Rainna J. Langley v. MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued September 20, 2023
Decided August 5, 2024
Before
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3008
RAINNA J. LANGLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:21-cv-00248
James R. Sweeney II,
Judge.
O R D E R
Rainna Langley appeals the denial of her application for supplemental social
security benefits. After considering multiple psychiatric opinions and Langley’s own
testimony, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Langley was not disabled
and denied her application. Langley sought review in the district court, which affirmed
the ALJ’s conclusion. Because the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Langley’s travails began in April 2019, when her anxiety and panic attacks forced
her to leave her job. Over the following year, Langley’s psychiatric symptoms caused
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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her to undergo six hospitalizations and multiple emergency room visits. Langley filed
an application for supplemental security income on December 30, 2019, asserting that
her anxiety, depression, and panic attacks precluded her from working. The Social
Security Administration initially denied her claim in June 2020, and again on
reconsideration in August 2020. Langley requested reconsideration and received a
hearing before an ALJ.
At the hearing, Langley testified that she was experiencing “severe panic attacks
daily” and felt “very overwhelmed with panic and anxiety.” While she noted some
improvement with treatment, she still had between five and six panic attacks per week.
Langley explained that these symptoms made simple tasks such as basic grooming and
grocery shopping difficult, and that she struggled to make decisions of any kind.
The ALJ also considered the assessments of multiple agency doctors. Clinical
Psychologist Dr. Melissa Sprinkle conducted a consultive exam on Langley in June 2020,
diagnosing her with Panic Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, and Generalized
Anxiety Disorder. Even with these diagnoses, Dr. Sprinkle found that Langley had the
capacity to complete basic tasks and suggested that a structured work environment
could alleviate some of her depressive symptoms.
But Dr. Sprinkle also recognized that Langley’s anxiety and depression would
hinder her motivation to look for a job. And even if Langley did secure employment,
Dr. Sprinkle wrote that Langley would struggle to “maintain her focus and attention to
complete assigned work activities.” Dr. Sprinkle concluded that Langley’s
“psychological symptoms would have a significant impact on her ability to establish
and maintain gainful employment.”
The ALJ also considered the reports of two additional agency doctors, Ken Lovko
and William Shipley, who reviewed Langley’s medical background without conducting
independent examinations. After an initial review, Dr. Lovko prepared a report, finding
that Langley was moderately limited in three categories of mental functioning:
understanding, remembering, and applying information; interacting with others; and
adapting or managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). He also found that
Langley was markedly limited in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. Id.
After reviewing an expanded record on reconsideration, Dr. Shipley found that Langley
was only moderately limited in all of the aforementioned categories.
The narrative portion of Dr. Lovko’s report, which was adopted by Dr. Shipley
(“Lovko/Shipley report” or “the report”), described Langley as able to perform simple

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No. 22-3008 Page 3
work-related tasks with some limitations. The Lovko/Shipley report reiterated Dr.
Sprinkle’s finding that employment could be beneficial for Langley, but that she would
struggle to apply for a job due to her symptoms. The report concluded that Langley
would “appear to work best alone, in semi-isolation from others or as part of a small
group.”
In a written decision, the ALJ considered this and other evidence, applied the
required five-step analysis, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a), and concluded that Langley was
not disabled. The ALJ determined that while Langley suffered from multiple mental
health impairments, her symptoms were not sufficient to give rise to a presumption of
eligibility for benefits. See Id. § 416.920(d). The ALJ also found that Langley could
perform a full range of work, subject to certain limitations. These constraints included
limiting Langley to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks” with no more than “occasional,
brief interaction with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors.” Based on this,
the ALJ then found that Langley was unable to perform her prior jobs, but “capable of
making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy.” As such, the ALJ concluded that Langley was not disabled and
denied her application for benefits.
Langley appealed this decision to the Social Security Appeals Council, which
declined to rehear her case. She then sought review in the district court, which affirmed
the ALJ’s decision. Langley now appeals.
We review the district court’s judgment affirming the agency’s decision de novo
but apply the “substantial evidence” standard when reviewing the ALJ’s decision. See
Sevec v. Kijakazi, 59 F.4th 293, 297 (7th Cir. 2023). Substantial evidence means “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “An ALJ
need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide a logical bridge
between the evidence and his conclusions.” O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614,
618 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review is deferential, and we
will not “reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.” Summers
v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017). As the Supreme Court has explained,
“whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such
evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019).
Under the Social Security Act, an individual must “furnish[] such medical and
other evidence” of a disability in order to qualify for benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). A
person is “disabled” if he or she has an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

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activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. § 423(d)(1)(a). Social security
regulations prescribe a five-step test for determining if a claimant meets this definition.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). We have summarized this test as requiring the ALJ to
consider whether:
(1) the claimant is presently employed; (2) the claimant has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant’s
impairment meets or equals any impairment listed in the
regulations as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful
activity; (4) the claimant’s residual functional capacity leaves him
unable to perform his past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is
unable to perform any other work existing in significant numbers
in the national economy.
Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920). Between steps three and four of this process, an ALJ determines a
claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (RFC), which is the most work an individual
can perform despite their limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The burden of proof
is on the claimant at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644, 651 (7th Cir. 2022).
On appeal, Langley raises two grounds for remand, both challenging the ALJ’s
formulation of her RFC. First, Langley contends that the ALJ arrived at an assessment
that was less limiting than the opinion of the state agency psychologists, Dr. Lovko and
Dr. Shipley, without explaining why. Second, she argues that the ALJ failed to articulate
a rationale for rejecting the opinion of the agency’s consulting psychologist, Dr.
Sprinkle. We address each argument in turn.
Langley first raises two issues with the ALJ’s treatment of the Lovko/Shipley
report. She claims that the ALJ committed legal error by not explaining why the RFC
deviated from the language in the report. And she argues that the ALJ failed to
incorporate any concentration limitations in the RFC as suggested by Dr. Lovko and Dr.
Shipley. Both arguments are unpersuasive.
We start with Langley’s contention that the ALJ erred by deviating from the
Lovko/Shipley report without explanation. Langley’s argument here is quite narrow.

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She does not contend that the doctors’ evaluations were erroneous, but only argues that
the ALJ should have explained why he did not adopt the report’s language.
An ALJ has discretion when incorporating a doctor’s narrative opinion into an
RFC assessment and need not replicate the precise language. See Recha v. Saul, 843 F.
App’x 1, 4 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[A]n ALJ has some latitude with the exact wording of an
RFC as long as it conveys in some way the restrictions necessary to address a claimant’s
limitations.”). In evaluating prior administrative medical findings, the ALJ must
consider criteria such as the supportability and consistency of the medical opinions. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). We will reverse only when the ALJ does not rely on
substantial evidence, a standard that “does not present a high hurdle.” Recha, 843 F.
App’x at 4. The ALJ’s decision need only include “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek, 587 U.S. at
103 (citation omitted).
The ALJ’s incorporation of the Lovko/Shipley report meets this standard. In
relevant part, the report states that Langley is “able to respond appropriately to brief
supervision and interactions with coworkers and work situations.” And while the
report also notes that Langley could “manage occasional contact with the public,” it also
suggests that “sustained, intensive, interpersonal contact would be precluded.”
In the RFC, the ALJ wrote that Langley is limited to “no more than occasional,
brief interaction with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors.” In constructing
this RFC, the ALJ copiously recounted the evidence Langley presented and found that
she could largely complete basic daily tasks such as controlling her personal care,
managing her finances, and taking care of her dog. And the ALJ also considered
Langley’s history of mental illness and difficulty interacting with other people. Based
on this evidence, the ALJ provided an RFC that closely echoed the doctors’ suggestion.
Moreover, the ALJ’s formulation that limits Langley to no more than occasional
interaction with other people is more limiting than the doctors’ assessment. As we have
noted previously, an RFC that is more limiting than an agency doctor’s analysis
illustrates that the ALJ gave “reasoned consideration” to the evidence. Burmester v.
Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). Because the ALJ has demonstrated such
reasoned consideration here, we are satisfied that the ALJ appropriately incorporated
Dr. Lovko’s and Dr. Shipley’s opinions in the RFC.
Furthermore, Langley’s supposition that the ALJ must explicitly explain any
deviation from the Lovko/Shipley report lacks grounding. We require only that an ALJ

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“consider the entire record”; they are not obligated to “rely entirely on a particular
physician’s opinion or choose between the opinions [of] any of the claimant’s
physicians.” Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007). In constructing the RFC,
the ALJ only minimally departed from the doctors’ opinion and, as explained above,
this deviation was supported by substantial evidence in the record. This is all we
require.
Next, Langley contends that the ALJ failed to incorporate her concentration
limitations in the RFC. This too finds no support in the record. Both Dr. Shipley and Dr.
Lovko noted that Langley was “moderately limited” in her ability to “maintain
attention and concentration for extended periods.” Dr. Lovko also indicated that
Langley had a “marked” limitation in the ability to “concentrate, persist, or maintain
pace.” But on reconsideration, Dr. Shipley changed this to only a “moderate” limitation.
In the RFC, the ALJ limited Langley’s ability to work to “simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks … with little opportunity for diversion or interruption.”
Langley rests her argument on Winsted v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019).
There, as here, the ALJ determined that the claimant was limited to “simple, routine,
repetitive tasks with few workplace changes.” Id. at 476. But, in Winsted, a physician
had concluded that the claimant had suffered from moderate difficulties with
concentration, persistence, and pace. Given this, we found the ALJ’s conclusory
statement wanting, noting that “in most cases employing terms like ‘simple repetitive
tasks’ on their own … are insufficient to present the claimant’s limitations in this area.”
Id. at 477 (quoting O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 620 (7th Cir. 2010)) (cleaned up).
But, unlike in Winsted, the ALJ in this case provided a more robust analysis of
Langley’s concentration deficit. He noted that Langley should have “little opportunity
for diversion or interruption” and that she is limited to only “occasional, brief
interactions with the general public.” The ALJ further added that Langley should have
no complex decisions, no complex written or verbal communications, and no fast-paced
or assembly-line production requirements. This is far more than the bald statement in
Winsted and fails to establish legal error.
Langley next argues that the ALJ failed to articulate a rationale for rejecting Dr.
Sprinkle’s opinion. After reviewing the record, Dr. Sprinkle concluded that Langley’s
“psychiatric symptoms would have a significant impact on her ability to establish and
maintain gainful employment.” She noted that the process of applying for and learning
a new job would increase the severity of Langley’s symptoms, and Langley would
struggle to maintain focus to complete work tasks.

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The ALJ outlined Dr. Sprinkle’s findings and stated that her determination was
“not consistent with [Langley’s] mental status examination findings and is not
supported by the record as a whole and is therefore not persuasive.” In Langley’s view,
this explanation was inadequate and constitutes legal error.
While an ALJ must provide a rationale for discounting a medical opinion, it is
well within the ALJ’s discretion to assign weight to different opinions based on their
consistency with the overall record. See Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738, 751 (7th Cir. 2022).
In finding that Langley’s symptoms would affect her ability to work, Dr. Sprinkle cites
Langley’s lack of motivation to find work and her trouble concentrating when given an
assigned task. As the ALJ notes, there is record evidence that contradicts both of these
conclusions.
The ALJ, for instance, pointed to Langley’s own testimony that she can complete
household chores, go shopping, and even exercise. And as the ALJ noted, these
activities are “consistent with the ability to perform work” subject to certain
requirements. Furthermore, Dr. Shipley, Dr. Lovko, and Dr. Sprinkle concluded that
Langley’s “attention and concentration are [ … ] adequate” and she can “focus for
sustained periods of time.” Relying on this evidence, the ALJ provided sufficient
reasons to afford Dr. Sprinkle’s opinions less weight.
Langley also insists that the ALJ erred in assessing Dr. Sprinkle’s determination
that Langley’s symptoms would “have a significant impact on her ability to establish
and maintain gainful employment.” The ALJ discounted this determination, finding
that it was a question reserved for the Commissioner. Under applicable regulations,
whether a claimant is disabled, able to work, or able to perform regular or continuing
work, are issues reserved to the Commissioner and an expert’s conclusion as to these
matters is “inherently neither valuable nor persuasive” to a disability determination. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(c).
But we need not conclusively decide this issue. As we note above, the ALJ’s
departure from Dr. Sprinkle’s report was supported by substantial evidence. So even if
the ALJ erred in failing to consider the statement, any differences are supported by the
ALJ’s extensive discussion of the record and the multiple pieces of evidence that
contradict Dr. Sprinkle’s assessment.
AFFIRMED

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