United States of America v. Gregory Harris

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 20, 2025
Decided June 23, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2053
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GREGORY HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-CR-00269(1)
Robert W. Gettleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Gregory Harris pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and heroin, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to
150 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. He appeals, but appointed
counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel explains the nature of the case and
addresses potential issues that an appeal like this could involve. Because the analysis
appears thorough and Harris has not responded to counsel’s motion, see C IR . R. 51(b),
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 5 --

No. 24-2053 Page 2
we limit our review to the subjects counsel raises. United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776
(7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Police suspected Harris and co-defendant Eric Jones of supplying a street gang
with heroin and MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine). Three controlled
buys with a confidential informant took place over two weeks in early 2019. On
February 21, Harris and Jones rode in Harris’s car to the sale site in Chicago. Harris
gave Jones heroin and MDMA, which Jones in turn sold to the informant. Jones then
stopped by Harris’s car and handed him some of the cash. Harris departed alone and
drove to a home in Dolton, Illinois. One week later, on February 28, officers spotted
Harris at the Dolton site shortly before he drove Jones to another meeting with the
informant, who then bought heroin from Jones. A similar sequence occurred several
days later, on March 7. Harris was arrested that day with cash with serial numbers that
matched what the informant had been given. Less than two weeks later, on March 20,
an officer applied for and received a warrant to search the Dolton home. The next day,
officers executing that warrant found a gun and bags of various controlled substances
(including methamphetamine), eventually leading to a raft of federal charges.
Harris moved to suppress the Dolton-home evidence, arguing that the
information underlying the warrant was stale or otherwise insufficient. He also sought
a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), arguing that officers omitted
facts he saw as material—e.g., that the Dolton site was the home of his infant son and
the son’s mother; that officers knew Harris lived in Chicago, not Dolton; and that no
other evidence tied the house to drug trafficking. The district court denied the motion,
ruling that the warrant was supported by probable cause and that the information was
not stale. Alternatively, the court concluded that even if the information technically
were stale, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would allow the evidence’s
admission. The court also denied a Franks hearing, reasoning that the omitted details,
even if true, were immaterial because they did not undercut probable cause.
Harris later pleaded guilty to just one of the counts, possessing with intent to
distribute methamphetamine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The
written plea agreement expressly reserved Harris’s right to appeal the suppression
ruling and anticipated a guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment based on
an offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of III.
A probation officer’s presentence investigation report (PSR) cited a base offense
level of 38, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(1), because Harris was responsible for more
than 106,000 kilograms of converted drug weight. The PSR added two levels for

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 24-2053 Page 3
possessing a firearm in the offense, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(1), but subtracted three for
accepting responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1(a)–(b), resulting in a total offense level of 37. The
probation officer also assessed seven criminal history points, yielding a criminal history
category of IV and a guidelines range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment—more than
the plea agreement had estimated.
Neither party objected to those calculations. Harris did argue that his criminal
history category overstated the seriousness of his criminal record, and the court agreed.
Weighing the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court imposed 150 months’
imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release.
In appellate counsel’s Anders brief, counsel first considers but rightly rejects as
frivolous any challenge to the denial of Harris’s motion to suppress. Harris’s presence
at the Dolton home shortly before or after three controlled buys of distribution
quantities of drugs over two weeks revealed a fair probability that evidence of ongoing
trafficking would be found there. See United States v. Yarber, 915 F.3d 1103, 1105–06
(7th Cir. 2019). And counsel correctly rejects any argument that the evidence was too
stale to support a warrant: The thirteen-day lapse between the third controlled buy and
the warrant application was not fatal because the affidavit suggested ongoing,
continuous drug dealing—three substantial controlled buys in two weeks.
See United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455, 476 (7th Cir. 2022) (evidence of ongoing crime
“just ten days before the warrant application” not too stale). And even if the warrant
were technically insufficient, counsel correctly concludes that the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule would apply. Obtaining a warrant yields a presumption of
good faith, and neither counsel nor we identify a nonfrivolous argument to rebut that
presumption here. See Yarber, 915 F.3d at 1106.
Counsel also correctly concludes that any challenge to the denial of a Franks
hearing would be frivolous. Harris did not make a substantial preliminary showing that
any omissions from the affidavit (e.g., that Harris did not live in Dolton and that he
often visited the house to care for his infant son) were material to the probable-cause
determination or that the officer acted with deliberate or reckless disregard for the
truth. See United States v. Woodfork, 999 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2021).
Counsel next tells us that Harris wishes to challenge his guilty plea but correctly
concludes that this would be frivolous. The district court substantially complied with
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and ensured the plea was voluntary.
See United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). The court informed
Harris of the nature of the charge, the possible penalties, the trial rights he was

-- 3 of 5 --

No. 24-2053 Page 4
forfeiting, and the sentencing process. Counsel identifies three omissions from the plea
colloquy, but all are harmless. The court did not discuss a forfeiture allegation
regarding a seized firearm, see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(J), but Harris’s plea agreement
expressly conceded the forfeiture issue. The court did not say Harris had the right to
appointed counsel if he went to trial, see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(D), but Harris was
represented by appointed counsel at the time and had no reason to doubt a trial would
be counseled. And although the judge did not discuss possible immigration
consequences, see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(O), Harris is a United States citizen and faces
none here.
Counsel next correctly notes that any challenge based on ineffective assistance of
counsel is best saved for collateral review, where a record can be fully developed.
See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–05 (2003).
As for sentencing, counsel rightly rejects any challenge to the guidelines
calculations. The parties agreed that Harris’s criminal history category of IV overstated
his criminal record, and the district court departed downward to a guidelines range of
262 to 327 months (based on an offense level of 37 and a revised criminal history
category of III). Harris waived any challenge to those calculations when his counsel
confirmed on the record that there were no other objections to the PSR. See United States
v. Picardi, 950 F.3d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 2020).
Counsel also rightly rejects challenging the substantive reasonableness of
Harris’s below-guidelines sentence of 150 months’ imprisonment. The district court
adequately justified it under the § 3553(a) factors, reasonably balancing Harris’s history
and characteristics (e.g., strong family support and the age of his criminal history) and
the seriousness of the offense (the large drug quantity and the dangers of unlawfully
possessing a gun). Harris could not overcome the presumption that his below-
guidelines sentence is reasonable. See United States v. Holder, 94 F.4th 695, 700 (7th Cir.
2024).
Finally, counsel sees no nonfrivolous challenge to the five-year length or
conditions of supervised release. The court’s reasons for imposing the term of
imprisonment also justify this supervision. See United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 869–
70 (7th Cir. 2016). Harris objected to one condition that would have authorized a
probation officer to search his person, effects, or home—and the court removed that
condition. And counsel correctly concludes that Harris waived any appellate challenge

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 24-2053 Page 5
to any other conditions because he told the district court that he had no objections to
them. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019).
We thus GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

-- 5 of 5 --