Greg Gilsinger v. Cities and Villages Mutual Insurance Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 14, 2024*
Decided August 9, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2963
GREG GILSINGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITIES AND VILLAGES MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-CV-831
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Greg Gilsinger worked in worker’s compensation for Cities and Villages Mutual
Insurance Company (“CVMIC”). CVMIC offered Gilsinger a severance package after
company leadership decided to restructure, but then fired him for cause upon
discovering he was operating a side business during company time and using company
servers and documents. Gilsinger sued CVMIC, complaining largely about receiving
* The Court granted the parties’ joint motion to waive oral argument. The appeal is therefore submitted
on the briefs and the record. See FED . R. A PP . P. 34(f).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 2
insufficient process before he was fired. The district court entered summary judgment
in favor of CVMIC, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
We view the facts in the light most favorable to Gilsinger and give him the
benefit of all reasonable inferences. Biggs v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 82 F.4th 554, 559 (7th
Cir. 2023).
CVMIC, an insurance company owned by Wisconsin municipalities, hired
Gilsinger in December 1997 as a worker’s compensation claims manager. By 2016,
CVMIC had promoted him to be the director of worker’s compensation claims.
Gilsinger had no written employment contract, but CVMIC’s employee manual stated
that employees were “at-will.” This meant that CVMIC could terminate Gilsinger’s
employment “with or without cause, and with or without notice.” Gilsinger, however,
could grieve “any matter concerning employment” through discussions with
supervisors and written appeals to CVMIC management and the Board of Directors.
In 2014, Gilsinger developed a “narrow network” of healthcare providers to treat
injured employees of CVMIC members, saving those members millions of dollars.
Gilsinger was later encouraged by a CVMIC consultant to further develop this concept
into a business. In April 2018, Gilsinger formed Quality Care Medical Solutions
(“QCMS”). While getting QCMS off the ground, Gilsinger sent CVMIC documents from
his work email address to himself.
It appears that Gilsinger was not forthcoming about his side business to CVMIC
leadership. The CEO of CVMIC, Ken Horner, learned about QCMS about a year after it
was formed. Horner initially worried Gilsinger might be misappropriating funds, but
an investigation revealed no evidence of this.
Around this same time (the record does not reveal exactly when), Horner
decided to restructure CVMIC. This decision came after learning that the director of
liability claims planned to retire. Horner determined that one person could handle both
the soon-to-be-vacant position as well as Gilsinger’s job. Believing Gilsinger unsuitable
for this dual role, Horner decided to eliminate Gilsinger’s position.

-- 2 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 3
Horner informed the Board of Directors of his decision and terminated
Gilsinger’s employment on October 31, 2019. CVMIC offered Gilsinger a severance
agreement with a 21-day acceptance period.
Gilsinger requested to appeal his position’s elimination at the November 2019
Board meeting. Horner initially confirmed that this in-person appeal would be heard.
Later, Horner asked Gilsinger if he was waiving his right to a written grievance. When
Gilsinger responded that he was not, Horner revoked the opportunity for an in-person
appeal, insisting that Gilsinger file a written grievance as per the employee manual.
Gilsinger then appealed to the Board, arguing that restructuring was a pretext for
firing him. He claimed that CVMIC leadership was retaliating against him for—among
other things—speaking out in 2017 at a CVMIC Board meeting against the company’s
“mismanagement” of claims handling for Green Bay, one of CVMIC’s largest members.
Although the record does not reveal precisely what Gilsinger said to the Board, he
recounts that he raised concerns about how losing the Green Bay account would impact
CVMIC’s reputation.
Gilsinger’s 2019 appeal to the Board included an email that caught Horner’s
attention. This email was forwarded from Gilsinger’s work account to a QCMS email
account. Horner launched an internal review of CVMIC’s servers, which revealed
thousands of emails sent to that QCMS email address, many with CVMIC documents
attached.
Upon discovering this “theft and transfer of documents for personal use,”
Horner rescinded the severance agreement and terminated Gilsinger for cause. The
termination letter informed Gilsinger of his right to appeal through the grievance
procedure. Gilsinger later filed an appeal with the Board, which was denied.
Two other events—both of which are disputed—allegedly occurred around the
time of Gilsinger’s termination. First, Gilsinger alleges that CVMIC leadership told Glen
Boyle, who works for a CVMIC contractor, that Gilsinger had misappropriated CVMIC
contracts. Boyle, however, denied being told about any misappropriation. Second,
CVMIC leadership allegedly accused Rick Ceman—an attorney who did work for both
CVMIC and QCMS—of double billing CVMIC for work that was actually done for
QCMS. CVMIC leaders deny that this accusation happened. Gilsinger asserts that these
incidents led Boyle and Ceman to halt their professional relationship with him and
QCMS.

-- 3 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 4
B. Procedural Background
In due course, Gilsinger sued CVMIC. He pursued two federal claims, alleging
that CVMIC fired him (1) without due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and (2) in retaliation for protected speech in violation of the First
Amendment. Gilsinger also claimed that CVMIC committed several state-law torts,
including (1) defamation; (2) intentional interference with contractual relationships; (3)
breach of contract; (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (5)
promissory estoppel.
CVMIC moved for summary judgment on all counts. CVMIC contended that all
of Gilsinger’s claims failed as a matter of law. It also argued that, because it is not a state
actor, it could not be liable for any alleged constitutional violations.
The district court granted the summary judgment motion. Gilsinger v. Cities &
Villages Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F. Supp. 3d 975 (E.D. Wis. 2023). In regards to the
constitutional claims, the court found that CVMIC was a state actor and therefore could
be liable for constitutional violations. Id. at 986–88. Nevertheless, the court ruled that
CVMIC had not violated Gilsinger’s constitutional rights and entered summary
judgment on Gilsinger’s federal claims. Id. at 988–93. The court then exercised
supplemental jurisdiction over Gilsinger’s state-law claims, entering summary
judgment to CVMIC on those as well. Id. at 993–98. Gilsinger appeals.
II. A NALYSIS
We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. Navratil v. City of Racine, 101
F.4th 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a).
A. Constitutional Claims
Gilsinger alleges that CVMIC fired him without due process (violating the
Fourteenth Amendment) and in retaliation for protected speech (violating the First
Amendment).
The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect citizens from government
conduct, not from conduct by private actors. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi.
Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2009). The district court determined that CVMIC,
as a municipality-owned insurance company, was a state actor. CVMIC disagrees but

-- 4 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 5
concedes this point for present purposes. We accept that concession and turn to the
merits of Gilsinger’s constitutional claims.
1. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claim
Gilsinger alleges that CVMIC violated the Fourteenth Amendment by firing him
without sufficient process—namely, a hearing. While the Constitution prohibits state
actors from depriving a person of property without due process of law, U.S. C ONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, we must first determine “whether a protected property interest
actually exists.” Cheli v. Taylorville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 986 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted). Property interests are not inherent in the Constitution but “are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law.’” Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls.
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
Gilsinger identifies his property interest as one in continued employment. But
Wisconsin state law has not given him such an interest. By default, employees in
Wisconsin can be fired at will. Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 623 N.W.2d 739, 747 (Wis.
2001). The CVMIC employee manual confirms this default rule, stating that “at-will”
employees are subject to termination at any time, with or without cause or notice.
Under Wisconsin law, “at-will” workers lack a property interest in continued
employment; only employees with “just cause” protection possess such an interest.
Beischel v. Stone Bank Sch. Dist., 362 F.3d 430, 436 (7th Cir. 2004). Because Gilsinger has
no protected property interest, the Fourteenth Amendment did not require CVMIC to
provide any process before firing Gilsinger. Id.
Gilsinger resists this conclusion for two reasons. Neither persuades us.
First, he contends that a Wisconsin statute providing government employees a
grievance procedure, WIS . S TAT. § 66.0509(1m), confers a property interest in continued
employment. But that’s incorrect: Gilsinger “must show entitlement to the job, not just
to the procedures.” Border v. City of Crystal Lake, 75 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1996). Without
Gilsinger identifying a statute giving him “just cause” protection in his continued
employment, this argument must fail. See Beischel, 362 F.3d at 436 (recognizing a statute
can confer a protected property interest on an employee).
Second, Gilsinger argues that CVMIC’s “long-established practice” of giving
employees some protection before firing them essentially gave him “just cause”
protection, notwithstanding the at-will default. But no reasonable juror could find that

-- 5 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 6
such a practice existed. Gilsinger cites a single example in which CVMIC gave an
employee a “progressive discipline” system before termination. Yet in that case, the
employee was explicitly told that the agreement did not change her at-will employment
status. Nothing about this one incident displaces the state’s default at-will rule.
Absent a protected property interest, Gilsinger’s Fourteenth Amendment claim
must fail. The district court was therefore right to enter summary judgment in favor of
CVMIC on this claim.1
2. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Gilsinger also claims that CVMIC fired him in retaliation for statements he made
at a 2017 Board meeting about CVMIC’s “mismanagement” of claims handling
involving the Green Bay account, in violation of the First Amendment.
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must prove
that: “(1) his speech was constitutionally protected, (2) he has suffered a deprivation
likely to deter speech, and (3) his speech was at least a motivating factor in the
employer’s action.” Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). We can assume without deciding that Gilsinger has met the first two elements
because, regardless, Gilsinger’s claim falters on the third element: causation. Massey v.
Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining the third element of the First
Amendment retaliation claim focuses on the causation inquiry—whether, and to what
degree, the plaintiff’s protected expression motivated the defendant’s decision). In his
opening brief, Gilsinger fails to present an argument about CVMIC’s retaliatory
motive—that his statements regarding alleged mismanagement were at least a
“motivating factor” in CVMIC’s decision to fire him. While Gilsinger does make this
argument in his reply brief, it’s too late; arguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief are considered waived because they leave no chance for response. White v. United
States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021). Without a properly presented causation
argument, Gilsinger’s First Amendment retaliation claim must fail.
1 Gilsinger also suggests that his termination “imposed on him a stigma that foreclosed his freedom to
take advantage of other employment opportunities.” This sounds like a “stigma plus” claim, see Malhotra
v. Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, 77 F.4th 532, 538 (7th Cir. 2023), but this theory was never raised
below and is therefore waived. United Cent. Bank v. Davenport Estate LLC, 815 F.3d 315, 318 (7th Cir. 2016).

-- 6 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 7
* * *
We therefore agree with the district court that neither of Gilsinger’s
constitutional claims survive summary judgment. The district court opted to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Gilsinger’s state-law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a
decision neither party contests on appeal. We therefore proceed to analyze Gilsinger’s
state-law claims.
B. State-Law Claims
Gilsinger brought five state-law claims: (1) defamation; (2) intentional
interference with contractual relationships; (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (5) promissory estoppel. All agree that
these claims are governed by Wisconsin law. See Schindler v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1010
(7th Cir. 2007). We analyze each claim in turn.
1. Defamation
To succeed on his defamation claim, Gilsinger must establish three elements:
“(1) a false statement; (2) communicated by speech, conduct or in writing to a person
other than the person defamed; and, (3) [that] the communication is unprivileged and
tends to harm one’s reputation so as to lower him or her in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him or her.” In re
Storms v. Action Wis. Inc., 750 N.W.2d 739, 748 (Wis. 2008).
Gilsinger’s defamation claim has two components. First, he alleges that CVMIC
leadership told Glen Boyle (who works for a CVMIC contractor) that Gilsinger had
misappropriated CVMIC contracts. But there is no admissible evidence that supports
this claim. In his sworn deposition, Boyle denied that CVMIC leadership accused
Gilsinger of any such thing.2 While Gilsinger stated that the incident did take place, his
testimony was hearsay, as he stated in his deposition that he knew this incident took
place only because Boyle told him so. The district court found this statement
inadmissible, and Gilsinger has not challenged this determination on appeal, thereby
waiving any such challenge. See Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807, 810 n.2
2 Deposition testimony is, in general, the type of evidence that can be used to support a summary
judgment motion. Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[s]ummary judgment is
proper if,” among other things, “the … depositions … show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (citation omitted)).
Gilsinger has not argued that Boyle’s deposition is inadmissible for any reason.

-- 7 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 8
(7th Cir. 2017). Without a false statement to rely on, the first component of Gilsinger’s
defamation claim fails.
The second component of this claim stems from an allegation that CVMIC
representatives accused Rick Ceman, an attorney, of billing CVMIC for work he had
done for Gilsinger’s side business, QCMS. This theory also fails. To start, CVMIC’s
alleged accusations implicate only Ceman and QCMS—and not Gilsinger—as doing
something wrong. Gilsinger cannot litigate for defamation of a third party. Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Rights personal to their holders may not
be enforced by third parties.”); see 1 R ODNEY A. S MOLLA, LAW OF D EFAMATION § 4:74 (2d
ed. 2024 update) (“[T]here can be no vicarious defamation, or defamation through guilt
by association.”). Moreover, there is no admissible evidence supporting this. The
CVMIC employees who allegedly made this statement testified that they did not accuse
Ceman of double billing. Again, Gilsinger insisted in his deposition that the incident
did happen, but only because Ceman told him so. That’s hearsay, Schindler, 474 F.3d at
1011, and Gilsinger does not argue otherwise.
For those reasons, the district court was right to determine that Gilsinger’s
defamation claim should not survive summary judgment.
2. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relationships
To prove intentional interference with contractual relationships, Gilsinger must
establish five elements: (1) that he had a contract or prospective contractual relationship
with a third party; (2) that CVMIC interfered with the relationship; (3) the interference
was intentional; (4) a causal connection exists between the interference and the
damages; and (5) CVMIC was not justified or privileged to interfere. Burbank Grease
Services, LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 796 (Wis. 2006); see also Briesemeister v.
Lehner, 720 N.W.2d 531, 542 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). The first element requires “an existing
contract or sufficiently concrete prospective contract.” Shank v. William R. Hague, Inc.,
192 F.3d 675, 689 (7th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d
965 (7th Cir. 2013). At minimum, the plaintiff and a third party must have “manifested
… intent[] to be bound to an agreement, the terms of which are sufficiently certain and
definite.” Id. at 684 (citing Novelly Oil Co. v. Mathy Constr. Co. 433 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Wis.
1988)).
Gilsinger claims that CVMIC interfered with his contractual relationships with
Boyle and Ceman. He alleges that CVMIC made clear to both of these individuals that it
would not do business with them if they continued working with Gilsinger. No

-- 8 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 9
reasonable juror, however, could find that CVMIC interfered with Gilsinger’s
contractual or prospective contractual relationships with either Boyle or Ceman.
Gilsinger did not have an “existing contract or sufficiently concrete prospective
contract” with Boyle or the company he worked for. Shank, 192 F.3d at 689; see id. at 684
(noting that a contract requires an “intention to be bound to an agreement, the terms of
which are sufficiently certain and definite” (emphasis added)). While there is evidence
of a business relationship between the two, CVMIC cannot be liable for interfering with
a mere business relationship. Instead, there must be a contractual relationship—either
present or prospective—for CVMIC to be liable. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d at 796. The lack
of a contractual relationship is “fatal to [Gilsinger’s] claim.” Shank, 192 F.3d at 684–91
(concluding Wisconsin does not recognize a claim for tortious interference with a “mere
business relationship”).
Regarding Ceman and his law firm, Gilsinger did not introduce admissible
evidence showing CVMIC interfered with any contractual relationship he had with
Ceman. Horner—the CVMIC CEO—testified that he never told Ceman that he should
stop working with Gilsinger and QCMS. Gilsinger essentially admitted as much in his
deposition, stating that Ceman never told him that CVMIC said he could not continue
working with Gilsinger. While Gilsinger later submitted an affidavit that stated that
“Ceman told me that [he] could not continue working with me without risking
CVMIC’s retaliation,” the district court struck this statement under the sham-affidavit
rule because it contradicted his prior deposition testimony. See James v. Hale, 959 F.3d
307, 316 (7th Cir. 2020). Gilsinger has not challenged this evidentiary decision on
appeal, thus waiving any challenge to it. See Parker, 845 F.3d at 810 n.2. Consequently,
no admissible evidence supports Gilsinger’s claim as relates to Ceman and his law firm.
For those reasons, the district court correctly entered summary judgment for
CVMIC on Gilsinger’s intentional interference with contractual relationships claim.
3. Breach of Contract Claim
Gilsinger claims that CVMIC breached its employment contract by firing him
instead of providing progressive discipline and an appeal hearing.
Recall that the default rule in Wisconsin—as also stated in the CVMIC employee
handbook—is that employees like Gilsinger can be fired at will. Mackenzie v. Miller
Brewing Co., 623 N.W.2d 739, 747 (Wis. 2001). At-will employment agreements are
contracts. Id. at 745–47. But, because of the nature of at-will employment, “termination

-- 9 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 10
of an employee who has agreed to enter into an at-will employment relationship does
not constitute a breach of contract justifying the recovery of damages.” Bukstein v. Dean
Health Sys., Inc., 903 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Wis. Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted).
An at-will employment relationship may, however, be modified through various
methods, including language in an employee handbook or an unwritten policy. Clay v.
Horton Mfg. Co., Inc., 493 N.W.2d 379, 381–82 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). In regards to the
employee handbook, it will bind parties to a “different employment relationship” only
when it “contains express provisions from which it can reasonably be inferred that the
parties intended to” make this modification. Helland v. Kurtis A. Froedtert Mem’l Lutheran
Hosp., 601 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). “It is [also] possible for a company
through its agents to modify an employment contract [through] company policies
notwithstanding the [specific language in the employee handbook], if both parties
intend to do so.” Clay, 493 N.W.2d at 382.
Gilsinger picks up on this line of cases and argues that certain portions of
CVMIC’s handbook and unwritten company policies communicated through his
superiors bound CVMIC and himself to a “different employment relationship.” See
Helland, 601 N.W.2d at 321. He first contends that the handbook’s right to appeal to the
Board demonstrates CVMIC intention in altering his “employment status.” But “the
mere existence of an employer-issued policy that provides guidelines for employees or
that sets forth employer policies and procedures is not sufficient to alter an at-will
employment relationship.” Bukstein, 903 N.W.2d at 135; compare Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368
N.W.2d 666, 672 (Wis. 1985) (finding a handbook modified an employment contract
only when it promised “continued employment”; a progressive discipline structure; a
layoff procedure based on seniority; and “just cause” discharge protections).
Gilsinger also argues that an unwritten practice at CVMIC modified his at-will
status. He points to a statement from the HR director that “nobody is really at will
anymore,” and that employees tend to get certain types of “progressive discipline”
before being fired. Gilsinger also cites to a “last chance agreement” that was offered to a
former subordinate of his, which put that employee on a probationary period.
Neither the statement nor the last-chance agreement establishes a disputed
material fact precluding summary judgment because neither suffices as a modification
of Gilsinger’s employment status. Clay v. Horton Manufacturing Co.—a case that
Gilsinger heavily relies on—shows why. 492 N.W.2d at 379. In Clay, company superiors
“repeated[ly]” assured the plaintiff that employees would be laid off based on seniority.
Id. at 380. This seniority policy, the Wisconsin appellate court held, plausibly became

-- 10 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 11
part of the plaintiff’s employment contract because it was reasonable to “conclude that
the assurances evince [the employer]’s intent to alter the employment contract to
encompass the company policies.” Id. at 382.
We have nothing like that here. What we do have is a stray comment from an HR
director noting that employees tend to get some process before termination. We also
have a personnel decision that reinforces that reality. But the HR director’s alleged
comments never rose to the level of what happened in Clay. Critically, she never
promised Gilsinger that he would get some sort of process akin to what another
employee received. Because Gilsinger has failed to present evidence that his
employment relationship with CVMIC was altered, this argument fails.
The district court thus rightly entered summary judgment in CVMIC’s favor on
the breach of contract claim.
4. Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim
Gilsinger also contends that CVMIC breached its duty of good faith and fair
dealing to him. But this claim fails at the threshold, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
“refuse[d] to impose a duty to terminate in good faith into employment contracts.”
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983). The district court thus
correctly entered summary judgment for CVMIC on this claim.
5. Promissory Estoppel Claim
Gilsinger’s final claim is that, even if he did not have a contract with CVMIC that
required progressive discipline before termination, he reasonably relied upon CVMIC’s
promise of progressive protection. To succeed on this type of promissory estoppel
claim, Gilsinger must establish three elements: “(1) the promise is one that the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee; (2) the promise induced such action or
forbearance; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”
McLellan v. Charly, 758 N.W.2d 94, 107–08 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). “Mere predictions or
statements of opinion are not promises supportive of a promissory estoppel cause of
action.” Major Mat Co. v. Monsanto Co., 969 F.2d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying
Wisconsin law).
The “promise” that Gilsinger identifies is the HR director’s statement that
“nobody is really at will anymore, and that’s why we do [progressive discipline].” Even

-- 11 of 12 --

No. 23-2963 Page 12
assuming that this statement is the type that meets the first element of a promissory
estoppel claim, Gilsinger’s claim still fails. That is because he makes no argument on the
final two elements of the promissory estoppel analysis. He does not state how his
behavior changed based on the HR director’s statement, nor he does he argue why
justice requires holding CVMIC to the HR director’s “promise.” See McClellan, 758
N.W.2d at 107–08. The failure to make either argument means that the district court was
right to enter summary judgment for CVMIC on this claim.3
III. CONCLUSION
For those reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s entry of summary judgment in
CVMIC’s favor.
3 Gilsinger mentions in a footnote on the last page of his brief that CVMIC “refused to provide” certain
documents in discovery related to this claim. This skeletal argument—“really nothing more than an
assertion”—is waived. United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991).

-- 12 of 12 --