United States of America v. Eric Corder

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 10, 2024*
Decided December 18, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1430
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ERIC CORDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 21-cr-114-1
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
O R D E R
Eric Corder moved to suppress the drug evidence in his criminal case, asserting
that a confidential informant (CS-2) working for law enforcement violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by entering the curtilage of his property to conduct a search without
a warrant or consent. The district judge denied the motion and Corder’s motion to
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1430 Page 2
reconsider. Corder appeals, but we affirm because CS-2 had an implied license to enter
the property and Corder’s voluntary consent to CS-2’s presence there attenuated the
discovery of the evidence from any illegal entry.
Corder lived in a single-family home with a backyard and a detached garage
behind the house. The property was enclosed by a fence with gates at the front and the
rear. A sidewalk ran through the yard from one gate to the other, with the back gate
leading to an alley. Corder lived in the basement (he shared the house with his sister),
and his bedroom had a window on the side of the house.
On December 15, 2020, law enforcement collaborated with CS-2, an acquaintance
of Corder who was familiar with his drug dealing, to stage a drug transaction. Law
enforcement equipped CS-2 with audio and video recording devices and provided $500
to complete the transaction with Corder. CS-2 approached Corder’s home and passed
through one of the gates.1 CS-2 walked along the walkway at the side of the house, cut
through the backyard, and approached the window of Corder’s bedroom. CS-2 knocked
on the window to get Corder’s attention, but Corder did not respond. CS-2 shined a
cellphone flashlight into the bedroom. In total, CS-2 knocked on the window
intermittently for roughly seven or eight minutes until Corder answered.
About three minutes after answering at the window, Corder emerged from the
bedroom and met CS-2 in the backyard. They exchanged pleasantries for about
15 seconds, and then Corder invited CS-2 into his garage to purchase substances later
confirmed to be fentanyl-laced heroin and cocaine. Corder and CS-2 talked for another
ten minutes about unrelated topics, and CS-2 then left the garage and returned to law
enforcement to deliver the drugs.
Using the evidence from the December 15 transaction (along with evidence from
a previous transaction between CS-2 and Corder on December 1), law enforcement
executed two search warrants on Corder’s residence. The warrants resulted in the
seizure of narcotics, among other evidence.
Two months later, Corder was charged with one count of distributing a mixture
or substance containing fentanyl and cocaine base for the December 15, 2020,
transaction (Count 1), and one count of possessing a mixture or substance containing
fentanyl and cocaine base with intent to distribute for the drugs recovered during the
1 The record is unclear whether CS-2 entered through the front gate or the back
gate.

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No. 24-1430 Page 3
subsequent search of Corder’s home in February 2021 (Count 2). See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). He moved to suppress the evidence obtained by law enforcement during the
December 15 transaction, arguing that he never consented to CS-2’s warrantless entry
into his backyard. The government argued that CS-2 had an implied license to enter the
curtilage to purchase drugs because Corder had previously received CS-2 and other
buyers at the premises. Regardless, the government asserted, Corder later voluntarily
consented to CS-2’s presence in the garage, attenuating the drug transaction from any
unlawful initial entry onto the property. Corder replied that CS-2 did not have an
implied license to enter the curtilage and contested the facts surrounding CS-2’s
knowledge of the property and Corder’s drug-dealing history. He also asserted that his
later consent was tainted by CS-2’s initial illegal entry onto the curtilage.
The district judge denied Corder’s motion to suppress. The judge concluded that
CS-2 had an implied license to enter the curtilage because CS-2 and previous buyers
had customarily entered Corder’s backyard to purchase drugs, and CS-2 had a
reasonable belief that knocking on Corder’s bedroom window was the equivalent of
knocking on his front door. Further, the judge explained that even if CS-2 did not have
an implied license to enter the curtilage, Corder later consented to CS-2’s presence.
Though his consent occurred shortly after the entry, the judge concluded that Corder
was free to tell CS-2 to leave, and CS-2 did not coerce Corder into permitting entry into
the garage.
Corder moved for reconsideration, contending that the judge had incorrectly
engaged in a subjective analysis of the property’s customary use based on CS-2’s
personal knowledge and misapplied precedent in its consent analysis.
The judge held an evidentiary hearing to clarify CS-2’s knowledge surrounding
the usage of Corder’s property. At the hearing, CS-2 testified to visiting Corder’s house
“20-plus times,” going to the backyard “a lot of times,” and entering the basement
many times. CS-2 also testified that Corder typically greeted buyers from his bedroom
window and requested that people seeking to buy drugs knock on the “back door”
because he did not want his sister to know he was selling drugs. Moreover, CS-2
testified to seeing other buyers knock on the bedroom window on two or three
occasions. Based on CS-2’s testimony, the judge reaffirmed the prior ruling that CS-2
had an implied license to enter Corder’s property, go to the backyard, and knock on the
bedroom window.
Corder then entered into a conditional plea agreement. He pleaded guilty to
Count 1, reserving the right to appeal the denials of his motion to suppress and motion

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to reconsider. In exchange, the government dismissed Count 2. The judge imposed
57 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release.
Acting pro se on appeal, Corder renews his argument that CS-2 violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home’s curtilage without an implied license.
Further, he disagrees with the district judge’s conclusion that Corder’s invitation for
CS-2 to join him in the garage to complete the drug transaction was not tainted by any
unlawful entry onto the property. We review the district judge’s legal conclusions
de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Jones, 22 F.4th 667, 673
(7th Cir. 2022).
Corder first argues that CS-2 exceeded the scope of the implied license to enter
the backyard when CS-2 walked through a closed gate, knocked on his bedroom
window for seven or eight minutes, and used a cellphone flashlight to look through the
window. But we agree with the district judge that CS-2’s conduct fell within the license
that Corder customarily granted to drug buyers who came to his property. A person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage of his home—the area
“immediately surrounding and associated with the home.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1,
6 (2013) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). Warrantless intrusions
into the curtilage are prohibited unless law enforcement enters in accordance with
“social norms,” id. at 9, and “for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant,”
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); see also United States v. Shelton, 997 F.3d
749, 766 (7th Cir. 2021). Here, CS-2 knew from previous encounters with Corder that he
had permitted familiar buyers to access his backyard and knock on his bedroom
window. And CS-2 entered the curtilage of the property intending to purchase drugs, a
purpose contemplated by Corder when he previously opened his home to drug buyers.
Next, Corder asserts that the district judge erred when he concluded in the
alternative that Corder’s invitation to complete a drug transaction in the garage was
sufficiently attenuated from any unlawful entry onto the property. We disagree.
Warrantless intrusions onto the curtilage by law enforcement “to engage in
conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner” are unreasonable. Id.
But a warrant is not required when a search is conducted pursuant to consent.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment be suppressed unless the connection between an unlawful search and the
subsequent discovery of evidence “become[s] so attenuated that the deterrent effect of

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the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” United States v. Carter, 573 F.3d 418,
422 (7th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring)). Indeed, “the exclusionary rule should not apply when
the causal connection between illegal police conduct and the procurement of evidence is
‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’ of the illegal action.” United States v. Fazio,
914 F.2d 950, 957 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805
(1984)). To determine whether a person’s voluntary consent to a search is sufficiently
attenuated from the unlawful action, courts balance three factors: “(1) the time elapsed
between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of
intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.” United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 1999).
Here, as for the timing factor, the district judge found that the mere ten or eleven
minutes that passed between CS-2’s first knock on the window and the drug sale
weighed more in favor of suppression than attenuation. To be sure, a few minutes may
not always be sufficient to purge the taint of an unlawful intrusion from later-collected
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 1997) (five minutes
likely insufficient). On the other hand, the interaction between Corder and CS-2 was
friendly, and Corder was free to end it at any time (and free to tell CS-2 to leave),
attenuating any underlying violation at least slightly. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 108 (1980) (“congenial atmosphere” made up for otherwise short passage of time,
weighing in favor of attenuation). In any event, timing is “only one factor to consider,
and is never dispositive.” Carter, 573 F.3d at 425 (internal citation omitted).
As for the second factor, we agree with the district judge that Corder’s consent to
CS-2’s presence on his property was an intervening circumstance, weighing in favor of
attenuation. Voluntary consent can serve as an independent intervening event so long
as the consent was not obtained immediately following an illegal entry or after an
illegal stop, detention, or arrest. See United States v. Conrad, 673 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir.
2012). Here, Corder’s voluntary consent favors attenuation: After Corder discovered
that CS-2 was outside his window, Corder emerged from the basement, engaged in
pleasantries with CS-2, and invited CS-2 into the garage to buy drugs. CS-2 did not ask
to go into the garage, nor did CS-2 attempt to lead Corder there. CS-2 did not threaten
Corder or otherwise pressure Corder to sell the drugs. After the transaction, CS-2
remained in the garage for ten minutes, engaging in casual conversation with Corder.
Nothing about the circumstances surrounding Corder’s consent reflect that he was
coerced into consenting to CS-2’s presence in the garage.

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Finally, the lack of purpose and flagrancy of any official misconduct supports
attenuation. A Fourth Amendment violation is purposeful and flagrant when “(1) the
impropriety of the official’s misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time,
that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the
misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose and executed in the hope that
something might turn up.” Carter, 573 F.3d at 425 (quoting United States v. Simpson,
439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if law
enforcement errs, a lack of evidence supporting an inference of bad faith means the
violation is not flagrant. Id. at 425–26.
Here, the evidence does not support an inference that law enforcement acted in
bad faith. No doubt, law enforcement set up the controlled buy at Corder’s house to
advance their investigation into Corder’s illegal drug activity. But CS-2 did not use the
initial entry and knock at the window for the purpose of gathering additional
information: CS-2 did not use the flashlight to look for contraband in the bedroom,
wander around the yard, or attempt to enter the garage alone. See Conrad, 673 F.3d
at 736 (law enforcement initially violated the curtilage of a home to advance an
investigation but did not enter as part of a “fishing expedition,” supporting
attenuation). Moreover, law enforcement did not encourage CS-2 to engage in any
behavior that was “coercive or calculated to cause surprise, fright or confusion.”
United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 2003). CS-2 relied on the knowledge of
drug dealing activity at Corder’s house and entered the property in a manner consistent
with previous visits and with knowledge of how others entered the property to buy
drugs. Further, an officer involved in the controlled buy testified that law enforcement
believed CS-2 had an implied license to enter the property because of CS-2’s friendly
relationship with Corder. See, e.g., Carter, 573 F.3d at 426 (agent did not act in bad faith
where he relied on tenant’s statement that unit was unoccupied before engaging in
unconstitutional search).
We agree with the district judge’s conclusion that the evidence obtained by CS-2
on December 15 did not need to be suppressed where CS-2 had an implied license to
enter the property and, even if there had been an unlawful entry, the discovery of the
evidence was sufficiently attenuated from it.
AFFIRMED

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