United States of America v. Vorheese D. Zanders

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 12, 2025
Decided June 13, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2087
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
VORHEESE D. ZANDERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:19-cr-62-001
Holly A. Brady,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Vorheese Zanders pleaded guilty—pursuant to a plea agreement—to possessing
fentanyl with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Zanders appeals, but his
appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of
the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve,
and Zanders has responded to the motion. See C IR . R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis
appears thorough, we limit our review to subjects that counsel and Zanders discuss.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2087 Page 2
See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We conclude that Zanders has
no arguable issues on appeal, and we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
In 2019, following a years-long investigation, Zanders was charged with ten drug
and firearm offenses in connection with his role in a drug trafficking organization called
the “Thrust Godz.” Zanders entered into a written agreement to plead guilty to two of
the charged offenses—possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl,
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)—in exchange for the dismissal of the eight other charges. The
agreement stated that Zanders qualified for a three-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility and that the government would recommend a sentence “equal to the
minimum of the applicable guideline range.” The parties further agreed, “pursuant to
the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, that the amount of controlled substances
involved in [the] offense of conviction including relevant conduct was no more than
3,000 kilograms of Converted Drug Weight.” The agreement also included a waiver of
Zanders’s appellate rights.
At a change-of-plea hearing, Zanders pleaded guilty to the two offenses stated in
the plea agreement. The magistrate judge asked Zanders whether he understood the
terms of the plea agreement, whether he had been coerced into accepting the
agreement, and whether the government had made any assurances or side promises to
him that were not contained in the agreement. Zanders responded that he understood
the plea agreement and that the agreement was not the result of coercion or other
promises. Additionally, the magistrate judge asked whether Zanders understood the
appellate waiver in the plea agreement, and Zanders responded that he did. After
hearing the factual basis for the plea and finding it sufficient, the magistrate judge
determined that the plea should be accepted. The district judge later accepted this
recommendation to accept Zanders’s guilty plea.
The presentence investigation report (PSR) set forth the applicable calculations
under the Sentencing Guidelines. It recommended a total offense level of 33 and
criminal history category of III, resulting in a guidelines range of 228 to 270 months’
imprisonment for both offenses. These figures derived from a base offense level of 30,
because Zanders was “responsible for at least 1,000 kilograms but less than 3,000
kilograms of Converted Drug Weight.” See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(5). The PSR then
added three two-level adjustments for maintaining a premises for manufacturing or
distributing a controlled substance; committing the offense as part of a criminal
livelihood; and acting as an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor in the criminal

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No. 24-2087 Page 3
activity. See id. § 2D1.1(b)(12), (16)(E); id. § 3B1.1(c). Finally, the PSR subtracted three
points for acceptance of responsibility. See id. § 3E1.1(a)–(b). The district judge ruled at a
pre-sentencing hearing that the livelihood adjustment should not apply, and the
probation office accordingly filed a revised PSR recommending a total offense level of
31 and a combined guidelines range of 195 to 228 months in prison for both offenses.
After the initial PSR was submitted, Zanders filed a motion arguing that the
government should be precluded from supporting any additions to his base offense
level. He asked the court to construe purported ambiguity in the plea agreement to
require that result. He argued that because of the agreement to a drug weight of no
more than 3,000 kilograms, which contained the phrase “including relevant conduct,”
his offense level had to be based solely on the drug weight. The district judge denied
Zanders’s motion at a hearing, explaining that there was no ambiguity in the plea
contract and that the provision reflected nothing more than the parties’ agreement to
the relevant drug quantity.
Thereafter, Zanders—at this point representing himself—filed a motion to
withdraw his plea. He alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that he
was not made aware of the full consequences of his plea, and that he entered into the
agreement under threat, duress, and coercion. The district judge rejected Zanders’s
request, concluding first that the factual assertions in his motion were all contradicted
by the representations he made during his plea colloquy, and second that he failed to
provide any evidence to support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
At the sentencing hearing, Zanders—once again represented by counsel—spoke
on his own behalf and argued that he believed the plea agreement bound the
government to a total offense level of 30. The district judge again explained that the plea
agreement bound the government only to agree to a certain drug quantity and did not
preclude it from arguing that other adjustments apply to Zanders’s offense level. After
adopting the recommended guidelines range calculated in the revised PSR, the district
judge imposed a total of 180 months’ imprisonment for both offenses.
In the Anders brief, counsel first tells us that although Zanders wishes to
challenge the validity of his plea (and thus his appeal waiver), he lacks any
nonfrivolous ground for doing so. As counsel correctly concludes, Zanders could not
reasonably argue that the district judge abused her discretion in denying Zanders’s
motion to withdraw his plea. See United States v. Cross, 962 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2020).
In support of his contention that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, Zanders

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provided only contradictions of statements that he had made under oath at the plea
hearing. A defendant’s assertion of his earlier perjury does not supply a valid basis for
withdrawing a plea. See United States v. Reed, 859 F.3d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 2017). And to
the extent Zanders wishes to argue that trial counsel was deficient and coerced him into
taking a plea, those issues are best reserved for collateral review where an evidentiary
record can be developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); United
States v. McClinton, 23 F.4th 732, 737 (7th Cir. 2022).
In opposing counsel’s motion to withdraw, Zanders reprises his argument that
the government breached the terms of the plea agreement by arguing for adjustments to
Zanders’s base offense level despite agreeing that the relevant drug weight in the
“offense of conviction including relevant conduct was no more than 3,000 kilograms.”
Zanders contends that the “relevant conduct” language in that provision is ambiguous
and should be construed to prohibit any upward guidelines adjustments to his base
offense level. But, as counsel correctly concludes, Zanders’s argument is frivolous
because the language of the plea agreement is unambiguous: the provision
straightforwardly sets forth the total drug amount for purposes of sentencing and states
that the amount includes drugs associated with relevant conduct. It does not address
any potential adjustments to Zanders’s base offense level. The district judge properly
declined to “ignore the plain language of the contract” because “there is no ambiguity.”
United States v. Matchopatow, 259 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis removed).
Finally, counsel correctly discerns that any challenge to Zanders’s sentence
would be fruitless because in his plea agreement he waived his right to contest “all
components of [his] sentence” and “the manner in which … [his] sentence was
determined or imposed.” When we decide that a defendant entered into a plea
agreement knowingly and voluntarily, we enforce an appeal waiver contained in that
agreement—unless the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum or the record suggests
that the court relied on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race. See Jones v.
United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999). Because, as counsel rightly concludes
based on the record, neither of those exceptions applies, we cannot address any
challenge to Zanders’s sentence.
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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