United States of America v. Juan Corona-Gonzalez

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 30, 2024 *
Decided November 1, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1535
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JUAN CORONA-GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:08-cr-00034-JRS-MJD-1
James R. Sweeney II,
Judge.
O R D E R
Juan Corona-Gonzalez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied his
motion because he did not show that a change in the law created a disparity between
his sentence and the one he would receive if sentenced today. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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Corona-Gonzalez was found guilty by a jury of possessing with intent to
distribute and knowingly distributing 500 grams or more of a mixture containing
methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of
that offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The government presented evidence at trial that the
drugs he trafficked had tested positive for methamphetamine. These tests did not assess
the purity of the methamphetamine.
The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report that held
Corona-Gonzalez responsible for possessing 316.3 grams of “pure” methamphetamine
(from a total of 660.4 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine).† The purity level of the methamphetamine is consequential under
the Sentencing Guidelines because it drives the applicable base offense level.
See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).
At sentencing, the district court adopted the findings of the PSR. Corona-
Gonzalez’s recommended guidelines range for the drug offenses (the firearms offense
was calculated separately) was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment: He had a baseline
offense level of 36 (34 for possession of more than 150 but less than 500 grams of pure
methamphetamine plus an upward adjustment of two for obstruction of justice at his
trial), and a criminal history category of III. Corona-Gonzalez did not object to the PSR’s
findings about the quantity of pure methamphetamine. The court then sentenced him to
300 months’ imprisonment—two concurrent 240-month sentences for the drug offenses
† The PSR stated that it derived these figures from a chemical analysis performed by the
DEA’s North Central Laboratory in Chicago. The PSR’s reference to “pure”
methamphetamine, however, is confusing in that “pure” is not a classification used in
the Guidelines. The Guidelines, instead, rely upon categories of methamphetamine
(actual) and methamphetamine (ice). Methamphetamine “actual” refers to the weight of
the methamphetamine itself in a mixture. See United States v. Johnson, 94 F.4th 661, 663
(7th Cir. 2024); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Notes to Drug Quantity Table (B). Methamphetamine
“ice” refers to a mixture containing d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at least 80%
purity. Id. § 2D1.1, Notes to Drug Quantity Table (C). Corona-Gonzalez’s PSR elsewhere
clarifies that it was assessing his offense level based on methamphetamine “actual.”
Notwithstanding any confusion in the terminology, the way in which the PSR classified
the methamphetamine does not affect this appeal because the offense level under
methamphetamine “ice” and “actual” is the same. See United States v. Yates, 98 F.4th 826,
832–33 (7th Cir. 2024); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).

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No. 24-1535 Page 3
plus a consecutive 60 months for the firearms offense. We vacated his sentence for
procedural error. See United States v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2010).
On remand, the district court sentenced him to 288 months in prison. We
dismissed his appeal. See United States v. Corona-Gonzalez, 452 F. App’x 685 (7th Cir.
2011).
In 2016, Corona-Gonzalez moved to reduce his sentence, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which lowered his offense
level for the drug offense from 34 to 32, his total offense level from 36 to 34, and his
guidelines range from 235 to 293 months to 188 to 235 months. The district court
reduced his sentence to 252 months—192 months for the drug offenses and 60 months
on the gun charge.
In 2023, Corona-Gonzalez again moved for a sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) based on a new policy statement, § 1B1.13(b)(6), which allows certain
defendants to seek early release based on intervening changes in law. He asserted that a
recent judicial decision, United States v. Carnell, 972 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2020), was a
change in the law that had the effect of invalidating his sentence. In Carnell, we held
that the government could not rely upon statements from users and police about
methamphetamine’s purity levels to prove that a defendant dealt or possessed
methamphetamine “ice”; such statements, we explained, could not prove purity levels
with precision. Id. at 941–43. Corona-Gonzalez argued that the statement in his PSR
attributing 316.3 grams of “pure” methamphetamine to him was—as in Carnell—
insufficiently reliable to support his sentence. He also asserted that Alleyne v. United
States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013), further invalidated his sentence because it required the
government at trial to prove purity beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district judge denied the motion. The judge explained that his ultimate
conclusion—that Corona-Gonzalez had not identified a change in law that would cause
a disparity in his sentence if he were sentenced today—allowed him to sidestep our
caselaw holding that new judicial decisions are not extraordinary and compelling
reasons for granting compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), see, e.g., United States
v. Von Vader, 58 F.4th 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2023); United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 595
(7th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021)), and the
question whether the Sentencing Commission may have exceeded its authority in
adopting § 1B1.13(b)(6). With regard to Corona-Gonzalez’s reliance on Carnell, the judge
found the case inapplicable. The evidence we had rejected in Carnell to prove the purity

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No. 24-1535 Page 4
classification of the methamphetamine was not at issue here. Moreover, there was no
dispute at Corona-Gonzalez’s sentencing about the purity of the methamphetamine
attributable to him. As for Alleyne, which held that any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the statutory minimum must be submitted to the jury, 570 U.S. at
103, the judge found this case inapplicable too because the purity level of Corona-
Gonzalez’s methamphetamine did not affect the statutory maximum or minimum
penalty to which he was exposed.
On appeal, Corona-Gonzalez first challenges the district court’s determination
that Carnell did not apply. He contends that the PSR’s statement that 316.3 of the 660
grams of methamphetamine tested were “pure” is the kind of “vague” description that
we criticized in Carnell when rejecting methods of proof that could not prove exact
purity levels. Because the lab report mentioned in the PSR stated only that the
methamphetamine was “pure” (without specifying any percentage of purity), he argues
that this evidence was insufficiently reliable to establish that the methamphetamine was
at least 80% pure—the baseline level for methamphetamine “ice.” See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,
Notes to Drug Quantity Table (C).
Even if we, like the district court, assume that the Commission was within its
authority to adopt § 1B1.13(b)(6), Carnell would not affect Corona-Gonzalez’s sentence
because the government did not rely on any of the types of evidence we rejected in that
case to prove the purity level of the methamphetamine attributable to him. Carnell held
that proof of methamphetamine “ice” could not be established merely by a lay person’s
statement. 972 F.3d at 942–43. But there, we also stated that chemical-analysis testing in
a laboratory would be the best way to determine purity levels. Id. at 943 (quoting United
States v. Walker, 688 F.3d 416, 425 n.4 (8th Cir. 2012)). And that is the sort of evidence
that the government relied on here. According to the PSR, a chemical analysis of the
seized substance determined that 316.3 grams were methamphetamine (actual). And to
the extent Corona-Gonzalez seeks to challenge the reliability of the lab report itself, a
motion under § 3582 is not the proper vehicle to raise an argument that could have been
advanced on direct appeal. See United States v. Brock, 39 F.4th 462, 465 (7th Cir. 2022).
Corona-Gonzalez also challenges the district court’s conclusion that Alleyne did
not apply to his case. He asserts that the government failed to meet its burden at trial of
proving purity to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. But because the purity level
alters only the calculation of the guidelines range (and not the statutory range of the
offense), it may be determined at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005); United States v. Miedzianowski,

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No. 24-1535 Page 5
60 F.4th 1051, 1057 (7th Cir. 2023). The government was not required to prove the purity
level at trial.
Finally, Corona-Gonzalez asserts that the district court erred by not addressing
the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But the court did not need to reach this
step because it found that he had not first identified an extraordinary and compelling
reason for a sentence reduction. See United States v. Newton, 37 F.4th 1207, 1210 (7th Cir.
2022).
AFFIRMED

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