Brannen Marcure v. Tyler Lynn

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 15, 2025*
Decided April 16, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2846
BRANNEN MARCURE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TYLER LYNN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 18-cv-3137
Colleen R. Lawless,
Judge.
O R D E R
Brannen Marcure appeals the dismissal of his federal complaint against four
officers of the Springfield (Illinois) Police Department for allegedly violating his
constitutional rights. We affirm the judgment because Marcure failed to state a claim.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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This case has had a long life, including an appeal in which we reversed the
dismissal of Marcure’s claims against several police officers. See Marcure v. Lynn,
992 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2021). It now returns to us after the dismissal of the third
amended complaint, in which Marcure asserts that the four officers violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by searching his house without a warrant or valid consent and his
Fourteenth Amendment rights by depriving him of his liberty without due process.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We accept the facts as stated in Marcure’s complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in his favor. See Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2023).
On July 23, 2016, four police officers arrived at Marcure’s home in response to reports of
a domestic disturbance and a fired gunshot. They found Marcure in his front yard; they
placed him in handcuffs, and one officer asked Marcure for consent to search his house.
Marcure agreed, and officers discovered a gun during the search. An officer then read
Marcure his Miranda rights but promised that Marcure would not be charged. (The
district court and the defendants say that Marcure received the warnings before the
search, but we interpret the third amended complaint differently.) Marcure was taken
to jail, but he was never convicted of a crime based on these events.
The defendants moved to dismiss the operative complaint, and the district court
granted the motion. The court concluded that Marcure did not state a claim under the
Fourth Amendment (for illegal search or failure to protect) because he consented to the
search of his house and alleged no facts permitting a reasonable inference that his
consent was coerced. Marcure also failed to state a claim that the officers violated his
due process rights, the court explained, because Marcure was not convicted of any
crime related to the officers’ actions. Even if analyzed under the Equal Protection
Clause, the court continued, the claim still failed because Marcure did not allege facts
suggesting that the officers arbitrarily treated him differently than similarly situated
people. We review the dismissal de novo. Hess, 72 F.4th at 756–57.
Marcure argues that the district court improperly dismissed his claims, but his
arguments are unavailing. First, he did not plausibly allege that the officers searched his
house without his valid consent. A warrant is not necessary when a person voluntarily
consents to a search, United States v. Sandoval-Vasquez, 435 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 2006),
and the facts here do not suggest that Marcure’s consent to search was not voluntary.
He consented while handcuffed, but that is not enough to render his consent
involuntary. See id. (voluntary consent after officers “entered the business with a show
of force and placed other employees in handcuffs almost immediately”); United States v.

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No. 24-2846 Page 3
Thurman, 889 F.3d 356, 367 (7th Cir. 2018) (consent voluntary although defendant was in
custody). Marcure also asserts that an officer coerced his consent by promising him that
no charges would be filed, but even if a statement like this can be coercive, the
complaint states that the promise occurred “[a]fter the search was finished.” The
promise could not have affected his decision to consent. No other allegations could
support a reasonable inference that his consent was coerced; thus, he does not state a
claim of unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.
Marcure also did not plausibly allege that the officers violated his rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Marcure is not required to plead legal theories in
his complaint, see Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop., 875 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2017), he must
provide sufficient facts to state a plausible legal claim, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). He fails to do so.
Marcure’s claim, which appears to be that he was falsely arrested or maliciously
prosecuted, cannot proceed under the Due Process Clause because his allegations fall
under the sole purview of the Fourth Amendment. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42
(2022) (describing Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim as a claim “for
unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process”). Here, Marcure’s complaint provides
enough detail about his arrest to make it implausible that the officers lacked probable
cause to seize and detain him. For instance, he admitted that the officers arrived at his
house in response to reports of a domestic disturbance and a fired gunshot, and that
they found a gun in his house. Regardless of whether he intended to assert a false arrest
claim or a malicious prosecution claim, probable cause to arrest him (for any offense,
see Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–55 (2004)) defeats both claims. See Lee v. Harris,
127 F.4th 666, 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2025).
His claim also fails when assessed under the Equal Protection Clause. Because he
did not allege that he is a member of a suspect class, we consider whether he stated a
class-of-one claim. That required him to “allege[] that [he] has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment.” Word v. City of Chicago, 946 F.3d 391, 395–96 (7th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). But Marcure offered no
facts about similarly situated individuals or differential treatment. And, if we look at his
grievance as one of selective enforcement, there are no facts in the complaint suggesting
that the officers’ actions had a discriminatory purpose or effect. See Hanes v. Zurick,
578 F.3d 491, 495–96 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that allegations of selective enforcement
by police can state a class-of-one claim).

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Finally, Marcure argues that the district judge showed bias and therefore should
be disqualified. See 28 U.S.C. § 455. Although he did not raise the issue in the district
court, we may consider judicial-qualification arguments raised for the first time on
appeal. Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th 835, 844 (7th Cir. 2022). Marcure asserts, without
evidence, that the district judge had conflicts of interest and ex parte communications
with an Assistant Attorney General and state judge, but he does not include any
allegations that would cause the district judge’s impartiality to be questioned by a
reasonable, well-informed observer. United States v. Barr, 960 F.3d 906, 919 (7th Cir.
2020). Marcure also argues that the district judge displayed bias by dismissing his case
before holding a scheduled (virtual) status conference. But district courts have broad
discretion to manage their dockets, see A. Bauer Mech., Inc. v. Joint Arb. Bd. of Plumbing
Contractors’ Ass’n, 562 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2009), and here, the judge vacated the
status conference when it became clear that it was no longer required. This is not an
action for which the judge’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994).
AFFIRMED

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