Angela Campbell v. Tony Evers

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 24, 2025*
Decided February 25, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2719
ANGELA CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TONY EVERS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-cv-374-jdp
James D. Peterson,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Angela Campbell brought this suit to obtain funds from her deceased mother’s
bank accounts. She previously litigated and lost a related suit in state court. While her
appeal in the state case was pending, Campbell brought this federal suit, alleging that
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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the state court’s decision violated her constitutional rights under the Contract Clause
and Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the complaint at screening for
failure to state a claim. We affirm.
We accept the allegations in Campbell’s complaint as true and view them in the
light most favorable to her. Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 522 (7th Cir.
2023). After Campbell’s mother, Marion Roesler, died in 2019, family members disputed
the proper distribution of funds from her accounts at Associated Bank. Marion had
named as beneficiaries her three children—Campbell, Kathleen Ketterer, and Ricky
Roesler. But Ketterer predeceased her. Ketterer’s son, Scott Austin, filed a suit in
Wisconsin state court arguing under state law that he was entitled to a share of the
proceeds. Campbell disagreed, arguing that Associated Bank’s policies dictated that
Ketterer’s portion of the funds be divided between the surviving named beneficiaries—
Campbell and Ricky. The state trial court sided with Austin.
After she appealed the state court’s decision, Campbell filed this suit in federal
court against Wisconsin’s governor, Tony Evers, Associated Bank, and the individual
defendants and attorneys (including her own) from the state-court lawsuit. She alleged
that the state court’s application of Wisconsin law to disburse the money to Austin
violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. In Campbell’s view, her
mother had formed a contract with Associated Bank by maintaining her accounts there.
That contract, Campbell urged, obligated the bank to disburse funds in accordance with
its own policy, which would have split Ketterer’s portion of the money between Ricky
and her. She insists that the Wisconsin statutes interfered with that contract. She also
alleged that the lawyers and parties involved in the state-court litigation conspired with
the state judge to deprive her of a jury trial—a conspiracy that violated her right to due
process. Finally, she invoked supplemental jurisdiction to allege that Austin, his
attorney, and Associated Bank were unjustly enriched by the state court’s ruling.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. First, it
determined that there was no violation of the Contract Clause because the Wisconsin
statutes—enacted in 1973 and 1997, see 1973 Wis. Act. 291; 1997 Wis. Act. 188—
pre-dated the agreement Marion had with the bank, allegedly created in 2018. Further,
it determined there was no violation of the Due Process Clause because Campbell had
not alleged that the governor was involved in any of the conduct, and none of the other
individuals or entities sued by Campbell were state actors. The court also explained that
a claim for unjust enrichment required Campbell to show that she provided the
defendants with a benefit; here, however, the benefit came from her mother, not her.

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And because there were no allegations that Campbell could add to her complaint to fix
the problems with her claim, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.
Campbell moved for reconsideration, arguing (as relevant to this appeal) that (1)
the defendants qualify as state actors for purposes of her due process claim because
they conspired with the state judge; (2) she should have been allowed to amend her
complaint; and (3) the district judge should have recused himself because of his private
interests in Associated Bank (his personal investments and his wife’s prior employment
there). The district court denied this motion. It concluded, first, that Campbell’s
allegations were not sufficient to infer a conspiracy. Next, it determined that granting
leave to amend would be futile, given that Campbell had failed to state a plausible
claim even after having the chance in her motion to clarify her allegations. Finally, the
court saw no basis for recusal, since the judge sold his stock in the bank (and his wife
had left her job with the bank) years before Campbell filed this suit. Campbell moved
again to reconsider on the basis of judicial bias, and the court dismissed that motion in a
short text order.
On appeal, Campbell challenges the dismissal of her due process claim. She
maintains that she did state a due process claim by plausibly alleging a conspiracy
between the state judge and the defendants. She points to her allegations that the
defendants were parties or counsel to the state action, that they misrepresented facts
and blocked discovery, and that the state judge ruled in their favor.
But Campbell, even after attempting several times to clarify her allegations, has
not alleged anything that suggests joint action, concerted effort, or a general
understanding between the defendants and the state judge. See Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d
452, 457–58 (7th Cir. 1998). And winning a lawsuit does not render a party a
co-conspirator with a judge. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980).
In the alternative, Campbell argues that she should be allowed to amend her
complaint to cure any defect. But she has yet to offer any clarifications (in her motion to
reconsider or even now on appeal) that would make her conspiracy claim plausible, so
we agree that amendment would be futile. See Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720,
734 (7th Cir. 2014).
Campbell also rehashes her argument that the district judge was biased. But she
does not address the judge’s assertion that he had no current financial interest in the
case that would necessitate recusal. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4); Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d
350, 356 (7th Cir. 1996). Campbell argues that the judge’s dismissal of her complaint and

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motions to reconsider are evidence of his bias, but adverse judicial rulings are almost
never a valid basis for recusal. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
AFFIRMED

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