Justin Fields v. Liberty Healthcare Corporation

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 7, 2025*
Decided January 21, 2025
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2515
JUSTIN FIELDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LIBERTY HEALTHCARE
CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 4:22-cv-04050-CSB
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
Justin Fields and three other civil detainees sued Liberty Healthcare Corporation
and some of its employees, alleging that their operation of a civil detainee conditional
release program, including the imposition of burdensome conditions of release, violates
their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district
court screened the initial complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and dismissed it for failure to
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. We have
agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts
and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 7 --

No. 23-2515 Page 2
state a claim. The district court dismissed the case after giving the plaintiffs two chances
to amend the complaint, concluding that the allegations still did not state a plausible
claim for relief. Only one plaintiff, Justin Fields, appeals. Because Fields has stated a
plausible claim under the First Amendment, we vacate and remand.
In 2009, an Illinois court adjudicated Fields to be a sexually violent person after
he served a three-year sentence for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. As a sexually
violent person, Fields was subject to involuntary commitment and indefinite detention
because the court found that there was a substantial probability that he would engage
in acts of sexual violence. See 725 ILCS 207/5, /9, /20, /35. Fields was detained at
Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility.
As a detainee, Fields must be provided with care and treatment designed to
affect recovery and discharged once it is determined that he no longer presents a
danger. See id. 207/40. As part of his detention, Fields became eligible for conditional
release: a program that allows him to live in the community if he meets certain
requirements. See id. 207/55(a). The conditional release program is operated by Liberty
Healthcare Corporation, which imposes many conditions and rules on the participants
and determines when participants violate them.
Fields was discharged on conditional release three times. First, beginning in
March 2019, he was placed on conditional release in Springfield, Illinois, but was
returned to Rushville after he attempted suicide in July 2020. He was released again in
December 2020—this time in Chicago, closer to his family—but his conditional release
was again revoked in December 2021 when he was caught with a smart phone. In May
2023, he was released again but has since been detained at Rushville.
During Fields’s second re-detention in 2022, he and three other civil detainees at
Rushville filed an initial complaint seeking relief on behalf of themselves and a putative
class of others and asserting that Liberty Healthcare Corporation discriminated against
African Americans in their operation of the conditional release program. The district
court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice because the plaintiffs’
allegations were too conclusory to plausibly allege that their Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated. The district court also denied class certification because the
plaintiffs did not have counsel to represent the proposed class and did not meet the
requirements for class certification. The court allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint that provided more factual details.

-- 2 of 7 --

No. 23-2515 Page 3
The plaintiffs then filed separate proposed amended complaints, which the
district court dismissed because they were a “patchwork of partial allegations” that did
not clearly state which allegations related to which parties. The court gave the plaintiffs
one more chance to amend and to consolidate their allegations and claims for relief. The
plaintiffs then filed a consolidated, proposed second amended complaint where they
sought relief for violations of their individual constitutional rights, and no longer
sought to represent a class.
The district court dismissed the proposed complaint for failure to state a claim.
First, the district court observed that the plaintiffs premised their legal claims upon
violations of Illinois state law and ruled that alleged violations of state law cannot
support a claim under § 1983. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003).
Second, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs made only vague, conclusory
statements about constitutional violations that were insufficient to state a claim under
§ 1983. The district court then entered judgment.
Fields was the only plaintiff to appeal. He argues that the district court
overlooked his claims under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments contained in
his second proposed amended complaint. We review his challenge to the screening
dismissal de novo, taking a fresh look at the allegations and construing them liberally.
See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015).
In his second proposed amended complaint, Fields alleged that Liberty
Healthcare Corporation imposed restrictions on his freedom that violated his rights
under the Constitution. Fields asserted that he was completely restricted from using the
internet and communicating with third parties who had not been vetted. Next, he
maintained that his case managers, Joe Meister and Keir Goatley, compelled him to
make incriminating statements to his mother and sister about “undiscovered” crimes in
order to communicate with them. Fields also alleged that after he attempted suicide in
July 2020, another case manager, Ron Gillette, transferred him from a mental-health
hold at a hospital to Rushville, where Fields was placed in an isolation cell without
clothes or a mattress for 15 days. Finally, Fields stated that he filed a motion to expand
his conditions of release in state court, but Meister and Goatley coerced him into
dropping the case by threatening to send him back to detention.
On appeal, Fields argues that the district court overlooked his plausible
allegations that Liberty Healthcare and his case managers violated his rights under the
Constitution. We agree in limited part. Fields has sufficiently alleged that Meister and
Goatley violated his rights under the First Amendment. For the remaining allegations,

-- 3 of 7 --

No. 23-2515 Page 4
the district court correctly concluded that Fields failed to state a claim against Liberty
Healthcare under the First Amendment, against Meister and Goatley under the Fifth
Amendment, and against Gillette under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fields first argues that he plausibly alleged that Meister and Goatley violated his
First Amendment rights when they retaliated against him for challenging his conditions
of release in state court. We agree. To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Fields
must plausibly allege that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First
Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment
activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating
factor’ in the [d]efendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Whitfield v. Spiller,
76 F.4th 698, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2023). Here, Fields filed a motion in state court to expand
his conditions of release to authorize him to make and receive calls from his mother and
to limit Liberty Healthcare and the Illinois Department of Human Services from
compelling Fields to make incriminating statements to third parties. Fields alleged that
he withdrew his motion only after Meister and Goatley threatened to return him to
detention if he did not withdraw his motion. Engaging in legal proceedings is a
protected activity that supports a First Amendment retaliation claim. Bridges v. Gilbert,
557 F.3d 541, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2009). And the threat of being returned to a detention
center is a deprivation that would likely deter Fields from seeking to have his
conditions of release changed by a state court in the future. Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708.
Fields also plausibly alleged that his filing of the motion in state court was the
motivating factor for his case managers’ threats to send him back to detention.
Although Fields has plausibly alleged that Goatley and Meister violated his First
Amendment rights, that plausible allegation does not extend to Liberty Healthcare
Director Steve Bryant, Deputy Director Josh Shelton, and Conditional Release Agent
William Beckett. Liability under § 1983 requires the personal involvement of each
defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Est. of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439,
459 (7th Cir. 2017). And Fields cannot hold these defendants liable without an allegation
of personal involvement or simply because of their supervisory role over the other
defendants. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017). Finally, because Fields did
not argue that a policy or practice of Liberty Healthcare Corporation was the “moving
force” behind his case managers’ alleged unconstitutional actions, the corporation is not
a proper defendant on this claim. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 694–95
(1978). On remand, the district court can order Fields to file an amended complaint to
narrow his claim.

-- 4 of 7 --

No. 23-2515 Page 5
The district court correctly concluded that Fields’s remaining allegations fail to
state a claim. Fields argues that the district court overlooked his allegations that Liberty
Healthcare violated his First Amendment rights by prohibiting him from accessing the
internet in any manner, including in a job-related setting. We disagree. Fields must
plausibly allege that the regulations on his internet access impinge on his constitutional
rights and are not rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in rehabilitating
civil detainees and protecting the public. Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir.
2012) (applying Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), to civil detainees); see also Brown
v. Phillips, 801 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2015). The conditions of conditional release
programs must restrict civil detainees from contacting their victims and possessing
illegal pornography. See 725 ILCS 207/40(5)(O), (T). In Brown, this court held that a ban
on internet-capable devices at Rushville was rationally related to the state’s interest in
preventing detainees from contacting their victims and downloading illegal
pornography. 801 F.3d at 855. Here, the conditions of release that Fields alleged violated
his First Amendment rights specifically ban internet-capable devices. Because Fields is
still a civil detainee while he is on conditional release, the state’s interest in protecting
the public and preventing crime remains the same. And preventing Fields from using
internet-capable devices that he could use to contact his victims or download illegal
pornography is rationally related to that interest.
Fields also argues that the requirement that his visitors be vetted with
background checks unduly burdened his freedom of speech. We disagree. Fields must
plausibly allege that the regulations requiring background checks for his visitors
impinge on his constitutional rights and are not related to the state’s legitimate interest
in rehabilitating civil detainees and protecting the public. Lane, 689 F.3d at 884;
see also Brown, 801 F.3d at 853. Here, Fields does not provide enough facts from which
we could plausibly conclude that the background check is not rationally related to the
state’s legitimate interest in protecting the public and ensuring that Fields’s
rehabilitation is not impeded by visitors with criminal histories related to sexual
violence.
Next, Fields argues that he plausibly alleged that his right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment was violated because his case managers
forced him to disclose “undiscovered” crimes to his mother and sister in order for them
to visit him and talk to him on the phone. We disagree. To allege a violation under the
Fifth Amendment, Fields must demonstrate that the disclosures to which he objects are
testimonial, incriminating, and compelled. Lacy v. Butts, 922 F.3d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 2019)
(citing Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004)). The privilege against

-- 5 of 7 --

No. 23-2515 Page 6
self-incrimination protects against disclosures a person “reasonably believes could be
used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.”
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972). But it only “protects against real
dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities.” Zicarelli v. N.J. State Comm’n of
Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972). Here, Fields alleges generally that the disclosures
to his mother and sister would result in the information going to the police. Without
more, Fields’s allegation that disclosure to his close family members would result in
prosecution is too speculative to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment.
Fields also argues that he plausibly alleged that his case manager, Ron Gillette,
violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by confining him to a cell without clothes
and a mattress for 15 days after Fields attempted suicide. We disagree. As a civil
detainee, Fields is protected from cruel and inhumane treatment by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Echols v. Johnson, 105 F.4th 973, 977 (7th Cir.
2024). To state a claim, Fields must plausibly allege that his confinement to a cell
without clothes and a mattress was not rationally related to a legitimate, nonpunitive
purpose or excessive in relation to that purpose. Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 800
(7th Cir. 2015) (discussing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979)). Here, Fields alleged
that after his suicide attempt, he was put on a mental-health hold at St. John’s Hospital
but was then transferred by Gillette to Rushville where he was put in a cold isolation
cell without clothes or a mattress for 15 days.
Restricting Fields from having items, like clothes and a mattress, that he could
use for self-harm is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose in
preventing Fields from attempting suicide for a second time. And Fields does not
provide further details about when he stopped being at risk of self-harm or when the
isolation without clothes and a mattress became excessive. Fields implied that the
isolation was unreasonable the moment he was transferred back to the detention center.
But Fields also stated that he was put on a 72-hour mental-health hold at St. John’s
Hospital and was transferred before the hold expired. Regardless, Fields does not
provide enough facts to plausibly allege that his confinement in a cell without clothes
and a mattress violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, to the extent that Fields argues that the district court erred by denying
class certification, we disagree. The district court acted well within its discretion when it
denied class certification because the plaintiffs did not have counsel to represent the
proposed class, see Howard v. Pollard, 814 F.3d 476, 478–79 (7th Cir. 2015), and did not

-- 6 of 7 --

No. 23-2515 Page 7
meet the requirements for class certification, see McFields v. Dart, 982 F.3d 511, 515–519
(7th Cir. 2020); F ED. R. C IV. P. 23(a).
Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this order.

-- 7 of 7 --