United States of America v. Richard A. Wells

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 22, 2024
Decided October 23, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2701
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RICHARD A. WELLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:21CR00193-002
James Patrick Hanlon,
Judge.
O R D E R
Richard Wells pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and
was sentenced to thirty years in prison. Wells appeals, but his appointed lawyer moves
to withdraw, contending that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967). We notified Wells of counsel’s motion, and he did not respond. See C IR .
R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses issues that an
appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses (with one exception
we note later). See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the
motion and dismiss the appeal.
Wells was involved in a drug-trafficking organization, led by co-defendant Jason
Betts, that sold large quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl in the Indianapolis
area. In July 2021, Wells and his co-conspirators were indicted under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Betts cooperated with the government. Wells ultimately pleaded
guilty, without a plea agreement, to the second superseding indictment.
At the change-of-plea hearing, Wells confirmed under oath that he understood
the charge, the penalties, and the rights he was waiving, and he affirmed that his plea
was voluntary. He confirmed his knowing participation in the conspiracy and admitted
that it involved at least 2,507 grams of methamphetamine. The district court found a
sufficient factual basis—after a sustained colloquy because of Wells’s adamance that
trafficking fentanyl was not a goal of the conspiracy—and accepted Wells’s guilty plea.
A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR
calculated a base offense level of 38 because Wells’s offense involved more than 90,000
kilograms of converted drug weight. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1). The PSR added two
levels for the possession of a firearm in relation to the offense, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and
removed two levels for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1(a). Wells was a career
offender under § 4B1.1(a) based on two prior qualifying convictions, and he was
therefore assigned a criminal history category of VI. (His offense level remained as
calculated under § 2D1.1 because it was higher than the career-offender offense level,
see id. § 4B1.1(b).) Based on the total offense level of 38 and a criminal history category
of VI, the PSR calculated a guideline range of 360 months to life imprisonment and 5
years’ supervised release.
Wells objected to the quantity of methamphetamine used to set his base offense
level because the only evidence for some portion of it was the testimony of Betts at a
co-defendant’s trial. Wells argued that Betts, who led the drug-trafficking operation,
was not credible and that the base offense level should be 36 based on objective (mainly
wiretap) evidence. For its part, the government objected to any reduction for acceptance
of responsibility because of Wells’s objections to the factual basis at his plea hearing.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court first resolved the parties’ objections
to the PSR. Wells’s brother (also a co-defendant) testified that Wells had received less

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No. 23-2701 Page 3
methamphetamine than the PSR stated and questioned the truthfulness of Betts’s
testimony. But the court overruled Wells’s objection to the drug quantity. The court
found that Betts’s trial testimony was credible and that Wells’s brother’s testimony was
unreliable and insufficient to rebut Betts’s more specific testimony. The court also
overruled the government’s objection to the reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
and so it ultimately adopted the guidelines calculations in the PSR. The district court
then weighed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and imposed a low-end
sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release.
In her Anders brief, counsel first states that she consulted with Wells and
confirmed that he does not wish to withdraw his guilty plea, so counsel properly omits
discussion of potential arguments related to Wells’s plea or plea colloquy. See United
States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024).
Counsel next considers arguments that Wells could make about the sentence.
First, counsel correctly concludes that any procedural challenge would be frivolous.
With respect to the base offense level, counsel recognizes that a challenge could succeed
only if we found clear error in the court’s credibility determination about Betts’s
testimony. See United States v. DeLeon, 603 F.3d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). Because the
court chose between two permissible views of the evidence and clearly stated the
reasons for doing so, we would not reverse its decision; the district court is best
positioned to evaluate the record and the testimony. See United States v. Austin, 806 F.3d
425, 431–33 (7th Cir. 2015). Indeed, a district court’s determination of witness credibility
“can virtually never be clear error,” so any challenge on this issue would be frivolous.
United States v. Olson, 41 F.4th 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2022). Wells did not preserve any other
challenges to his guidelines range, and counsel does not identify any other potential
arguments about the procedural soundness of the sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (listing the primary procedural errors).
Counsel does not discuss the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, but we
observe for the sake of completeness that it would be frivolous for Wells to argue that
the sentence is unreasonably long. A within-guidelines sentence is presumptively
reasonable, and we will affirm if the judge provides an “adequate statement of
reasons.” United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384–85 (7th Cir. 2022). Here, the district
court explained the sentence with reference to the § 3553(a) factors, highlighting the
“extremely serious” nature of the offense (“vast quantities of extremely dangerous
drugs” over a long time period and the involvement of firearms), the need to protect the
public, and Wells’s criminal history (including his squandering of the “break of a

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lifetime,” a probation sentence for a recent felony). Balancing these factors against
Wells’s rehabilitative conduct, the support of his family, and the sentences given to
Wells’s co-defendants, the court settled on the low-range sentence of 360 months. Wells
would be unable to overcome the presumption of reasonableness on appeal.
We GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.

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