Paul Sung v. Old National Bank

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 17, 2025*
Decided July 17, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3347
PAUL SUNG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OLD NATIONAL BANK,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Evansville Division.
No. 3:23-cv-00155-MPB-CSW
Matthew P. Brookman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Paul Sung sought a business loan from Old National Bank on behalf of his
company to finance the purchase of an apartment complex. The Bank declined to give
his company a loan and Sung sued, alleging that the Bank denied the loan because he is
Asian. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691; 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted the Bank’s
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-3347 Page 2
motion for summary judgment because Sung did not furnish sufficient evidence that
the loan was denied because of his race. We affirm the judgment.
We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, recounting the facts and
drawing inferences in the light most favorable to Sung, the party opposing summary
judgment. See Lewis v. Ind. Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th Cir. 2022). In September
2022, Sung contacted Old National Bank—from which his company had previously
received a loan—to discuss another loan to finance the purchase of an apartment
complex. A Bank employee referred him to an attorney to assist with negotiating and
drafting an agreement and provided a letter to sellers stating that Sung was “a qualified
and experienced buyer” but that the Bank had not committed to lending money. After
Sung agreed to purchase the complex, subject to the condition that he obtain financing,
the Bank determined that the ratio of the complex’s past net income to Sung’s requested
debt obligation would not meet its minimum requirements and declined to loan the
money. Sung did not complete the purchase.
Sung then sued the Bank, alleging that it denied the loan because he is Asian.
The district court dismissed several counts of the complaint alleging various statutory
violations, leaving only his theories under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
see 15 U.S.C. § 1691e, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After discovery, the court granted the Bank’s
motion for summary judgment, reasoning that Sung did not provide direct or
circumstantial evidence suggesting that the Bank denied the loan based on his race.
On appeal, Sung argues that the Bank imposed stricter criteria because of his race
and that his failure to meet those criteria was a pretext for discrimination. The Equal
Credit Opportunity Act prohibits any creditor from discriminating against an applicant
on the basis of race, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects all persons’
rights to make and enforce contracts without regard to their race. To defeat a motion for
summary judgment under either statute, Sung needed to supply evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that the Bank treated him less favorably because of his race.
See Circle City Broad. I, LLC v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 99 F.4th 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2024) (§ 1981);
Est. of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529, 538 (7th Cir. 2011) (Equal Credit
Opportunity Act); see also Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764–65 (7th Cir.
2016) (describing general process for assessing proof of discrimination).
Sung produced no evidence connecting the denial of the loan to his race. He
insists that the Bank’s letter pre-qualified him for a loan and that the Bank used a
flawed estimate of the complex’s projected income based on incomplete historical data
from the seller without accounting for future recoveries if Sung were to take over. But

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No. 24-3347 Page 3
even if we were to assume that the Bank’s calculation was deficient, that would not be
evidence of discrimination. See Circle City, 99 F.4th at 385. Proof of pretext does not
depend on whether the Bank acted accurately or fairly, but on whether the Bank lied.
See, e.g., Hoffstead v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R., 132 F.4th 503, 512 (7th Cir. 2025). The
undisputed evidence demonstrates that the Bank believed the complex’s profits would
not sustain the loan’s debt obligation, even if Sung might have been more optimistic.
Sung further contends that the Bank changed its standards for a loan by
suggesting he make a larger down payment or negotiate a lower sale price and that this
inconsistency implies that its stated reason for denying the loan was pretextual.
Although shifting or inconsistent explanations can be evidence of pretext, see Parker v.
Brooks Life Sci., Inc., 39 F.4th 931, 938 (7th Cir. 2022), the Bank’s reasoning here never
changed. It denied the loan based on the debt-to-income ratio, and either a larger down
payment or a lower purchase price would have reduced the debt so that Sung could
meet the Bank’s required ratio.
Sung also argues that the Bank applied higher standards to his loan application
than to others’ applications, but he does not identify any comparators. Instead, he
points to his company’s own approved loan from years earlier. But approval of a prior,
smaller loan for a different property does not imply that the rejection of this loan was
discriminatory. Cf. Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 959 (7th Cir.
2021) (satisfying past expectations is not evidence that later adverse actions are
discriminatory). Although Sung believes that there are examples of non-Asian
applicants whose loans were approved without a debt-to-income ratio calculation, his
mere belief is not evidence that defeats summary judgment. See, e.g., Est. of Davis,
633 F.3d at 540.
Finally, Sung spends much of his brief on appeal pressing new claims of breach
of contract, misrepresentation, and unfair lending practices. But he failed to raise these
claims in the district court and may not do so now. See, e.g., Homoky v. Ogden, 816 F.3d
448, 455 (7th Cir. 2016).
AFFIRMED

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