Dotson,
this indicated to the jury that Dotson was guilty. Stimage’s
statement, however, had little chance of swaying the jury be-
cause, after all, Dotson was on trial and, unlike the other co-
operating witnesses, he did not testify against his fellow
Bomb Squad members.
Dotson also argues that the vast array of evidence the gov-
ernment introduced to incriminate his codefendants irrepara-
bly tainted the jury’s view of him as well. But the district court
properly instructed the jury to consider the evidence against
each defendant separately, without allowing its decision as to
one defendant influence its decision as to any other. See Zafiro
v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993); United States v. Mo-
rales, 655 F.3d 608, 625 (7th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, even if
Dotson had been tried separately, the government would
have been permitted to introduce evidence of the Bomb
Squad’s other racketeering activities, along with Dotson’s as-
sent, to prove that Dotson had knowingly participated in the
RICO conspiracy, even if he had not committed them person-
ally. See Morales, 655 F.3d at 627. Given this, the district court
acted well within its discretion in denying his motion to sever.

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 21
C. Sufficiency of Evidence and Motions for
New Trial
We now turn to the arguments each defendant raises to
attack the sufficiency of evidence supporting his individual
conviction, as well as the district court’s denial of the defend-
ants’ motions for a new trial or judgment as a matter of law.
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Foy, 50 F.4th 616, 622 (7th Cir.
2022). “De novo review applies to the denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal; practically speaking, however, the
standard of review is that for sufficiency of the evidence.” Pe-
terson, 823 F.3d at 1120. “In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence chal-
lenge after a jury verdict, we review the evidence presented
at trial in the light most favorable to the government and
draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States v.
Anderson, 988 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 2021). “[W]e respect the
exclusive function of the jury to determine the credibility of
witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable
inferences.” United States v. Godinez, 7 F.4th 628, 638–39 (7th
Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We will over-
turn a conviction only if, after reviewing the record in this
light, we determine that no rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.” Anderson, 988 F.3d at 424. “This burden is a high
one—one we have described as ‘nearly insurmountable.’”
United States v. Fitzpatrick, 32 F.4th 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Anderson, 988 F.3d at 424).
1. Dotson: No RICO Enterprise
According to Dotson, his conviction on Count 1 should be
overturned because the government failed to prove that the

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22 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
Bomb Squad was a RICO enterprise. To prove a RICO con-
spiracy under § 1962(d), “the government must show (1) an
agreement to conduct or participate in the affairs (2) of an en-
terprise (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity.” United
States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2006). “[T]he exist-
ence of an enterprise is an element distinct from the pattern of
racketeering activity and proof of one does not necessarily es-
tablish the other.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 947
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). In turn, an association-in-fact is a
“group of persons associated together for a common purpose
of engaging in a course of conduct.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). An association-in-fact “need
not have any structural features beyond ‘a purpose, relation-
ships among those associated with the enterprise, and longev-
ity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enter-
prise’s purpose.’’’ United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667, 682 (7th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946).
Dotson asserts that, although various defendants came to-
gether at various points to engage in the predicate acts, they
were independent participants involved in unrelated criminal
activity that lacked any organization or structure. But this
gloss casts the facts in a light most favorable to him, rather
than the government.
As outlined above, the trial evidence clearly showed that
the Bomb Squad was a distinct group that protected specific
territory in Peoria. Several witnesses testified that the Bomb
Squad and its members were identifiable by special

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 23
handshakes, hand signs, and tattoos. See Brown, 973 F.3d at
684 (considering tattoos and hand signs as evidence of an en-
terprise). These outward displays of an alliance appeared in
numerous videos and photographs.
What’s more, the Bomb Squad also held meetings at the
homes of members to discuss plans to shoot rival gang mem-
bers, sell drugs, and punish members for infractions like steal-
ing from the gang. Typically, higher-ranking members, in-
cluding Raheem Wilson (nicknamed “Boosie”) and Hay-
wood, made the decisions, while lower-ranking members
strove to higher ranks by committing acts of violence and
ruthlessness. And members loaned each other guns to commit
these crimes and sometimes posted bond for each other when
they were arrested. Moreover, multiple witnesses testified
that the defendants carried out robberies, assaults, arson, at-
tempted murders, and murders in order to protect the gang’s
territory and to retaliate against rival gang members.
The jury also heard evidence of the Bomb Squad’s coordi-
nated drug-trafficking activity. The gang operated trap
houses where illegal drugs were stored and distributed. And
its members, including Dotson, Rashaad Flora (Mytrez Flora’s
cousin), Johnson, and Williams, used these locations to dis-
tribute their illegal drugs.
In short, there is ample evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that the Bomb Squad was a RICO enter-
prise.
2. Dotson and Watkins: No Agreement to Join
RICO Conspiracy
Dotson and Watkins separately challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence that they had agreed to join the racketeering

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24 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
conspiracy. To make its case, the government needed to prove
that Dotson and Watkins agreed to two things: (1) that they
would participate in the affairs of the Bomb Squad through a
pattern of racketeering activity, and (2) that a member of the
conspiracy would commit at least two predicate acts in fur-
therance of it. See Domanus v. Locke Lord LLP, 847 F.3d 469, 479
(7th Cir. 2017). It is not necessary for the government to show
that Dotson and Watkins actually were members of the Bomb
Squad. See Morales, 655 F.3d at 629. Nor did they have to agree
to personally commit the predicate acts themselves. See United
States v. Amaya, 828 F.3d 518, 530 (7th Cir. 2016).
The record contains ample evidence of Dotson’s agree-
ment to participate in the racketeering conspiracy. For exam-
ple, in July 2013, Dotson (along with Haywood and Flora)
shot at the car of a rival gang member, Scott, killing a passen-
ger. Then, in February 2017, to retaliate for Boosie’s murder,
Dotson helped burn down a bakery owned by the family of a
rival gang member, Greenwood. And, in May of that year,
Dotson fired eighteen shots at Greenwood’s car, striking a
passenger. Dotson committed these acts to support the Bomb
Squad’s criminal activities.
The same is true for Watkins. At a Bradley University party
in April 2018, Watkins pointed out a rival gang member,
Polnitz, to a Bomb Squad member and passed a gun to him to
shoot Polnitz. The Bomb Squad member obeyed, killing
Polnitz and a student. In addition, Watkins agreed to hold
guns for Bomb Squad members and appeared in a social me-
dia video to promote Rashaad’s drug sales.
There is more evidence, but the evidence noted above was
sufficient for the jury to find that Dotson and Watkins agreed

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 25
to conduct the Bomb Squad’s affairs and actively participated
in numerous predicate acts in furtherance of the gang’s goals.
3. Haywood and Dotson: Additional Findings
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), the government sought
maximum sentences of life for Haywood based on his in-
volvement in the murders of Brown and Chester and for Dot-
son based on his participation in Chester’s murder. Although
the standard statutory maximum sentence for a RICO con-
spiracy conviction is twenty years’ imprisonment, it increases
to life imprisonment “if the violation is based on a racketeer-
ing activity for which the maximum penalty includes life im-
prisonment.” § 1963(a). For this enhancement to apply, the
jury must make additional findings of fact regarding the rack-
eteering activity at issue. Here, the jury did so on an addi-
tional verdict form the court provided for that purpose. Hay-
wood and Dotson challenge the district court’s application of
§ 1963(a) to their individual sentences on several grounds.
a) Haywood
1) Mislabeled Verdict Form
Haywood first objects to the additional verdict form itself,
which was entitled “Government’s Proposed Additional
Findings” rather than just “Additional Findings.”4 According
to Haywood, this implicitly endorsed the government’s de-
sired outcome to his detriment. Because Haywood did not
timely object to the verdict form during the trial, we review
for plain error. See United States v. Gonzalez-Velez, 466 F.3d 27,
4 Although the court had given the jury replacement pages for Hay-
wood’s verdict form with the “Additional Findings” caption, the jury mis-
takenly used the old form to record its verdict.

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26 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
36 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that verdict-form issue raised by a
defendant who did not timely object to a special verdict form
during conference was subject to plain error review); see also
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993) (“If the forfeited
error is plain and affect[s] substantial rights, the court of ap-
peals has authority to order correction, but is not required to
do so.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is difficult to see how the jury could have viewed the
mislabeled caption as the court’s endorsement of the govern-
ment’s position. After all, it merely suggests that the govern-
ment requested the findings and leaves it up to the jury to
agree (or not) to them. If anything, the caption reminds the
jury that it was the government’s burden to prove the allega-
tions in the case.
Nor did Haywood suffer any prejudice as a result. Upon
discovering the mislabeling, the district court polled the jury
to determine whether amending the caption would have
made a difference to its verdict; each juror replied in the neg-
ative. Thus, the court’s use of the incorrectly captioned verdict
form was not plain error.
2) Brown’s Murder
As noted, for a maximum life sentence under § 1963(a) to
apply, the government must prove that the RICO violation is
based on “a racketeering activity for which the maximum
penalty includes life imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a); see
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The govern-
ment pointed to Haywood’s killing of Brown in June 2013 as
the “racketeering activity” that triggered § 1963(a)’s life sen-
tence maximum. And, because the murder took place in Illi-
nois, we look to Illinois law to see when murder can carry a

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 27
life sentence. See United States v. Perez, 21 F.4th 490 (7th Cir.
2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 257 (2022).
“Illinois law authorizes a sentence of life imprisonment for
first-degree murder when certain aggravating factors are pre-
sent.” Id. at 493. Here, the government relied on two aggra-
vating factors that, it believed, made Haywood eligible for life
imprisonment. First, Haywood’s killing of Brown was “com-
mitted in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursu-
ant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human
life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant cre-
ated a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being
would result therefrom.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-1(b)(11); 730
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b). In the alternative, the govern-
ment posited, Haywood “personally discharged a firearm
that proximately caused … death to another person.” 730 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii). The jury found that the gov-
ernment had proved each of these things beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Haywood argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support these findings by the jury. In his view, two of the trial
witnesses failed to identify him as the shooter, and certain fac-
tual inconsistencies between the surveillance video and wit-
ness testimony undermined the government’s theory that he
was the shooter. This, he says, created reasonable doubt that
he was the one who shot Brown.
The jury’s additional findings find ample support in the
record. Faulkner testified that he was at a house with Johnson,
Barnes, and Dominick Wilson on June 23, 2013, when Hay-
wood arrived. Haywood told Faulkner and Johnson that
members of Zone 4 had just chased him near Western Avenue.
Haywood said that he needed a “pipe,” meaning a gun, and

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28 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
Barnes gave him a .22-caliber long-barrel gun, one that does
not eject shell casings. Then Haywood and Johnson left on bi-
cycles.
Shortly thereafter, Brown, a member of Zone 4, was shot
near Western Avenue. Before Brown’s murder, an eyewitness
saw two men on bicycles cross Western Avenue. Another eye-
witness, Christopher Edwards, saw one of the bicyclists
stopped between two houses, across the street from a house
where Brown and others had gathered. The bicyclist drew a
gun and fired several shots at the group of men, and a .22-
caliber bullet pierced Brown’s arm and struck the side of his
chest. Brown died afterward from wounds caused by the bul-
let.
According to Wilson, within an hour after Barnes had
given Haywood the .22-caliber gun, a sweaty Haywood and
Johnson returned to the house, and Haywood handed the gun
back to Barnes. Johnson recounted that there was a shoot-out
and someone had gotten shot in the side. And Haywood later
told Thomas and Terry Moss, another Bomb Squad member
who cooperated with the government, that he had shot and
killed Brown.
The police found no shell casings at the murder scene, but
a nearby store’s surveillance camera captured two bicyclists
riding away from the area less than thirty seconds after the
shooting. When Faulkner viewed the video at trial, he identi-
fied the bicyclists as Haywood and Johnson.
From this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found
that Brown’s murder was part of the Bomb Squad’s RICO con-
spiracy and Haywood was complicit in it. Furthermore, from
these facts, a reasonable jury could have concluded that

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 29
Haywood had planned to commit the murder in a cold, cal-
culated, and premeditated manner that could reasonably be
expected to result in Brown’s death and that Haywood had
personally shot and killed Brown. Thus, the district court
properly denied Haywood’s motion for a new trial or judg-
ment as a matter of law.
b) Haywood and Dotson: Chester’s Murder
As part of its additional findings supporting maximum
life sentences as to Haywood and Dotson, the jury also found
that Chester’s murder was part of the RICO conspiracy to
which Haywood and Dotson assented. But the jury stopped
short of finding that they had committed the act in a cold, cal-
culated, and premeditated manner that could reasonably be
expected to result in the death of a human being as Illinois
law required. Thus, Haywood’s and Dotson’s contention that
the record did not support an enhancement under § 1963(a) is
moot.5
4. Wilson, Washington, and Haywood: Suffi-
ciency of Evidence
Wilson, Washington, and Haywood separately argue that
the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for
assault and attempted murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) and
use of a deadly or dangerous weapon during a crime of vio-
lence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). We first address a
5 To the extent that Dotson asserts that his convictions for Counts 26
and 27 also relate to Chester’s murder, he is mistaken. Those counts relate
to the assault and attempted murder of Greenwood and for use of a deadly
or dangerous weapon during that crime. And Dotson has not raised any
arguments specific to Greenwood.

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30 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
common issue raised by these defendants, then proceed to
their individual arguments.
Section 1959(a) requires proof that a defendant (1) com-
mitted assault with a dangerous weapon or attempted or con-
spired to commit murder (2) “for the purpose of gaining en-
trance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enter-
prise engaged in racketeering activity.” See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1959(a)(3), (5); Amaya, 828 F.3d at 530. Section 924(c), in turn,
prohibits using a firearm “during and in relation to any crime
of violence,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which requires the gov-
ernment to prove (among other things) that the defendant
committed a predicate crime of violence. United States v. Mor-
row, 5 F.4th 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2021).
Each of these defendants contends that the government
failed to present sufficient evidence that he committed a pred-
icate offense for the purpose of maintaining or increasing his
position in the Bomb Squad. But the record speaks otherwise.
Thomas testified that gang members achieved higher sta-
tus by committing acts of violence, and the most ruthless
members were the most respected. Faulkner explained that a
member with a reputation for shooting and killing others
earned respect and recognition within the gang. Moss admit-
ted that he had participated in violent acts of retaliation
simply because that was what Bomb Squad members were ex-
pected to do.
When Wilson, Washington, and Haywood committed
their respective offenses—Wilson’s shooting of Richardson on
May 12, 2016; Washington’s shooting of Perkins on July 10,
2016; Haywood’s shooting of Jones on August 6, 2017—they
did so in front of, alongside, or in defense of, other Bomb

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 31
Squad members. And, afterwards, they told or bragged to
other Bomb Squad members about their deeds to ensure they
received credit. From these facts, a reasonable jury could find
that they each had engaged in the offenses to maintain or in-
crease his position in the Bomb Squad.
a) Wilson: Assault and Attempted Murder
Wilson was convicted of assaulting and attempting to
murder Richardson under § 1959(a) (Count 12) and using a
firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under § 924(c)(1)(A)
(Count 13). According to Wilson, the record contains insuffi-
cient evidence to support his conviction, and, alternatively, he
is entitled to a new trial because the conviction was against
the weight of the evidence.
Richardson was a heroin dealer unaffiliated with the
Bomb Squad. According to his testimony, he was playing a
dice game with Washington and others behind a liquor store
on May 12, 2016. During the game, Wilson tapped Richardson
on the back, pointed a gun at his face from a couple of feet
away, and demanded his money. When Richardson did not
comply, Wilson shot him in the hand. Richardson then threw
his money down and began to run away, and Wilson shot him
in the back. After Richardson fell to the ground, Wilson stood
over him with his gun. Richardson raised his hands in antici-
pation of being shot again when the other players told Wilson
not to kill Richardson. Wilson then took everyone’s money
and fled the scene.
Richardson’s account is corroborated by other Bomb
Squad members. Faulkner testified that he saw Wilson snatch
everyone’s money and shoot Richardson that day, but that
Wilson later returned money he had stolen from Bomb Squad

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32 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
members. Moss and Timothy both testified that Wilson ad-
mitted that he had shot Richardson that night.
For his part, Wilson argues that Faulkner, Moss, and Tim-
othy cannot be believed, because they were cooperating with
the government to gain reduced sentences. But this still leaves
the unrebutted testimony of Richardson himself, and, in any
case, the credibility of witnesses is for the jury to decide.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convict Wil-
son on Counts 12 and 13. Nor did the district court abuse its
discretion in denying Wilson’s motion for a new trial.
b) Washington: Assault and Attempted Murder
Washington asserts that he is entitled to an acquittal or a
new trial because the government obtained his conviction for
assault and attempted murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3)
and (5) (Count 16) and for use of a firearm during a crime of
violence under § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 17) based entirely on his
uncorroborated admissions that he had shot Perkins on July
10, 2016. “It is a settled principle … that a conviction must rest
upon firmer ground than the uncorroborated admission or
confession of the accused.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488–89 (1963). For example, “an admission of homicide
must be corroborated by tangible evidence of the death of the
supposed victim.” Id. at 491 n.15. And for crimes involving
“physical damage to person or property,” a confession may
be corroborated with evidence “that the injury for which the
accused confesses responsibility did in fact occur, and that
some person was criminally culpable.” Id.; see United States v.
Baltrunas, 957 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1992) (evidence that bank
robbery occurred is sufficient to corroborate a defendant’s
confession).

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 33
The purpose of this requirement is “not to establish the ad-
mission itself, but rather to ensure its reliability.” United States
v. Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 507 (7th Cir. 2003); see United States v.
Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1106 (7th Cir. 1970). “It is sufficient if
the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted suffi-
ciently to justify a jury inference of their truth.” Opper v.
United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954).
At the trial, Thomas testified that Washington had told
him that he had shot Perkins, a member of Moe Block, a rival
gang. Washington recounted that, on July 10, 2016, he, Crowe,
and another Bomb Squad member, Tremaine Drummond
(nicknamed “Misal”), saw Perkins and Austin Woods stand-
ing outside of a club. Drummond did not have a gun, but
Washington and Crowe did, and they shot at Perkins and
Woods. Washington bragged that he had shot first and that he
knew he had hit Perkins because Perkins fell to the ground.
Thomas also spoke to Crowe about the shooting. Crowe
confirmed that he and Washington carried out the shooting,
and that Drummond was there but did not have a gun. When
Thomas reported to Crowe that Washington had bragged
about shooting Perkins, Crowe laughed and said Washington
was lying because there was no way to know whether Crowe
or Washington had shot Perkins.
According to Moss, he saw Washington and Crowe about
thirty minutes after the Perkins shooting. Washington told
Moss that he had shot Perkins, stating, “I popped his ass.”
Moss saw that Washington still had the gun on him, which, as
Moss recalled, was “a 9 or a .40.” During the conversation,
Crowe disagreed with Washington and claimed that he was
the one who had shot Perkins.

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34 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
The evidence at trial corroborated the essential facts in
Washington’s admission to Thomas. First, Perkins testified
that he indeed was shot in the leg on July 10, 2016. He also
confirmed that Woods was with him that night and that two
Black males had yelled at them that night. Moreover, he told
a police officer at the hospital immediately after the shooting
that he had been shot in the leg by two people.6 Furthermore,
police officers recovered 9mm shell casings at the scene, sub-
stantiating Moss’s recollection that Washington was carrying
a “9 or a .40” that evening. And there was ample evidence that
Washington had access to firearms of all types during this
time and of the animosity between the Bomb Squad and the
Moe Block gang.
Washington takes issue with Thomas’s credibility as a co-
operating witness and the gaps in Perkins’s testimony. But the
essential elements of their testimony are corroborated by the
trial evidence. And the district court committed no error in
denying his motion.
c) Haywood: Assault and Attempted Murder
The jury also convicted Haywood of the assault and at-
tempted murder of Jones under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) and (5)
(Count 30), as well as the use of a firearm during a crime of
violence under § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 31). Haywood argues
that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of these
charges. He also generally asserts that the district court erred
in denying his motions for acquittal and a new trial.
6 During his testimony, Perkins occasionally contradicted prior state-
ments about the event or claimed he did not remember, but the jury was
entitled to evaluate his testimony as a whole and in the context of the other
evidence in the case.

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 35
Jones, who is unaffiliated with any Peoria gang, testified
that, on August 16, 2017, he walked past three to four young
Black men and had “minor words” with them on his way to
his aunt’s apartment in Harrison Homes. They said, “Ahh,
there he go right there.” As Jones opened his aunt’s screen
door, a Black man with braids or dreadlocks rode up on a
BMX bike. The man shot at Jones twice: one of the bullets
struck Jones’s right knee, and the other hit his cell phone in
his right front pocket.
Jones’s cousin, Danaja Dillard, testified that she was out-
side when the shooter rode up on his bike and shot Jones. She
saw Jones trying to get into her house, but the door was
locked. So, Dillard ran to the back door to enter the house and
ran through the house to unlock the front door for Jones. She
recounted that she saw the shooter, that she knew his name
was “Nunu” (which three other witnesses confirmed is Hay-
wood’s nickname), and that he had dark skin with dread-
locks.
Officer Shannon Parnell testified that he was the first to ar-
rive at the apartment. He found Jones, who was animated, ex-
cited, and obviously in pain. As Parnell applied pressure to
Jones’s wound, he asked Jones who had shot him, and Jones
responded, “Nunu,” based on what Dillard had told him.7
7 Haywood contends that Parnell’s statement was based on inadmis-
sible double hearsay, an issue we review for an abuse of discretion, see
United States v. Bell, 28 F.4th 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2022). The district court’s
decision was not an abuse of discretion because Dillard’s and Jones’s state-
ments were admissible.
First, Dillard’s statement to Jones was admissible as a prior consistent
statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) because Dillard tes-
tified at trial, her statement was consistent with her trial testimony, the

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36 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
Queen Hatcher, who is Jones’s aunt and Dillard’s mother,
testified that she was a witness during Haywood’s criminal
proceedings in state court regarding the shooting of Jones.
She recalled that “Wody” (Ezra Johnson’s nickname) came to
her home, asked to speak to Dillard about Haywood, and
stated that he had $500 for Dillard. Hatcher ousted Johnson
from her house, but not before he warned: “Well, we can get
on some gangsta shit.”
Like her mom, Dillard also stated that she was scheduled
to be a witness in Haywood’s criminal trial in state court. She
also remembered that Johnson had come to the house and of-
fered her money not to testify against Haywood, but she did
not take the money.
Johnson’s visit to Hatcher’s and Dillard’s home lends fur-
ther support for the government’s contention that Haywood
had shot Jones. Because Johnson had previously helped Hay-
wood commit Brown’s shooting, a rational juror could con-
clude that Johnson was close to Haywood. Furthermore, a
statement was offered to rebut the insinuation on cross-examination that
she was fabricating the statement, and the statement was made before
Dillard had a motive to fabricate. See United States v. Stoecker, 215 F.3d 788,
791 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Rule
801(d)(1)(B) does not bar the introduction of a prior consistent statement
through the testimony of someone other than the declarant, so long as the
declarant is available for cross-examination about the statement at some
time during trial.”).
Turning to the next level of hearsay, Jones’s statement to Parnell falls
under the exception to the hearsay rules for excited utterances because it
“relat[ed] to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was
under the stress of the excitement caused.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). Parnell
spoke to Jones on the heels of the shooting and reported that Jones was
animated, excited, and in pain. Under these facts, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in admitting Parnell’s testimony.

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 37
jury could reasonably infer from Johnson’s attempts to dis-
suade Dillard from testifying, that her identification of Hay-
wood as the shooter was credible.
Other evidence also tied Haywood to the shooting. Jones
described the shooter as a “Black male” with “some braids or
dreads,” and Dillard described him as a dark-skinned man
with “dreads.” A photograph of Haywood on the day of the
shooting matched those physical descriptions.
Both Jones and Dillard recalled that the shooter arrived on
a bike. Haywood had previously used a bicycle to travel to
the scene of Brown’s murder.
Lastly, a rational jury could have found that Haywood
shot Jones after Jones “had minor words” with the three or
four men on the way to his aunt’s house, especially when
Haywood shot him after saying, “I heard you had some
words with my people.” Based on this evidence, a jury could
reasonably find that Haywood shot Jones to maintain or in-
crease his position in the Bomb Squad.8
When viewing all of this evidence in the government’s fa-
vor, there was ample evidence allowing a jury to find Hay-
wood’s guilt as to Counts 30 and 31 beyond a reasonable
doubt. The district court did not err in denying Haywood’s
motions for acquittal or a new trial on this basis.
8 Contrary to Haywood’s assertion otherwise, the government was
not required to prove that Jones was shot because he was selling mariju-
ana in Bomb Squad territory. Counts 30 and 31 do not contain that allega-
tion. And although Count One’s Overt Act (gg) included that allegation,
it was not essential to the charge and, therefore, is “mere surplusage.” See
United States v. Swanson, 394 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 2005).

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38 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
D. Sentencing
Lastly, Watkins and Flora challenge various aspects of
their sentences. Watkins asserts that his sentence was substan-
tively unreasonable. Flora argues that the district court erred
when it found him ineligible for credit for time served on a
state court conviction.
We review the district court’s legal interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Ford, 22 F.4th
687, 691 (7th Cir. 2022). We review a sentence’s substantive
reasonableness for abuse of discretion and the district court’s
underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Ma-
jor, 33 F.4th 370, 379 (7th Cir. 2022).
1. Watkins
Watkins challenges the reasonableness of his sentence for
his conviction under Count 1, the racketeering conspiracy.
Based on his total offense level of 43 and criminal history cat-
egory of IV, the bottom end of Watkins’s guideline range was
240 months’ imprisonment. He received a custodial sentence
of 228 months, below the guideline range. In such cases,
“there is a nearly irrebuttable presumption that a below-range
sentence is reasonable.” United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519,
527 (7th Cir. 2016). A defendant can only rebut this presump-
tion “by showing that the sentence does not comport with the
factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Patel,
921 F.3d 663, 672 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Solo-
mon, 892 F.3d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 2018)).
In considering Watkins’s sentence, the district court took
note of the numerous aggravating factors—the serious and vi-
olent nature of the RICO conspiracy; Watkins’s pattern of re-
buffing chances to lead a law-abiding life; the need to deter

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 39
him from future crimes given the high risk of recidivism; the
need to protect residents of Peoria’s south side from his vio-
lence; as well as Watkins’s personal involvement in Polnitz’s
and Murray’s murders. Against this, the district court also
weighed the various mitigating factors, including the state-
ment of Demario Boone, a school safety officer, that Watkins
has the potential to make something of himself. The district
court’s careful consideration of these and other relevant fac-
tors satisfy the requirements of § 3553(a).
Watkins attempts to trivialize his criminal conduct, claim-
ing that he merely handed Brock the gun that was used to
murder Polnitz and Murray. But Watkins did much more than
that. He pointed out Polnitz as a rival gang member to Brock
and then gave him the gun, after which Brock shot at Polnitz,
killing Polnitz and Murray. It was not clearly erroneous for
the district court to find that Watkins gave the gun to Brock,
knowing (indeed, wanting) Brock to shoot Polnitz.
Watkins also complains that the length of his sentence is
unreasonable when compared to those of McCree and Moss,
who were convicted of a greater number of offenses. But, un-
like Watkins, McCree and Moss pleaded guilty prior to trial.
Moreover, Moss cooperated with the government and testi-
fied at trial. This distinguishes McCree and Moss from Wat-
kins for sentencing purposes.
Put simply, Watkins has not rebutted the presumption that
his below-range sentence was reasonable. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing
Watkins to a prison term of 228 months.

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40 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
2. Flora
Lastly, Flora argues that the time he served on his state
weapon-possession conviction related to Chester’s murder
should have been credited to his federal sentence. As he sees
it, the district court erred in concluding that his weapon-pos-
session offense did not constitute relevant conduct, thereby
making inapplicable a downward departure under United
States Sentencing Guideline § 5K2.23.
Section 5K2.23 permits a downward departure for a com-
pleted term of imprisonment if § 5G1.3(b) “would have pro-
vided an adjustment had that completed term of imprison-
ment been undischarged at the time of sentencing.” Section
5G1.3(b), in turn, authorizes a sentencing adjustment where
the defendant has an undischarged term of imprisonment for
an offense that “is relevant conduct to the instant offense of
conviction” under § 1B1.3(a)(1), (2), or (3).
Flora was convicted of RICO conspiracy, so § 2E1.1 pro-
vided his offense level.9 See U.S.S.G. App. A. Under
§ 2E1.1(a)(2), Flora’s base offense level was “the offense level
applicable to the underlying racketeering activity.” Applica-
tion Note 4 provides that a RICO-conspiracy count may
charge certain conduct “as a part of a ‘pattern of racketeering
activity’ even though the defendant has previously been sen-
tenced for that conduct.” But if such a prior sentence “resulted
from a conviction prior to the last overt act of the instant of-
fense,” Application Note 4 specifically states that the
9 Although Flora argues that the court should have applied § 1B1.3(a)
to determine whether his prior offense constituted relevant conduct, he is
incorrect. That section starts out with the qualification “[u]nless otherwise
specified.” Here, § 2E1.1 specifies otherwise.

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Nos. 20-2048, et al. 41
predicate act should be counted as a prior sentence under
§ 4A1.2(a)(1), rather than part of the RICO offense. U.S.S.G.
§ 2E1.1 cmt. n.4; see United States v. De La Cruz, 897 F.3d 841,
843 (7th Cir. 2018); Morales, 655 F.3d at 639.
Flora pleaded guilty to weapon possession in 2013. He
served approximately thirty-two months in prison and was
released in 2016. The district court found that Flora remained
a member of the RICO conspiracy through at least May 9,
2017, when he acted as an accessory to the attempted murder
of the worker at Starr Street Market. Because Flora’s 2013 con-
viction occurred prior to the last overt act of the RICO con-
spiracy, the district court correctly treated his prior sentence
for weapon possession as part of his criminal history, rather
than relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, cmt. n.4. Thus,
Flora’s 2013 conviction did not entitle him to a downward de-
parture under § 5K2.23.
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we issue a limited remand so that
the district court may make additional findings under Batson
consistent with this opinion and, after doing so, order a new
trial if it deems it necessary. We express no opinion on the
outcome of the district court’s rulings.
We shall retain jurisdiction of the appeal while the district
court makes its additional findings. If the district court deems
a new trial unnecessary, the parties may file position state-
ments in this court seeking appellate review of the Batson de-
termination. If the district court deems a new trial necessary,
it should inform this court of its conclusion so that we may
issue a final resolution and the mandate.

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42 Nos. 20-2048, et al.
As we noted at the outset, if the district court does order a
new trial, much of this opinion becomes moot. But, because
the court may not order a new trial or, if it does, certain issues
likely will be relevant to any retrial, we have addressed the
remaining issues raised by the defendants in the interest of
judicial economy and find no reversible error.

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