United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 15, 2025*
Decided April 21, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2453
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ZENON GRZEGORCZYK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 12 CR 320
Elaine E. Bucklo,
Judge.
O R D E R
Zenon Grzegorczyk appeals the denial of his second motion for compassionate
release. The district court denied the motion after ruling that the sentencing factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against release. We review denials of motions for
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1
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compassionate release for abuse of discretion, United States v. Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 562
(7th Cir. 2022), and affirm.
In 2012, Grzegorczyk, while possessing a gun unlawfully, met multiple times
with hitmen (in reality, undercover law enforcement officers) and attempted to pay
them to burn several people alive, among them his ex-wife. He was apprehended after a
meeting with the officers. He then pleaded guilty to using a facility of interstate
commerce with intent that murder be committed, 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), and possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, id. § 924(c)(1)(A). He was sentenced to
211 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. He appealed, but we
affirmed his sentence. United States v. Grzegorczyk, 800 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2015).
In 2016, Grzegorczyk moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his firearm
conviction after the Supreme Court invalidated the definition of a “crime of violence” in
§ 924(c). Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). The district court denied the
motion, and we affirmed. Grzegorczyk v. United States, 997 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2021).
Grzegorczyk then petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the
petition, Grzegorczyk v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2580 (2022), but five justices noted that
his unconditional guilty plea foreclosed any argument predicated on the new caselaw
around § 924(c). Id. at 2580 (Statement of Kavanaugh, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and
Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari).
Meanwhile, in 2020, Grzegorczyk moved for compassionate release based on a
COVID-19 diagnosis and the ongoing aftereffects of the disease, such as shortness of
breath and fluid in his lungs. The district court denied the motion, noting in its analysis
of the § 3553(a) factors that his offense conduct—attempting to have several people
burned alive—was “shockingly callous” and that nothing in his request suggested that
his “cavalier attitude toward taking human lives had evolved.” United States v.
Grzegorczyk, 533 F.Supp. 3d 665 (N.D. Ill. 2021).
In 2024, Grzegorczyk again moved for compassionate release. This time, he cited
the Sentencing Guidelines policy statement § 1B1.13(b)(6), which expands the list of
extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief to include an “unusually long
sentence.” He argued that his sentence was unusually long because (1) if he were
convicted today, he no longer would be subject to a § 924(c) charge and (2) the court
miscalculated the statutory minimum for his § 1958(a) offense at 20 rather than 10 years.
The district court denied the motion based only on the § 3553(a) factors. Quoting
extensively from its prior ruling, the court again referred to Grzegorczyk’s shockingly
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callous conduct, adding that “nothing” in his second motion altered its view that the
§ 3553(a) factors did not support early release. United States v. Grzegorczyk,
743 F.Supp. 3d 973, 973–74 (N.D. Ill. 2024).
Grzegorczyk appeals, disagreeing generally with the court’s analysis. But he
gives no reason to suggest why the court was wrong to deny his latest motion based on
the same reasons as the denial of his first. The court rightly noted that it could rest its
conclusion on the independent basis of the § 3553(a) inquiry, see United States v.
Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2023), and here the court did not abuse its discretion
when deciding against early release based on the serious nature of his crimes. And just
“one good reason” for denying a motion like Grzegorczyk’s is enough. United States v.
Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021).
Grzegorczyk also asserts that he was never informed that the government had
responded in the district court to his motion for compassionate release, and thus he had
no opportunity to respond in kind. But in denying relief, the district court did not rely
on any new evidence in the government’s response (which addressed only the validity
of § 1B1.13(b)(6), an issue the district court declined to address), so Grzegorczyk cannot
show he was prejudiced by the lack of opportunity to reply. See United States v. Sanders,
992 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2021).
AFFIRMED
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