United States of America v. FALANDIS RUSSELL and TERRANCE WILLIAMS

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FALANDIS R USSELL and T ERRANCE WILLIAMS ,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cr-107 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 14, 2025 — D ECIDED J UNE 11, 2025
____________________
Before BRENNAN, ST . EVE , and L EE , Circuit Judges.
LEE , Circuit Judge. Defendants Falandis Russell and Ter-
rance Williams pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to
obstruct commerce by robbery and multiple counts of ob-
struction of commerce by robbery. Both defendants now ap-
peal. Russell challenges the district court’s determination that
he was competent to stand trial as well as the procedural
soundness of his sentence. Williams objects to a supervised
release condition requiring him to notify another person if his

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2 Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685
probation officer determines that he poses a risk to that per-
son. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Russell’s con-
viction and sentence, and we vacate the challenged condition
imposed on Williams and remand for further proceedings.
I
For nearly a year and a half, Russell and Williams commit-
ted a series of armed commercial robberies throughout Chi-
cago. They were eventually indicted for conspiracy to ob-
struct commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)
(Count One). In addition, Russell was charged under the same
statute with eleven counts of obstruction of commerce by rob-
bery (Counts Two through Twelve), while Williams was
charged with six (Counts Five through Ten).
A
During pretrial proceedings, Russell’s counsel filed an ex
parte motion for the appointment of a forensic psychologist to
assess Russell’s cognitive capacity, which the district court
granted. The appointed psychologist, Dr. Melissa Jajko, con-
ducted a psychological evaluation of Russell, diagnosed him
with an intellectual disability and attention-deficit/hyperac-
tivity disorder, and recommended that he undergo further
evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial.
In arriving at her conclusions, Dr. Jajko administered sev-
eral intellectual functioning tests, the results of which, she
warned, “should be interpreted with caution” “[d]ue to [Rus-
sell’s] inadequate effort.” Additionally, Dr. Jajko interviewed
Russell and his mother and reviewed his school records that
indicated sparse attendance. Dr. Jajko did not review Russell’s
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) records or Social Security disability
benefit records.

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Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685 3
Based on Dr. Jajko’s recommendation, both the govern-
ment and defense requested a competency examination of
Russell pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). The court agreed,
finding reasonable cause to believe Russell may be incompe-
tent. The court was particularly concerned about his ability to
properly assist in the preparation of his defense.
With the court’s approval, Dr. Jajko conducted Russell’s
competency examination and submitted a report, opining that
Russell was unfit to stand trial. To conduct her evaluation, Dr.
Jajko interviewed Russell, although the session was cut short
due to Russell’s inability to “adequately participate” (which
Dr. Jajko attributed to his “observed and documented cogni-
tive impairments”). Dr. Jajko also reviewed Russell’s prison
and health records for the six months preceding the examina-
tion. But, again, she did not review his Social Security records.
Based on Dr. Jajko’s report (and without objection from
the government), the district court found by a preponderance
of the evidence that Russell suffered a mental disability ren-
dering him unable to properly assist in his defense. As a re-
sult, the court remanded Russell to the custody of the United
States Attorney General for further evaluation and treatment
in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Russell was subse-
quently transferred to the Federal Medical Center in Butner,
North Carolina, for treatment.
About four months later, Dr. Marina Muhkin, a BOP psy-
chologist who evaluated Russell during his time at FMC But-
ner, submitted a forensic report, opining that Russell was
competent to proceed to trial. Dr. Muhkin grounded her opin-
ion on a series of clinical interviews with Russell, observations
of his behavior, and psychological testing. She also reviewed
Russell’s BOP records, school records, criminal history

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4 Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685
records, and Social Security records. The Social Security rec-
ords were particularly noteworthy because they indicated a
greater acuity with intellectual tasks, such as simple mathe-
matics and recall.
What is more, Dr. Muhkin observed that “Russell dis-
played a deliberate suppression on tests of effort of cognitive
abilities” and “achieved a profile suggestive of Feigning.” She
also remarked that “[g]iven the defendant’s poor motivation
to present his psychological functioning accurately, the …
subjective impressions should be viewed with caution.”
Defense counsel objected to Dr. Muhkin’s conclusions of
Russell’s competency. And so, the parties agreed to jointly re-
tain another forensic expert, Dr. Stephen Dinwiddie, for a
third psychological opinion.
As part of his analysis, Dr. Dinwiddie examined Russell
and reviewed his BOP records, school records, criminal his-
tory records, and Social Security records. Dr. Dinwiddie also
reviewed the evaluations of Drs. Jajko and Muhkin.
Based on this review, Dr. Dinwiddie concluded that,
“from a psychiatric perspective, there are no barriers to con-
sidering Mr. Russell competent to stand trial.” “Mr. Russell’s
poor performance on a number of assessments,” Dr. Dinwid-
die continued, “is best explained by a conscious attempt to
misrepresent his intellectual abilities.” Further, “[n]o psychi-
atric disease or defect is identified that would render Mr. Rus-
sell unable to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable de-
gree of rational understanding or render him unable to have
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.”

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Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685 5
The district court subsequently held a multi-day compe-
tency hearing, at which Drs. Jajko, Muhkin, and Dinwiddie all
testified. Russell’s mother testified as well. And the govern-
ment introduced in evidence Russell’s school records, Social
Security records, BOP medical records, and some of his rec-
orded telephone calls while in BOP custody.
In the end, the district court concluded that “Russell is
mentally competent: he understands the nature and conse-
quences of the proceedings against him and he can assist
properly in his defense.” In doing so, the court discussed the
testimony of the three experts along with the other evidence
presented at the hearing. The court was careful to note that it
was “not rejecting the notion that Russell suffers an intellec-
tual disability at all. But he simply does not suffer a cognitive
impairment that renders him incompetent.”
B
Both Russell and Williams ultimately pleaded guilty. Rus-
sell entered a conditional plea of guilty on Counts Seven,
Eight, and Ten, reserving the right to challenge the court’s
competency determination. As part of the plea, Russell stipu-
lated to having committed three additional robberies during
the relevant time period. As for Williams, he pleaded guilty to
Count Five, acknowledging that he had committed six addi-
tional robberies during the same time period.
In anticipation of Russell’s sentencing hearing, the proba-
tion department prepared a presentencing investigation re-
port (PSR). In addition to attributing thirteen robberies to
Russell (the six in his plea agreement and seven additional
robberies that the government contended he committed

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6 Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685
during the same period), the PSR calculated Russell’s guide-
line range to be 121 to 151 months of imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court resolved a
guideline dispute not relevant here and determined Russell’s
sentencing guidelines range to be 97 to 121 months of impris-
onment. The government then recommended an above-
guideline sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment, while the
defense asked for 121 to 151 months. After hearing from Rus-
sell himself, the court imposed a sentence of 180 months of
imprisonment and 60 months of supervised release.
To explain the above-guideline sentence, the district court
noted the large number of armed robberies Russell had com-
mitted and emphasized the “extreme fear and terror” and
“lifelong consequences” that he and his co-conspirators
“struck in the minds and hearts” of dozens of victims. The
court also referenced Russell’s criminal history, including
convictions for three residential burglaries and possession of
a firearm while a felon, which placed him in criminal history
category II. And, having found by a preponderance of the ev-
idence that Russell had committed the seven additional rob-
beries described in the PSR, the court observed that Russell’s
guideline range did not account for these other robberies.
In terms of mitigation, the court acknowledged Russell’s
“cognitive impairments.” But, when imposing the sentence, it
underscored “the need for specific deterrence, general deter-
rence, the protection of the public, and most significantly to
reflect the seriousness of the offense that was committed.”
Williams’s sentencing hearing took place about two weeks
later. Unlike Russell’s, Williams’s guideline range of 97 to 121
months’ imprisonment accounted for six of the seven

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Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685 7
acknowledged robberies (the one to which he pleaded guilty
and six additional robberies to which he stipulated). Williams
also had zero criminal history points, placing him into crimi-
nal history category I. And the court ultimately sentenced
Wiliams to a within-guidelines sentence of 114 months of im-
prisonment.
The district court then discussed the differences between
Williams’s and Russell’s custodial sentences. The court ob-
served that, unlike Williams, Russell had a criminal history as
an adult and had committed six more robberies than Wil-
liams. But the court also acknowledged that Russell suffered
from “a more intense cognitive impairment.”
When it came to Williams’s supervised release, the proba-
tion department recommended the imposition of a super-
vised release condition that would require Williams to inform
another person of his record of arrests, convictions, substance
use, and other indicia of risk, if his probation officer were to
determine that Williams poses a risk to that other person.
Williams objected to the condition, but the court nonethe-
less imposed it with two amendments. First, it removed the
reference to arrests. Second, it required the probation officer
to provide Williams with seven days’ notice so he could file
an objection. The resulting condition read:
[I]f the probation officer determines that you pose a
risk to another person (including an organization or
members of the community), the probation officer may
require you to tell the person about the risk, and you
must comply with that instruction. Such notification
could include advising the person about your record of
convictions and substance abuse. The probation officer

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8 Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685
may contact the person and confirm that you have told
the person about the risk. The Defendant may file,
within seven days of being informed of the proposed
notification, a written objection with the Court.
II
We begin with Russell’s claims that the district court’s
competency determination was clearly erroneous and that his
sentence was procedurally defective. We then turn to Wil-
liams’s challenge to the supervised release condition.
A
“A court may not put a criminal defendant on trial unless
he is competent at the time of trial.” United States v. Wessel, 2
F.4th 1043, 1053 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). “To stand
trial a defendant must have both a ‘sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding’ and ‘a rational as well as factual understand-
ing of the proceedings against him.’” United States v. Nichols,
77 F.4th 490, 498 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). We review a district court’s finding
of competence to stand trial for clear error. See Wessel, 2 F.4th
at 1054 (citations omitted).
Russell offers two arguments against the district court’s
competency finding. First, he contends that the district court
wholly disregarded Dr. Jajko’s opinion that Russell was unfit
for trial. Second, in his view, the court improperly credited
the competency determinations of Drs. Muhkin and Dinwid-
die, neither of which, he claims, finds support in the record.
Neither argument is convincing.
First, the district court did not disregard Dr. Jajko’s assess-
ments. To the contrary, the district court’s order discussed Dr.

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Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685 9
Jajko’s evaluation in depth, ultimately discounting it for sev-
eral reasons. For example, the court took issue with Dr. Jajko’s
failure to review Russell’s Social Security records and his
other past psychological evaluations. The court also found
that Dr. Jajko “failed to adequately examine whether Russell
was malingering,” despite observing his low effort on her
tests. Russell may disagree with the district court’s decision
to give Dr. Jajko’s opinions little weight, but this does not
make the decision clearly erroneous. See Wipf v. Kowalski, 519
F.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n a case of dueling experts …
it is left to the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to decide
how to weigh the competing expert testimony.”).1
As for Drs. Muhkin and Dinwiddie, Russell attempts to
discredit their opinions by pointing to purported deficiencies
in their evaluations. For example, Russell criticizes Dr.
Muhkin for failing to consider his cognitive deficits as the
cause of his poor school attendance (rather than the effect), for
encouraging him to guess on certain test questions, and for
not participating in his competency restoration program
while he was at FMC Butner. As for Dr. Dinwiddie, Russell
faults him for not personally conducting any tests, for mis-
placing some of his notes, and for overlooking the possibility
that Russell’s intellectual ability is even lower than docu-
mented. The problem is that Russell does not explain how any
1 Russell relies on our unpublished decision in United States v. Wabol,
182 F. App’x 530 (7th Cir. 2006). But that case is inapposite because, there,
“[t]he only evidence presented at the first competency hearing was the
testimony of the government psychologist who concluded after examin-
ing Wabol that he was not competent to stand trial. The prosecutor, in fact,
conceded that Wabol was not competent, and Wabol’s counsel did not ar-
gue otherwise.” Id. at 532 (emphases added). None of that is true here.

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10 Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685
of these alleged shortcomings, even if valid, so fatally under-
mined their opinions as to make the court’s reliance upon
them clearly erroneous.
Russell also argues that Drs. Muhkin and Dinwiddie were
evasive during the hearing. But “[w]e give a district court’s
credibility determinations of expert witnesses ‘great weight.’”
Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis, 736 F.3d 1060, 1069 (7th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted), and the district court here certainly
considered their opinions more persuasive than Dr. Jajko’s.
This makes sense given this record. Unlike Dr. Jajko, Drs.
Muhkin and Dinwiddie based their opinions on a more com-
plete review of Russell’s record. For instance, Dr. Muhkin
considered Russell’s ongoing clinical interviews, her own per-
sonal observations of Russell’s behavior at FMC Butner, and
other tests administered over time. As for Dr. Dinwiddie, it is
true that he did not conduct his own tests and admittedly did
not always keep contemporaneous notes. But he did conduct
a more thorough review of Russell’s prior records than Dr.
Jajko. And both Drs. Muhkin and Dinwiddie reviewed his So-
cial Security records, while Dr. Jajko did not. Given this, the
district court’s reliance upon their opinions was not clearly
erroneous.
But that was not all. In addition to weighing the opinions
of the three experts, the district court took into account Rus-
sell’s school records and prison telephone calls. Both, the
court found, evinced his capacity to communicate effectively
with others. Take the recordings of Russell’s telephone calls
from jail. The court observed that the call records “present[ed]
Russell as an engaged conversant who understands what is
said to him, who can respond to others, and who indeed can

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Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685 11
make his ideas and thoughts known (sometimes quite insist-
ently).”
At the same time, the court recognized that Russell suf-
fered from some mental illness. But, as the court aptly pointed
out: “Mental illness, by itself, does not constitute incompe-
tence.” See also Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831, 833–34 (7th Cir.
2011) (“The fact that a person suffers from a mental illness
does not mean that he’s incompetent to stand trial. He need
only be able to follow the proceedings and provide the infor-
mation that his lawyer needs in order to conduct an adequate
defense, and to participate in certain critical decisions, such as
whether to appeal.”). Thus, the finding of the district court
that Russell was competent to stand trial was not clearly erro-
neous.
B
Russell also contends that the district court procedurally
erred when it sentenced him. “A sentencing court commits
procedural error by not adequately explaining its choice of
sentence.” United States v. Garcia-Oliveros, 639 F.3d 380, 381
(7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The sentencing judge must,
“at the time of sentencing, … state in open court the reasons
for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c). We evaluate the sentence de novo for procedural er-
ror. United States v. Jerry, 55 F.4th 1124, 1130 (7th Cir. 2022).
According to Russell, the district court ignored his princi-
pal mitigation argument that he suffered from intellectual dis-
abilities. The record, however, is to the contrary. At sentenc-
ing, the district court expressly recognized Russell’s cognitive
impairments, remarked how such impairments could make
custody more difficult, and assured Russell that it would take

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12 Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685
that into account. And, as the transcript illustrates, the court
did so when crafting the sentence. This is sufficient. See United
States v. Tounisi, 900 F.3d 982, 987 (7th Cir. 2018) (“A district
judge must address the defendant’s principal arguments
made in mitigation, but the explanation can be implicit or im-
precise and does not need to be extensive.”).2
Nonetheless, Russell submits that the disparity between
his sentence and that of Williams (which was 66 months
shorter) demonstrates that the court failed to adequately con-
sider his cognitive impairments as mitigation. But the sen-
tencing disparity by itself does not prove that the district
court failed to consider Russell’s cognitive impairments; the
transcript shows that the court did. And the court explained
the reasons for the difference when it sentenced Williams.3
Additionally, Russell takes issue with the sufficiency of
the district court’s sentencing explanation. But, again, the
transcript indicates that the court provided a detailed discus-
sion of the relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and how they impacted Russell’s sentence.
2 Russell cites our decision in United States v. Poulin, 745 F.3d 796 (7th
Cir. 2014). That case is distinguishable because, there, the district judge
“explicitly stated that he did not know the exact context of [the defend-
ant’s] argument, simply referring to it as ‘some comment.’” Id. at 801. By
contrast, here, the district court acknowledged and considered Russell’s
argument.
3 We also reject Russell’s contention that the court’s consideration of
his cognitive impairment somehow “presents ambiguity.” The court
clearly considered Russell’s cognitive impairment to be a mitigating fac-
tor, while it deemed his exaggeration of it to be an aggravating factor.

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Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685 13
Accordingly, Russell’s procedural challenge to his sentence
lacks merit.4
C
Turning to Williams’s appeal, he argues that the notifica-
tion condition the court imposed as part of his supervised re-
lease is unconstitutionally vague, violates Article III’s non-
delegation principle, and implicates government-compelled
speech in violation of the First Amendment. We generally re-
view contested supervised release conditions for abuse of dis-
cretion. United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir.
2016). However, a vagueness challenge is a legal question sub-
ject to de novo review. United States v. Sandidge, 863 F.3d 755,
758 (7th Cir. 2017).
For its part, the government does not dispute that certain
terms in the condition are vague. We agree for the reasons we
previously discussed in United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828,
849 (7th Cir. 2015), and Bickart, 825 F.3d at 841–42. Accord-
ingly, we remand to the district court for the limited purpose
of considering the necessity and scope of that condition.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Russell’s convic-
tion and sentence, and we VACATE Special Condition No. 13
imposed on Williams as part of his supervised release and
4 To the extent that Russell also contends that his sentence was sub-
stantively unreasonable because it was “excessive,” we decline to consider
an issue that was “insufficiently developed” in his briefs. See United States
v. Figueroa, 622 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

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14 Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.

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