Alan Braid v. Oscar A. Stilley

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2815
A LAN BRAID,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OSCAR A. STILLEY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-05283 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge .
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 1, 2025 — D ECIDED J ULY 10, 2025
____________________
Before SYKES , Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and K IRSCH , Circuit
Judges.
SCUDDER , Circuit Judge. In September 2021 Dr. Alan Braid,
a Texas OB/GYN, wrote an editorial in the Washington Post
admitting he performed an abortion in violation of the Texas
Heartbeat Act. Three individuals from three different states
reacted by each invoking the citizen-suit enforcement provi-
sion of the Texas Heartbeat Act and seeking to recover at least
$10,000 in statutory damages.

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2 No. 22-2815
Now facing the prospect of duplicative liability, Dr. Braid
made use of the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335,
to join the claimants in a single suit. But, in an odd twist, he
did not do so by going to any Texas federal court but instead
by filing suit in federal court in Chicago. In addition to his
interpleader claim, Dr. Braid sought declaratory relief, urging
the district court to declare the Texas Heartbeat Act unconsti-
tutional.
The district court dismissed Dr. Braid’s entire suit, con-
cluding that the existence of parallel state-court proceedings
justified abstention under the Supreme Court’s Wilton-
Brillhart doctrine. Though we chart a different course of rea-
soning, we ultimately reach the same end point and therefore
affirm the dismissal of Dr. Braid’s federal case.
I
A
Texas enacted the Heartbeat Act, more commonly known
as S.B. 8, in March 2021. The Act makes it unlawful for an in-
dividual to perform, or aid in performing, an abortion after
the detection of a fetal heartbeat, which typically occurs
around six weeks’ gestation. See Tex. Health & Safety Code
§ 171.204(a); Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 58
(2021) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
The law has several uncommon elements, chief among
them its citizen-suit enforcement provision, which the Texas
legislature designed to “shield” the “law from judicial re-
view.” Jackson, 595 U.S. at 59. S.B. 8’s enforcement scheme is
novel, divesting state officials of all enforcement authority
and, instead, empowering private enforcement. The Act

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No. 22-2815 3
authorizes civil actions in state court by private individuals
who, if successful in proving a statutory violation, may re-
cover a minimum $10,000 in statutory damages, plus costs
and fees, from the individual who performed the unlawful
abortion. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.208(a), (b)(2)–
(3). The cost and fee provision does not work both directions,
however. A prevailing defendant cannot recover their own
costs incurred in defending the lawsuit. See id. § 171.208(i).
The Act also bars defendants from raising certain de-
fenses, including that any aspect of S.B. 8 is unconstitutional
(see id. § 171.208(e)(2)) or asserting non-mutual issue or claim
preclusion (see id. § 171.208(e)(5)) if the defendant already
prevailed in a separate lawsuit brought by another private
“bounty hunter[]” plaintiff. Jackson, 595 U.S. at 62 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
If, however, a defendant provides proof of having “paid the
full amount of statutory damages … in a previous action for
that particular abortion,” the court may not award relief to a
second claimant. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.208(c).
B
Dr. Alan Braid is an OB/GYN licensed to practice in Texas.
On September 18, 2021, the Washington Post published an ed-
itorial written by Dr. Braid in which he admitted to perform-
ing an abortion twelve days earlier (on September 6), in vio-
lation of S.B. 8. The response was immediate. Three individu-
als sued Dr. Braid in Texas state court pursuant to S.B. 8’s cit-
izen-suit provision: Felipe N. Gomez, Oscar Stilley, and Wolf-
gang P. Hirczy de Miño.
As the parties confirmed at oral argument, Stilley’s law-
suit is the only one that remains pending. (Hirczy de Miño

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4 No. 22-2815
voluntarily dismissed his suit without prejudice, and the
Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a state trial court’s dismissal
of Gomez’s suit for lack of standing.) Dr. Braid remains ex-
posed to additional litigation and liability, however, includ-
ing by non-parties to this suit, because the Act’s four-year
statute of limitations does not expire until September 6, 2025.
See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.208(d).
After Gomez, Stilley, and Hirczy de Miño filed their law-
suits in Texas courts, Dr. Braid went on the offensive. In Oc-
tober 2021 he invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1335 and brought a federal
interpleader action in Illinois federal court. Because Gomez,
one of the interpleader defendants, lives in or around Chi-
cago, the Northern District of Illinois offered an appropriate
venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1397. Along with his complaint, Dr.
Braid deposited $10,000 with the district court—the minimum
statutory damages recoverable under S.B. 8 and more than the
$500 required by § 1335 to establish an interpleader fund.
In addition to his federal interpleader claim, Dr. Braid also
sought declaratory relief, asking the district court to declare
S.B. 8 unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
C
In February 2022 Dr. Braid moved for summary judgment,
contending that he did not owe any of the interpleader de-
fendants statutory damages because S.B. 8 is unconstitutional,
including, among other reasons, because it conflicts with Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But while Dr. Braid’s motion was
pending, the Supreme Court decided Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Organization, and overruled Roe. See 597 U.S. 215, 302
(2022). Dr. Braid acknowledged Dobbs as part of informing the

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No. 22-2815 5
district court he still sought a declaration that S.B. 8’s enforce-
ment scheme violates his “due-process, equal-protection, and
First Amendment rights.”
In the interim, plaintiff Hirczy de Miño moved to dismiss
Dr. Braid’s complaint, and plaintiff Gomez urged the district
court to abstain. The district court resolved these motions in a
single order dismissing Dr. Braid’s complaint.
The district court began by assuring itself of its jurisdic-
tion, observing that “[t]his case is not the usual interpleader
action.” For one, the court explained, unlike most inter-
pleader actions where multiple people lay claim to a “partic-
ular asset” or “identifiable fund,” the interpleader defendants
here press “a mere private right of action” against Dr. Braid’s
assets, not claiming entitlement to a pre-established fund.
Even still, because Dr. Braid deposited $10,000 with the
court’s registry, the court determined that he “theoretically”
established a fund sufficient to sustain an action in inter-
pleader.
From there the district court questioned whether Dr. Braid
has a “reasonable fear of double liability”—a condition neces-
sary to establish Article III standing to sustain an interpleader
action. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Balti-
more, 741 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1984) (Indianapolis Colts II)
(“[T]he stakeholder must have a real and reasonable fear of
double liability or vexatious, conflicting claims to justify in-
terpleader.”); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Jonas, 775 F.3d 867, 870
(7th Cir. 2014) (concluding no justiciable controversy existed
where state law eliminated the risk that the interpleader
plaintiff would face multiple liability).

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6 No. 22-2815
The court turned next to S.B. 8’s provision prohibiting any
award of relief if the defendant demonstrates that he “previ-
ously paid the full amount of statutory damages” in a sepa-
rate action. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.208(b)(2). While
that provision, at first glance, might appear to foreclose dou-
ble recovery, the district court observed that subsection (b)(2)
hinges its protection on a defendant providing proof of pay-
ment, not merely proof of a separate preexisting judgment.
So, the court concluded, S.B. 8 leaves open the possibility of
duplicative and conflicting judgments, resulting in a justicia-
ble interpleader claim.
But even though the district court determined it had juris-
diction to consider Dr. Braid’s claims, it ultimately dismissed
the case, exercising its discretion to abstain under the Wilton-
Brillhart doctrine. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277
(1995); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
The court found no basis upon which it “could select among
the three interpleader claimants,” rendering it all but impos-
sible to resolve Dr. Braid’s interpleader claim. Abstention re-
flected the appropriate path forward, the court underscored,
because it would allow Texas state courts to resolve the dis-
position of competing claims against Dr. Braid in the first in-
stance.
This appeal followed. With each of the three appellee
plaintiffs proceeding pro se on appeal, as they did below, we
appointed Brian J. Paul of Faegre Drinker Briddle & Reath
LLP as amicus curiae to defend the district court’s decision.

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No. 22-2815 7
II
A
We begin, as we must, by assessing whether Dr. Braid’s
suit falls within the “limited jurisdiction” conferred upon fed-
eral courts by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Dr. Braid invoked federal sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the fed-
eral question jurisdiction statute. Section 1331 grants district
courts original jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” in-
cluding where “federal law creates the cause of action as-
serted.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1331).
Dr. Braid advanced multiple claims, seeking both inter-
pleader and declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335 and
2201, respectively. Because § 2201, or the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, “provides no independent source of federal subject-
matter jurisdiction,” it was Dr. Braid’s federal interpleader
claim which supplied the cause of action necessary to open
the federal courthouse doors. Manley v. Law, 889 F.3d 885, 893
(7th Cir. 2018) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339
U.S. 667, 671 (1950)). Before we assess the merits of Dr. Braid’s
complaint, then, we must assure ourselves that Dr. Braid’s in-
terpleader claim fits within the contours of 28 U.S.C. § 1335.
Like the district court, the parties, too, recognize that this
case is far from an ordinary interpleader case which follows a
similar and well-known pattern: “a neutral stakeholder, usu-
ally an insurance company or a bank,” sues in federal court to
force “all the claimants” to the policy or fund “to litigate their
claims in a single action brought by the stakeholder.”

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8 No. 22-2815
Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 733 F.2d
484, 486 (7th Cir. 1984) (Indianapolis Colts I) (citing 7 Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 1701 (1972)). Congress originally limited our jurisdiction to
this narrow set of claims, specifying that statutory inter-
pleader applied only to actions brought by “any insurance
company or fraternal beneficiary society.” Act of Feb. 22,
1917, Pub. L. No. 64-346, ch. 113, 19 Stat. 929; see also Wright
& Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1701 (3d ed. 2025).
But over time Congress expanded the remedy’s availabil-
ity, amending the statute in 1936 to make interpleader availa-
ble to “any person, firm, corporation, association, or soci-
ety … under any obligation written or unwritten to the
amount of $500 or more” to which two or more adverse and
diverse claimants assert entitlement. Act of Jan. 20, 1936, Pub.
L. No. 74-422, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1335). This amendment also extended the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to actions “in the nature of interpleader,”
thereby “relax[ing]” some of the remedy’s common-law re-
quirements, including “that the stakeholder be neutral and
that the conflicting claims have the same origin.” Indianapolis
Colts I, 733 F.2d at 486; see also Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398,
406–07 (1939) (explaining that the expansion of federal juris-
diction to suits “in the nature of interpleader” extends inter-
pleader to plaintiffs who themselves “claim[] an interest in
the property or fund which is subjected to the risk”).
In today’s iteration, § 1335 provides that “district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of inter-
pleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person,
firm, or corporation, association, or society having in his or its

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No. 22-2815 9
custody or possession money or property of the value of $500
or more,” so long as:
(1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse
citizenship as defined in subsection (a) or (d) or
section 1332 of this title, are claiming or may
claim to be entitled to such money or property,
or to any one or more of the benefits arising by
virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy or
other instrument, or arising by virtue of any
such obligation; and if (2) the plaintiff has de-
posited such money or property or has paid the
amount of or the loan or other value of such in-
strument or the amount due under such obliga-
tion into the registry of the court, there to abide
the judgment of the court, or has given bond
payable to the clerk of the court in such amount
and with such surety as the court or judge may
deem proper, conditioned upon the compliance
by the plaintiff with the future order or judg-
ment of the court with respect to the subject
matter of the controversy.
28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1)–(2).
From this text, courts have identified three prerequisites
to the exercise of interpleader jurisdiction pursuant to § 1335:
(1) an amount in controversy in excess of $500; (2) two or more
adverse claimants of diverse citizenship; and (3) the deposit
or conferral of a bond by the interpleader plaintiff sufficient
to ensure compliance with a future order or judgment. 7
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1714 (3d ed.
2025) (collecting cases). It is against this backdrop that we con-
sider whether Dr. Braid’s suit meets these requirements,

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10 No. 22-2815
thereby allowing us to consider his interpleader claim and ac-
companying claims for declaratory relief on the merits.
B
In defending the district court’s decision, Mr. Paul, as ami-
cus, contends that Dr. Braid’s interpleader suit falls short in
two ways: his liability has not yet been determined, so there
is no set fund to discern or deposit with the district court, and,
in any event, Dr. Braid failed to deposit the largest amount in
controversy, rendering his $10,000 deposit insufficient. While
these points have much to say for themselves, we conclude
that neither presents a barrier to the district court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over Dr. Braid’s interpleader action.
Start with the presence of a definite fund. Section 1335(a)
requires that a plaintiff deposit with the court “such money
or property” that “aris[es] by virtue of any such obligation.”
Courts have interpreted this language to require the existence
of “a limited fund or some specific, identifiable property,”
such that the court can adjudicate an equitable division of the
property and conclusively resolve competing claims. 7
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1704 (3d ed.
2025). But that does not mean interpleader confines itself to
resolving entitlement to contested insurance funds or estate
assets, though those fact patterns may remain the typical use
of interpleader. See id. Remember that Congress drafted
§ 1335 to cover actions “in the nature of interpleader,” 28
U.S.C. § 1335(a), rendering it fit to resolve “any protectable
property interest” with the remedy “seldom … rendered in-
appropriate because of the nature of the stake,” 7 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1704 (3d ed. 2025) (em-
phasis added).

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No. 22-2815 11
Congress’s expansion of § 1335 explains the application of
interpleader to a variety of non-traditional contexts, including
to resolve competing claims to reward money for an arrest
and conviction of a robber, see Davis v. Mathews, 361 F.2d 899,
900 (4th Cir. 1966), the assignment of oil and gas leases, see
Guy v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Tr. Co., 429 F.2d 828, 829 (6th Cir.
1970), and funds recovered from a man who pleaded guilty to
multiple bank robbery charges, see United States v. Cent. Nat.
Bank of Cleveland, 429 F.2d 5, 6 (8th Cir. 1970).
Section 1335 is broad in another way: it extends relief to
circumstances where multiple individuals claim entitlement
to “such money or property” that “aris[es] by virtue of any
such obligation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1335. By its terms, then, the stat-
ute encompasses monetary obligations arising from a statu-
tory violation. See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Federal
Interpleader Act of 1936 (pt. 1), 45 Yale L.J. 963, 972 (1936) (ex-
plaining, as the principal drafter of the modern federal inter-
pleader statute, that the use of “obligation” in § 1335 is broad
enough to encompass “tort obligations”).
And although the exact and ultimate scope of Dr. Braid’s
liability has not yet been determined, we believe it is definite
enough to establish a viable interpleader fund. S.B. 8 provides
that private individuals may recover a minimum of $10,000
from any individual who violates the Act. After Dr. Braid took
to the Washington Post to admit to performing an abortion in
violation of S.B. 8, a predictable, if not invited, reaction fol-
lowed: three individuals invoked S.B. 8, became claimants,
and thereby sought to recover a singular fund—damages un-
der S.B. 8—from Dr. Braid in the Texas state courts. So even
though the monetary value of Dr. Braid’s liability may be
open-ended to some degree at this stage, a district court’s

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12 No. 22-2815
interpleader jurisdiction remains sound even where “claims
against the stakeholder potentially exceed the value of the in-
terpleaded fund.” Ashton v. Josephine Bay Paul & C. Michael
Paul Found., Inc., 918 F.2d 1065, 1069 (2d Cir. 1990).
This outcome makes sense considering Congress’s expan-
sion of interpleader to allow interested stakeholders to resort
to the mechanism even while contesting their own liability.
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 532 n.9
(1967) (acknowledging that the modern interpleader statute
in § 1335 authorizes suits “‘in the nature of interpleader,’ …
meaning those in which the plaintiff is not wholly disinter-
ested”). Indeed, an interpleader plaintiff may challenge a suc-
cessful claimant’s recovery if “the amount awarded is more
than the stakeholder’s admitted liability.” 7 Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1714 (3d ed. 2025). It follows then
that an interpleader plaintiff’s liability does not need to be
conclusively determined at the pleading stage to establish a
definite interpleader fund.
Mr. Paul also contends that Dr. Braid’s fund is jurisdic-
tionally defective because one of the interpleader defendants,
Oscar Stilley, sought to recover $100,000 in his Texas suit—an
amount far greater than the $10,000 Dr. Braid deposited with
the district court. While it is true that, “[a]s a general rule, the
stakeholder must deposit or post a bond in the amount equal
to the largest claim,” id. § 1716, assessing an interpleader
fund’s sufficiency “is not a mechanical process under which
the court uncritically searches for the highest amount claimed
by the adverse claimants,” U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Asbestospray,
Inc., 182 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.); but see In re
Sinking of M/V Ukola, 806 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986) (“A court may
not assert jurisdiction over an interpleader action where the

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No. 22-2815 13
money, property or bond could not suffice to pay the largest
amount in controversy.”); Acuity v. Rex, LLC, 929 F.3d 995,
1101 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the interpleader plaintiff
must “deposit the amount claimed by [the claimant] or at the
very least ‘the largest amount for which it may be liable in
view of the subject matter of the controversy’” (first citation
omitted) (quoting Asbestospray, 182 F.3d at 210)).
The amount required instead “depends upon the person
who invokes interpleader and what he asserts to be the sub-
ject matter of the controversy.” Asbestospray, 182 F.3d at 210
(quoting In re Sinking of M/V Ukola, 806 F.2d at 5). And here it
is the abortion Dr. Braid performed on September 6, 2021, that
is the “subject matter of the controversy” for which multiple
claimants seek to recover statutory damages under S.B. 8,
though only one claimant will be able to do so at the expense
of the others. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.208(c). In
this way, then, the $10,000 on deposit in the district court rep-
resents at least the minimum mandatory statutory damages
under S.B. 8 to which the three Texas plaintiffs all claim equal
entitlement. Put most simply, for Stilley to recover the
$100,000 he seeks, he first needs to win out against the other
two interpleader defendants to the $10,000 fund.
While the largest amount in controversy usually controls,
a plaintiff need not deposit an amount which is “not realisti-
cally within the scope of the interpleader as pleaded.” Asbes-
tospray, 182 F.3d at 210. And here, on the facts presented by
all parties, we see no reasonable basis to conclude that Oscar
Stilley would ever recover the $100,000 he sought in his Texas
complaint. He could have sought $1 million, as S.B. 8 imposes
no statutory cap on damages. See Tex. Health & Safety Code
§ 171.208(b). Yet S.B. 8 does not automatically entitle a bounty

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14 No. 22-2815
hunter plaintiff (like Stilley) to the damages he dares to re-
quest in an enforcement suit. Mr. Paul makes no argument to
the contrary, acknowledging that there is no way to know
whether (or on what basis) a Texas court would award more
than the $10,000 provided by statute.
Although we ultimately reject Mr. Paul’s contention that
the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider
Dr. Braid’s interpleader claim, his arguments by no means are
makeweight. He is right that Dr. Braid’s federal suit is an odd
fit in a few different ways with the interpleader statute. But,
at bottom, we see the requisite jurisdictional inquiry as one
rooted in interpreting a statute Congress deliberately drafted
in broad terms. Section 1335 establishes a federal cause of ac-
tion which, by its terms, extends to cases where, as here, mul-
tiple individuals seek mandatory statutory damages recover-
able by only one claimant. And Dr. Braid’s interpleader action
satisfies the statute’s other demands. The district court, there-
fore, had subject-matter jurisdiction over Dr. Braid’s inter-
pleader action.
III
A
After determining it had jurisdiction over this dispute, the
district court applied the Wilton-Brillhart abstention doctrine,
a decision we review without deference. See R.R. St. & Co. v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 2009).
Dr. Braid contends that the district court erred when it dis-
missed the case on abstention grounds and, more specifically,
when it concluded that Wilton-Brillhart applied to govern stat-
utory interpleader actions. In Dr. Braid’s view, the Supreme
Court has limited the doctrine’s scope to actions brought

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No. 22-2815 15
pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, so the district
court should have applied the more demanding Colorado River
standard to abstain in favor of parallel state-court proceed-
ings. Whether Wilton-Brillhart should apply to statutory inter-
pleader actions is a difficult question and one which requires
us to take a close look at Supreme Court case law on federal
abstention against the backdrop of parallel state-court pro-
ceedings.
We start at the beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1942
decision in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S.
491, holding that a district court may exercise its discretion to
abstain from a suit brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act in favor of parallel state-court proceedings, id. at
494. “Although the District Court had [diversity] jurisdiction”
over the action in Brillhart, the Supreme Court explained, “it
was under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction.” Id. Ra-
ther, the court had discretion to abstain from resolving the
federal action if it determined that “the questions in contro-
versy between the parties to the federal suit … can better be
settled in the proceeding in the state court.” Id. at 495.
The Supreme Court encountered a similar fact pattern
over three decades later, considering once again whether fed-
eral abstention was proper in favor of parallel state-court pro-
ceedings. This time, however, the Supreme Court proceeded
differently and emphasized federal courts’ lack of discretion in
the face of their “virtually unflagging obligation … to exercise
the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Confronted with
a suit brought by the federal government seeking a resolution
of its water rights, which were actively being litigated in state-
court proceedings, the Supreme Court applied a far more

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16 No. 22-2815
demanding test, declaring that “[a]bstention from the exercise
of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Id. at 813.
In most cases, the Court observed, “the pendency of an ac-
tion in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the
same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction,” so
“[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal.”
Id. at 817, 819 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282
(1910)). Before electing to abstain, then, district courts must
assess whether “exceptional” circumstances justify dismissal
“for reasons of wise judicial administration.” Id. at 818. Such
circumstances existed in Colorado River, the Court determined,
because of “the inconvenience of the federal forum,” “the de-
sirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation,” as well as “the or-
der in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent fo-
rums.” Id. (citing Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495). The Supreme
Court expanded the list of relevant considerations in subse-
quent cases to include whether “federal law provides the rule
of decision on the merits” and the potential “inadequacy of
the state-court proceeding to protect” the plaintiff’s rights.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 23, 26 (1983).
If our description of Colorado River seems in tension with
Brillhart, that is a fair reaction. See generally Will v. Calvert Fire
Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 667 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment) (expressing confusion over the plurality’s de-
scription of Brillhart and Colorado River as “fully compatible”
with one another). Indeed, the circuits split on this precise ob-
servation—over whether Brillhart survived Colorado River
and, more specifically, over whether the exceptional circum-
stances test also applies to motions to abstain from Declara-
tory Judgment Act claims in the face of parallel state

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No. 22-2815 17
litigation. Compare Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Conn. Bank &
Tr. Co., 806 F.2d 411, 413–14 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the
district court erred when it applied Brillhart abstention to a
declaratory judgment action), with Granite State Ins. Co. v.
Tandy Corp., 986 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the
Moses H. Cone and Colorado River factors do not apply to de-
claratory judgment actions).
The Supreme Court resolved the split in its 1995 decision
in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 279, clarifying that Brillhart
abstention remained good law after Colorado River, id. at 289.
“Distinct features of the Declaratory Judgment Act,” the
Court explained, “justify … vesting district courts with
greater discretion in declaratory judgment actions than that
permitted under the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test of Colo-
rado River.” Id. at 286. The most prominent of these “features,”
the Court recognized, is the Act’s “textual commitment to dis-
cretion,” providing that courts “may declare the rights … of
any interested party seeking such declaration.” Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)). In that way, Congress
“created an opportunity, rather than a duty,” for federal
courts to grant “a new form of relief,” thereby reserving its
exercise to the sound discretion of district courts. Id. at 288.
And like Colorado River, Brillhart abstention roots itself in the
recognition that the obligation of federal courts to exercise
their jurisdiction may yield to “considerations of practicality
and wise judicial administration.” Id.
It is against these precedents that we are asked to resolve
whether Wilton-Brillhart abstention extends to statutory inter-
pleader actions where the district court exercises jurisdiction
pursuant to § 1335.

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18 No. 22-2815
B
The district court was not the first court to apply Wilton-
Brillhart to abstain from an interpleader action. As the court
recognized, the Third Circuit has held that Wilton-Brillhart
(and not Colorado River) governs a district court’s decision to
abstain from a statutory interpleader action. See NYLife Dis-
tribs., Inc. v. Adherence Grp., Inc., 72 F.3d 371, 382 (3d Cir. 1995).
On the Third Circuit’s reading, Wilton itself clarified that Col-
orado River’s “exceptional circumstances test is not universal,”
and may “yield” in those instances where district courts are
exercising discretion conferred by statute. Id. at 379. And his-
torically, the court continued, “interpleader is a suit in eq-
uity,” so the operative question became whether “district
courts retain their traditional equitable discretion” when ex-
ercising jurisdiction pursuant to § 1335. Id. at 380.
In answering this question in the affirmative, the Third
Circuit relied on Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305
(1982), where the Supreme Court held that a federal court’s
“equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the ab-
sence of a clear and valid legislative command” from Con-
gress, id. at 313 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S.
395, 398 (1946)). Examining § 1335 and its related statutory
provisions, the Third Circuit found the text “inconclusive,” so
it “resolve[d] any ambiguities … in favor of that interpreta-
tion which preserves the courts’ equitable discretion.” NYLife
Distribs., 72 F.3d at 381. Interpleader’s historic expansion pro-
vided further support for this conclusion, the Third Circuit
reasoned, because Congress appeared “more interested in
providing an opportunity for litigants to resolve disputes,
than in creating a duty in the district courts to exercise the ju-
risdiction given them.” Id. at 382.

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No. 22-2815 19
A year later came the Supreme Court’s decision in
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996),
which could be read to lend support to the Third Circuit’s
conclusion. Although Quackenbush involved application of
the Burford abstention doctrine—and not Wilton-Brillhart or
Colorado River—the Court reinforced the relationship between
abstention and the equitable discretion of federal courts. See
id. at 717–18. In its discussion of abstention’s historical roots,
the Court emphasized that “it has long been established that
a federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its ju-
risdiction when it ‘is asked to employ its historic powers as a
court of equity.’” Id. at 717 (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Est.
Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring)). This discretion to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
“extends to all cases in which the court has discretion to grant
or deny relief.” Id. at 718.
For our part, we have applied this same reasoning in the
context before us here—statutory interpleader. In Koehring Co.
v. Hyde Construction Co., 424 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1970), we af-
firmed a district court’s exercise of its discretion to dismiss a
statutory interpleader action “on grounds of equity and com-
ity, when the interests of the stakeholder and all claimants
will be adequately protected in a pending state court proceed-
ing,” id. at 1202.
Other circuits too have reached much the same conclusion
in the wake of Colorado River and Quackenbush—that inter-
pleader relief is grounded in equity, thereby committing its
exercise, against the backdrop of parallel state-court proceed-
ings, to the district court’s discretion—though none reference
the Wilton-Brillhart doctrine by name. See Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc. of the U.S. v. Porter-Englehart, 867 F.2d 79, 83 (1st Cir.

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20 No. 22-2815
1989) (“agree[ing]” with the notion that “federal courts
should dismiss interpleader actions when federal adjudica-
tion would disrupt ongoing state proceedings”); Am. Airlines,
Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); Asbestospray,
182 F.3d at 211 (same) (citing NYLife Distribs., 72 F.3d at 381));
Home Indem. Co. v. Moore, 499 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1974)
(same); but see Gold-Fogel v. Fogel, 16 F.4th 790, 799 (11th Cir.
2021) (explaining that the court’s own multi-factor test gov-
erning the application of Wilton-Brillhart abstention does not
apply to a statutory interpleader claim because Wilton-
Brillhart “relies on the permissive wording of the Declaratory
Judgment Act”). This approach also accords with the gener-
ally accepted view that courts may “dismiss or stay an inter-
pleader proceeding … if the disputed issues are likely to be
resolved in [another] proceeding.” 7 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1709 (3d ed. 2025).
To be sure, we also have case law pointing in the opposite
direction, suggesting Wilton-Brillhart’s more limited scope. In
R.R. Street & Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 711, we held
that district courts may not apply the Wilton-Brillhart doctrine
to dismiss claims “independent” from a plaintiff’s claims for
declaratory relief, meaning “they could stand alone in federal
court—both jurisdictionally and substantively—irrespective
of the declaratory claim,” id. at 716. Courts must hear those
independent non-declaratory claims, we explained, “subject
to the presence of exceptional circumstances under the Colo-
rado River doctrine.” Id.
Dr. Braid contends that R.R. Street should control here. His
claim for interpleader relief stands alone and distinct from his
constitutional claims for declaratory relief, his argument goes,
so Wilton-Brillhart does not apply to his interpleader claim.

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No. 22-2815 21
But R.R. Street did not involve a claim for interpleader relief
and did not otherwise purport to resolve whether Wilton-
Brillhart governs a district court’s decision to abstain from an
action brought pursuant to § 1335 in favor of parallel state-
court proceedings. See id. at 713–14. R.R. Street, in short, does
not resolve the question presented here: is the district court’s
exercise of § 1335 interpleader power governed by the Su-
preme Court’s more lenient Wilton-Brillhart standard, consid-
ering the inherent discretion of federal courts in exercising
their powers of equity, or is Wilton-Brillhart, by its terms, lim-
ited solely to actions brought pursuant to the Declaratory
Judgment Act?
This is a difficult question, but ultimately one we do not
need to resolve because, in the final analysis, we would affirm
the district court’s decision to abstain under either the Wilton-
Brillhart or Colorado River doctrines.
C
We acknowledge that the parties did not brief how Colo-
rado River’s exceptional circumstances test might apply to the
facts of this case were we to agree with Dr. Braid that Wilton-
Brillhart does not govern this action. As a court of review,
however, we may consider abstention—and the full scope of
arguments counseling in favor of its application—on our own
volition. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976); see
also Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Valcq, 16 F.4th 508, 525
(7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “abstention doctrines do not
exist ‘to protect the rights of one of the parties’ but instead to
‘promote a harmonious federal system’” (quoting Waldron v.
McAtee, 723 F.2d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir. 1983)). And where, as
here, the views of the parties have been so fully and ably rep-
resented by talented counsel, we are comfortable reaching the

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22 No. 22-2815
ultimate issue of whether abstention is proper and saving the
threshold question about which doctrine should apply for an-
other day.
Because we conclude that exceptional circumstances war-
rant federal court abstention in favor of the ongoing Texas lit-
igation, we affirm the dismissal of Dr. Braid’s complaint un-
der the Colorado River doctrine.
1
Colorado River authorizes federal courts to defer to parallel
state-court proceedings in “exceptional” cases “where absten-
tion would promote ‘wise judicial administration.’” Antosh v.
Village of Mount Pleasant, 99 F.4th 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818). Before we can evaluate
whether exceptional circumstances exist to warrant absten-
tion, however, we must make the threshold finding that the
Texas proceedings involve “substantially the same parties
… contemporaneously litigating substantially the same is-
sues,” such that, under Colorado River, they may be considered
parallel. Tyrer v. City of South Beloit, 456 F.3d 744, 752 (7th Cir.
2006).
We have little difficulty reaching that conclusion here. No,
the federal and state-court litigation are not mirror images of
one another. Only plaintiff Oscar Stilley’s suit remains pend-
ing in the Texas courts (as far as we are aware), so Dr. Braid’s
federal interpleader action includes two additional parties not
currently represented in the state-court proceedings (plaintiff
Felipe Gomez and plaintiff Wolfgang Hirczy de Miño). And
it is fair to say, at least generally, that interpleader might pro-
vide a more efficient remedy and get Dr. Braid the bottom-
line relief he seeks in a cleaner fashion—binding all three

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No. 22-2815 23
defendants by a single judgment declaring S.B. 8 unconstitu-
tional.
But we do not demand “formal symmetry” between the
federal and state actions, instead requiring only a “substantial
likelihood that the state litigation will dispose of all claims
presented in the federal case.” Clark v. Lacy, 376 F.3d 682, 686
(7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lumen Constr., Inc. v. Brant Constr. Co.,
780 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1985)). As we have explained, “[t]he
addition of a party or parties to a proceeding, by itself, does
not destroy the parallel nature of state and federal proceed-
ings.” Id. at 686. It is sufficient in this case that the actions are
substantially similar. “[T]he thrust” of the proceedings is the
same here, as “they rely on the same factual predicate”—the
September 2021 abortion—“to raise substantially similar legal
issues”—whether S.B. 8 is enforceable—“against substan-
tially similar parties.” Id. at 687.
Dr. Braid disagrees and contends that the Texas proceed-
ings are not parallel because S.B. 8 “rigs proceedings against
defendants,” making it impossible for him to receive a fair
shake on his constitutional challenges in the Texas state
courts. By way of example, he points to S.B. 8’s provision bar-
ring defendants from asserting their “belief that the require-
ments of this subchapter are unconstitutional or were uncon-
stitutional” as an affirmative defense. Tex. Health & Safety
Code § 171.208(e)(2). But reference to this or that aspect of S.B.
8’s statutory scheme does little to undermine our “assump-
tion that state courts are co-equal to federal courts and are
fully capable of respecting and protecting [a plaintiff’s consti-
tutional] rights.” J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 724 (7th Cir.
2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Courthouse News Serv. v.
Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 2018)); see also Sawyer v.

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24 No. 22-2815
Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990) (“State courts are coequal parts
of our national judicial system and give serious attention to
their responsibilities for enforcing the commands of the Con-
stitution.”). So despite Dr. Braid’s assertions to the contrary,
we see nothing in S.B. 8 to suggest that a Texas court could
bar him from litigating the constitutionality of subsection
(e)(2) or any other provision he finds problematic in response
to plaintiff Stilley’s Texas suit to recover damages.
To frame the question too literally and demand a perfect
parallel would undermine “the more general principles of
federalism that underlie all of the abstention doctrines,” in-
cluding Colorado River, namely “equity, comity, and federal-
ism.” Courthouse News Serv., 908 F.3d at 1072–73 (determining
that even though none of the abstention doctrines provided a
“perfect fit,” abstention was nevertheless proper where a
news service brought a federal suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the clerk of the county court’s process for releasing
newly filed complaints to the press). Where, as here, adjudi-
cation of the federal claim “risks a serious federalism infringe-
ment,” we do not demand “literal perfection.” Woodard, 997
F.3d at 723.
2
Having concluded that the state-court proceedings are
parallel to Dr. Braid’s federal suit, the next step is to assess
whether exceptional circumstances warrant abstention. Ten
factors inform the inquiry, though “[n]ot all of these consid-
erations will be pertinent to every case,” DePuy Synthes Sales,
Inc. v. OrthoLA, Inc., 953 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2020):
1) whether the state has assumed jurisdiction
over property; 2) the inconvenience of the

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No. 22-2815 25
federal forum; 3) the desirability of avoiding
piecemeal litigation; 4) the order in which juris-
diction was obtained by the concurrent forums;
5) the source of governing law, state or federal;
6) the adequacy of state-court action to protect
the federal plaintiff’s rights; 7) the relative pro-
gress of state and federal proceedings; 8) the
presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction;
9) the availability of removal; and 10) the vexa-
tious or contrived nature of the federal claim.
Tyrer, 456 F.3d at 754 (quoting Caminiti & Iatarola, Ltd. v.
Behnke Warehousing, Inc., 962 F.2d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 1992)). We
do not tally up those factors weighing for and against absten-
tion in a “mechanical checklist,” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16,
but instead make “a practical judgment informed by princi-
ples of comity, federalism, and sound judicial administra-
tion,” Driftless Area Land Conservancy, 16 F.4th at 527 (describ-
ing the Colorado River abstention inquiry as “flexible”).
We see several considerations weighing so heavily in fa-
vor of abstention that the impact of any factors counseling for
federal retention is negligible. Foremost, not only are the
Texas courts capable of resolving Dr. Braid’s claims, but they
are also better suited, making the federal forum inconvenient.
A fundamental problem with Dr. Braid’s federal interpleader
claim becomes readily apparent upon considering a question
at its epicenter: how is a federal court to apportion damages
among multiple competing S.B. 8 claimants? As the district
court underscored, the Texas legislature provided no guid-
ance on this issue, so any decision on this important question
of state law would be little more than a shot in the dark given
S.B. 8’s deliberate uniqueness. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at

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26 No. 22-2815
26 (explaining that “in some rare circumstances the presence
of state-law issues may weigh in favor” of abstention).
Taking a closer look at Dr. Braid’s claims for declaratory
relief, much the same problem persists, and this is true
whether we proceed with a Colorado River analysis or under
the lesser standard of Wilton-Brillhart. See R.R. St. & Co., 569
F.3d at 717 (explaining that, where a complaint contains inde-
pendent claims for declaratory and non-declaratory relief,
district courts should apply Colorado River to the non-declara-
tory claims and Wilton-Brillhart to the declaratory ones). We
see no two ways about it: his constitutional challenges would
require us to interpret S.B. 8 in the first instance, defining its
contours and giving shape to the limitations it imposes on
civil defendants—a question governed wholly by Texas
law—before we can proceed to the second step and determine
whether a particular dimension of the Act violates Dr. Braid’s
constitutional rights. To engage in this type of detailed analy-
sis would require a federal court to answer novel state-law
questions without a fulsome understanding of Texas proce-
dure—including, for example, Texas’s application of the con-
stitutional avoidance and severability doctrines, to name a
few issues—leaving us to reason on our back foot.
Against this backdrop, the risk of intrusion on federal-
state comity is substantial, and we see no sufficient counter-
vailing concern to justify federal court intervention. To the
contrary, the state courts were the first to obtain jurisdiction
over this controversy when the three plaintiffs sued Dr. Braid
in Texas state court. And we are confident that the state
courts, and perhaps ultimately the Texas Supreme Court, are
much better positioned to resolve the full range of complex
questions before us about S.B. 8’s permissible application in

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No. 22-2815 27
circumstances like those pressed by Dr. Braid’s multi-faceted
constitutional challenge to the enactment. See Courthouse
News Serv., 908 F.3d at 1074 (explaining that comity rests on
“the assumption that state courts … are fully capable of re-
specting and protecting” individual constitutional rights). It
strikes us as inevitable that the Texas courts in time will all
but have to supply answers given the many suits filed by non-
parties challenging the constitutionality of S.B. 8 as Dr. Braid
does here.
Abstention also avoids the danger of piecemeal litigation
and conflicting judgments, the very problem Dr. Braid seeks
to avoid. By abstaining, we protect both “the efficient use of
judicial resources and the public’s perception of the legiti-
macy of judicial authority.” Tyrer, 456 F.3d at 756. If, for ex-
ample, plaintiff Stilley succeeds in winning a judgment
against Dr. Braid in his Texas suit during the pendency of this
litigation, a federal judgment for plaintiffs Gomez or Hirczy
de Miño on Dr. Braid’s interpleader claim would create a new
dilemma to sort through: is the federal interpleader judgment
enforceable in light of a conflicting state-court decision? Ab-
stention avoids these concerns, and the other downstream is-
sues that may arise, by the district court’s exercise of jurisdic-
tion.
Abstaining is also appropriate considering that resolution
of an issue of state law may moot Dr. Braid’s federal suit,
thereby providing for a cleaner and more efficient resolution
of this litigation. While these federal proceedings have been
ongoing, a Texas trial court dismissed plaintiff Gomez’s state
suit against Dr. Braid because it found he lacked standing un-
der the Texas Constitution. The Texas Court of Appeals af-
firmed, stopping short of examining the merits of that

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28 No. 22-2815
conclusion. See Gomez v. Braid, No. 04-22-00829-CV, 2024 WL
697105 at *3 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2024). It stands to rea-
son, then, that if a Texas court concludes that S.B. 8’s citizen-
suit provision falters under the Texas Constitution, there
would be no need for any court, state or federal, to supply
answers under the U.S. Constitution.
As a final note, and to state the obvious, this lawsuit re-
flects an element of forum-shopping. Dr. Braid, a Texas phy-
sician, has asked a federal court in Illinois to adjudicate his
liability and pass upon the constitutionality of a Texas law, in
part, to avoid resolving those same issues in the state-court
system, which he characterizes as rigged against him. We of-
fer this observation not as a criticism, for there is no question
S.B. 8 has put Dr. Braid in a difficult predicament. Our more
limited observation is only to underscore that abstention is
particularly appropriate in a case like this one where we see
no connection between the subject matter of the controversy
and the federal venue sought. In the end, because Dr. Braid’s
federal claim would require the district court to wade into
complex and unsettled questions of state law (with difficult
federal constitutional claims waiting in the wings), and
thereby disregard the existence of parallel state proceedings
capable of providing the answers, we find that exceptional
circumstances exist which warrant abstention under Colorado
River.
IV
We thank counsel on both sides for their exceptional ad-
vocacy in the face of challenging legal issues and offer our
special gratitude to Brian J. Paul of Faegre Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP who took on this assignment as a friend of the
court.

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No. 22-2815 29
For the reasons explained, even though we conclude that
the district court possessed jurisdiction over Dr. Braid’s inter-
pleader action, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment be-
cause this case belongs in the Texas courts.

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