TIMOTHY McCULLOUGH v. Darren Galloway

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 16, 2025*
Decided January 17, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1822
TIMOTHY McCULLOUGH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DARREN GALLOWAY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 18-CV-1427-SMY
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
Timothy McCullough, an Illinois state prisoner, has worsening eyesight and
persistent headaches that he believes stem from eyestrain. He brought Eighth
Amendment claims against the warden and prison staff for deliberate indifference to his
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 23-1822 Page 2
serious medical needs, as well as against the prison’s healthcare provider (Wexford
Health Sources) for its policy of understaffing optometrists. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the
evidence could not support a finding that any individual defendant was deliberately
indifferent to McCullough’s medical needs. We affirm.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to McCullough, the party
opposing summary judgment. See Moore v. W. Ill. Corr. Ctr., 89 F.4th 582, 590 (7th Cir.
2023). Upon McCullough’s arrival at Shawnee Correctional Center in Vienna, Illinois, in
2017, he requested a new pair of glasses as well as an evaluation by an optometrist.
About six months later, he had yet to receive new glasses or an evaluation, so he filed a
grievance over the staff’s disregard of his vision problems. He explained that he had a
degenerative eye condition necessitating biannual eye exams, that his vision was
deteriorating rapidly, and that his eyestrain caused dizziness and throbbing headaches.
He again asked for an eye exam and new glasses.
A grievance officer referred McCullough’s complaint to Karen Smoot, a
healthcare unit administrator, who reviewed the grievance and found no record that
McCullough’s diagnosed condition was degenerative or that he needed to be seen twice
a year. But after reviewing McCullough’s medical records, she discovered that
McCullough was prescribed eyeglasses in 2015 at Hill Correctional Center and that it
was recommended he follow up “as needed.” She noted that Shawnee did not then
have an optometrist on staff, but that McCullough was waitlisted to see the optometrist
serving the facility, and in the meantime could buy reading glasses through the
commissary. Smoot also notified Ethan Wilke, the director of nursing, who reported
that McCullough was flagged as a priority to see the optometrist. Based on Wilke’s
response, a grievance officer denied the grievance as moot. McCullough appealed the
denial in early 2018, but Sherry Benton, a member of the administrative review board,
denied the appeal because McCullough apparently had not filed his grievance within
the requisite 60-day timeframe.
Over the next few months, McCullough saw Dr. Alan Montgomery, an
optometrist filling in at Shawnee Correctional Center, who prescribed updated glasses
and eye drops and referred McCullough to an outside ophthalmologist, Dr. Maqbool
Ahmad. Dr. Ahmad examined McCullough and found that he had “narrow angles”—a
congenital and asymptomatic condition that takes its name from the shape of the
drainage angle of the eye and, if left untreated, can develop into glaucoma. That same
day, Dr. Ahmad performed a laser procedure to treat the condition, and he confirmed

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 23-1822 Page 3
the procedure was successful. A week later, McCullough saw Dr. Allan Brummel,
another optometrist at the prison, who confirmed that McCullough had healed from the
procedure and was still receiving drops.
McCullough then filed this § 1983 suit. He alleged that Wilke, Smoot, Benton,
Dr. Brummel, and Jeffrey Dennison (the prison’s warden) were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical need for eye care and the severe side effects caused by his
psychotropic medications. He also alleged that Wexford had a policy of understaffing
optometrists which led to delayed medical treatment in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. At screening, the district judge dismissed Dr. Brummel from the
suit for lack of personal involvement. The judge also dismissed any claim against
Dennison in his personal capacity but allowed McCullough to proceed with his official-
capacity claims against Dennison for purposes of an injunction.
In three later rulings, the judge entered summary judgment for the defendants.
First, in September 2019, the judge dismissed McCullough’s claim alleging deliberate
indifference to the side effects of medications because he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies by filing a grievance over the issue. Second, nearly two years
later, the judge entered summary judgment for Wilke and Wexford: Wilke could not be
liable under § 1983 because he was not involved in McCullough’s scheduling or
treatment, and McCullough did not produce any evidence showing that Wexford had a
policy of understaffing its optometrists.
The judge then appointed counsel to assist McCullough with his claim against
Smoot (the health care administrator), Benton (the administrative review board
member), and Darren Galloway (Shawnee’s new warden), and later allowed for
discovery to be re-opened at counsel’s request.
During this discovery period, counsel deposed Dr. Ahmad regarding his
treatment of McCullough. Dr. Ahmad testified that he performed the laser procedure
before McCullough’s narrow angles had become problematic, when McCullough had
20/20 vision while wearing glasses and had no damage to his optic nerve. Dr. Ahmad
added that, based on his examination, McCullough had no reason to be experiencing
pain, and so any complaints of eye pain or blurred vision were “unjustified.”
At the close of that discovery period, the judge entered summary judgment for
Smoot, Benton, and Galloway. The judge found no evidence that Smoot or Benton was
personally involved in McCullough’s care, that any delay in care prolonged

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 23-1822 Page 4
McCullough’s pain, or that there was any constitutional violation to justify injunctive
relief.
McCullough appeals, arguing for the first time that the testimony of Dr. Ahmad
was biased and unreliable, and that the judge erred in relying on that testimony to
conclude that McCullough’s pain was not caused or prolonged by a delay in treatment.
In McCullough’s view, his medical records confirm the seriousness of his eye condition
and refute Dr. Ahmad’s testimony that his condition did not cause his pain.
But McCullough waived this challenge to the reliability of Dr. Ahmad’s
testimony by not raising it first in the district court. Milwaukee Ctr. for Indep., Inc. v.
Milwaukee Health Care, LLC, 929 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2019). Regardless, Dr. Ahmad’s
testimony was not necessary to support the judge’s conclusion that summary judgment
was warranted. The judge determined that any involvement of Smoot, Benton, and
Wilke was limited to reviewing McCullough’s grievance, and officials who simply
process, review, or reject grievances are not responsible for the underlying conduct.
See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609–10
(7th Cir. 2007). McCullough urges that the judge should have credited the allegations in
his complaint that these defendants, by virtue of their positions, should have done more
to ensure that he received appropriate care, but unsupported statements in a pleading
will not be considered at summary judgment. See Weaver v. Speedway, LLC, 28 F.4th 816,
820 (7th Cir. 2022); Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006); see
also F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(e)(3).
Finally, McCullough argues that the judge improperly entered summary
judgment for Smoot, Benton, and Galloway because a trial date had already been set
and McCullough had already responded to multiple motions for summary judgment.
But as the defendants point out, it was McCullough who moved to reopen discovery,
and the parties thereafter jointly moved to set a deadline for the defendants to file
dispositive motions. There was nothing unreasonable about allowing newly appointed
counsel time to conduct additional discovery, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permit summary judgment motions at the close of discovery. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(b). Trial
management decisions fall in the district judge’s purview, see Griffin v. Foley, 542 F.3d
209, 217 (7th Cir. 2008), and here the judge acted reasonably in reopening discovery and
allowing for dispositive motions to be filed.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --