United States of America v. Juan Angel Martinez, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 1, 2024
Decided August 19, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2685
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JUAN ANGEL MARTINEZ, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-CR-00601(4)
John J. Tharp,
Judge.
O R D E R
Juan Martinez distributed cocaine and marijuana in Chicago for 15 months,
beginning in late 2016. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and to distributing cocaine and
marijuana. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). The district judge sentenced him to the statutory
minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. Martinez filed
a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Martinez
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2685 Page 2
responded under Circuit Rule 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we
limit our review to the subjects that counsel and Martinez discuss. See United States v.
Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
In his Anders submission, counsel informs us that Martinez does not wish to
challenge his guilty plea, so counsel appropriately refrains from discussing any
arguments related to the plea’s validity. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349
(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel first considers challenging the judge’s finding that Martinez was
ineligible for safety-valve relief from his 10-year statutory minimum sentence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f). To qualify for such relief, a defendant must not have committed a prior
offense amounting to at least three criminal history points. Id.; United States v. Pace,
48 F.4th 741, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2022). Martinez has such an offense: a 2015 state conviction
for dealing cocaine. At sentencing, Martinez contended that the cocaine dealing was
merely “relevant conduct” to the charged offense, and relevant conduct ordinarily is
not factored in a defendant’s criminal history calculation. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2); United
States v. Nance, 611 F.3d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 2010). The judge, after holding an evidentiary
hearing, disagreed and found Martinez ineligible for safety-valve relief.
Counsel correctly concludes that it would be frivolous to challenge the judge’s
conclusion that the prior drug offense was not relevant conduct. To assess relevant
conduct, a judge evaluates whether there is a “strong relationship” between the current
offense and the previous conduct, accounting for such factors as “similarity, regularity,
and temporal proximity.” United States v. Hubbert, 35 F4th 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 2022)
(internal citations omitted). And the judge here appropriately highlighted facts
confirming that the prior offense was not sufficiently related to the current offense: the
disparate quantity of drugs (100 grams in the prior offense versus almost 100 kilograms
in the instant offense); different suppliers; different locations (Joliet and Chicago); and
lack of temporal proximity (the offenses occurred more than a year apart). See United
States v. Draheim, 958 F.3d 651, 658–60 (7th Cir. 2020). In his Rule 51(b) response,
Martinez disputes these factual findings but points to no evidence in the record that
contradicts the district court’s conclusions, and we do not re-weigh evidence on appeal.
United States v. Wallace, 991 F.3d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 2021).
Counsel also properly rejects reprising Martinez’s argument at sentencing that he
does not meet all three of the criteria under § 3553(f)(1) needed to disqualify him from

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No. 23-2685 Page 3
safety-valve relief.∗ The Supreme Court has made clear that only one of the
disqualifying factors is needed to preclude safety-valve relief. Pulsifer v. United States,
601 U.S. 124, 152 (2024); see also Pace, 48 F.4th at 756.
Finally, counsel rules out any challenge to Martinez’s sentence. Martinez
received the statutory minimum term of imprisonment and supervised release and so
could not demonstrate that the sentence was unreasonable. See United States v. Spann,
682 F.3d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2012).
Martinez also argues, for the first time, that he should receive a sentence
reduction to account for the two and half years he spent in federal prison for his 2015
drug offense. Under the Guidelines, time served for one offense can be credited to a
sentence for another offense if the first offense is relevant conduct to the second offense.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b); see United States v. Conley, 777 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2015). But
because Martinez offered nothing to disturb the district judge’s conclusion that the 2015
offense was not relevant conduct to his current offense, he cannot receive credit for the
time served.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
∗ A defendant meets the criteria in § 3553(f)(1) if:
“(1) The defendant does not have –
(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history
points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the
sentencing guidelines;
(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
and
(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing
guidelines[.]”

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