United States of America v. Devontae Martin

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-3086
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DEVONTAE M ARTIN ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:18-cr-00021-TLS-APR-5 — Philip P. Simon, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 1, 2024 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 2, 2024
____________________
Before BRENNAN , S CUDDER , and M ALDONADO, Circuit
Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. Devontae Martin received a life
sentence for his role in a July 2017 federal drug offense in
which a fellow drug dealer shot and killed a local car wash
owner believed to possess a substantial stash of cocaine. We
have little trouble affirming Martin’s sentence. But we do so
by undertaking our own independent review of the sentenc-
ing hearing, rejecting the government’s invitation to review

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2 No. 23-3086
only for plain error. We have held many times over in recent
years that a defendant like Martin need not object at sentenc-
ing to an error believed to occur during sentencing itself to
preserve the issue for de novo review on appeal. See,
e.g., United States v. Wood, 31 F.4th 593 (7th Cir. 2022); United
States v. Wilcher, 91 F.4th 864 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v.
Martin, 109 F.4th 985 (7th Cir. 2024). That is exactly the cir-
cumstance here. We are running low on patience with the lack
of adherence to our precedent in this area.
I
Devontae Martin was a key player in Teddia Caldwell’s
drug distribution operation in Gary, Indiana. Caldwell
owned a car wash in Gary. Upon learning that another local
car wash owner, Kevin Hood, might have a large stash of
drugs and money, Caldwell proposed a robbery. Martin told
Caldwell he and “his people would get on it.” His people in-
cluded Taquan Clarke. Martin’s plan was simple: he and
Clarke would show up at Hood’s car wash, “kidnap him, and
hold him for ransom” until he turned over the drugs.
On July 28, 2017, Martin, armed with an AK-47 assault ri-
fle, and Clarke, carrying a pistol, drove to Hood’s car wash.
An employee, likely presuming that the two men were there
for a wash, helped guide them into the wash bay. From there,
however, Martin and Clarke suddenly jumped out of their
SUV brandishing guns. Martin shouted at bystanders to get
down and then used the AK-47 to strike the employee who
had just helped him into the car wash in the head. Martin and
Clarke then attempted to kick down the door to the office
where they believed Hood was working. Hood reacted by
running and a chase ensued, leading to Martin catching and
tussling with Hood in the parking lot. Two shots rang out

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No. 23-3086 3
from Martin’s AK-47 during the struggle. The tangle ended
when Clarke approached and shot Hood in the head, killing
him.
Federal drug and firearms charges followed, and Martin
chose to go to trial. A jury found him guilty of both a drug
conspiracy charge (21 U.S.C. § 846) and carrying, using, and
discharging a firearm during and in connection with the drug
offense (18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (j)).
Everyone agreed at sentencing that Martin faced an advi-
sory range of life imprisonment under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. The district court applied the factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), and especially underscored the gravity of Martin’s
offense conduct, including his “shockingly violent” decision
to take an AK-47 to a public place surrounded by ordinary
people “going about their day” to confront Kevin Hood. On
the mitigating side, the district court acknowledged Martin’s
difficult upbringing but, in the end, declined to vary down-
ward from the advisory range of life imprisonment.
Martin now appeals, challenging his sentence on two
grounds.
II
First, Martin contends that the district court procedurally
erred by believing it could impose a sentence of less than life
imprisonment only by identifying a departure ground ex-
pressly authorized by the Guidelines. The sentencing tran-
script shows otherwise, however.
Early in the proceeding, the district court asked the parties
whether a sentence of less than life might be justified based
on a Guidelines application note stating that a “downward
departure may be warranted” in cases of felony murder, “[i]f

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4 No. 23-3086
the defendant did not cause the death intentionally or know-
ingly.” See U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 cmt. n.2(B). After hearing the par-
ties’ perspectives, the district court decided to impose a life
sentence. A full and fair reading of the transcript does not
show that the district court believed it lacked authority or dis-
cretion beyond that recognized in application note 2(B). To
the contrary, the transcript shows that the district court un-
derstood that the advisory guideline range provided only a
“starting point” for determining an appropriate sentence. The
district judge then proceeded to consider and apply the fac-
tors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), ultimately explaining
that, after considering all aggravating and mitigating factors
and “contemplat[ing]” the Guidelines application note, the
court was “exercising [its] discretion to not depart in the case
or to vary, either.”
On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court
construed the Sentencing Guidelines generally or application
note 2(B) specifically as limiting its discretion to sentence
Martin to something less than life imprisonment.
Second, Martin contends that the district court sentenced
him based on inaccurate information. He sees the ultimate
sentencing decision as rooted in findings that he both fired his
AK-47 during the struggle with Hood and indeed intended to
commit murder. Here, too, the sentencing transcript shows
otherwise. Foremost, while the government argued that Mar-
tin fired a shot and sought to kill Hood, the district court
never credited those contentions. Indeed, the court was care-
ful to observe no more than that “shots [ ] were fired by [the
AK-47]”—a statement that stopped short of finding that Mar-
tin affirmatively or intentionally pulled the trigger. Nor do we
see anything in the sentencing transcript showing or

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No. 23-3086 5
suggesting the district court determined that Martin intended
to kill Hood when the robbery plan went bad. The record, in
short, does not support the contention that the district court
sentenced Martin based on inaccurate information. See United
States v. Gamble, 969 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2020).
III
In no way do we discount the gravity of Martin’s life sen-
tence. But having taken our own fresh and independent look
at the sentencing proceeding in the district court—as de novo
review requires we do—we are confident no error occurred.
We pause on this point because the government insists that
our review should be for plain error. In doing so, the govern-
ment disregards three recent holdings explaining that a de-
fendant like Devontae Martin need not object at sentencing to
an error believed to occur during sentencing itself to preserve
the issue for de novo review on appeal.
By now our precedent is crystal clear on the point. In
United States v. Wood, we explained that “Rule 51(a) states in
no uncertain terms: ‘[e]xceptions to rulings or orders of the
court are unnecessary’ to preserve a basis for appeal.” 31 F.4th
at 597 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(a)). So when the “grounds
for appeal existed prior to and separate from the district
court's ultimate ruling,” a party waives their claim of error if
they fail to raise it in the district court. Id. at 598. When the
error is “created by the district court’s ruling itself,” however,
a defendant is not required to contemporaneously object to
the error to preserve it for de novo review. Id.
Lest there be any doubt, we reinforced the point in plain,
practical terms. “A district court’s explanation of its
sentencing decision, regardless of whether it precedes or

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6 No. 23-3086
follows the announcement of the sentence itself,” we
observed, “is a ruling to which an exception is not required.”
Id. at 597. Such a ruling or determination does not require a
defendant to object—either by interrupting the sentencing
judge mid-explanation or by raising the issue at some point
before the proceeding concludes—to preserve a basis for error
on appeal. See id. at 598–99.
We returned to the same issue two years later in United
States v. Wilcher, again rejecting the government’s invitation
to review for plain error because Joseph Wilcher’s contentions
on appeal—that the district court relied on an improper con-
sideration in determining his sentence and failed to consider
his mitigation arguments—arose out of the district court’s
sentencing determination and accompanying explanation.
91 F.4th at 870. Our review, then, was de novo and not merely
for plain error.
So too in United States v. Martin, decided just six months
after Wilcher. 109 F.4th 985. There the government—seeming
to resist our holding in Wood—pressed us to review Darkel
Martin’s challenge to alleged procedural errors in the sentenc-
ing decision for plain error. See id. at 988. Returning to Wood,
we observed that because Martin premised his claims “en-
tirely on the adequacy of the district court’s explanation of its
sentencing decision,” our review was de novo. Id.
Wood, Wilcher, and Martin reflect the law of this circuit.
Unless and until the full court chooses to revisit these cases,
all parties—the government included—must follow them.
With these closing observations, we AFFIRM.

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