Jeremy Blue v. Daniel Bedwell

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 20, 2025 *
Decided June 23, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1735
JEREMY BLUE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DANIEL BEDWELL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:21-cv-00315-JRS-MKK
James R. Sweeney II,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jeremy Blue, an Indiana prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his case with prejudice
as a sanction for falsifying evidence. Because the district court did not err in finding that
Blue filed declarations with forged signatures, we affirm the judgment.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1735 Page 2
In 2021 Blue sued Daniel Bedwell, the food services director at Wabash Valley
Correctional Center, alleging that Bedwell violated the Eighth Amendment by routinely
providing food trays with insufficient portions or with insect infestations and other
contamination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed his claim related to
contamination at screening. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Eventually, Blue moved for summary
judgment on his remaining claim of an inadequate diet, and Bedwell filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment a month later. In support of his motion and in
response to Bedwell’s motion, Blue submitted five declarations purportedly signed by
Wabash correctional officers. Two of these declarations are relevant here. The first, from
officer Jaiden Lundy, said that Lundy served Blue a tray of food containing a bug. The
second, from officer M. Shepard, stated that staff “constantly have no choice but to
serve trays w[ith] short portions.” The district court denied both parties’ motions for
summary judgment, partly relying on Shepard’s declaration to conclude that there were
disputes of fact to resolve at trial. The court recruited counsel to represent Blue, first at
an unsuccessful settlement conference, and then in preparation for trial.
With the case set for trial, defense counsel contacted the officers to discuss their
testimony. During those conversations, some of the officers revealed that they had not
signed the declarations Blue had submitted. Shepard and Lundy prepared new
affidavits attesting that, although Blue had asked them to sign declarations, they had
refused, and that the signatures on Blue’s declarations were not theirs.
With this revelation, Bedwell moved for the case to be dismissed with prejudice
as a sanction. Blue, with the assistance of recruited counsel, responded that the court
should hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the signatures had been
forged or, in the alternative, should impose less severe sanctions. But Blue did not point
to any evidence that the declarations were authentic.
The court granted Bedwell’s motion without a hearing, finding that he had
provided unrefuted evidence that at least the two signatures were forged. The court
explained that although it had relied on only Shepard’s declaration for its summary
judgment ruling, it considered Lundy’s declaration to corroborate that Blue had filed
forged documents to deceive the court. Recognizing the severity of the conduct and the
resources the court had devoted to Blue already, the court concluded no other sanction
besides dismissal would be adequate.
On appeal, Blue (pro se again) insists that the signatures on the declarations were
not forged and that the officers are now claiming they were in retaliation for his filing
grievances. He maintains that Bedwell was deliberately indifferent to his diet and gave

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No. 24-1735 Page 3
false and incomplete responses to his requests for discovery. We review the court’s
factual findings for clear error and the sanction it chose for an abuse of discretion.
See Martin v. Redden, 34 F.4th 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2022). In response to Bedwell’s evidence
of forgery, Blue offered no evidence of his own; he requested only that the district court
hold an evidentiary hearing. But we have held a district court is not obligated to
conduct a hearing if one will not aid its decision. See id. at 569. As in Martin, Blue failed
to explain what he would have introduced at the hearing that might have affected the
court’s decision. Id. Even now, his only response to the evidence of forgery is the bare
assertion that he “did no such thing.” Given the officers’ unchallenged affidavits, the
court did not clearly err in finding that Blue had submitted forged declarations. See id.
at 568.
Nor was it an abuse of discretion to dismiss the case with prejudice. Forging
documents to defeat a dispositive motion undermines the integrity of the court system
and wastes valuable resources, justifying severe penalties. See Fulks v. Watson, 88 F.4th
1202, 1208 (7th Cir. 2023); Secrease v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir.
2015). Because the district court appropriately dismissed this case as a sanction, we do
not consider Blue’s arguments regarding his underlying claims or Bedwell’s discovery
responses. Litigants cannot lie to the court to bolster their claims, even if they feel their
constitutional rights have been violated; nor may they make up facts that they feel
defendants should have admitted in discovery. Cf. Kennedy v. Huibregtse, 831 F.3d 441,
443 (7th Cir. 2016) (“An applicant has to tell the truth … . A litigant can’t say, ‘I know
how the judge should rule, so I’m entitled to conceal material information from him.’”).
Finally, Blue blames his recruited counsel for not taking his allegations that
prison staff were retaliating against him seriously and failing to advise him to submit an
affidavit attesting that he did not forge the declarations. But there is no right to effective
assistance of counsel in a civil case, and so a litigant’s disputes with his attorney are not
a basis for relief on appeal. See Stanciel v. Gramley, 267 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2001).
AFFIRMED

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