Christopher Stephen Beckman v. Christina Reagle

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 28, 2024*
Decided August 29, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2962
CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN BECKMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHRISTINA REAGLE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:20-cv-00607-JPH-MKK
James Patrick Hanlon,
Judge.
O R D E R
Christopher Beckman sued the Indiana Department of Correction to enjoin
enforcement of policies that restrict him from receiving certain printed materials
through the mail. The district court ruled against Beckman at summary judgment, and
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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we affirm because, on this record, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that the
Department’s policies lack a legitimate penological justification.
While incarcerated at Indiana’s Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Beckman
submitted to the mailroom a list of publications related to role-playing games or
collectable-card games, asking if the materials were permitted under the prison’s
policies. Prison staff said the materials would be considered contraband, so Beckman
did not order them. But he later ordered other materials for role-playing games, as well
as a biography about an adult film star, pornographic magazines and catalogues, and
magazines and photographs with sexual content (but not nudity). In keeping with
Department policy, the prison reviewed these materials and confiscated everything
except some of the photographs; it made black-and-white copies of those, retained the
originals, and gave the copies to Beckman.
In a third amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Beckman sued the
Department’s Commissioner, Christina Reagle, in her official capacity, asserting that the
Department’s policies violated the First Amendment. He sought to enjoin enforcement
of three policies: the prohibition of role-playing or collectible-card game materials, a ban
on materials containing nudity or sexually explicit content, and the substitution of
black-and-white copies for original photographs. During the litigation, Beckman was
transferred to Indiana State Prison, where he continued to order materials that the
mailroom staff confiscated for violating these Department policies.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. With its motion, the Department
submitted an affidavit from Andy Dunigan, the Department’s policy manager. Dunigan
attested that sexually explicit materials incited sexual aggression, particularly against
female guards, and hindered the rehabilitation of sex offenders who might gain access
to other prisoners’ materials. He also opined that role-playing games encouraged gang
activities because they promote rigid, hierarchical structures. Further, Dunigan asserted
that role-playing and collectible-card games encouraged obsessions with escape,
weapons, and violence or could otherwise lead prisoners to ignore staff. Finally,
Dunigan said that the prison provided only copies of all photographs to prevent drugs
from entering prisons via paper laced with illicit substances. The only evidence
Beckman submitted in support of his motion were several black-and-white copies of the
photographs with sexual material, meant to show the poor quality of the copies.
Beckman otherwise generally disagreed with Dunigan’s assessments, offering
anecdotes and his opinion in support.

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No. 23-2962 Page 3
The district court then granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment
and denied Beckman’s, concluding that Dunigan’s affidavit adequately justified the
Department’s policies and that Beckman’s unsworn personal opinions could not create
a triable issue of fact when weighed against that evidence.
While the summary-judgment motions were pending, Beckman had moved for
sanctions because staff at Indiana State Prison destroyed some of his confiscated mail
even though counsel for the Department had instructed them to “preserve all material
the Department … has confiscated.” Counsel asserted that this was an accident and
submitted an affidavit from the mailroom supervisor attesting that staff misunderstood
counsel’s instruction as being backward-looking only. The district court concluded that
Beckman had not shown bad faith and denied sanctions for spoliation of evidence.
On appeal, Beckman first challenges the denial of an injunction against
enforcement of the Department’s policies restricting access to sexually explicit
materials, role-playing and collectible-card game materials, and original copies of
photographs. It is unclear whether Beckman intended to bring a facial or as-applied
challenge. But because facial challenges are disfavored, see Moody v. NetChoice, LLC,
144 S. Ct. 2383, 2397, 2409 (2024), and because Beckman makes some arguments
suggesting the policies should not be applied to him and the materials he ordered, we
will understand him to raise an as-applied challenge. To determine if the Department’s
policies violate Beckman’s rights under the First Amendment, we consider whether
(1) the policies are rationally connected to a legitimate government interest; (2) he can
still exercise the asserted right in some fashion; (3) reducing restrictions will adversely
affect guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) there are
“ready alternatives” to the challenged policies. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91
(1987).
1. Materials Containing Nudity or Sexually Explicit Content
To start, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Department’s policy
restricting materials containing nudity or sexually explicit content was irrational or
unconnected to a legitimate government interest. Prisoner rehabilitation and the
prevention of violence against prison staff are legitimate penological interests.
See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 129, 133–34 (2003). Dunigan attested that in his
professional judgment, the policy furthers both. Indeed, we have previously held that
reducing sexual harassment of female prison guards can justify restricting materials
containing nudity. See Payton v. Cannon, 806 F.3d 1109, 1110 (7th Cir. 2015). Once the
Department provided a plausible explanation for this policy, the burden was on

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Beckman to present evidence calling that explanation into question. See Singer v.
Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 536–37 (7th Cir. 2010). He presented nothing but his opinion and
anecdotes to illustrate that the policy sweeps too broadly and is ineffective. This cannot
overcome the “substantial deference” we must accord to “the professional judgment of
prison administrators.” Overton, 539 U.S. at 132; see also Singer, 593 F.3d at 536–37.
Neither can questioning the sincerity of the Department’s justifications for
banning materials depicting nudity or sexually explicit content. Beckman notes that the
Department does not prohibit all materials containing nudity or violence: It allows
inmates to order publications displaying nudity in an educational or incidental manner,
as well as the Bible and other religious texts, which contain violence. But “inconsistent
results are not necessarily signs of arbitrariness or irrationality.” Munson v. Gaetz,
673 F.3d 630, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 n.15
(1989)). Whatever the superficial similarities, there are significant differences between
sexually explicit magazines and educational or religious texts within a prison setting.
And Beckman makes no effort to explain why distinguishing between them is irrational
(indeed, his argument would support banning more material, not less).
The other Turner factors also weigh in favor of the policies. As to the second
factor—whether the prisoner has alternative means of exercising their right—Beckman
is still free to order materials with sexual content, as long as there are no pictorial
depictions of nudity or sexually explicit acts. As to the third Turner factor, Dunigan
attested that exceptions to the policy could increase sexual violence toward prison
guards. Finally, Beckman asserts that as a ready alternative to the ban, the Department
should just enforce its policies prohibiting harassment of staff. But he presented no
evidence that the Department does not already punish prisoners who harass staff, or
that doing so more zealously would be as effective at reducing sexual harassment as the
ban on sexually explicit materials. See Singer, 593 F.3d at 539–40.
2. Role-Playing and Collectible-Card Games
As for the Department’s restrictions on role-playing and collectible-card game
materials, the evidence again supports summary judgment for the Department. In
Singer, we held that prison officials could ban role-playing games and related materials
out of concern that the games encouraged development of gangs and fostered
obsessions with escaping and violence. Id. at 535–40. Here, Dunigan explained similar
concerns and pointed to one more—that inmates could become engrossed in the games
and ignore directions from prison staff. His professional judgment on matters of inmate
behavior and prison safety is entitled to deference. Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. And

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Beckman did not contradict these plausible justifications with reliable evidence; his
opinions do not qualify. See Payton, 806 F.3d at 1110.
The other Turner factors also favor the Department on this policy. Beckman does
not contest that other tabletop games are available, and he offers no ready alternative
that also would serve the Department’s legitimate interests. Indeed, because prison
safety and inmate rehabilitation underlie the role-playing and collectible-card game
bans, “it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to dream up a realistically implementable
alternative policy that would serve [the Department’s] interests with similar efficacy
and efficiency.” Singer, 593 F.3d at 539–40.
3. Photocopying Mail
Summary judgment for the Department was also warranted with respect to the
Department’s practice of providing only copies of the photographs to Beckman and
withholding the originals. Beckman concedes that the policy serves an important
interest—combatting the introduction of drugs into prisons. He mainly argues that
there are less restrictive ways to accomplish this goal. For example, the prison could
make color photocopies or test the mail for drugs. But he offers no evidence to show
that these accommodations would not affect the prison system’s financial resources (the
third Turner factor). Indeed, we have found providing copies of mail to be a desirable
alternative to blanket prohibitions on receiving certain types of mail. See Lindell v. Frank,
377 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2004).
To the extent Beckman argues that the prison staff’s treatment of his mail did not
conform to the policies or state law, his point is immaterial. Violations of state law or
agency policies are “completely immaterial as to the question of whether a violation of
the federal constitution has been established.” McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 668
(7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
Finally, Beckman argues that the district court should have sanctioned the
Department for spoliation of evidence because prison staff destroyed some of his mail,
but the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. A court must
make a finding of bad faith—that the offending party destroyed evidence “for the
purpose of hiding adverse information”—before imposing sanctions for spoliation.
Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013). And here, the prison’s mailroom
supervisor attested that staff destroyed mail received later because defense counsel told
them to “preserve all material the Department … has confiscated.” (Emphasis added).
Beckman argues that because the email said “all,” staff surely knew that they needed to

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retain mail regardless of when it was confiscated. But this ignores the second half of the
instruction, which was phrased in the past tense and could reasonably be interpreted as
a directive not to destroy what already had been confiscated. The court was well within
reason to credit the Department’s explanation for the mistake.
AFFIRMED

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