United States of America v. Tramale J.m. Hooser

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 17, 2025*
Decided March 19, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1789
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TRAMALE J.M. HOOSER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 04-CR-20054
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. F ED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1789 Page 2
Tramale J.M. Hooser appeals the denial of his two of his post-conviction motions
seeking to terminate the remainder of a criminal sentence. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that early termination is not warranted because of
Hooser’s criminal conduct while on supervision, and we affirm that decision. But
because the second motion is, in substance, a successive petition to vacate his sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which he lacked leave to file, we vacate the denial of the motion
and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
In 2005, Hooser pleaded guilty in the Central District of Illinois to one count of
illegal possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Based on
three of his prior convictions, Hooser qualified for and received an enhanced sentence
under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The district court sentenced
him to the statutory minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment to be followed by a five-
year term of supervised release.
In 2006, Hooser filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his counsel had been ineffective by not objecting
to his allegedly illegal enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The district
court denied the motion. Hooser later filed a “Rule 60(b) Motion,” again based on his
purportedly unlawful designation as an armed career criminal. The court construed this
as an unauthorized successive collateral attack and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.
Hooser started his term of supervised release in 2017. Less than two years later,
in 2019, he was arrested for drug possession. Hooser pleaded guilty in the Southern
District of Indiana to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 120 months’
imprisonment. The Probation Office in the Central District of Illinois also petitioned to
revoke the supervised release for his 2005 conviction based on his new criminal
conduct. Hooser is currently serving the imprisonment portion of his 2019 sentence, and
the petition to revoke his prior term of supervised release remains pending.
While serving this second sentence, Hooser moved for early termination of
supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), and for a “writ of coram nobis,” in
connection with his 2005 conviction. In both motions, Hooser again argued that he was
incorrectly sentenced as an armed career criminal. He argued that the court should
vacate his sentence or, alternatively, that his supervised release should be terminated
early to account for the erroneously long sentence.

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No. 24-1789 Page 3
The district court denied both motions. The court ruled that early termination of
supervised release was not warranted by Hooser’s conduct and would not serve the
interests of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Then, without considering if the writ of
corum notice is ever available, see FED. R. C IV. P RO. 60(e), the court then that Hooser was
only those who are out of custody may obtain the writ, whereas Hooser was “in
custody” because the term of supervised release from his 2005 conviction was
undischarged. Hooser appeals.
First, Hooser argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion for
early termination of supervised release because it failed to properly consider the impact
of the allegedly erroneous enhancement on his sentence. We find an abuse of discretion
only when a district court commits a “serious error of judgment, such as the failure to
consider an essential factor.” United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d 996, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2011).
The district court was well within its discretion here. As required, it looked to the
appropriate factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determined that termination was not
warranted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); Lowe, 632 F.3d at 998. Specifically, the court
highlighted that Hooser failed to comply with the conditions of his supervised release
when he committed a serious drug offense only 15 months into his term of supervision.
The court also explained that Hooser’s swift and serious violation of the conditions of
supervised release was not outweighed by his argument—rejected multiple times—that
his 2005 sentence was unlawfully long.
As for Hooser’s second motion, we do not address the merits because it was
effectively an unauthorized successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the district
court had no jurisdiction to consider it. The court correctly observed that Hooser
seemed to “intentionally eschew” § 2255 in favor of an ancient writ. But a motion a
defendant files after the time for direct appeal has expired, while in custody, and raising
grounds mentioned in § 2255, is a collateral attack regardless of how the defendant
labels it. Melton v. United States, 359 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Adams v. United
States, 911 F.3d 397, 404 (7th Cir. 2018). Hooser’s argument —that his sentence was
above the maximum authorized by law—falls within the scope of § 2255(a). And
despite Hooser’s argument to the contrary, supervised release is “custody” for purposes
of § 2255. See e.g., Clarke v. United States, 703 F.3d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 2013). Hooser’s
motion is therefore properly construed as a successive and unauthorized collateral
attack. He did not have this court’s permission to file it, so the district court lacked
jurisdiction to decide it on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); United States v. Boyd, 591
F.3d 953, 957 (7th Cir. 2010).

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No. 24-1789 Page 4
We can consider Hooser’s appeal to be an implied request for permission to file a
successive collateral attack. But he does not assert valid grounds under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h), and we therefore deny permission. Further, Hooser was required to obtain a
certificate of appealability before appealing the final decision of the district court
denying relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). To the extent we construe his appellate filings
as an implied request for a certificate of appealability, he does not meet the criteria, and
so we deny that request, too. See id. § 2253(c)(2).
The district court’s decision on the motion for a writ of coram nobis is
VACATED and REMANDED with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The
decision regarding the motion for early termination of supervised release is
AFFIRMED.

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