Richard A. Etheridge v. Midland Paper Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 12, 2025*
Decided June 13, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2693
RICHARD A. ETHERIDGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MIDLAND PAPER COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22 CV 3401
Jeremy C. Daniel,
Judge.
O R D E R
Richard Etheridge sued Midland Paper Company, Derrick Antonio, and Jim
Evans, alleging that they discriminated against him while he worked at Midland Paper.
The district judge dismissed Etheridge’s amended complaint, concluding that he could
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2693 Page 2
not sue individuals under federal employment-discrimination statutes and that he
failed to state a claim against Midland Paper. We affirm.
We construe Etheridge’s pro se complaint liberally and assume the truth of his
allegations, as supplemented by the documents he attached. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 10(c);
O’Brien v. Village of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2020). Etheridge, a 58-year-
old white man, was hired by Express Employment Professionals and assigned to work
at Midland Paper Company, where he was supervised by Jim Evans. Derrick Antonio,
an employee of Midland Paper, harassed Etheridge by calling him “old man” and
“white boy” and saying that he “should not be in the work place.” Etheridge also was
denied “promotional opportunities” because of his age, race, and disability status, and
he was ultimately fired because he complained to Evans’s manager, who was employed
by Express Employment. (Etheridge does not make any specific allegations against
Evans in his amended complaint.)
After his firing, Etheridge filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Illinois Department of Human
Rights. The EEOC eventually issued him a Notice of Right to Sue letter.
Thereafter, Etheridge sued Midland Paper in federal court, alleging age,
disability, and race discrimination and retaliation for engaging in protected activity, in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634;
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101; and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. On the form complaint, Etheridge
checked boxes to indicate that he was suing for termination of employment, failure to
accommodate his disabilities, and failure to stop harassment against him—though he
did not include any narrative of the purportedly unlawful conduct.
The district judge screened Etheridge’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
and dismissed it, concluding that Etheridge’s complaint failed to plausibly connect the
termination of his employment and other adverse actions with his protected
characteristics. The judge provided Etheridge with leave to file an amended complaint.
Etheridge did so, this time naming Antonio and Evans as defendants in addition to
Midland Paper. The judge accepted the amended complaint and ordered service on the
defendants.

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No. 24-2693 Page 3
Midland Paper and Evans† moved to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting
that the claims against Antonio and Evans failed because federal employment-
discrimination laws do not provide for individual liability, and that the claims against
Midland Paper fell short because Etheridge failed to allege an employee-employer
relationship between him and the company.
The district judge agreed with the defendants’ arguments and granted the
motion to dismiss. The judge dismissed the claims against Antonio and Evans with
prejudice. He dismissed the claims against Midland Paper without prejudice and gave
Etheridge leave to amend his claims against the company within 28 days. If he did not,
the judge stated, he would dismiss the case with prejudice. Instead of amending his
complaint, Etheridge filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, the judge entered a final
judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.
On appeal, Etheridge generally restates the allegations from his amended
complaint and adds some new facts. The defendants suggest that the appeal should be
dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), which
requires an appellant to provide “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to
the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” F ED. R. A PP . P.
28(a)(8)(A); see Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). But we gather that
Etheridge challenges the dismissal of his case and believes he stated a claim. We review
de novo the dismissal of the amended complaint. O’Brien, 955 F.3d at 621.
The district judge correctly dismissed the claims against Antonio and Evans. The
federal employment-discrimination laws invoked by Etheridge do not provide for
individual liability. See Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634,
644 (7th Cir. 2015) (ADA); Horwitz v. Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 602, 610 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001)
(ADEA); Gastineau v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1998) (Title VII).
As to Midland Paper, Etheridge failed to plausibly allege that this company
subjected him to any adverse employment actions based on protected conduct or
characteristics, in violation of the ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII. To be sure, Etheridge
did not need to plead a prima facie case of discrimination. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). Rather, he needed to allege only that he and Midland Paper
† Antonio was not served with the amended complaint and did not appear before
the district judge. Midland Paper represents that it is unaware of any current or former
employee with the name “Derrick Antonio.”

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No. 24-2693 Page 4
had an employment relationship, see Bronson v. Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children’s Hosp.,
69 F.4th 437, 448 (7th Cir. 2023), and that the company took action against him or
interfered with his employment on the basis of a protected status, see Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008).
Still, even assuming that Midland Paper was Etheridge’s employer, Etheridge
did not allege any facts that support a plausible discrimination claim against the
company. He alleged that he was harassed by a Midland Paper employee but not that
he reported the harassment to a supervisor at Midland Paper or that Midland Paper
took any official action against him. Rather, he alleged that he brought his complaints to
Evans’s manager at Express Employment and that he was discharged as a result. He
also pleaded that he was denied promotions, but he did not specify which entity
(Midland Paper or Express Employment) was responsible for making promotion
decisions, or what positions he applied to and did not receive. Etheridge asserted that
he filed a complaint with the human resources department at Midland Paper, but he
did not detail the content of his complaint or what, if any, action Midland Paper took in
response. This conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim against Midland
Paper. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
AFFIRMED

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