Gurkirat Singh v. PAMELA J. BONDI , Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-3091
GURKIRAT SINGH ,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI , Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A216-183-486
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 14, 2025 — DECIDED J UNE 23, 2025
____________________
Before BRENNAN , ST. E VE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Gurkirat Singh, a citizen of India,
fled his home in Punjab for the United States after being
beaten and threatened for his political activities. Upon his ar-
rival, Singh applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Singh’s requests for
relief on multiple grounds, including because Singh could

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2 No. 24-3091
reasonably relocate within India to avoid persecution. The
Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) affirmed. Be-
cause substantial evidence supports the IJ and Board’s reloca-
tion determination, we deny Singh’s petition for review.
I. Background
Petitioner Gurkirat Singh is an Indian national and a mem-
ber of the Sikh ethnoreligious group. While residing in his
home state of Punjab, Singh joined a Sikh separatist party,
commonly known as the Mann Party. His political participa-
tion rapidly attracted the attention of members of the compet-
ing Congress Party, who approached Singh and told him that
it “would be good for him” to switch parties. Singh was un-
swayed.
A year later, Singh had a more serious run-in with the
Congress Party. While hanging up flyers for a Mann Party-
sponsored blood donation event, a small group of men con-
fronted Singh and beat him with baseball bats and hockey
sticks for ten to twelve minutes. The men reminded Singh that
they had told him to join the Congress Party. Singh attempted
to report the attack to the local police, but they refused to ac-
cept his report and advised him that he ought to join the Con-
gress Party.
Congress Party members beat Singh for a second time a
few months later. His attackers also threatened him, warning:
“we told you to quit you [sic] party and join our party, but
this time we will kill you, we will take your life.” The beating
ended when Singh’s cries drew the attention of nearby resi-
dents. Again, local police refused to investigate, instead in-
structing Singh to join the Congress Party.

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No. 24-3091 3
Following this second attack, Singh left India for the
United States, entering the country without authorization or
inspection. Within a month of his arrival, the Government
commenced removal proceedings against him. Singh con-
ceded his inadmissibility but filed an application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.
At an Immigration Court hearing, Singh testified to the
above facts. The IJ found his testimony credible but denied his
applications because he had not suffered persecution, would
not face a “substantial risk” of torture if deported, and could
relocate to safety within India. Expecting Singh to internally
relocate was reasonable, the IJ elaborated, because “he is a
twenty-five-year-old male in good health” and he “was able
to relocate to the United States, a predominately English-
speaking nation, and maintain a livelihood.” Singh appealed
and the Board affirmed the IJ’s decision pursuant to Matter of
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), explaining that it
discerned no clear error in the IJ’s relocation or past persecu-
tion findings.
II. Discussion
Singh now petitions our court for review. He presses three
principal arguments: (1) the Board improperly deferred to the
IJ when deciding his appeal, (2) the IJ and Board erred by
finding he could reasonably relocate to safety within India,
and (3) the IJ and Board erred by finding that he had not suf-
fered past persecution. We reach only Singh’s first two con-
tentions, as they resolve the petition.
A. Scope of the Board’s Review
We begin with Singh’s charge that the Board examined the
IJ’s decision under an erroneous standard of review. Whether

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4 No. 24-3091
the Board applied the correct standard of review is a legal
question we consider de novo. F.J.A.P. v. Garland, 94 F.4th 620,
638 (7th Cir. 2024). Board precedent mandates that the Board
apply a dual review standard for mixed questions of law and
fact. See Matter of R-A-F, 27 I. & N. Dec. 778, 779–80 (A.G.
2020). So while the Board reviews an IJ’s factual findings for
clear error, its review of legal questions, “including the appli-
cation of law to fact,” is plenary. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii).
Singh objects that in his appeal, the Board improperly de-
ferred to the IJ’s resolution of the “legal” half of a mixed ques-
tion: the reasonableness of his relocation. As evidence of def-
erence, he points to the Board’s statement that it discerned
“no clear error” in the IJ’s finding that he could reasonably
relocate within India. Yet Singh’s view of the record overlooks
that the Board affirmed the IJ’s judgment pursuant to Matter
of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 874. Under Burbano, the Board
may affirm “in a summary fashion” when its independent re-
view of the record yields conclusions that coincide with the
IJ’s decision. Id. The Board’s invocation of Burbano thus
demonstrates that the Board did not defer to the IJ. Instead, it
exercised its “independent review authority” and concluded
that Singh could reasonably relocate.1 Id.
Seeing no procedural infirmity in the Board’s decision, we
now turn to the merits of the relocation finding.
1 Singh waived any contention that the Board’s Burbano statement was
mere parroting of the correct standard of review or an insufficient indi-
cium of independence, see F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 638, by failing to file a reply
brief. Accordingly, we do not reach that question here.

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No. 24-3091 5
B. Singh’s Ability to Relocate within India
To be eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or pro-
tection under the CAT, an applicant must be unable to reason-
ably relocate to safety within his country of nationality. Singh
v. Garland, 89 F.4th 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2024); see also 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.13(b)(3), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A)–(B), (c)(3).
We review the IJ and Board’s determination that Singh
could reasonably relocate under the highly deferential sub-
stantial evidence standard. Mateo-Mateo v. Garland, 124 F.4th
470, 474 (7th Cir. 2024); see also Cui v. Garland, 71 F.4th 592,
599, 600 (7th Cir. 2023). We may not reverse “unless any rea-
sonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.” Santashbekov v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir.
2016) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
Singh conceded at oral argument that it is possible for low-
level Mann Party members to avoid persecution by relocating
within India, asserting only that personal circumstances make
relocation unreasonable for him. On substantial evidence re-
view, we cannot agree. Singh is a healthy, working-age male.
He may have few occupational skills and speak only Punjabi,
but he demonstrated resilience and adaptability when he suc-
cessfully migrated to the United States. Endowed with these
strengths, we do not think any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to find that Singh’s limited family ties outside
Punjab make it unreasonable for him to relocate within India.
We therefore hold that substantial evidence supports the
IJ and Board’s conclusion that Singh could reasonably relo-
cate. As a result, he is ineligible for asylum, withholding of
removal, or protection under the CAT.
* * *

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For these reasons, we must DENY the petition for review.

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