United States of America v. Steven M. Stathas, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 2, 2024
Decided December 3, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1001
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
STEVEN M. STATHAS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-cr-00104-BHL
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Steven Stathas pleaded guilty to enticing a minor and was sentenced to 180
months in prison and 10 years of supervised release. Although his plea agreement
contains an appellate waiver, Stathas filed a notice of appeal. His appointed counsel
contends that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses
issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because counsel’s
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1001 Page 2
analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses,
plus the additional arguments that Stathas proposes in his response under Circuit Rule
51(b). See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
At the time of the offense, Stathas was a 31-year-old Wisconsin resident. He used
social media to communicate with a 15-year-old girl who lived in Kentucky. Aware of
her age, Stathas sent the victim numerous sexually graphic messages and persuaded her
to engage in sexual activity with him. He traveled to Kentucky to meet the victim three
times for that purpose. During the third visit, in November 2021, Stathas drove the
victim from Kentucky to Wisconsin. The victim’s family reported her missing, and
police soon discovered her contacts with Stathas and surmised that she was on her way
to Stathas’s home. Local police officers intercepted their vehicle near Stathas’s home
and arrested him. At the time, Stathas denied sexual contact with the victim but added
that any such contact was consensual.
Stathas was charged with enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and
committing a felony offense with a minor while required to register as a sex offender (as
a result of a prior conviction in Wisconsin), 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. Stathas moved to
suppress evidence from the search of his vehicle as well as statements he made while
interrogated at the police station. He argued that the search was unlawful and that his
statements were fruit of an illegal search and arrest. Accepting the report and
recommendation of a magistrate judge over Stathas’s objections, the district judge
denied the motions.
Stathas then entered a written plea agreement with the government in which he
admitted to the above facts and pleaded guilty to enticing a minor to engage in criminal
sexual activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). In his agreement, Stathas waived his right to appeal
or collaterally attack his conviction and to appeal “any pretrial issues, including, but not
limited to, the district court’s denial of his suppression motion.” He also waived any
argument that § 2422(b) or the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutional or does not
apply to his conduct. The waiver makes exceptions for arguments about “sentencing
errors,” “ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the plea
agreement or sentencing,” and the voluntariness of the guilty plea.
At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court placed Stathas under oath and
conducted a colloquy in which it probed Stathas’s understanding of the plea agreement,
the charged offense, and the potential penalties. The court also explained to Stathas the
rights he would waive with a guilty plea—including his right to an appeal or collateral
attack about most issues—and the process of sentencing. Although Stathas expressed

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No. 24-1001 Page 3
that he was “conflicted” about the plea agreement, he ultimately confirmed that he
voluntarily signed the agreement and wished to go through with entering a plea. After
Stathas agreed with the government’s oral summary of the factual basis for his guilt,
and the government reassured Stathas that authorities in other jurisdictions did not
intend to prosecute him for the same course of conduct, the court accepted Stathas’s
guilty plea. Stathas later moved pro se for a change of counsel and to withdraw his
guilty plea. After the court appointed new counsel, Stathas rescinded his motion to
withdraw the plea.
The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report recounting the
offense conduct and Stathas’s criminal history. By statute, Stathas faced 10 years to life
in prison and 5 years to life on supervised release. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b), 3583(k). Based
on a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of II under the Sentencing
Guidelines, the presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated a range of 121 to 151
months’ imprisonment and 5 years to life of supervised release. U.S.S.G. §§ 2G1.3; 3E1.1;
5D1.2(b)(2).
The day before the sentencing hearing, the government filed and moved to seal
victim impact statements by the victim and her mother. At the hearing, defense counsel
told the court that he did not receive copies of the statements until 40 minutes before
the hearing. The court gave Stathas the opportunity to continue the hearing to review
the statements further, but after consulting with his lawyer, he expressly declined.
The district court then adopted the PSR’s calculations with no objections and
heard argument from both parties; Stathas requested a 12-year sentence while the
government advocated for 20 years’ imprisonment. The court next discussed the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It considered mitigating factors, namely,
the sexual abuse Stathas had suffered as a child and his ability to maintain employment.
As aggravating factors, the court discussed his prior conviction for similar conduct and
his failure to take responsibility for his actions in treatment programs during a previous
state prison sentence and while on supervision. The court ultimately imposed 180
months’ imprisonment (29 months above the high end of the Guidelines range) and 10
years of supervised release.
Counsel first informs us that she had the required consultation with Stathas and
determined that he wishes to challenge his guilty plea on appeal, so counsel discusses
whether any challenge would be frivolous. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349
(7th Cir. 2012). When Stathas rescinded his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, he
reaffirmed the original plea, Doe v. United States, 51 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 1995), and so

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No. 24-1001 Page 4
we review the validity of that plea for plain error, see United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d
917, 921 (7th Cir. 2020). But, as counsel rightly concludes, any plain-error challenge to
the validity of the plea would be pointless. The transcript of the plea colloquy reflects
that the district court fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court also advised Stathas of the minimum penalties
that were mandatory. Under oath, Stathas confirmed that he understood the charge, the
penalties, and the rights he was waiving; he also affirmed that his plea was voluntary,
not the product of coercion or given in exchange for any promises outside the plea
agreement. Moreover, each time Stathas expressed reservations or asked questions, the
court allowed him time to speak privately with his attorney, and he re-confirmed that
he wished to proceed with the hearing. Stathas could not establish that the district court
plainly erred by accepting his sworn statements. See United States v. Moody, 770 F.3d 577,
581–82 (7th Cir. 2014).
Because the guilty plea was valid, we would also enforce the waiver provision
limiting the scope of any appeal or collateral attack to discrete issues. The waiver is
enforceable to the same extent as the plea agreement of which it is part. United States v.
Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020).
Counsel next addresses potential challenges to Stathas’s sentence and begins by
explaining, correctly, that Stathas could not plausibly challenge his sentence on any
procedural ground. The appellate waiver applies to any argument that his conduct did
not fall within the Sentencing Guidelines, so he is barred from challenging the specific
offense characteristics that increased his offense level. He could challenge his
Guidelines range only by pointing to “error” in calculating the total offense level and
criminal history category. But Stathas affirmatively agreed to the PSR’s final
calculations before the district court adopted them, and he therefore waived this
argument, too. See United States v. Fuentes, 858 F.3d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 2017).
Arguments about the substantive reasonableness of the sentence are exempt
from the appellate waiver, but counsel correctly concludes that Stathas could not
plausibly argue that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We will uphold an
above-Guidelines sentence if the district court gave adequate justification based on the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), tailored to the circumstances of the case. See United States
v. Ingram, 40 F.4th 791, 796 (7th Cir. 2022). Here, the court discussed circumstances
particular to Stathas such as his history of similar predatory conduct and his poor
performance in previous sex-offender treatment programs. And the court expressly
found that both the offense level and the criminal history category under the Guidelines

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No. 24-1001 Page 5
underrepresented the seriousness of Stathas’s conduct in this instance and his history of
criminal offenses against minors. See United States v. Moultrie, 975 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir.
2020) (criminal history); United States v. Ferguson, 889 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 2018)
(seriousness of offense). The court also adequately considered mitigating factors,
including that Stathas was himself a victim of child sexual abuse and that he has the
capacity for a productive life outside of prison. See United States v. Modjewski, 783 F.3d
645, 654 (7th Cir. 2015). We would not reweigh the factors on appeal.
Counsel states that Stathas wishes to argue that the court should not have
considered the victim impact statements because they were provided with little
advance notice and contained misstatements. But as counsel notes, Stathas expressly
declined an opportunity to request a continuance to review the statements, which
waived the issue of notice. See United States v. Harris, 102 F.4th 847, 850-51 (7th Cir.
2024). And the district court did not cite any information from the victim impact
statements to justify the sentence, except to observe the damaging effect of Stathas’s
conduct on the victim and her family. Stathas therefore would be unable to show that
the district court made any purported inaccuracy a basis of the sentence. See United
States v. Williams, 106 F.4th 639, 656 (7th Cir. 2024).
Counsel concludes her analysis by considering, and rightly rejecting, challenges
to the term or conditions of supervised release. Stathas affirmatively waived objection
to the conditions. He did not object to the term (or request any particular length of
supervision), so he forfeited any challenge. See United States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075,
1083–84 (7th Cir. 2016). And there could be no plain error in imposing the 10-year term;
the maximum was life, and the Guidelines recommend the maximum term for sex
offenses. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b) (policy statement). Moreover, the district court’s
justifications for imposing a term of imprisonment also justified the term of supervised
release. See United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016).
Finally, Stathas proposes arguing that the district court should have granted his
suppression motions and that trial counsel was ineffective by not moving for the
suppression of additional statements. Neither of these issues is appealable in light of the
waiver. It expressly bars suppression arguments, and it preserves ineffective assistance
claims only “in connection with the negotiation of the plea agreement or sentencing.”
Further, it would be frivolous to raise any ineffective assistance challenge on direct
appeal; such claims, if not barred by the waiver, should be saved for collateral review,
where an evidentiary foundation can be developed. See United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d
453, 456–57 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003)).

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Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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