Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging v. Paula Basta

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2788
NORTHWESTERN I LLINOIS A REA
A GENCY ON A GING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAULA BASTA,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 3:22-cv-50070 — Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 18, 2024 — DECIDED J ULY 23, 2025
____________________
Before R IPPLE, JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and K OLAR , Circuit
Judges.
JACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit Judge. The Older Americans
Act (OAA) establishes funding mechanisms and an adminis-
trative framework to help states provide healthcare, housing,
and community services for older persons. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 et
seq. States must jump through several hoops before securing
OAA funding, including submitting a state plan, designating

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2 No. 23-2788
a state agency, and geographically dividing the state into dis-
tinct planning and service areas. See 42 U.S.C. § 3027; 42 U.S.C.
§ 3025(a)(1). Then, for each service area, states must designate
a “public or private nonprofit … as the area agency.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3025(a)(2). At the heart of this case is whether those “area
agencies” can sue to enforce OAA provisions and related Illi-
nois state laws.
One such area agency, the Northwestern Illinois Area
Agency on Aging (NIAAA), filed state and federal suits
against Paula Basta, the former Director of the Illinois Depart-
ment on Aging (IDA). NIAAA’s lawsuits alleged that Basta,
in her personal and official capacities, deprived it and others
of rights guaranteed by Illinois law and the OAA. Specifically,
the lawsuits alleged that Basta unlawfully refused to hold
hearings on three administrative petitions that NIAAA filed.
Ultimately, NIAAA lost both suits. The Illinois Supreme
Court first ruled in Basta’s favor. Then, the federal district
court dismissed NIAAA’s suit on the grounds that it was
time-barred and failed to state a claim. After requesting entry
of a final judgment, NIAAA brought this appeal raising a host
of issues.
We find no error and affirm across the board.
I
We begin with the facts. At the pleadings stage, we accept
all well-pled facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw
all reasonable inferences in NIAAA's favor. Gociman v. Loyola
Univ. of Chicago, 41 F.4th 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2022).

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No. 23-2788 3
A. Administrative Background
As noted above, the Older Americans Act (OAA) requires
states to take certain steps to designate area agencies respon-
sible for providing services to senior citizens. Should states
fail to comply with those requirements, the federal govern-
ment can take remedial measures, such as terminating fund-
ing. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3027(d). Area agencies, in turn, serve
as the “public advocate[s] for the development or enhance-
ment of comprehensive and coordinated community-based
systems of services in each community throughout and spe-
cific to each planning and service area.” 45 C.F.R. § 1321.61(a);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 3025(b)(5). Area agencies must develop a
plan to provide services within their designated area and then
submit that plan to state authorities. See 42 U.S.C. § 3026(a).
The Illinois Act on Aging designates the Illinois Depart-
ment on Aging (IDA) as the “single State agency for receiving
and disbursing federal funds made available under the ‘Older
Americans Act.’” 20 ILCS 105/4. The IDA is responsible for
complying with the OAA’s provisions and “[a]ssisting area
agencies on aging in the development of comprehensive and
coordinated service delivery systems throughout the State.”
89 Ill. Admin. Code § 230.10(a)(4). NIAAA is one such agency,
which the IDA assigned to cover the state’s nine northwest-
ernmost counties. Although an independent nonprofit,
NIAAA receives more than ninety percent of its funding from
the IDA.
Previously, Illinois regulations required the IDA to pro-
vide agencies like NIAAA an opportunity for a hearing when
the IDA “propose[d] to disapprove the area plan or any
amendment to the area plan … or withdraw from the agency

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4 No. 23-2788
designation as an [area agency],” when “any eligible appli-
cant for designation as a planning and service area under the
provisions of [the Act]” has been denied, or for “any nutrition
project that an area agency proposes to defund.” Nyhammer v.
Basta, 215 N.E.3d 935, 948 (Ill. 2022) (citing 89 Ill. Admin. Code
§ 230.410 amended at 5 Ill. Reg. 3722 (eff. Mar. 31, 1981), re-
numbered at 7 Ill. Reg. 5178 (eff. July 27, 1983)). That regula-
tion was amended effective August 2021. Under the amend-
ment, a hearing is to be provided to an area agency when the
IDA proposes to: “(A) [d]isapprove the area plan or any
amendment to the area plan that has been submitted to the
[IDA] by the [area agency]; or (B) [r]eject the [area agency’s]
recommendation to designate a service provider.” 89 Ill. Ad-
min. Code § 230.450(a)(1) (“2021 Hearing Rule”). The IDA
also has the right to “conduct administrative hearings for
other appeal requests concerning the health, safety and wel-
fare of older individuals.” 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 230.450(b).
B. The Underlying Disputes
In June 2019, NIAAA requested an administrative hearing
(“Initial Petition”) with the IDA. The petition presented two
grievances and requested findings that the IDA violated the
Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 5 ILCS 100/1–1 et seq.,
by withholding funds from it, and that the Department also
violated Illinois law.
The first grievance NIAAA aired in its Initial Petition
stemmed from the fallout that occurred when NIAAA de-
cided that the IDA’s Adult Protective Services (APS) Manual
was invalid and ought to be recalled. In July 2013, NIAAA
reached out to the IDA’s then-director, John Holton, raising
concerns about the manual. Months later, Holton sent

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No. 23-2788 5
NIAAA a letter advising that the IDA was terminating
NIAAA’s FY2014 Adult Protective Services (APS) Grant, ef-
fective January 2014. Fast forward to 2019. In April of that
year, the petition alleged, NIAAA’s director and general
counsel, Grant Nyhammer, was told by an IDA employee that
the employee had been “given an order [to] withhold funding
from [NIAAA] to retaliate for [its] advocacy.” Later that
month, as outlined in the petition, Nyhammer asked Basta via
email to “investigate funding being withheld” from NIAAA.
Basta responded that she could not speak to practices preced-
ing her tenure as director.
From this emerged the second grievance NIAAA pre-
sented in the Initial Petition—that the IDA had refused
NIAAA’s administrative hearing request. The IDA denied the
Initial Petition because it did not present a “contested case” as
defined in the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act and
therefore did not require a hearing.
Two months after submitting the Initial Petition, NIAAA
submitted a second petition (“APS Petition”) in August 2019.
The APS Petition raised grievances about events after the fil-
ing of the Initial Petition. This second petition requested a
hearing and alleged that the IDA had improperly rejected
NIAAA’s designation of APS providers. As background, two
months earlier, in June, NIAAA had designated APS provid-
ers for its service agency. The next month, the IDA responded
that the IDA was “exercising its right to reject the [provider]
recommendations” because of “various deficiencies in the un-
derlying [r]equest.” NIAAA’s APS Petition followed, which
the IDA denied by letter in September 2019. The letter in-
formed NIAAA that the IDA “is unable to provide a hearing

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6 No. 23-2788
because the [APS Petition] fails to present a contested case
that would support the right to an adjudicatory hearing.”
Two years after its first two petitions were denied, NIAAA
submitted a third petition (“State Plan Appeal”). This peti-
tion, sent in September 2021, alleged that the IDA’s state plan
for 2022–2024 did not comply with the OAA’s regulations.
Like the first two petitions, the third petition requested an ad-
ministrative hearing. In December 2021, the IDA responded
with a letter dismissing the petition because 89 Ill. Adm. Code
230.420(d) only permitted area agency appeals in two limited
and inapplicable circumstances.
C. Court Proceedings
On November 5, 2019, NIAAA filed a complaint for man-
damus in Winnebago County Circuit Court. The state trial
court denied relief, but the state appellate court reversed with
instructions for the IDA to conduct hearings on both the Ini-
tial Petition and APS Petition. In its order remanding the mat-
ter, the appellate court concluded that the IDA’s “summary
dismissals of [NIAAA’s] petitions and its conclusory state-
ments that the petitions failed to present contested cases were
insufficient for meaningful judicial review.” Nyhammer v.
Basta, 188 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). The appellate
court also held that the IDA was “required to give [NIAAA]
adjudicatory hearings and determine the merits of its peti-
tions.” Id. at 1292. The case then made its way to the Illinois
Supreme Court which disagreed with the state appellate court
and, instead, affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing
the mandamus complaint. Nyhammer v. Basta, 215 N.E.3d 935
(Ill. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2497 (2023).

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No. 23-2788 7
Having lost its administrative and state court challenges,
NIAAA proceeded to federal court. On February 28, 2022,
NIAAA filed a complaint against Paula Basta in the Northern
District of Illinois. NIAAA pleaded ten causes of action
against Basta in its First Amended Complaint: five in her per-
sonal capacity (Counts I–V) and five in her official capacity
(Counts VI–X). The allegations at issue in this appeal are as
follows:
Count I: the dismissal of the State Plan Appeal
violated NIAAA’s hearing rights under the
OAA;
Count II: the dismissal of the State Plan Appeal
violated NIAAA’s right to function as a public
advocate as defined by the OAA;
Count III: the refusal to provide a hearing on the
Initial Petition violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s due process guarantees;
Count IV: the refusal to provide a hearing on the
APS Petition violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s due process guarantees;
Count V: the IDA’s regulation on hearings (as
amended and codified under 89 Ill. Admin.
Code § 230.410, which the parties refer to as the
“Hearing Rule”) denies NIAAA its right to a
hearing under the OAA and thereby deprives
NIAAA of due process.
Counts I–V were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts VI–
X involved pendant state law claims. NIAAA sought dam-
ages in excess of $75,000, attorneys’ fees, and declaratory
judgments that (1) Basta unlawfully failed to provide

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8 No. 23-2788
hearings on NIAAA’s three petitions, (2) Basta violated due
process, OAA, and state law rights, and (3) the Hearing Rule
is invalid under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act.
In response, Basta filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That motion
alleged that NIAAA had not shown: (A) “any property right
in an administrative hearing pursuant to due process [or] the
Older Americans Act”; (B) a clearly established right that had
been violated to defeat qualified immunity to bar Counts I–V;
(C) why sovereign immunity would not bar Counts VI–X; (D)
why the statute of limitations would not bar Counts III and
IV; (E) what standing NIAAA has to bring Counts VII–VIII on
behalf of older adults and organizations. After full briefing on
that motion, the district court entered an order dismissing
NIAAA’s complaint without prejudice. The order invited
NIAAA to file an amended complaint, but NIAAA instead
filed a motion for entry of a final judgment. The district court
granted that motion, and this appeal followed.
II
With those facts established, we turn to NIAAA’s chal-
lenge to the district court order granting the motion to dis-
miss. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a
claim. Gociman, 41 F.4th at 881. And we may affirm a dismis-
sal on any basis supported by the record. Thomas v. Dart, 39
F.4th 835, 840 (7th Cir. 2022).
Recall, the district court dismissed all of NIAAA’s federal
claims (Counts I–V) for three reasons: (1) the statute of limita-
tions barred claims arising from the IDA’s denials of
NIAAA’s Initial Petition and APS Petition; (2) NIAAA lacked

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No. 23-2788 9
any property interest deprived by the IDA without due pro-
cess; and (3) the OAA provisions at issue did not clearly man-
ifest an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights en-
forceable by NIAAA via § 1983. On appeal, NIAAA chal-
lenges all three reasons. We review each in turn.
A. Statute of Limitations
As a threshold matter, NIAAA argues that the district
court improperly considered the statute of limitations when
ruling on Basta’s motion to dismiss. Specifically, NIAAA
claims that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense
and therefore must be raised in an answer, not a motion to
dismiss. That is incorrect. In Talevski ex rel. Talevski, our court
did indeed caution that “the proper way to raise a limitations
defense is in the answer, as an affirmative defense.” Talevski
ex rel. Talevski v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty., 6 F.4th
713, 721 (7th Cir. 2021), aff'd sub nom. Health & Hosp. Corp. of
Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166 (2023) (emphasis added)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)). But in that very case, we also
acknowledged two other ways that the defense can be raised:
(1) in a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(c); or (2) in a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in the rare circumstance where “the
complaint alone alleges enough facts to eliminate all doubt
about timeliness.” Id. Here, there was no factual dispute as to
timeliness, only a legal one. The parties do not dispute when
the underlying facts occurred, and the timing of those events
was adequately alleged in the complaint. Instead, they dis-
pute whether the timing of those events meant that related
claims were barred as a matter of law. Thus, the district court

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10 No. 23-2788
was right to consider Basta’s statute of limitations argument
when ruling on the motion to dismiss.
With this threshold matter settled, we consider whether
the statute of limitations legally barred the claims at issue
here. We have previously held that “section 1983 claims aris-
ing in Illinois are governed by a two-year statute of limita-
tions.” Kelly v. City of Chicago, 4 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1993).
In Kelly, we made three important observations: (1) courts
look to the personal injury laws of the state where the injury
occurred to determine the statute of limitations in a § 1983
case; (2) federal law governs the accrual of claims for these
purposes; and (3) courts apply the tolling laws of the state
where the injury occurred. Id. These rules and principles
guide us in answering two questions. We first ask when the
claims accrued. We then ask whether the limitations period
was tolled.
As we observed in Kelly, the general standard for the ac-
crual question is that § 1983 claims “accrue when the plaintiff
knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights
have been violated.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d
738, 740 (7th Cir. 1992)). In this case, the two relevant petition
denials were discrete events that both occurred by September
2019. It is difficult to imagine how NIAAA would not or
should not have known of the injuries it suffered as a result of
those denials in September 2019. And NIAAA does not pre-
sent any support for an alternative conclusion. In its appellate
briefing, NIAAA does not directly challenge Basta’s argu-
ment about when NIAAA’s claims accrued. Thus, NIAAA
has waived any argument that the claims accrued after Sep-
tember 2019. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v.
Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 181 F.3d 799, 808 (7th Cir. 1999)

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No. 23-2788 11
(“Arguments not developed in any meaningful way are
waived.”).
NIAAA does argue, however, that its state court litigation
tolled the limitations period. Illinois law does not support this
argument. NIAAA points us to the Illinois continuing tort
doctrine, under which the limitations period is “tolled” for
continuing violations. Despite courts occasionally using the
word “toll” when applying the doctrine, the Illinois continu-
ing tort doctrine governs only the point at which a claim ac-
crues. See Pitts v. City of Kankakee, Ill., 267 F.3d 592, 595 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“The continuing violation doctrine is … best char-
acterized as a doctrine governing the accrual of a claim.”); see
also Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
correct characterization of the [Illinois] doctrine of continuing
violation is that it is a doctrine governing accrual, … not a toll-
ing doctrine[.]” (citations omitted)); Powell v. City of Danville,
625 N.E.2d 830, 831 (Ill. 1993) (“There are situations where the
tortious conduct is continuing, and the limitations period be-
gins on the date of the last injury (the date the tortious acts
cease).”). Thus, NIAAA has not offered, nor have we found,
any authority to support NIAAA’s position that its state court
litigation tolled the statute of limitations for its federal claims.
For these reasons, we find that the relevant claims accrued
by September 2019—more than two years before NIAAA filed
its complaint in federal court in February 2022—and were not
tolled for any period. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s ruling that NIAAA’s claims “arising from the denials
of the Initial Petition and the APS Petition are barred by the
statute of limitations.” Nw. Ill. Area Agency on Aging v. Basta,
3:22-cv-50070, 2023 WL 6057263, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2023).

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12 No. 23-2788
B. Deprivation of Property Rights Without Due Process
Although the statute of limitations problem is sufficient to
affirm the dismissal of NIAAA’s claims about the denial of
the Initial and APS Petitions, it does not support dismissal of
the State Plan Appeal claims. Therefore, we next consider
whether those claims implicate NIAAA’s due process rights.
NIAAA argues that Illinois state law establishes property
rights enforceable under § 1983. But this is hard to square with
the fact that Illinois’ highest court determined that Illinois
state law does not create such rights, at least regarding the
IDA’s denial of hearings on the Initial Petition and APS Peti-
tion. In Nyhammer, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the
IDA’s denial of hearings on the Initial Petition and APS Peti-
tion and held:
Here, NIAAA makes no argument that it has a
life or liberty interest in the subjects of its peti-
tions for hearing. Thus, the only potentially ap-
plicable interest NIAAA could have in the fund-
ing or service provider designation for which it
seeks a hearing from the Department is a prop-
erty interest. However, to have a property inter-
est, there must be more than a unilateral expec-
tation of the funding or approval of its service
provider designations. Rather, NIAAA must
show a legitimate claim of entitlement to the
funding or service provider designation for
which it seeks a hearing.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we
cannot say that NIAAA has a constitutionally
protected property interest because NIAAA has

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No. 23-2788 13
not alleged facts explaining how, under objec-
tively ascertainable criteria set forth in the law
that limits the Department's discretion in some
way, it is entitled to the “other funding” or ser-
vice provider designation approval that it seeks.
215 N.E.3d at 950 (citations omitted).
We see no reason why the denial of the hearing requested
in NIAAA’s State Plan Appeal—which was not before the Il-
linois Supreme Court—would have involved property rights
created by state law where the first two denials did not. In its
briefing, the NIAAA notes that the third petition cited two
agency regulations, but those would have also applied to the
first two petitions, as would the Illinois Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. Thus, in accordance with the Illinois Supreme
Court’s decision in Nyhammer, we affirm the district court’s
holding that NIAAA has failed to plausibly allege a due pro-
cess violation. See Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Miscevic, 880 F.3d
927, 934 (7th Cir. 2018) (“We must defer to a state court’s in-
terpretation of the state’s statute.”) (cleaned).
C. The OAA & Section 1983
On the question of whether the OAA creates rights en-
forceable under § 1983, NIAAA asks us to reach the same re-
sult that the Supreme Court did in Health & Hospital Corp. of
Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166 (2023). As we recently
observed, the Supreme Court in Talevski provided a twofold
test to analyze whether a Spending Clause statute creates a
right enforceable under § 1983. Saint Anthony Hosp. v. White-
horn, 132 F.4th 962, 970–71 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Talevski, 599
U.S. at 180–183); see also Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl.,
145 S. Ct. 2219, 2229–34 (2025) (clarifying the analysis). The

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14 No. 23-2788
first part of that analysis asks whether Congress “unambigu-
ously conferred individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries
to which the plaintiff belongs.” Talevski, 599 U.S. at 183
(cleaned). If we answer that question in the affirmative, then
the second part of the Talevski analysis asks whether Congress
intended to preclude the enforcement of those individual
rights via § 1983. Id. at 186.
Applying that two-part approach in Talevski, the Court
concluded that the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act’s
(FNHRA) unnecessary-restraint and predischarge-notice pro-
visions “unambiguously” conferred such rights to nursing
home residents. Id. at 184 (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 284 (2002)). The nursing home residents cleared the first
hurdle because the provisions at issue spoke specifically in
terms of individual rights. Id. at 184–86. And the defendants
could not rebut the resulting presumption—that is, that the
individual rights Congress created in the FNHRA could be
enforced via § 1983—because enforcement under § 1983 was
compatible with the enforcement scheme provided for in the
FNHRA. Id. at 187–91.
Here, the district court determined that the OAA differs
from the FNHRA in both relevant respects. At the first step of
the Talevski analysis, we “employ traditional tools of statutory
construction.” Talevski, 599 U.S. at 183. Here, those tools leave
us without the necessary conviction that the OAA provisions
at issue in this case create individual rights enforceable by
NIAAA. So, we need not reach the second part of the analysis.
Starting with § 3027 of the OAA, we conclude that this pro-
vision does not create an individual right enforceable under
§ 1983 for three reasons.

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No. 23-2788 15
First, the context of § 3027 militates against this determi-
nation. Although the OAA speaks to older Americans’ “enti-
tlements” generally, § 3027 was not enacted to secure those
entitlements per se, but to regulate federal funding related to
those entitlements. An indicator of that purpose, for example,
is the remedy the section provides for noncompliance. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981)
(“[T]he typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally
imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for non-
compliance but rather action by the Federal Government to
terminate funds to the State.”). Here, that remedy is the ter-
mination of funds to non-compliant states. See 42 U.S.C. §
3027(d) (“Discontinuance of Payments”).
Second, § 3027 does not identify area agencies specifically
or older persons more generally as the benefited class.
Whereas the FNHRA’s relevant provisions spoke directly to
nursing home residents’ needs and welfare, § 3027 speaks
only in terms of the states. It deals with giving funds to states,
withholding those funds from states, allowing states to appeal
findings made by the federal government, the notice afforded
to states, and the limitations of states’ power.
Third, no provision of § 3027 specifically confers rights to
residents. Although it requires detailed state plans targeted at
specific services, § 3027 governs neither how those services
are to be administered nor what individual rights (if any) the
services are intended to secure. This differs from the FNHRA
provisions at issue in Talevski which required nursing homes
to protect “transfer and discharge rights” and “protect and
promote the right to be free from any physical or chemical re-
straints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience
and not required to treat the resident's medical symptoms.”

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16 No. 23-2788
Talevski, 599 U.S. at 184–85 (emphasis in original) (cleaned)
(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 1369r(c)(2)); see also
Medina, 145 S. Ct. at 2234 (“[T]he statutes at issue in Talevski
supply the only reliable yardstick against which to measure
whether spending-power legislation confers a privately en-
forceable right.”). Indeed, there is no mention of individual
“rights,” “privileges,” “immunities,” or any similar language,
in § 3027.
As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, § 1983 per-
mits plaintiffs “to sue for violations of federal spending-
power statutes only in ‘atypical’ situations ….” Medina, 145 S.
Ct. at 2239 (quoting Talevski, 599 U.S. at 183). For the three rea-
sons discussed above, we are left unconvinced that § 3027 is
the sort of “atypical” provision contemplated in Talevski.
Turning to § 3026(f)(2) of the OAA, we see no reason to
engage in the Talevski analysis. This is because, even if the pro-
vision could be enforced via § 1983, NIAAA failed to state a
claim against Basta. Recall, NIAAA claimed that § 3026(f)(2)
required the IDA to hold a hearing on the withheld funding
at issue in the Initial Petition. Yet the defendant, Basta, played
no role in that affair. As the district court noted, “there are no
allegations from which it can plausibly be inferred that [Basta]
ever made any decision to withhold OAA funding.” Basta,
2023 WL 6057263 at *5. In the Initial Petition, NIAAA alleged
only that Basta’s predecessor withheld funds without first
granting a hearing. So, even if § 3026(f)(2) does create rights
enforceable under § 1983—a question that we do not consider
today—NIAAA fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

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No. 23-2788 17
Having followed the approach set forth in Talevski, we af-
firm the district court’s ruling that none of the relevant OAA
provisions create a right enforceable under § 1983.
III
In conclusion, we find that the district court correctly de-
cided the due process, § 1983, and statute of limitations issues
NIAAA raises, and properly granted the motion to dismiss.
Because we affirm on those grounds, we do not reach the
question of qualified immunity. See Hicks v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.,
109 F.4th 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2024).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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