Manpreet Singh v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued May 20, 2024
Decided August 5, 2024
Before
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1446
MANPREET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General of the United States,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A209-396-283
O R D E R
Manpreet Singh, a Sikh Indian national, came to the United States illegally in
2016. He requests asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge denied relief, and the Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. Before us is Singh’s petition to review that
dismissal.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Background
In India, Manpreet Singh was a member of the Mann Party, which supports Sikh
interests in India. In November 2015, while walking home from a Mann Party event, he
was confronted by a group of men belonging to the Badal Party, an opposition party.
The men asked Singh what party he belonged to, and when he told them he was part of
the Mann Party and did not want to join theirs, they beat him until he lost
consciousness. His father and grandfather went to the police, but no report was filed.
In May 2016, while walking home from a Sikh temple, another group of men
stopped Singh. They also said he should have ceased working with the Mann Party and
beat him, but Singh escaped into a field. He overheard them warn that he would be
killed the next time. After the second attack, Singh hid in fields near his aunt’s house for
around a month and a half, then he took a bus to Delhi. In Delhi, he caught a flight to
South America.
He entered the United States through Tijuana, Mexico into Otay Mesa, California
on October 1, 2016. On November 3, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security
charged him with inadmissibility, as he lacked valid entry documents. After Singh
conceded he should be removed, the immigration court ruled that the government
established removal. Singh then applied for asylum, and on May 30, 2019, the court
heard his application.
At the hearing, the evidence before the IJ included Singh’s testimony, U.S. State
Department reports on human rights in India, and affidavits. The IJ found Singh’s
testimony to be credible. The DHS objected to the affidavits because the authors were
not available for cross-examination. The IJ “admitted the documents but gave them
appropriate evidentiary weight.”
The IJ denied Singh’s application on June 4, 2019, concluding that Singh was not
eligible for asylum because he had not established that he suffered past persecution or
that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution if forced to return to India. The IJ
explained that “two incidents of harm in India” wherein Singh suffered “only minor
injuries” did not rise to the level of persecution. The death threats, too, were not enough
because they were “not sufficiently imminent as the respondent overheard them as he
was running away.” As for future persecution, the IJ reasoned that Singh had no
evidence to support his claim that Sikhs could not live anywhere within India or that
the Mann Party was specifically persecuted. Singh’s only support for his argument of
widespread Sikh persecution were old documents, from 2003 and 2005, and according

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to the most recent State Department country reports and the Indian constitution, there
is not nationwide persecution of Sikhs. Similarly, Singh did not have evidence of
persecution against the Mann Party specifically.
The IJ also denied the other grounds Singh raised. Because the standard for
withholding removal is higher than the standard for asylum, the IJ explained, Singh
also could not meet his burden to show he was entitled to withholding removal. And
the IJ dismissed his application for CAT protection because Singh had not
demonstrated past torture, can relocate within India to avoid any harm, and had not
shown that torture even happens against Mann Party members.
Singh appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the
Board affirmed in full.
Discussion
Singh petitions for review of the Board’s decision, arguing he was entitled to
asylum, his application for withholding removal should have been granted, and his
application for CAT protection should have been granted.1 We review the Board’s
decision de novo as to legal conclusions and accept its factual conclusions if they were
supported by substantial evidence. Orellana-Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 484 (7th Cir.
2017).
A. Past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution
Eligibility for both asylum and withholding of removal requires a showing of
persecution. Asylum applicants must show “persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion” in the home country. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A);
see Kamaljit Singh v. Garland, 89 F.4th 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2024). To be eligible for
withholding of removal, an applicant must show there is a “clear probability of
persecution” upon the applicant’s return to his home country. Kamaljit Singh, 89 F.4th at
605 (quotations omitted); Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2008). Because the
withholding of removal standard is higher, if an asylum application fails, it takes the
1 Singh also contends the IJ did not accord his affidavits full evidentiary weight. His proof is that the IJ
said she would give the affidavits “appropriate evidentiary weight.” But the IJ also said she found the
affidavits to be “probative” and admitted them over the DHS’s objection. Singh does not point to any
examples of the IJ discounting the affidavits, so this argument may place form over substance.

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withholding of removal application with it. Torres, 551 F.3d at 625. An applicant’s
ability to relocate creates grounds to reject both forms of relief. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(3),
1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A)–(b), (c)(3).
The first way Singh could establish asylum status is by showing he has suffered
past persecution. See Kamaljit Singh, 89 F.4th at 605. The Board correctly affirmed the IJ’s
conclusion that Singh could not make this showing. Earlier this year, this court held that
a Mann Party member who also was attacked twice by Badal Party members did not
suffer past persecution. Id. at 606, 604. That case and this one are remarkably similar.
There, like here, Kamaljit Singh was engaged in Mann Party activities when the Badal
Party attackers approached him by car; his attackers also beat him after he rejected their
invitation to join the Badal Party; he too went to the police and was turned away; he
also was attacked a second time and fled afterward; and members of the Badal Party
also threatened his family after he fled India. See id.at 604. There, this court decided that
these “brief, isolated incidents” did not rise to persecution, especially where there was
no “further abuse or humiliation.” Id. at 606. “On substantial evidence review,” we held
that no past persecution occurred. Id.
Manpreet Singh argues that the credibility finding against the petitioner in
Kamaljit Singh, as well as that Manpreet Singh lost consciousness, render that case
distinguishable from this case. We disagree. Our court concluded in Kamaljit Singh that
even putting the lack of credibility to the side, the petitioner’s case there failed on the
persecution finding. Id. And while loss of consciousness is a factor in determining past
persecution, worse facts than these have not risen to that level. See, e.g., Mema v.
Gonzales, 474 F.3d 412, 416–18 (7th Cir. 2007) (abduction at gunpoint followed by
detention and physical abuse, resulting in petitioner losing consciousness, did not
compel conclusion that petitioner suffered past persecution).
Kamaljit Singh controls here. We held that the same type of harm the petitioner
experienced in that case did not rise to the level of persecution. The only other
distinction between that case and this one is the death threat here. The IJ correctly
explained, though, that this distinction does not make a difference. The threat here was
not “sufficiently imminent,” as Singh was running away when he heard it. Cf. N.L.A. v.
Holder, 744 F.3d 425, 431–32 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[C]redible threats of imminent death or
grave physical harm can … amount to past persecution, provided they are credible,
imminent and severe.”).
The second way Singh could establish asylum status is by demonstrating that he
has a well-founded fear that he will be persecuted upon returning to India. See Kamaljit

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Singh, 89 F.4th at 605. A well-founded fear of future persecution must be “subjectively
genuine and objectively reasonable in light of credible evidence.” Granados Arias v.
Garland, 69 F.4th 454, 463 (7th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted). Singh can demonstrate
that his fear is objectively reasonable in one of two ways: there is “a reasonable
possibility he … would be singled out individually for persecution,” or there is “a
pattern or practice” of persecution of Sikhs or the Mann Party. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Granados Arias, 69 F.4th at 463.
The IJ correctly decided that Singh could relocate to parts of India where there is
no persecution of Sikhs or the Mann Party. Singh’s evidence, the IJ explained, did not
support his argument that India as a whole is unfavorable toward Sikhs. On appeal
Singh cites to the same country reports, plus some of his affidavits. But the portions of
the affidavits that he cites simply restate how his father and grandfather were turned
away from the police station after his first attack. And the country reports, as the IJ
explained, do not discuss violence against Sikhs or the Mann Party, let alone
nationwide violence. To the contrary, one of the country reports shows the Indian
government attempting to protect religious minorities. Substantial evidence supports
the conclusion that internal relocation is safe and reasonable for petitioner.
B. Significant risk of being tortured
To receive protection under the Convention Against Torture, an applicant must
demonstrate that, “more likely than not,” he would be tortured if returned. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2); Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, 918 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2019). Torture is “the
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering for the purpose of coercion,
punishment, or discrimination.” Id. (cleaned up); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Several
factors affect the torture determination: “Evidence of past torture”; “[e]vidence that the
applicant could relocate to a part of [his home country] where he … is not likely to be
tortured”; “[e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the
country of removal”; and “[o]ther relevant information regarding conditions in [his
home country].” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i)–(iv).
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that Singh did not face a
significant risk of torture. As the IJ noted, Singh has not been tortured in the past and
could relocate to a place where he has not been persecuted (which means he could
relocate to a place where it is unlikely he would be tortured). And the Board explained
that “even considering general country conditions,” the IJ “did not clearly err” when
determining that it was unlikely that he would “be targeted for [torture].”

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On appeal, Singh challenges the IJ and the Board’s consideration of the evidence
of general country conditions and evidence of past torture. First, there is no evidence
that Singh has been tortured—as discussed above, the intentional infliction of pain
Singh endured is not severe enough to rise to the level of persecution, so it does not rise
to the level of torture either. Second, to support his argument that general country
conditions make torture a significant possibility, Singh cites to the four India Human
Rights Reports between 2019 and 2022. These reports contain, as he explains it,
warnings about governmental abuse of political dissidents, including torture by police
and prison officials. Yet, the Mann Party is not mentioned in any of the four reports.
The only report to reference violence against Sikhs is the 2022 report, which gives no
details other than that some number of Sikhs were killed, the attacks were targeted at
them, and the perpetrators were terrorists. 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: India, U.S. D EP’ T OF STATE 3 (March 20, 2023). We have held that “evidence of
generalized violence is not enough” and instead, “there must be a substantial risk that
the petitioner will be targeted specifically.” Herrera-Garcia, 918 F.3d at 562 (cleaned up)
(alteration omitted). The generalized violence Singh points to does not support his
argument on the country conditions factor. Singh’s arguments on the current state of
Indian politics were not presented until very recently, and the Board considered what
evidence it could.
* * *
Singh cannot overcome the evidentiary hurdle necessary to overturn the Board’s
decision. There is substantial evidence in support of the conclusions of the IJ and the
Board. Singh has not shown that he was persecuted or that he has a well-founded fear
of future persecution. This resolves his asylum and withholding of removal arguments.
And none of the factors for deciding whether it is more likely than not that he will be
tortured in India cut in his favor, so he is not entitled to protection under the
Convention Against Torture.
For these reasons, we DENY the petition for review.

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