United States of America v. Jarrell D. Knight

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 27, 2025
Decided May 27, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2098
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JARRELL D. KNIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 3:23-cr-00099-001
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
After Jarrell Knight sold fentanyl to a confidential source, he pleaded guilty to
one count of distributing more than 40 grams of fentanyl. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The
district judge sentenced him to 100 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised
release. Knight appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous
and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief
explains the nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal like this could
involve. Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, and Knight responded, see C IR . R.
51(b), we limit our review to subjects that counsel and Knight discuss. See United States
v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2098 Page 2
Counsel tells us that Knight wishes to challenge his plea as unknowing based on
an alleged defect in the indictment. Knight notes that his indictment did not refer to
21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi), the penalty subsection that subjects defendants to an
increased sentencing range when the crime involves more than 40 grams of fentanyl.
But counsel rightly concludes that any challenge to this omission would be frivolous.
First, the indictment adequately alleged the fact that increased the penalty range for
Knight’s crimes (his distributing 40 grams or more of a substance that contained
fentanyl). See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). No authority suggests that
an otherwise valid guilty plea is rendered unknowing when an indictment does not cite
the specific subsection that facilitates that increase. Further, Knight received “real notice
of the true nature of the charge against him,” Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645
(1976) (quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)), because he agreed—both in
his plea agreement and at the change-of-plea hearing—that he distributed more than 40
grams of fentanyl and faced a statutory range of 5 to 40 years’ imprisonment, and he
confirmed at the hearing that he understood the drug weight to be an element of his
crime. We also agree with counsel that any other challenge to the validity of his plea
would be frivolous because the district judge substantially complied with Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure during the plea hearing. See United States v.
Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013).
Counsel next considers whether Knight could challenge the calculation of his
guideline range but rightly rejects this challenge as frivolous. Knight’s career-offender
designation raised his offense level to 34, reduced to 31 after acceptance of
responsibility, which, together with his criminal history category of VI, yielded an
advisory guidelines range of 188-235 months.
Counsel also considers challenging the substantive reasonableness of Knight’s
sentence, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), but correctly concludes that this
challenge would be frivolous, too. We would presume that Knight’s below-guidelines
sentence is reasonable. See United States v. Fitzpatrick, 32 F.4th 644, 651 (7th Cir. 2022).
And nothing in the record would rebut that presumption. The judge appropriately
considered the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense
(distributing fentanyl across three states), Knight’s personal history (his difficult
childhood), and the need for deterrence (Knight’s past criminal conduct and dishonesty
during his term of supervised release for a prior offense).
Counsel then considers and appropriately rejects challenging the length or
conditions of supervised release. Knight waived his right to challenge the conditions of

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No. 24-2098 Page 3
his supervised release when he confirmed at sentencing that he did not object to the
conditions contained in the PSR. See United States v. Smith, 906 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.
2019). The term of supervision is also within the statutory limit, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), and
the judge’s (adequate) justification for the prison term also applies to the five-year term
of supervised release. See United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016).
Finally, Knight indicates that he would like to argue that his counsel was
ineffective. But this challenge is best saved for collateral review, where an evidentiary
basis can be developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–05 (2003);
United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453, 456–57 (7th Cir. 2020).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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