United States of America v. Jose V. Sanchez

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 18, 2024
Decided December 19, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1916
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSE V. SANCHEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:22-CR-30055-DWD-2
David W. Dugan,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jose Sanchez pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine. The district court imposed 210 months’ imprisonment
and 5 years’ supervised release. Sanchez appeals, but his appointed lawyer asserts that
the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967). We notified Sanchez of counsel’s motion, and he did not respond. See C IR . R.
51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses one of the issues that
an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s brief addresses
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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only one potential argument, we review the record for others. We grant the motion and
dismiss the appeal.
In May 2022, Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrested Sanchez and his
co-defendant, Christopher Palmer, after a traffic stop. Sanchez had been driving closely
behind Palmer, and the two cars appeared to be traveling together. Agents stopped
Palmer’s vehicle, and Sanchez drove away. Palmer attempted to flee, but the agents
detained him. A search of Palmer’s car uncovered over 17 kilograms of
methamphetamine, other drugs, two phones, bundles of cash, and a gun. During the
search, agents heard a phone call through the car’s speakers. The caller asked Palmer if
he ran, so other agents began a search for the car Sanchez was driving. Those agents
quickly found Sanchez in a nearby Walmart parking lot.
A search of Sanchez’s car revealed a large amount of cash and multiple rounds of
ammunition. Meanwhile, a Walmart employee told the agents that Sanchez had
discarded items near a storm drain and trash can. There, agents found parts of a
disassembled gun, ammunition, and currency sleeves. Video surveillance showed
Sanchez discarding the disassembled gun components in the trash. The gun
components were all from the same gun, which agents were later able to reassemble
into a SCCY 9mm pistol. After his arrest, Sanchez initially denied any connection to
Palmer, but he eventually admitted that he knew Palmer, was aware Palmer had drugs
in his car, and knew that the drugs were bound for Indianapolis. A search of Sanchez’s
phone records also revealed that he had extensive contact with other uncharged
members of the drug conspiracy, including the alleged leader.
Based on these events, Sanchez pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii); 846. At the change-of-plea
hearing, Sanchez confirmed under oath that his plea was voluntary and that he
understood the charges and applicable penalties, his trial rights, and the role of the
Sentencing Guidelines. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C)-(N). The court found an adequate
factual basis and accepted Sanchez’s plea.
In the same hearing, Sanchez received his sentence. The U.S. Probation Office
had prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) before Sanchez pleaded guilty.
Applying the Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR listed Sanchez’s base offense level as 38
because his offense involved at least 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c)(1). The PSR then added two levels because Sanchez and Palmer possessed

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No. 24-1916 Page 3
firearms during the commission of the charged offense, see § 2D1.1(b)(1), and removed
three levels for acceptance of responsibility, see § 3E1.1(a)–(b). Based on a total offense
level of 37 and Sanchez’s criminal history category of I, the range for his sentence was
210 to 262 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt.
A; § 5D1.2(c); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
Before the hearing, Sanchez had objected to the PSR’s addition of two offense
levels for possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. Sanchez insisted the
increase was not applicable because he possessed only gun parts and had no knowledge
that Palmer had a gun. Sanchez had also argued that he should have received
reductions for being a minor participant, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, and for being a zero-point
offender, see § 4C1.1. Finally, he had argued that the 10-year statutory minimum for his
offense was not applicable because he was eligible for the “safety-valve” provision in
the guidelines. See § 5C1.2.
At the hearing, Sanchez expressly withdrew his objection to the two-level
increase for possessing a firearm. The district court overruled Sanchez’s objection that
he was a minor participant, finding that Sanchez played an integral role in furthering
the conspiracy. The court also overruled Sanchez’s objection that he qualified for the
safety valve, finding that he possessed a firearm and had not truthfully provided to the
government all information about the offense. The court did not address Sanchez’s
objection based on his status as a zero-point offender. The court then adopted the PSR’s
calculations.
Next, the court heard arguments from both parties about the appropriate
sentence. The government requested a within-guidelines sentence of 236 months
because of the seriousness of Sanchez’s involvement in drug trafficking. Sanchez
requested a sentence of 210 months because it was his first offense. Then, Sanchez
provided an allocution, during which he recounted a difficult childhood where he was
forced to take care of his siblings and mother because his father was absent. He also
described how he had two children of his own who depended upon him. After
considering the arguments and weighing the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court
imposed 210 months’ imprisonment followed by 5 years’ supervised release.
In his Anders brief, counsel does not say that he consulted with Sanchez about
whether he wishes to challenge his guilty plea on appeal, as our court requires.
See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Konczak,
683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). But the information contained in counsel’s brief,

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coupled with our own review of the record, assures us that a challenge to the district
court’s acceptance of Sanchez’s guilty plea would be frivolous.
Sanchez did not move in the district court to withdraw his plea, so our review of
the plea’s acceptance would be for plain error, United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616,
618 (7th Cir. 2013), and we see none. The district court properly found that Sanchez was
competent to enter a plea and that his plea was voluntary and supported by an
adequate factual basis. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(2)–(3). The court also ensured that
Sanchez knew the nature of the charges against him, the possible penalties he faced, the
rights he would waive by pleading guilty, and the role of the Sentencing Guidelines.
See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1); Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349.
The court omitted some warnings from the plea colloquy, but we conclude that
these omissions were harmless. First, the court did not warn Sanchez that lying under
oath could lead to a prosecution for perjury, see FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A), but nothing
in the record suggests that he faces any risk of such a prosecution, see United States v.
Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2016). Second, the court did not clearly inform
Sanchez of his right to plead not guilty. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B). But that
omission could not have affected Sanchez’s substantial rights—he “knew he could
plead not guilty because he previously had pleaded not guilty.” United States v. Brown,
973 F.3d 667, 717 (7th Cir. 2020). We are thus satisfied that Sanchez could not plausibly
argue that the court plainly erred in accepting his plea.
We also conclude that any procedural challenges to Sanchez’s sentence would be
frivolous. Counsel considers whether Sanchez could argue that the district court erred
when it found that he possessed a firearm in connection with drug trafficking and
imposed a two-level increase to his base offense level. Counsel considers the merits of
this argument and concludes that it would be frivolous because the evidence presented
at sentencing supported a finding that Palmer possessed a gun in furtherance of the
jointly undertaken drug trafficking and that possession was reasonably foreseeable to
Sanchez. We agree that any challenge would be frivolous, but for a different reason. At
the sentencing hearing, Sanchez expressly withdrew his objections related to the two–
level increase and conceded that it applied, a fact that counsel overlooks. Sanchez has
thus waived this argument on appeal. See United States v. Syms, 846 F.3d 230, 234
(7th Cir. 2017).
Any arguments about the district court’s handling of Sanchez’s other, non–
withdrawn objections to the guidelines calculations would be equally frivolous. We see

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no error in the court’s refusal to apply the “safety valve” provision based on Sanchez’s
own possession of a disassembled firearm and his failure to provide complete and
truthful information about the offense to the government. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2), (5).
Sanchez’s possession of gun components (including the frame or receiver) that were
readily reassembled into a complete gun meets the definition of a firearm. See § 1B1.1,
cmt. n.1(H). And Sanchez did not truthfully provide the government with all of the
information related to the offense because he maintained throughout his case that he
was not in possession of a firearm, and that he did not know who was leading the drug
operation despite having extensive contact with the alleged organizer in the days
leading up to the arrest.
Sanchez also could not argue that the court clearly erred in finding that he was
not “substantially less culpable than the average participant” in the conspiracy,
see United States v. Guzman-Ramirez, 949 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2020), and that he was
thus ineligible for a minor-role adjustment, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Indeed, Sanchez had
knowledge of the scope and structure of the conspiracy as well as extensive
communication with its alleged leader. See United States v. Freyermuth, 76 F.4th 616, 619
(7th Cir. 2023) (discussing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C)).
Further, although the district court did not address this written objection (and
Sanchez did not raise it again at the sentencing hearing), we see no error in the court’s
conclusion that Sanchez was not eligible for a reduction based on his status as a zero–
point offender. Sanchez would not meet the criteria for the adjustment because he
possessed and disposed of readily reassembled firearm components. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4C1.1(a)(7) (adopting definition of firearm in commentary to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1).
Finally, we conclude that any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of
Sanchez’s within-guidelines sentence would be frivolous. Such a sentence is
presumptively reasonable, and we would affirm it if the judge provides an “adequate
statement of reasons.” United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384–85 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation
omitted). Here, the district court explained the sentence with reference to the § 3553(a)
factors, highlighting the serious nature of the drug trafficking, Sanchez’s significant
involvement in the trafficking operation, the need for deterrence, and Sanchez’s lack of
criminal history. Likewise, Sanchez’s five-year term of supervised release is within the
guidelines range and presumed reasonable. See United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 621
(7th Cir. 2019). Five years is the statutory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). And
Sanchez confirmed at the sentencing hearing that he had read the proposed conditions

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of release, and he raised no objections. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449–50
(7th Cir. 2019).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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