United States of America v. Sherman M. Threets

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued June 4, 2025
Decided June 11, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2394
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SHERMAN M. THREETS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-CR-216
William C. Griesbach,
Judge.
O R D E R
Sherman Threets appeals his 180-month sentence for leading a conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute drugs. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846; 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A),
(b)(1)(B). At issue here is whether the district court and the parties modified a plea
agreement at the change-of-plea hearing to include a lower sentencing range based on
state revocation sentences Threets was serving for the same conduct. Because the
district court did not modify the agreement and sentenced Threets within the express
terms of the agreement, we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2394 Page 2
Soon after serving a six-year prison term for a drug conspiracy conviction,
Threets returned to selling drugs. From February to April 2022, Threets led a four-
person conspiracy to sell heroin and methamphetamine in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. He
later was indicted on several counts of drug crimes. At the time, Threets was on state
supervision for two Wisconsin sentences. But because of the conduct underlying the
new charges, his state supervision was revoked.
The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report
that calculated a guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment (based on a total
offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI).
In early 2024, Threets sent a letter to the court asking to be transferred from the
Dodge County, Wisconsin jail (where he was serving time for his state revocation
sentences), to the nearby state correctional facility in Fox Lake, Wisconsin, so that he
could access a full law library. Threets’s counsel informed him, however, that any
transfer would compromise the double credit he was accumulating at the county jail
under a federal writ for time served on the state and federal sentences. But Threets said
that he wanted to be transferred to Fox Lake to access better facilities, so the court
granted his request and ordered his transfer under a federal detainer.
A few months later, Threets signed a plea agreement under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), agreeing to a prison term of 120 to 180 months for
conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances.
21 U.S.C. §§ 846; 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B). The parties agreed that the remaining
charges would be dismissed. In the agreement, Threets acknowledged that his decision
to plead guilty was not induced by any “threats, promises, representations, or other
inducements … other than those set forth in [the] agreement.”
The change-of-plea hearing that followed presents the dispute in this appeal. At
the hearing, where the court accepted Threets’s guilty plea and the plea agreement, the
question arose whether Threets’s new federal sentence should run concurrently with his
state revocation sentences. Defense counsel informed the court that he intended to
argue at the sentencing hearing that the sentences should be concurrent:
THE COURT: … [I]s this sentence to be concurrent [or] consecutive to
that, or is that up in the air? Is the sentence to be reduced for time spent?
Have you discussed those things?

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No. 24-2394 Page 3
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We have discussed it. As a matter of fact, it was a
topic we just brought up today. My understanding is that we would be
arguing that, and I feel that the law would be in our favor on that, but
that’s a determination that the Court will be making at the time of
sentencing.
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There are also various ways we can do that. If it’s
unexpired at that time, [the sentences can be] concurrent. If it is expired by
the time of sentencing, there can be a way in which the sentence is
fashioned such that this is taken into consideration, but we will get to that.
That is our understanding. We feel it is related, and it should be
concurrent.
THE COURT: [I]s this a point of argument, or is there agreement on this?
[GOVERNMENT COUNSEL]: There isn’t agreement on paper, but I don’t
think there will be an argument at sentencing.
THE COURT: That the sentence I impose should be concurrent?
[GOVERNMENT COUNSEL]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
THE COURT: Should that require a reduction—I mean, is it to be fully
concurrent with whatever the revocation was so I reduce whatever time I
impose by what he’s already served because it doesn’t sound like he
would get credit for that.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We would be asking that.
THE COURT: That I reduce. So what was his revocation term?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me?
THE COURT: What was his term?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Twenty-seven months.

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No. 24-2394 Page 4
THE COURT: Twenty-seven months. So really this then goes down to a
significant—you know 120 minus 27 what is that, 93 months to whatever
180 minus 27 [is]. Those are the ranges then … .
At the end of the hearing, the court told Threets: “[B]ecause of the kind of plea
agreement you’ve entered into with the [g]overnment, your sentence has to be between
ten years, 120 months, and 15 years, 180 months. And it can be reduced from that to
account for the sentence that … you’ve been serving on the revocation to the extent the
revocation is due to the same conduct.”
About two months later a sentencing hearing was conducted. Near the outset,
the court alluded to a possible sentencing range—remarking that it was “required by
the agreement to impose a sentence that’s between 120 months … and 180 months.” The
government argued for a 180-month sentence while Threets argued for a 120-month
sentence, reduced by the 27 months he served for the state revocation sentences.
The court sided with the government and sentenced Threets to 180 months. The
court explained that Threets sold large amounts of “addictive and destructive” drugs,
had multiple convictions for selling drugs that did not deter him from leading a
conspiracy to sell drugs, was still serving a sentence when he resumed drug dealing,
and—in exchange for drugs—tried to get someone else to take “take the heat” for him.
But the court declined to grant Threets credit for the state sentences. “He’s not
deserving of credit for the State sentences,” the court said. “Those were for different
crimes.” The court added that it was “imposing the sentence under the terms of the plea
agreement [it was] required to impose or within the range that [it was] required to
impose. What the Bureau of Prisons does with credit is up to the Bureau of Prisons.”
Threets objected.
On appeal, Threets argues that the district court breached the plea agreement by
not giving him the benefit of the agreement he says was modified at the change-of-plea
hearing. He highlights the court’s statement that the sentencing range was “120 minus
27, what is that, 93 months to whatever 180 minus 27.” Threets contends he was entitled
to a concurrent sentence or reduction in his sentence because the conduct underlying
his state revocation sentences was relevant conduct for his new federal sentence.
See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. In his view, the highest sentence he could receive under the Rule
11(c)(1)(C) agreement was 153 months (i.e., 180 minus 27 months).

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No. 24-2394 Page 5
Under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the parties may agree to a specific sentence that binds the
court once it accepts the plea agreement. United States v. Filzen, 991 F.3d 785, 788
(7th Cir. 2021). The court may reject the plea agreement, but to do so it must follow the
procedures in Rule 11(c)(5). Id. Where there is no dispute about the relevant facts, this
court reviews de novo the interpretation of a plea agreement and whether it has been
breached. United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 474 (7th Cir. 2016).
The statements at the change-of-plea hearing did not modify the terms of the
parties’ plea agreement. Plea agreements are interpreted according to general principles
of contract law, United States v. Colbert, 54 F.4th 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2022), and Threets’s
agreement does not even mention concurrent sentences or a sentence reduction based
on his state revocation sentences. Nor, for that matter, does Threets point to any
extrinsic evidence to call into question the 120- to 180-month sentencing range set forth
in the plea agreement. The transcripts of the change-of-plea and sentencing hearings
confirm the parties’ and the court’s understanding that the court could—but was not
required to—reduce his sentence by 27 months. Threets’s counsel seemed to
acknowledge as much when he began the change-of-plea hearing by saying “we would
be arguing [for a concurrent sentence]” and that it was “a determination that the Court
will be making at the time of sentencing.” (emphasis added) And while the government
agreed that the district court should impose concurrent sentences, the court—
significantly, for purposes of this appeal—did not. At the end of the change-of-plea
hearing, the court suggested that a reduction was a possibility but not a certainty:
“[B]ecause of the kind of plea agreement you’ve entered into with the [g]overnment,
your sentence has to be between ten years, 120 months, and 15 years, 180 months. And
it can be reduced from that to account for the sentence that—you’ve been serving on the
revocation to the extent the revocation is due to the same conduct.” (emphasis added) The
court then asked the parties whether this was a “correct statement of where we are,”
and the parties concurred. At no point did the court tell Threets that his sentence would
be reduced.
The district court acted well within its discretion to refuse to reduce Threets’s
sentence or treat his sentences as concurrent. True, a district court has the discretion to
impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence for a defendant “who is already subject to
an undischarged term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). But by the time of
sentencing, Threets already had served the entirety of his state revocation sentences,
and therefore was ineligible for a concurrent sentence, see United States v. Cruz, 595 F.3d
744, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2010). And the court could not sentence Threets below the 120-
month statutory minimum. Id. Although the court could have given Threets a 27-month

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No. 24-2394 Page 6
downward departure, it was not required to do so. The court reasoned that Threets’s
conduct underlying the state revocation sentences was not relevant conduct for his
federal sentence, see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, but even if it were, the court had the discretion
not to impose a concurrent sentence, see United States v. Orozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844,
850 (7th Cir. 2016), or reduce the term of imprisonment based on a discharged sentence,
see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 cmt. 4(E), 5.
A FFIRMED.

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