United States of America v. Daniel Stewart

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1120
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
D ANIEL STEWART ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:15-cr-00024-JPH-TAB-1 — James P. Hanlon, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED MAY 29, 2025 — D ECIDED A UGUST 4, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK , BRENNAN, and SCUDDER , Circuit
Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. A jury found Daniel Stewart
guilty of drug-distribution, firearm, and financial crimes. He
was initially sentenced to life in prison plus five years, but the
district court later vacated that sentence. It then imposed a
360-month term of imprisonment, to which Stewart now ob-
jects on several grounds. We reject his arguments and affirm.

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2 No. 24-1120
I
What started as a traffic incident in early 2015 led to a mas-
sive drug bust. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police stopped
Stewart for driving through a red light and then searched his
car. They found a handgun, more than $9,000 in cash, and
over 800 grams of illegal narcotics. Officers later searched his
home and found even more illegal drugs, almost $500,000 in
cash, as well as five additional firearms. After Stewart’s arrest,
investigators discovered that he had been laundering the pro-
ceeds from his significant drug operation through bank ac-
counts associated with sham businesses.
Stewart was convicted in November 2016 of possessing
with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 1); possessing a firearm as a felon
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 2); possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 3); engaging in monetary transac-
tions in property derived from an unlawful activity in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count 4); and money laundering in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (Counts 5 and 6).
At that time, Count 1 carried with it an enhanced manda-
tory life sentence for any defendant who had at least two prior
felony drug offenses. See Harris v. United States, 13 F.4th 623,
625 (7th Cir. 2021). Five of Stewart’s Indiana convictions qual-
ified. He was also subject to an enhanced 15-year-minimum
sentence for Count 2, which the district court ordered he serve
concurrently with his life sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)
(enhancement based on “three previous convictions” for “se-
rious drug offense[s]”). Count 3 mandated a consecutive 60-
month, or five-year, sentence. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Counts 4
through 6 did not carry mandatory minimums, so the district

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No. 24-1120 3
court imposed 10 years’ imprisonment apiece, which Stewart
would serve concurrently with his other sentences. Together,
his final sentence was thus life plus five years.
Stewart appealed his convictions, but we affirmed across
the board. United States v. Stewart, 902 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2018).
He then moved for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. Among other things, he cited intervening caselaw to
argue that his prior Indiana drug convictions no longer qual-
ified him for a sentence enhancement on either Count 1 or
Count 2. See, e.g., United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938 (7th
Cir. 2019). The government conceded the point.
The district court accordingly ordered resentencing. This
time, all agreed Count 1 would carry a sentencing range of 10
years to life, rather than a mandatory life term. 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b). And on Count 2, Stewart would be subject to only a
10-year-maximum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006).
The Probation Department prepared a new presentence
investigation report (PSR) for Stewart’s resentencing, which
included an advisory sentencing range. Relevant here, the
PSR reported that he qualified as a career offender under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENT ’ G
G UIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1. Probation, adhering to the ca-
reer-offender Guideline and the Sentencing Commission’s
corresponding application notes, arrived at a final advisory
range of 420 months to life in prison. The district court
adopted that range without objection.
Ultimately, though, the court sentenced Stewart to 360
months’ imprisonment. It attributed the below-Guidelines
sentence to Stewart’s “substantial efforts towards rehabilita-
tion and bettering himself” since his initial sentence. But it

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4 No. 24-1120
weighed those efforts against the “overwhelming” evidence
of his “very dangerous” crimes and his failure to accept re-
sponsibility.
No longer bound by a mandatory life sentence, the district
court first imposed 300 months’ imprisonment for Count 1. It
sentenced Stewart to the lower 10-year, or 120-month, statu-
tory maximum for Count 2, which would run concurrently
with the other counts. The sentences for Counts 3 and 4 did
not change. The former still mandated a consecutive 60
months. As for the latter, the district court again imposed a
120-month sentence to run concurrently with the others. The
court did, however, increase Stewart’s sentences for Counts 5
and 6 (the money laundering counts) from 120 months’ to 240
months’ imprisonment, respectively. But that made no sub-
stantive difference, as those ran concurrently with his other-
wise longer Count 1 sentence. The result was, again, a final
sentence of 360 months.
Stewart appeals, seeking another resentencing. His main
contention is that the Probation Department—and by exten-
sion the district court—miscalculated his sentencing range
under the career-offender Guideline. He also faults the dis-
trict court for misunderstanding the extent to which it could
consider his rehabilitation when fashioning a new sentence
and for increasing his money laundering sentences without
explanation.
II
Stewart’s primary argument on appeal pertains to the ca-
reer-offender Guideline. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. He faults the
probation officer who prepared the PSR for misapplying
§ 4B1.1 when calculating his 420-months-to-life advisory

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No. 24-1120 5
sentencing range and, consequently, the district court for
adopting the PSR. Stewart acknowledges he inadvertently
failed to object to the Guidelines range. So, we review the dis-
trict court’s calculation only for plain error. United States v.
Truett, 109 F.4th 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 2024) (reviewing a “district
court’s Guideline calculation for plain error because” the de-
fendant “did not raise [an] objection to the district court, and
the failure to object appear[ed] inadvertent”).
A
We start with the text of the career-offender Guideline.
Subsection (a) defines “career offender” and thus serves as a
gateway to the rest of the Guideline:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the de-
fendant was at least eighteen years old at the
time the defendant committed the instant of-
fense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of vi-
olence or a controlled substance offense; and (3)
the defendant has at least two prior felony con-
victions of either a crime of violence or a con-
trolled substance offense.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
When the gateway subsection is satisfied, subsections (b)
and (c) of the Guideline provide the means of calculating a
career offender’s advisory sentencing range. Subsection (b)
serves as the default provision:
Except as provided in subsection (c), if the of-
fense level for a career offender from the table
in this subsection is greater than the offense
level otherwise applicable, the offense level

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6 No. 24-1120
from the table in this subsection shall apply. A
career offender’s criminal history category in
every case under this subsection shall be Cate-
gory VI.
Id. § 4B1.1(b). The table referred to in subsection (b) assigns
the career offender an offense level depending on the statu-
tory maximum for his controlled-substance or crime-of-vio-
lence offense. Greater statutory maximums are associated
with correspondingly higher offense levels. Id.
Subsection (c) contains exceptions to the default provision.
The exceptions apply when the career offender has been con-
victed of “using or carrying a firearm during and in relation
to, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of, any federal crime
of violence or drug trafficking crime” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c). United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 449 (2019) (inter-
nal quotations omitted).1 Relevant here is subsection (c)(2):
In the case of multiple counts of conviction in
which at least one of the counts is a conviction
other than a conviction for 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) …,
the guideline range shall be the greater of—
(A) the guideline range that results by adding
the mandatory minimum consecutive pen-
alty required by the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) …
count(s) to the minimum and the maximum
of the otherwise applicable guideline range
determined for the count(s) of conviction
1 Subsection (c) also applies when the career offender was convicted
of using restricted ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 929(a). See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c). For ease of reading, though, we have omitted any ref-
erence to § 929(a), as Stewart was convicted of only a § 924(c) offense.

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No. 24-1120 7
other than the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) … count(s);
and
(B) the guideline range determined using the
table in subsection (c)(3).
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A)–(B). The table referred to in this sub-
section assigns the career offender a Guidelines range that de-
pends on his acceptance of responsibility—or lack thereof. See
id. § 3E1.1.
B
We turn now to the district court’s Guidelines calculation.
The court first concluded that Stewart met the career-offender
definition in § 4B1.1’s gateway provision, subsection (a). On
this Stewart agrees. He was at least 18 years old when he vio-
lated 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for possessing with intent to dis-
tribute a controlled substance (Count 1), and he had at least
two earlier controlled-substance felony convictions. Stewart
also qualified as a career offender on account of his 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) conviction (Count 3). See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (“A
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) … is a ‘crime of violence’ or a
‘controlled substance offense’ if the offense of conviction es-
tablished that the underlying offense was a ‘crime of violence’
or a ‘controlled substance offense.’”).
The district court thus proceeded to subsections (b) and
(c). Recall that subsection (b) acts as the default provision. It
controls “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c).” Id.
§ 4B1.1(b). The court correctly concluded that subsection
(c)(2)’s exception applied to Stewart because this case in-
volves “multiple counts of conviction in which” one, but not
all, of the convictions is for a § 924(c) offense. Id. § 4B1.1(c)(2).
Here, too, Stewart agrees.

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8 No. 24-1120
The subsection (c)(2) exception requires a court to calcu-
late two comparator ranges, the greater of which becomes the
career offender’s advisory Guidelines range. The easier of the
two calculations directs the court to the acceptance of respon-
sibility table in subsection (c)(3). Id. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(B). All agree
Stewart did not accept responsibility, resulting in a compara-
tor range of 360 months to life. Id. § 4B1.1(c)(3).
Central to this appeal is how to correctly calculate the
other comparator range. The Guideline mandates that the
court “add[] the mandatory minimum consecutive penalty re-
quired by” the career offender’s § 924(c) count “to the mini-
mum and the maximum of the otherwise applicable guideline
range determined for the count(s) of conviction other than
the” § 924(c) count. Id. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A).
The mandatory minimum for a § 924(c) offense is 60
months. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). That leaves only the “oth-
erwise applicable guideline range.” The Guidelines do not de-
fine that phrase. But the Sentencing Commission’s application
notes do. According to the Commission, “[i]f the count(s) of
conviction other than the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) … count(s) does
not qualify the defendant as a career offender, the otherwise
appliable guideline range” is just the range that would apply
if not for the defendant’s career-offender status. U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(i); see also id. chs. 2–3 (computing offense
level); id. §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2 (computing criminal history cate-
gory); id. ch. 5, pt. A (computing Guidelines range). But “[i]f
the count(s) of conviction other than the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
… count(s)” still “qualifies the defendant as a career offender,
the otherwise applicable guideline range for that count(s) is
the guideline range determined for the count(s) under
§ 4B1.1(a) and (b).” Id. § 4B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(ii).

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No. 24-1120 9
To put it simply, the relevant application note instructs
courts to ignore any § 924(c) convictions. If a defendant
continues to meet the definition of a career offender, then the
career-offender Guideline remains relevant. If not, the Guide-
line is no longer relevant.
Consistent with that approach, the district court here cor-
rectly determined that, putting aside Stewart’s § 924(c) con-
viction, he still qualified as a career offender because of his
controlled-substance offense. With the subsection (a) gateway
satisfied again, the court could proceed to subsections (b) and
(c). But of course, subsection (c) could not apply this time be-
cause the court had to blind itself to Stewart’s § 924(c) convic-
tion. So, the subsection (b) default applied.
As set out above, subsection (b) instructs courts to calcu-
late a sentencing range using a criminal history category of VI
and the higher of the defendant’s “otherwise applicable” of-
fense level and the offense level calculated in the subsection’s
table. Id. § 4B1.1(b). Stewart’s “otherwise applicable” offense
level—the offense level but for his career-offender status—is
34. But because the statutory maximum for his controlled-
substance offense is life imprisonment, subsection (b)’s table
provided the greater offense level: 37. Id.; id. § 4B1.1 cmt. n.2;
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). An offense level of 37 and criminal
history category of VI produced for the district court a Guide-
lines range of 360 months to life. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
Recall, that range was calculated for purposes of compar-
ison under subsection (c)(2). Returning there, the court had to
select the greater of:
 the range it just computed (360 months to
life) plus “the mandatory minimum

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10 No. 24-1120
consecutive penalty required by” Stewart’s
§ 924(c) conviction (again, 60 months); and
 the range from subsection (c)’s table (as ex-
plained, 360 months to life).
Id. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A)–(B). In the final comparison, then, the court
had to choose the greater of 420 months to life and 360 months
to life. Based on these calculations, it accurately selected the
former.
C
Stewart contends the district court calculated incorrectly.
Specifically, he disagrees with the Sentencing Commission’s
application note on which the court relied to reach his “other-
wise applicable guideline range” for the subsection (c)(2)
comparison. See id. § 4B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). Stewart faces an uphill
battle, though, because a court must abide by a relevant ap-
plication note “unless it violates the Constitution or a federal
statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading
of,” the applicable Guideline. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S.
36, 38 (1993); see also United States v. Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 584
(7th Cir. 2021) (same). Undeterred, he argues that the applica-
tion note contradicts § 4B1.1’s plain text.
To Stewart, the Commission’s commentary on § 4B1.1 im-
permissibly directed the district court to apply both the sub-
section (b) default provision and a subsection (c) exception to
arrive at his Guidelines range. Remember, the relevant appli-
cation note says—when calculating a sentencing range under
subsection (c)(2)—to put aside a defendant’s § 924(c) convic-
tion. If after doing so a defendant remains a career offender,
the court should then rely on subsection (b) to determine the
“otherwise applicable guideline range” for purposes of

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No. 24-1120 11
comparing to the range from subsection (c)’s table. U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(ii). In Stewart’s view, however, the plain
text of the career-offender Guideline permits a court to rely
on only subsection (b) or (c)—not both.
His position largely hinges on subsection (b)’s use of the
phrase “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c).” Id. § 4B1.1(b).
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]housands of statutory
provisions use the phrase ‘except as provided in …’ followed
by a cross-reference in order to indicate that one rule should
prevail over another in any circumstance in which the two
conflict.” Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 583 U.S.
416, 428 (2018). From this, Stewart argues that because the
subsection (c)(2) exception prevailed here, the district court
was barred from resorting back to the subsection (b) default
provision at any point in the calculation.
That leaves the issue of how to calculate “the otherwise
applicable guideline range” for defendants, like Stewart, that
qualify as career offenders even after ignoring any § 924(c)
convictions. To him, the presumption of consistent usage pro-
vides the answer. A NTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. G ARNER ,
R EADING L AW : T HE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL T EXTS 170 (2012)
(“A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning
throughout a text[.]”). Both subsections (b) and (c) use the
words “otherwise applicable.” Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b),
with id. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A). In subsection (b), “otherwise
applicable” refers to the defendant’s offense level but for his
career-offender status. So, Stewart says, in subsection (c), “the
otherwise applicable guideline range” must refer to the de-
fendant’s range if not for his career-offender status.
If Stewart is correct, his final Guidelines range would have
been 360 months to life, not 420 months to life. Return to the

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12 No. 24-1120
subsection (c)(2) exception. Again, the district court must
identify the greater of (A) “the otherwise applicable guideline
range determined for the count(s) of conviction other than
the” § 924(c) count plus the 60-month mandatory minimum
and (B) the Guidelines range calculated in subsection (c)’s ta-
ble—for Stewart, 360 months to life. Id. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A)–(B).
Applying Stewart’s approach, if he were not a career offender,
his offense level would be 34 and his criminal history category
would be VI. His “otherwise applicable guideline range”
would accordingly be 262 to 327 months. Id. ch. 5, pt. A. Ac-
counting for the additional 60-month mandatory minimum,
the range used for comparison in subsection (c)(2) would be
322 to 387 months. Because 360 months to life is the greater of
the two ranges, according to Stewart, that is the one the court
should have chosen in the final comparison.
D
Stewart’s textual argument falters out of the gate. The dis-
trict court’s approach—based on the relevant application
note—did not, as he contends, conflict with the Supreme
Court’s statement in Cyan about the meaning of “except as
provided.” Indeed, the district court’s approach was
consistent with the Supreme Court’s rather unremarkable
observation in that case: When an “except as provided” pro-
vision precedes a cross-referenced provision, and the two
conflict, the latter provision normally prevails. Cyan, 583 U.S.
at 428.
The ordinary meaning of “except as” confirms that to be
true. The phrase means “unless.” See Except as, G ARNER ’ S
D ICTIONARY OF LEGAL U SAGE (3d ed. 2011). The subsection (b)
default provision could read: “Unless provided in subsection
(c), subsection (b) controls.” Or to put it even more simply:

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No. 24-1120 13
“Unless subsection (c) applies, subsection (b) applies.” Each
formulation “indicate[s] that one rule should prevail over an-
other in any circumstance in which the two” provisions “con-
flict.” Cyan, 583 U.S. at 428.
Here, after concluding that Stewart qualified as a career
offender under the subsection (a) gateway, the district court
correctly interpreted “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c)”
to mean that the subsection (b) default would apply unless a
subsection (c) exception did. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). And because
an exception applied, the court calculated Stewart’s Guide-
lines range under subsection (c)(2).
Stewart’s textual argument ultimately goes too far. He
says the district court had to completely blind itself to subsec-
tion (b) once it decided subsection (c) governed. But that po-
sition runs headlong into the Supreme Court’s more recent
guidance on the meaning of “except as provided” in Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1 (2020). There, the Court ex-
plained that “[s]uch clauses explain what happens in the case
of a clash” between two provisions, “but they do not other-
wise expand or contract the scope of either provision by im-
plication.” Id. at 16.
Stewart’s reading of the career-offender Guideline would
contract the scope of subsection (b) by making it irrelevant
once a district court decides that subsection (c) applies. Yet
subsection (c) tells courts to determine the “otherwise
applicable guideline range determined for the count(s) of con-
viction other than the” § 924(c) count for purposes of compar-
ison. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A). Because Stewart would still be
a career offender absent his § 924(c) conviction, his Guidelines
range would otherwise be dictated by § 4B1.1(b). We cannot
“contract the scope” of subsection (b) by reading it out of the

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14 No. 24-1120
Guideline any time subsection (c) applies. See Atl. Richfield,
590 U.S. at 16. The Commission’s application note avoids this
contraction problem by directing courts back to subsection (b)
when—putting aside any § 924(c) convictions—the defendant
remains a career offender. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(ii).
Stewart’s resort to the presumption of consistent usage
does not help him. As explained, he points out that “other-
wise applicable offense level” in subsection (b) means “the of-
fense level that would apply if the defendant were not a career
offender.” Opening Br. at 24 (internal quotation omitted). The
use of “otherwise applicable [Guideline] range” in subsection
(c), he continues, must mean “the guideline range that would
apply without a career-offender enhancement.” Id.
For one, the only words shared between the two provi-
sions are “otherwise applicable.” But in subsection (b), “oth-
erwise applicable” refers to an “offense level,” U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(b), whereas in subsection (c), “otherwise applicable”
refers to a “guideline range.” Id. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A). So, Stewart’s
premise—that these are repeated phrases—is weak. For an-
other, the presumption of consistent usage “canon is particu-
larly defeasible by context.” SCALIA & G ARNER , supra, at 171.
In other words, it can be defeated when the phrase at issue is
interpreted in light of its surroundings. Read as a whole, sub-
section (c) demands that a court ignore only “the 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) … count(s)” when calculating “the otherwise applica-
ble guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A). It does not, as
Stewart wishes, require a court to blind itself to subsection (b),
which remains eminently relevant for determining the Guide-
lines range of a career offender who does not have a § 924(c)
conviction.

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No. 24-1120 15
Consistent with the Guideline’s text, the relevant applica-
tion note also instructs courts to blind themselves only to
§ 924(c) convictions. If, putting those convictions aside, a de-
fendant remains a career offender, the court must calculate his
Guidelines range as if he is a career offender without § 924(c)
convictions. Id. § 4B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(ii). But if the defendant
does not still qualify as a career offender, the note instructs
the court to calculate his Guidelines range as if he were not a
career offender. Id. § 4B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(i).
All told, the Commission offers a far more “reasonable un-
derstanding of the Guideline” than Stewart. United States v.
Nitzkin, 37 F.4th 1290, 1291 (7th Cir. 2022). At the very least,
the relevant application note does not amount to a “plainly
erroneous reading of” the career-offender Guideline. United
States v. White, 97 F.4th 532, 537 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38). Courts must accordingly afford it
“controlling weight.” Id. The district court, having faithfully
applied the application note, did not err, let alone plainly err.2
III
The two additional errors Stewart raises on appeal require
less explanation. First, he claims the district court misunder-
stood its discretion under federal law to consider his rehabil-
itation when fashioning a new sentence. Second, Stewart
faults the court for failing to explain why it increased his
2 Stewart alternatively argues that the deference we give to the Com-
mission’s application notes under Stinson runs afoul of the Supreme
Court’s more recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019). There,
the Court clarified the standard for deferring to an agency’s interpretation
of an ambiguous regulation. Id. at 574–79. But, as Stewart concedes, circuit
precedent forecloses that argument. White, 97 F.4th at 535 (“Kisor did not
disturb Stinson or our circuit precedent.”).

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16 No. 24-1120
sentences on the money laundering counts. As the parties
agree, because both alleged errors “were created by the dis-
trict court in the ruling itself,” our review is de novo. United
States v. Wood, 31 F.4th 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v.
Martin, 122 F.4th 286, 289–90 (7th Cir. 2024); FED. R. C RIM. P.
51(a).3
A
We begin with Stewart’s contention that the district court
was unaware of the extent of its discretion to consider his re-
habilitation at resentencing.
The sentencing factors direct courts to consider “the need
to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of sim-
ilar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). For a time, some courts
understood § 3553(a)(6) to bar any consideration at
3 The Supreme Court recently made a “few observations about appel-
late review” in response to an argument offered by the government in
Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031, 2045 (2025). The Court stated that a
defendant’s failure to object to a district court “impermissibly relying on
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(2)(A)” at a revocation hearing would result in plain-
error review on appeal. Id.
The Supreme Court was not discussing Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 51(a), so we do not understand it to have upset our “crystal clear”
precedent on that rule. Martin, 122 F.4th at 289. In Esteras the Court was
concerned with the consequences of a defendant’s failure to object. 145 S.
Ct. at 2045 (citing F ED . R. CRIM . P. 52(b)). Rule 51(a), however, does “not
require a litigant to complain about a judicial choice after it has been made.
Such a complaint is properly called, not an objection, but an exception.
The rule about exceptions is explicit: ‘Exceptions to rulings or orders of
the court are unnecessary.’” United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th
Cir. 2009) (quoting F ED . R. CRIM . P. 51(a)). So, Rule 51(a) controls the stand-
ard of review here.

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No. 24-1120 17
resentencing of a defendant’s efforts to rehabilitate. Those
courts deemed it unfair to credit one defendant for his post-
sentencing progress when a similarly situated defendant—
without the chance of resentencing—would not receive a sim-
ilar reward.
The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning in Pepper v.
United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011). It acknowledged that per-
mitting district courts to consider rehabilitation could result
in disparities among defendants who receive new sentences
and those who do not. But, the Court reasoned, any dispari-
ties are the result of “the ordinary operation of appellate sen-
tencing review.” Id. at 502. It went on to hold that “a district
court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defend-
ant’s postsentencing rehabilitation and that such evidence
may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance
from” the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range. Id. at 481
(emphases added). The Court’s decision in Pepper affords dis-
trict courts wide latitude to decide if, and to what extent, re-
habilitation should factor into a new sentence. United States v.
Doyle, 857 F.3d 1115, 1121 (11th Cir. 2017) (“That’s a double
‘may’ holding that leaves what consideration, if any, to give
… post-sentencing rehabilitation … up to the district court.”).
The district court here understood it had discretion to con-
sider Stewart’s efforts to rehabilitate, and it did. The court
found “Stewart ha[d] made substantial efforts towards
rehabilitation.” It went on to ensure “his family and friends”
knew those efforts “count[ed] for something.” And that
“something” was a below-Guidelines sentence.
Stewart pushes back, citing the district court’s statement
that it would not “be fair to other people in similar cases to
have his post-offense conduct result in a drastic variance”

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18 No. 24-1120
downward. To him, that reasoning flies in the face of Pepper.
But Stewart misunderstands the Supreme Court as having
replaced one categorical rule (a prohibition on considering re-
habilitation) with another (a prohibition on considering sen-
tencing disparities). As explained, though, the Court in Pepper
left district courts free to decide the extent to which rehabili-
tation should influence a new sentence. Here, the district
court mentioned concerns about disparate treatment to deny
Stewart only a “drastic” downward variance, not to deny him
a variance altogether. That was not an error.
B
We arrive last at the district court’s sentencing explana-
tion. The court either reduced or maintained Stewart’s origi-
nal sentences for each of the counts, except for the money
laundering counts. Those sentences were increased from 120
to 240 months’ imprisonment apiece. Yet the changes had no
practical impact on Stewart’s total sentence because Counts 5
and 6 ran concurrently with his otherwise longer 300-month
sentence for possessing with intent to distribute a controlled
substance. Still, Stewart faults the court for failing to explain
the increases, especially given his efforts to rehabilitate.
District courts must sufficiently explain sentences both to
ensure we can perform our appellate review function and to
preserve fairness at sentencing. United States v. Jett, 982 F.3d
1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 2020). That said, this court has “repeatedly
and unambiguously rejected the idea that sentences must be
evaluated on a per-count basis.” United States v. Baldwin, 68
F.4th 1070, 1074 (7th Cir. 2023). We have taken our cue from
the Supreme Court, which has instructed courts that they may
evaluate sentences in the aggregate—or as a package. Dean v.

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No. 24-1120 19
United States, 581 U.S. 62, 67–68 (2017); see also Jett, 982 F.3d at
1080 (same).
The district court’s explanation of Stewart’s aggregate sen-
tence was the gold standard. It noted the “overwhelming” ev-
idence that supported his convictions, including the “large
quantities of several lethal controlled substances” that could
have “ruined” the lives of people in the greater Indianapolis
community. Despite the harm Stewart caused, the court was
unconvinced that he “really accepted responsibility.” If that
were not enough, he had an extensive criminal history, show-
ing his lack of “respect for the law.” And though Stewart’s of-
fenses were not necessarily “violent,” they were “very, very
dangerous.” The court thus felt compelled to account for “the
need to protect the public from” him. It weighed all this
against the fact that Stewart had, indeed, “made substantial
efforts towards rehabilitation and bettering himself.” And in
the end, it deemed a below-Guidelines sentence of 360
months’ imprisonment appropriate.
We decline Stewart’s invitation to order yet another resen-
tencing because his money laundering counts, viewed in iso-
lation, carried longer prison terms—especially when those
counts had no substantive impact on his aggregate sentence.
* * *
Finding no errors with Stewart’s resentencing, we A FFIRM .

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