Steven Miller Johnson v. Shana Tims

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 21, 2025*
Decided October 27, 2025
Before
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2805
STEVEN MILLER JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHANA TIMS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-cv-496-bhl
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Steven Johnson appeals the dismissal of his complaint against two Wisconsin
probation officers and a jail superintendent for violating his right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Johnson alleges the defendants
detained him for over a year on a probation hold without a preliminary hearing. The
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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district court dismissed his complaint at screening for failure to state a claim.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. But because Johnson plausibly states a claim for a violation of his
right to due process, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
At this stage in the proceedings, we accept as true Johnson’s factual allegations
and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. See Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753, 756–57
(7th Cir. 2023). We may also take judicial notice of the court records from Johnson’s
related criminal case in Wisconsin, State v. Johnson, No. 2023CF005515 (Milwaukee
County Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2023). See F ED. R. EVID. 201.
After receiving a fourth conviction for driving under the influence in Illinois,
Johnson was permitted to serve his probation in his home state of Wisconsin under the
compact of the Interstate Commission on Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS). But
while on probation in Wisconsin in November 2023, Johnson was arrested for and
charged with a fifth operating while intoxicated offense, a felony. Five days after his
arrest, a Wisconsin judge ordered him released on a signature bond.
But Johnson remained in jail on a probation hold. Because Johnson was an out-
of-state probationer, Johnson’s probation agent, Shana Tims, told him she needed to
inform Illinois of the new charge and determine if Illinois planned to retake him and
revoke his probation. See ICAOS Rule 4.109.
After the ten-day deadline for Illinois to respond under the interstate compact
passed, see id., Johnson began advocating for his release. He mailed a formal request for
reinstatement of his probation to Nicole McDade, the regional chief of the Division of
Community Corrections (DCC), in January 2024, see WIS . A DMIN . CODE DOC § 328.26;
had a friend call McDade in February; and contacted other correctional officials to no
avail. In March, Tims wrote to Johnson that the DCC was waiting for an update from
Illinois and had “Administrator approval” to detain him until at least his next court
date. Eventually, a correctional official promised to inform the jail superintendent,
Chantell Jewell, about Johnson’s situation. Johnson never heard from Jewell’s office.
And Johnson never received a preliminary probable cause hearing on his alleged
probation violation.
While in jail, Johnson filed this action alleging that the defendants violated
Wisconsin state law, the interstate compact, and the Constitution. Specifically, he
alleged the defendants detained him beyond statutory deadlines even though the

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No. 24-2805 Page 3
Wisconsin trial court ordered him released on a signature bond.† He sought a
preliminary injunction ordering Jewell to release him from jail and monetary damages
from Tims, McDade, and Jewell.
After a thorough review of Johnson’s complaint, the district court dismissed his
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). First, the court concluded that Johnson could not
state a claim under Wisconsin law because the interstate compact supersedes any
conflicting state law. See WIS . S TAT. § 304.16(14)(a)(2). The court also reasoned that
Johnson could not state a claim under the interstate compact because compliance with
the compact is a matter of state law and therefore not reviewable under § 1983.
Disposing of Johnson’s remaining constitutional claim, the court noted that Johnson
could seek release from custody only through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). The court also explained that Johnson
failed to allege personal involvement of the Wisconsin defendants in Illinois’s delay in
responding to his violation or beginning revocation proceedings and that any
defendants involved in the decision to charge Johnson with violations of Wisconsin
state law would be entitled to absolute immunity. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d
634, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2018).
On appeal, Johnson pursues only the constitutional claim relating to his
detention without process after receiving a signature bond. Because Johnson has now
been convicted of the criminal charges in Wisconsin and sentenced to a term of
confinement, his request for a preliminary injunction is moot. See United States v. Shorter,
27 F.4th 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2022). So we address only his request for damages. See Manuel
v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018). We review de novo the dismissal for
failure to state a claim. Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 557 (7th Cir. 2023). At this stage in
the proceedings, Johnson “‘need only plead sufficient facts to suggest a plausible claim
for relief,’ which is ‘not an exacting standard.’” Id. (quoting Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th
331, 333–34 (7th Cir. 2022)). After reviewing his complaint, we identify a plausible claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A probationer has a “valuable” liberty interest in probation. Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Because a probationer suffers “a grievous loss” when the state
† Johnson said that the interstate compact gave Wisconsin authority to detain him for only 40
days. ICAOS Rule 4.109. Under Wisconsin law, a probationer subject to revocation must receive a
preliminary hearing within 15 working days of being detained and a final revocation hearing within 50
days. W IS. S TAT. § 302.335(2)(a), (b). If no hearing occurs, a jail administrator, like Jewell, may release the
probationer. See id. § 302.355(3).

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revokes probation, the state must provide minimum due process. Id. (establishing
minimum due process for parole revocation proceedings); see Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (applying the Morrissey standards to probation revocation
proceedings). To that end, a detained probationer is entitled to a preliminary hearing
“as promptly as convenient after arrest” to determine if there is probable cause that a
violation occurred. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485.
We accept Johnson’s assertion that, but for the probation hold, he would not
have been detained. As the state criminal docket confirms, the trial court ordered him
released on a signature bond just five days after his initial arrest. See Williams v. Dart,
967 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[B]ail orders terminate law enforcement’s authority to
seize on the same charges.”).
As a probationer held in custody because of pending revocation proceedings,
Johnson was entitled to a preliminary probable-cause hearing on the alleged violation of
probation. See United States v. Sciuto, 531 F.2d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1976). Johnson asserts
that he never received that hearing, so he has plausibly alleged a constitutional
deprivation. To be sure, Johnson waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the new
criminal charges, and the trial court found probable cause to bind Johnson over for trial.
But Johnson maintains that his signature bond was not revoked at that time, and the
defendants kept him in custody on a probation hold without a preliminary hearing on
the alleged probation violation.
Because Johnson has plausibly alleged that he was detained without process, we
must also consider whether the defendants are personally responsible. See Ghelf v. Town
of Wheatland, 132 F.4th 456, 472 (7th Cir. 2025). Johnson must plead facts that permit us
to reasonably infer “some causal connection or affirmative link” between the
defendants and the violation. Id.; see Hess, 72 F.4th at 758.
Johnson has plausibly alleged that Tims and McDade, the probation officers,
were involved in the violation. After Johnson was ordered released on a signature bond,
Tims informed Illinois of the alleged violation. In March, three months after Johnson’s
arrest, she wrote to Johnson telling him that “we” had yet to hear from Illinois but that
“we” had “[a]dministrator approval” to hold him until at least his next court date.
Likewise, Johnson plausibly alleges that McDade, the DCC regional chief, was involved
in the decision to detain him. He says that when he elevated his concerns to McDade,
she repeatedly ignored his complaints about his detention, “turn[ing] a blind eye” to
her subordinate’s failure to offer Johnson a hearing or request his release. Ollison v.
Gossett, 136 F.4th 729, 736 (7th Cir. 2025).

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Johnson also states a claim against Jewell because he has plausibly alleged that
she knew he was detained unconstitutionally and yet “consciously refused to prevent”
future harm. Martinez v. Santiago, 51 F.4th 258, 262 (7th Cir. 2022). Although Jewell was
not responsible for offering Johnson a hearing, we have held that “the Due Process
Clause does not allow government officials to continue holding a detainee after learning
that they lack authority to do so.” Id. at 262 (citing Sivard v. Pulaski Cnty., 959 F.2d 662,
668 (7th Cir. 1992) (complaint plausibly alleged sheriff “knew of [the plaintiff’s]
wrongful detention and continued to detain him in spite of that knowledge”)); cf. Figgs
v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2016) (addressing deliberate indifference under the
Eighth Amendment when prison official failed to investigate prisoner’s claims of
prolonged detention).
Johnson has plausibly alleged Jewell knew of his detention. Johnson complained
to multiple correctional officers under her supervision, one of whom promised to
inform Jewell of Johnson’s complaints. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781–82
(7th Cir. 2015) (prisoner’s multiple written complaints permitted inference the warden
knew of his medical condition). Further, Johnson has alleged Jewell failed to release him
when she could have done so. See W IS . S TAT. § 302.355(3) (authorizing jail
administrators to release detained probationers denied a timely hearing).
The district court was right to consider whether these defendants are immune
from suit because courts must dismiss claims seeking monetary damages from
defendants immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). But we are not yet
prepared to conclude that immunity bars Johnson’s claims. Non-judicial officers, like
probation agents, are entitled to absolute immunity for only those “limited functions”
sufficiently analogous to work performed by judges. Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656,
662 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Tobey, 890 F.3d at 649–50 (discussing tasks for which
probation officers do and do not have absolute immunity). Without the benefit of the
defendants’ perspective on their involvement here, we cannot attempt this functional
analysis.
We make two final observations. First, although Johnson focuses his complaint
on the Fourteenth Amendment, on remand the district court may consider whether
Johnson’s factual allegations also plausibly state a claim for relief under the Fourth
Amendment. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017). Second, as we noted
above, Johnson has now been convicted of the new criminal charges in Wisconsin. The
trial court imposed 21 months’ initial confinement. It appears that Johnson was
awarded 423 days’ sentence credit. This credit might account for some or all of

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Johnson’s pretrial custody. The district court may consider whether this award of credit
defeats any claim for damages. See Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017).
Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment, DIRECT service of the complaint on the
defendants, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.

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