United States of America v. Michael Foley

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 16, 2025*
Decided January 21, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2149
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL FOLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:12-cr-00133-SEB-TAB-11
Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge.
O R D E R
Michael Foley, who was convicted of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine,
appeals the district judge’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence. The judge
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. F ED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-2149 Page 2
denied Foley’s motion based on her analysis of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). Because the judge adequately justified her decision, we affirm.
In August 2013, Foley pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2010).
Because of a prior felony drug offense in Indiana, Foley’s minimum sentence was
20 years in prison. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 851 (2010). Based on a total offense level of
35 and a criminal history category of VI, the guidelines range for imprisonment was
292 to 365 months. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(1), 3E1.1(a)–(b), 5A. The judge imposed
300 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release.
In February 2024, roughly 11 years before his projected release date, Foley
moved to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing two
extraordinary and compelling reasons: sexual abuse he endured while in prison,
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(4)(A), and his unusually long sentence, U.S.S.G. § 1.B1.13(b)(6).
Regarding the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), he argued that the time he
already had served reflected the seriousness of the offense, promoted respect for the
law, provided just punishment, and would deter any future criminal conduct; that his
age (42 years old) made him a low risk for recidivism; and that he had been
rehabilitated in that he had housing, employment, and substance-abuse treatment lined
up upon his release.
The district judge denied the motion. She assumed without deciding that Foley
had established that the sexual abuse he endured while incarcerated was an
extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduced sentence. (Because the abuse
constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason, the judge did not address Foley’s
second argument that his unusually long sentence similarly qualified.) After
considering the factors under § 3553(a), however, the judge concluded that a sentence
reduction was not warranted. The judge explained that Foley’s rehabilitative
accomplishments were outweighed by the seriousness of the crime, his extensive
criminal history, his disciplinary record while incarcerated, his prior failure to comply
with the requirements of his work-release program, and the substantial time remaining
on his sentence.
On appeal, Foley first argues that the district judge abused her discretion in
weighing the sentencing factors under § 3553(a). He contends that the judge gave too
much weight to his lengthy prison disciplinary history, which was based on 13 drug
violations he accumulated from 2015 to 2022. Foley, who has been addicted to heroin
since age 17, asserts that he received those violations because he was not receiving

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No. 24-2149 Page 3
adequate drug treatment in prison and was forced to self-medicate. Foley says that he
has not received any infractions since being placed in an addiction-treatment program
in the prison. Foley also contends that the judge overlooked that he was convicted of a
non-violent offense.
The district judge did not abuse her discretion. Foley did not present the
mitigating argument about his drug violations in the district court, so the judge could
not have considered it. See United States v. Clayton, 811 F.3d 918, 921 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016).
And, in any event, the judge provided several other valid reasons that a sentence
reduction was not appropriate under the § 3553(a) factors: Foley’s offense was serious,
he had an extensive criminal history (including nine prior felony convictions), he had
failed to comply with the requirements of his work-release program, and reducing his
sentence while substantial time remained to be served would not promote respect for
the law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), (2)(D). Because the judge was required to
provide only “[o]ne good reason” to deny Foley’s motion, her decision not to explicitly
address whether Foley’s offense was non-violent is irrelevant. United States v. Ugbah,
4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Sarno, 37 F.4th 1249, 1254 (7th Cir.
2022).
Foley next argues that the district judge erred by failing to consider his argument
that his sentence was unusually long. We disagree. The judge already had assumed that
Foley presented an extraordinary and compelling reason under U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(4)(A), and concluded that a reduction was not warranted under the
§ 3553(a) factors in any event. See United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir.
2021) (“Because of the importance of the § 3553(a) factors, courts are not compelled to
release every prisoner with extraordinary and compelling [reasons for release].”);
United States v. Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2023) (analysis of the § 3553(a) factors
is an independent basis for denying a motion to reduce a sentence).
AFFIRMED

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