Jeanne Hedgepeth v. James A. Britton

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1427
JEANNE H EDGEPETH ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMES A. BRITTON , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-03790 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED DECEMBER 12, 2024 — DECIDED A UGUST 26, 2025
____________________
Before R IPPLE, S CUDDER , and M ALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
M ALDONADO, Circuit Judge. Jeanne Hedgepeth, a high
school teacher with two suspensions and prior warnings of
possible termination, posted inflammatory messages to a Fa-
cebook account followed mostly by former students. The
posts prompted numerous complaints and media inquiries to
the school district. Given the disruption and previous warn-
ings, the school district fired Hedgepeth.

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2 No. 24-1427
Hedgepeth sued the school district and other associated
individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that her discharge
violated the First Amendment. The district court granted de-
fendants summary judgment, and Hedgepeth appealed. We
affirm. We hold that Hedgepeth failed to adduce sufficient ev-
idence from which a reasonable juror could find in her favor
on the merits of her First Amendment claim.
I
Until her dismissal in 2020, Hedgepeth taught social stud-
ies at Palatine High School (PHS) for twenty years. PHS is an
Illinois public school located in Township High School Dis-
trict 211.
Prior to her termination, the District had suspended
Hedgepeth twice. The first suspension came in 2016 after
Hedgepeth erupted with profanity at her students after the
2016 United States Presidential Election, using the word
“fucking” while in a “volatile emotional state.” Citing policies
demanding “just and courteous professional relationships”
and student welfare, the District suspended Hedgepeth with-
out pay for one day. Hedgepeth received an explicit written
warning that future use of profanity or another similar inci-
dent would result in additional disciplinary measures, in-
cluding possible termination.
Hedgepeth’s second suspension occurred in 2019, after an-
other profane outburst in the classroom, this time in response
to a student. According to the incident report, she told the stu-
dent, “You haven’t even done your fucking homework,” and
directed him to “read the fucking chapter.” She also replied
“no shit” to another one of the student’s comments. An audio
recording of the incident documented Hedgepeth’s heated

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No. 24-1427 3
and profane comments. Apparently aware that her conduct
violated District policy, she announced to the class that she
would “surely be suspended for that.” She was correct. Citing
the same policies that led to her first suspension, the District
suspended Hedgepeth without pay again – this time for four
days. It also issued a notice to remedy, again warning of pos-
sible dismissal, and required her to attend at least six counsel-
ing sessions.
The following year, on May 31 and June 1, 2020, during
nationwide protests following the police killing of George
Floyd, Hedgepeth made a series of posts on Facebook. At the
time, she was vacationing in Florida. The first post, evidently
in response to media reports about the ongoing protests, in-
cluded pictures from her vacation with the caption, “I don’t
want to go home tomorrow. Now that the civil war has begun
I want to move.” A Facebook friend commented on her post,
“Follow your gut! Move!!!!!!!!” to which Hedgepeth replied,
“I need a gun and training.”
In another Facebook post, Hedgepeth reposted a viral
meme evoking the high-pressure water hoses used against
civil rights protestors in the early 1960s that read, “Wanna
stop the Riots? Mobilize the septic tank trucks, put a pressure
cannon on em … hose em down … the end.” Hedgepeth com-
mented on her own post, “You think this would work?”
Finally, Hedgepeth engaged in an online debate with a
former PHS student about race in America. Over the course
of that debate, Hedgepeth wrote in a Facebook comment, “I
find the term ‘white privilege’ as racist as the ‘N’ word.”
According to Hedgepeth, former students constituted
about 80% of her roughly 800 Facebook friends in June 2020.

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Before and after making the posts, Hedgepeth configured her
Facebook account to “private” and she did not accept “friend
requests” from current PHS students. Those measures, how-
ever, especially with the very high percentage of former stu-
dent Facebook friends, were inadequate to keep the “private”
posts from the public domain.
The day after Hedgepeth made the posts, PHS Principal
Tony Medina began receiving complaints from current PHS
students and alumni, another teacher, and a parent, which he
relayed to District Superintendent Lisa Small. The District
also received emails, calls, and media inquiries (both local and
international) regarding Hedgepeth’s posts. The District
promptly issued a press release clarifying that Hedgepeth’s
posts “do not reflect the values or principles of District 211”
and apologizing “for any harm or disrespect that this may
have caused.” By the end of the first week of June, Hedgepeth
met with District Human Resources Director James Britton,
who told her that the District would investigate her conduct.
A week later, Britton and Superintendent Small met with
Hedgepeth and informed her they planned to recommend
that the District School Board fire her. Small based the recom-
mendation on Hedgepeth’s prior disciplinary sanctions and
warnings, her Facebook posts, the public reaction to them,
and her “lack of any understanding or appreciation for why
many people found her comments objectionable.” In addition
to violating her prior disciplinary warnings, Small found that
Hedgepeth had violated four other District policies, including
one governing teacher conduct on social media and the same
“just and courteous professional relationships” policy she
had been disciplined for violating twice before.

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No. 24-1427 5
The District Board held two public meetings, both of
which included public comment. The first meeting featured
at least 58 public comments on Hedgepeth’s Facebook posts,
most critical and a handful in support. At the second meeting,
speakers also spoke mostly critically of Hedgepeth.
After holding the public meetings, the District Board
voted to fire Hedgepeth. The District Board served Hedge-
peth with a notice of charges, bill of particulars, and advised
her of her right to request a hearing before the Illinois State
Board of Education. The bill of particulars explained that the
District Board no longer considered Hedgepeth qualified as a
teacher because she did not conduct herself “in a manner that
demonstrates good judgment,” especially because she failed
“to serve as [a] role model” for the community. The District
Board further explained that her conduct had “damaged”
Hedgepeth’s effectiveness as a teacher, her broader reputa-
tion, and the reputation of PHS and the broader District com-
munity.
The bill of particulars went on, explaining that the District
had by then “received over 135 emails and phone calls ex-
pressing concern or outrage about your posts. The communi-
cations came from former students, parents, current students
and staff. Your postings also received media coverage, includ-
ing on WGNTV, ABC7, NBC5, Fox 32, the New York Post and
the Daily Herald.” The District Board viewed this as incom-
patible with Hedgepeth’s workplace duties, which required
Hedgepeth “to work with staff and students of all back-
grounds and races” such that her posts “injure[d] and

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6 No. 24-1427
impede[d] the efficiency of the District’s provision of ser-
vices.”1 Citing as well to Hedgepeth’s prior disciplinary his-
tory, the District Board concluded that Hedgepeth had “lost
the trust and respect of colleagues and students.”
Hedgepeth’s immediate response was to request a review
hearing before the Illinois State Board of Education. At the
hearing, Hedgepeth was represented by counsel and had the
opportunity to call witnesses, offer documents into evidence,
cross-examine witnesses, and present arguments. Among
other things, Hedgepeth argued that her termination was
wrongful because her Facebook posts were protected under
the First Amendment. The hearing officer applied the balanc-
ing test under Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205,
391 U.S. 563 (1968) and found that Hedgepeth’s dismissal did
not violate her First Amendment rights.
While awaiting decision on her administrative hearing,
Hedgepeth elected to seek relief in federal court as well. She
sued the District and various District Board members who
voted in favor of her termination (including Superintendent
Small and Director Britton), alleging that they violated her
First Amendment rights. After the close of discovery, the dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to all defendants (to-
gether, the District), holding that Hedgepeth was collaterally
estopped from bringing her First Amendment claim because
she pursued appellate review before the Illinois State Board
of Education and that, in any event, her claim failed on the
merits.
1 This was no hypothetical concern. PHS has a highly diverse student
body composed of 5.3% Black, 46.1% Latino, 8.1% Asian, and 37.9% white
students as of 2020.

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No. 24-1427 7
II
We review the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to the District de novo, drawing all reasonable in-
ferences in Hedgepeth’s favor. Hicks v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 109
F.4th 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2024). We can affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by the
record. See Hoffstead v. Ne. Reg’l Commuter R.R. Corp., 132 F.4th
503, 514 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). We agree that sum-
mary judgment for the District was appropriate on the merits,
and we decline to rule on the preclusive effect of decisions by
the Illinois State School Board.
A.
“Public employees do not relinquish their First Amend-
ment rights as a condition of entering government service ….”
Kilborn v. Amiridis, 131 F.4th 550, 557 (7th Cir. 2025) (gathering
cases). Instead, “the First Amendment protects a public em-
ployee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen
addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (citations omitted). But just like “private
employers, the government needs to exercise control over its
employees to provide public services effectively.” Kilborn, 131
F.4th at 557 (citations omitted). In other words, public em-
ployees “by necessity … accept certain limitations on [their]
freedom,” which may be particular to that employee’s role
and whether it is a public-facing role of “trust.” Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 418–19.
A public employee bringing a First Amendment retalia-
tion claim must prove three things: (1) that she engaged in
constitutionally protected speech, (2) that she suffered a dep-
rivation likely to deter such speech, and (3) that the speech

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8 No. 24-1427
was a motivating factor in her termination. Harnishfeger v.
United States, 943 F.3d 1105, 1112–13 (7th Cir. 2019).
This case turns on the first element: whether Hedgepeth’s
Facebook posts are constitutionally protected speech. That is-
sue is a question of law, though it may require courts to make
certain “predicate factual determinations.” Gustafson v. Jones,
290 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2002).
Whether a public employee’s speech is protected under
the First Amendment follows a two-part framework. See
Harnishfeger, 943 F.3d at 1113. First, we ask “whether the em-
ployee is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”
Kilborn, 131 F.4th at 557 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
147 (1983)). If so, we proceed to the second step: balancing the
employee’s interest in commenting on matters of public con-
cern against the government employer’s interest “in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public services.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at
568.2 Even speech addressing matters of public concern may
lose constitutional protection if the government’s interest in
workplace efficiency outweighs the employee’s interest in
speaking freely. Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills, 832 F.3d 785,
795 (7th Cir. 2016).
There is no dispute that Hedgepeth spoke, through her
May 31 and June 1 Facebook posts, as a citizen on a matter of
public concern. Accordingly, we must apply Pickering balanc-
ing to weigh her First Amendment interests against the
2 Hedgepeth asks us to depart from or otherwise modify Supreme
Court precedent because Pickering balancing is inconsistent with the orig-
inal public meaning of the First Amendment. That is beyond our authority
to decide as an intermediate court of appeals. See Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).

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No. 24-1427 9
District’s interest in workplace efficiency. Harnishfeger, 943
F.3d at 1115.
Under Pickering, the employer bears the burden of show-
ing that its interest in workplace efficiency outweighs the em-
ployee’s right to speak. Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227,
736 F.3d 1110, 1118 (7th Cir. 2013). In evaluating whether the
employer has met this burden, courts consider seven factors:
(1) [W]hether the speech would create problems
in maintaining discipline or harmony among
co-workers; (2) whether the employment rela-
tionship is one in which personal loyalty and
confidence are necessary; (3) whether the
speech impeded the employee’s ability to per-
form her responsibilities; (4) the time, place, and
manner of the speech; (5) the context in which
the underlying dispute arose; (6) whether the
matter was one on which debate was vital to in-
formed decisionmaking; and (7) whether the
speaker should be regarded as a member of the
general public.
Kristofek, 832 F.3d at 796 (quoting Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d
358, 371 (7th Cir. 2000)). That being said, we have also made
it clear that these seven factors are “not a doctrinal touchstone
and certainly not a straitjacket” insofar as “it’s not necessary
to consider each one.” Darlingh v. Maddaleni, 142 F.4th 558, 566
(7th Cir. 2025).
In the public education context, the critical focus of each
factor is “the effective functioning of the public employer’s
enterprise.” Craig, 736 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Rankin v. McPher-
son, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)). We have held that

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10 No. 24-1427
“[i]nterference with work, personnel relationships, or the
speaker’s job performance can detract from the public em-
ployer’s function, so avoiding such interference can be a
strong state interest.” Id. School officials can also act to nip
reasonable predictions of looming disruption in the bud.
Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997). We
stress that those predictions must be reasonable, meaning that
they are “supported with an evidentiary foundation and [are]
more than mere speculation.” Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705,
715 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gazarkiewicz v. Town of Kingsford
Heights, 359 F.3d 933, 944 (7th Cir. 2004)).
The level of disruption needed to justify a restriction var-
ies with context. Craig, 736 F.3d at 1119. The more serious and
politically charged the message, the stronger the govern-
ment’s justification must be. Id. (citing McGreal v. Ostov, 368
F.3d 657, 681–82 (7th Cir. 2004)). By contrast, when the speech
is “less serious, portentous, and political,” a lighter justifica-
tion by the employer may suffice. Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17
F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation modified). Also, em-
ployers enjoy “more leeway in restricting the speech” of a
public-facing employee like a classroom teacher who must
maintain public trust and respect to be effective. Craig, 736
F.3d at 1119. Finally, the time, place, and manner of the speech
factor into the overall analysis. Id. (citation omitted).
B.
After weighing the undisputed facts in the light most fa-
vorable to Hedgepeth, we conclude that the District’s interest

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No. 24-1427 11
in addressing actual disruptions and averting future disrup-
tion outweighed Hedgepeth’s speech interests.
Start with the District’s evidence. The District produced a
wealth of undisputed evidence of the actual disruption at
PHS engendered by Hedgepeth’s posts.3 By the time the Dis-
trict Board voted to dismiss Hedgepeth in July, the District
had received 113 emails about her posts. The record contains
many examples of students and parents expressing concern
about Hedgepeth’s fitness as a teacher. In an email to District
Board member Kimberly Cavill, students shared that,
[a]s students of color, we feel angered by Ms.
Hedgepeth’s statements and feel that she
should no longer have a place as staff at PHS. …
We don’t want a teacher at Palatine who be-
lieves we are being dramatic when a racist act
has been done against us. We want a teacher
who understands what we are going through
and … the obstacles presented to us for simply
being of different color.
This evidence of internal disruption is enough to distin-
guish Melton v. City of Forrest City, --- F.4th ---, 2025 WL
2329190 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025). There the Eighth Circuit re-
versed summary judgment for a fire department because
“[n]o current firefighter complained” about the plaintiff’s
3 To dispute the disruption evidence, Hedgepeth produced a declara-
tion from Julie Schmidt Aymler which analyzed the 113 emails and found
that some were duplicative. Even crediting that declaration, the District
still faced a tremendous amount of scrutiny, both from the local commu-
nity and press, which is unrebutted.

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12 No. 24-1427
social media posts. Id. at *7 (emphasis in original). Here, the
opposite is the case.
The disruption was not limited to PHS’s students—it rip-
pled through the entire community. Hedgepeth’s posts threw
school and district operations into disarray and unsettled her
colleagues’ classrooms. The posts sparked outrage, drew me-
dia attention, and forced the District into a costly and time-
consuming public relations response. Just days after her
posts, other PHS teachers told the principal that summer
school had been derailed by ongoing discussions about the
controversy. The undisputed record further confirms that
Hedgepeth’s posts interfered with core District functions by
diverting staff and resources to address widespread concerns
from the community and the press. Given the scale of the fall-
out on top of Hedgepeth’s prior disciplinary history, the Dis-
trict reasonably concluded that her conduct undermined her
job performance. This is precisely the “interference with
work, personnel relationships, or the speaker’s job perfor-
mance” that we have routinely recognized as constituting a
“strong state interest.” Craig, 736 F.3d at 1119.
Critically, these disruptions did not occur in a vacuum.
The District was entitled to look at Hedgepeth’s entire em-
ployment record. That context reveals two prior, serious inci-
dents of workplace discipline for similar violations of the Dis-
trict’s decorum policies. The District was not required to wait
around for a fourth violation. Kristofek, 832 F.3d at 796 (“[A]
government employer is allowed to consider both the actual
and the potential disruptiveness.” (citing Lalowski v. City of Des
Plaines, 789 F.3d 784, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2015))).
None of Hedgepeth’s arguments compel a different result.
She first argues that her speech concerned “debate about …

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No. 24-1427 13
George Floyd’s death” and therefore was “vital to informed
decisionmaking.” See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387. This argument
misunderstands the relationship between step one and step
two of the test. We agree with Hedgepeth that, in commenting
about ongoing national protests, she spoke on important mat-
ters of public concern, which is why she is entitled to proceed
to Pickering balancing at step two. But the inquiry at step two
is different. The question is not whether Hedgepeth’s speech
implicates the First Amendment (it does), it is whether the
District’s interest in workplace efficiency outweighs her right
to speak. See Craig, 736 F.3d at 1118.
True, in some cases, the step two analysis must presump-
tively elevate a teacher’s expressive interest over the em-
ployer’s interest in avoiding disruption. In Pickering itself, for
example, “the Court observed that ‘[t]eachers are … the mem-
bers of a community most likely to have informed and defi-
nite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the
schools should be spent’” and therefore it is “essential” that
teachers “be able to speak out freely on such questions with-
out fear of retaliatory dismissal.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228,
239–40 (2014) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572).
This is not such a case. “Special knowledge” contemplates
situations where, for example, an employee learns of miscon-
duct and brings the issue to light or an employee testifies to
the existence of corruption in the allocation of public funds.
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (holding that speech which “ex-
pose[s] governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter
of considerable significance” for purposes of Pickering balanc-
ing). There is no dispute that Hedgepeth’s speech was not in-
formed by any specialized expertise or knowledge gained
through her status as a public employee. Hedgepeth

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14 No. 24-1427
described these posts as either jokes or as sharing the views
of others, not her own. Further, Hedgepeth’s “use of vulgar
language” – i.e., jokes about excrement – weakens her speech
interests since her role of public trust counsels instead for a
“calm, reasoned presentation of her views on [a] sensitive
subject” in order to be effective in the classroom and re-
spected in the PHS community. Darlingh, 142 F.4th at 566–67.
Given that context, while her speech was certainly not devoid
of constitutional value, the District’s showing of substantial
disruption engendered by Hedgepeth’s conduct is sufficient
to outweigh her interest in expression.
Hedgepeth also emphasizes that she made her posts on a
private personal Facebook account that did not specifically
identify her as a PHS employee. She is right that speech made
outside of the workplace may be less disruptive to the “effi-
cient functioning of the office.” See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388–89.
That said, speech on social media is no automatic win for
Hedgepeth, far from it. Her decision to post inflammatory
comments to an audience that she herself curated—80% of
whom were part of the PHS community—carried a clear risk
of amplification. See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d
400, 407 (4th Cir. 2016) (“A social media platform amplifies
the distribution of the speaker’s message—which favors the
employee’s free speech interests—but also increases the po-
tential, in some cases exponentially, for departmental disrup-
tion, thereby favoring the employer’s interest in efficiency.”).
Even with minimal privacy settings, Hedgepeth’s audience
choice rendered any claim to private speech illusory. Her
posts, though not technically public, functioned more like a
stage whisper than a secret. Thus, even drawing inferences in
her favor, the posts predictably and rapidly circulated within

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No. 24-1427 15
the PHS community, including among current students and
faculty, and shaped public perception of her as a teacher.
Hedgepeth next argues that her termination on the
grounds of workplace disruption amounts to affording the
PHS community a “heckler’s veto” over the content of her
speech. But, on the factual record before us, our precedent
squarely forecloses that argument. Most significantly, “this
argument does not account for the unique relationship” that
Hedgepeth has to her audience as a public school teacher and
therefore a role model for others in the PHS community.
Craig, 736 F.3d at 1121. We have repeatedly recognized that
public school teachers occupy a unique position of trust. See
id. (citing Melzer v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of New
York, 336 F.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003) (drawing analogy to in
loco parentis)); see also Darlingh, 142 F.4th at 567 (“Teachers oc-
cupy roles that entail an inordinate amount of trust and au-
thority, which makes the government’s interest particularly
compelling.” (citation modified)). PHS community members,
including current students who predictably saw her posts,
“are not ‘outsiders seeking to heckle [Hedgepeth] into silence,
rather they are participants in public education, without
whose cooperation public education as a practical matter can-
not function.’” Craig, 736 F.3d at 1121 (citation omitted).
Nor is it persuasive that some community members ex-
pressed support for Hedgepeth, which we construe as a vari-
ation on the heckler’s veto theme. As the Second Circuit has
recognized, just because “some parents and students ex-
pressed support for [Hedgepeth] as a person harmlessly ex-
pressing [her] ideas,” it can still be “entirely reasonable for the
Board to believe that many parents and students had a strong
negative reaction to [her], and that such a reaction caused the

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16 No. 24-1427
school to suffer severe internal disruption.” Melzer, 336 F.3d
at 198.
Hedgepeth also devotes a substantial amount of her brief-
ing to arguments that her posts were not racist or racially in-
flammatory. Such considerations are irrelevant to our deci-
sion. Instead, we emphasize that the District has produced
unrefuted, objective evidence of significant disruption of
workplace operations.
Zooming out, the District produced ample undisputed ev-
idence of actual disruption. That evidence shows that Hedge-
peth did not lose her job because she expressed her views on
a matter of public concern on Facebook. Rather, she lost her
job because she posted a series of vulgar, intemperate, and ra-
cially insensitive messages to a large audience of recent PHS
alumni. The District’s undisputed evidence demonstrated
that these posts predictably rippled throughout the commu-
nity causing substantial disruption among current students
and faculty and at school board meetings, even attracting lo-
cal and international media attention. Emphasizing that this
was Hedgepeth’s third strike and not an isolated incident, the
District reasonably concluded that the scope and intensity of
the disruption created an insurmountable barrier to the high
school’s learning environment in the fast-approaching aca-
demic year. Hedgepeth has failed to rejoin this capacious
showing to sufficiently carry her burden at summary judg-
ment. We therefore conclude that Hedgepeth’s posts were not
entitled to First Amendment protection.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.

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