M.t.b. v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued September 5, 2024
Decided October 2, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2941
M.T.B.,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A000-000-000
O R D E R
M.T.B., a Mexican citizen, petitions for review of the denial of his application for
deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. M.T.B. fears he will be
tortured by the Sinaloa Cartel if he is removed to Mexico. Because substantial evidence
supports the immigration judge’s decision that M.T.B. failed to show he faced a
substantial risk of torture, we deny the petition for review.
M.T.B. has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over 30
years. After he pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 23-2941 Page 2
Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Although conceding
his removability, M.T.B. applied for deferral of removal under the Convention Against
Torture. He claimed his wife’s family will ask the Sinaloa Cartel to locate and torture
him because he had a falling out with the family and because he cooperated with a
federal investigation of the cartel.
At a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), M.T.B. testified that if he is
removed to Mexico, he would be unable to hide from the cartel because he will remain
in contact with his wife, S.V., and her family will tell the cartel where he is. M.T.B. also
had an expert witness, Dr. Rosen, testify that someone targeted by the cartel could not
relocate safely in Mexico. The IJ found the testimony of M.T.B. and Dr. Rosen credible.
After the hearing, the IJ denied M.T.B.’s application. The IJ determined that
M.T.B. did not show “that each step in the hypothetical chain of events leading to any
future torture is more likely than not to happen.” Specifically, the IJ found M.T.B. did
not adequately show (1) that his wife’s family would ask the cartel (or that the cartel
would agree) to locate and torture M.T.B. over a family vendetta, (2) that his wife’s
family knows or will find out he cooperated with law enforcement, and (3) that the
cartel could locate him in Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted and
affirmed the IJ’s decision, determining that the IJ’s findings were not clearly erroneous.
In his petition, M.T.B. first challenges the Board’s application of clear error
review. But M.T.B. does not explain how the Board misapplied clear error review, and
the case law he relies on does not help his argument. In Estrada-Martinez v. Lynch, 809
F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2015), we granted the petition because the Board did not give enough
deference to the IJ’s findings of fact. Id. at 894–95. Here, M.T.B. would need to show the
opposite—that the Board was too deferential to the IJ’s findings. He has not done so.
The Board articulated the correct standard of review and appropriately explained what
facts in the record supported the IJ’s findings.
M.T.B. next argues that the IJ erred by failing to consider the aggregate risk of
torture posed by the family vendetta and his cooperation with law enforcement. But we
have advised that “the agency may address risk factors individually so long as it
considers all sources of and reasons for risk cumulatively to determine whether there is
a substantial risk of torture.” Nyandwi v. Garland, 15 F.4th 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2021). That is
what the IJ did here. He considered the two risk factors individually and then
determined that the aggregate risk the cartel posed to M.T.B. was not substantial, in
part because it was likely M.T.B. could safely relocate within Mexico. M.T.B. suggests
that the IJ erred by placing the burden on him to show he could not safely relocate in
Mexico, but he bore the burden of establishing the likelihood of torture if he is returned

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 23-2941 Page 3
to Mexico. Barry v. Barr, 916 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2019). That inquiry encompasses
several factors, including evidence of the inability to relocate within the country. Id.
Finally, M.T.B. challenges the Board’s overall denial of his application. To be
entitled to deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, M.T.B. had to
show that he faces a “substantial risk” of torture that is “intentionally inflicted with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official.” Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676, 686
(7th Cir. 2021). When the Board “adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision and adds its own
analysis, as it did here, we review both decisions.” Halim v. Holder, 755 F.3d 506, 511
(7th Cir. 2014). Our review is limited to “the highly deferential substantial evidence
test,” which requires us to affirm if the Board’s decision is supported “by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole and permits us
to reverse only if the facts compel the opposite conclusion.” Mabuneza v. Garland, 16
F.4th 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Here, the Board agreed with the IJ that
M.T.B. does not face a substantial risk of torture by the Sinaloa Cartel.* The Board’s
decision rested mainly on three findings, all of which are supported by the record.
First, the Board found that M.T.B. had not shown that S.V.’s family was part of
the cartel, which made it unlikely that they would ask for and receive the cartel’s
assistance. M.T.B.’s testimony on this issue was speculative and uncertain, and the IJ
did not need to find it persuasive just because he found M.T.B. credible. See Garland v.
Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 371–72 (2021); Pineda-Teruel v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1216, 1222 (7th
Cir. 2021). Second, the Board found that the reduction in M.T.B.’s sentence would not
cause S.V.’s family to suspect he cooperated with law enforcement. This finding was
adequately supported by the record. M.T.B.’s reduced sentence was still comparable to
his co-defendants, and S.V.’s family is aware that sentences can change for reasons
other than cooperation—S.V.’s own brother was released early. Third, the Board found
that M.T.B. had not shown that S.V. would tell her family where he is in Mexico or that
he cooperated with law enforcement. The evidence showed that M.T.B. and S.V.
maintain a somewhat friendly relationship and that S.V. is unwilling to get in the
middle of anything involving M.T.B. and her family. M.T.B.’s alternative reading of the
record, while plausible, does not compel the opposite conclusion.
DENIED
* Because the Board did not address whether the risk of torture M.T.B. faces is “intentionally inflicted
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official,” Meraz-Saucedo, 986 F.3d at 686, we do not consider
the issue either, see Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that our review is
limited to the basis the Board articulated for denying relief under the Convention Against Torture).

-- 3 of 3 --