Brandon E. Klein v. Brian Daniels

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 4, 2025
Decided November 13, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1099
BRANDON E. KLEIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRIAN DANIELS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:19-cv-00484-TLS
Theresa L. Springmann,
Judge.
O R D E R
Officer Brian Daniels of the Schererville Police Department arrested Brandon
Klein for violating a protective order. Klein later invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge
his arrest and temporary detainment under the Fourth Amendment. The district court
entered summary judgment for Officer Daniels because probable cause supported the
arrest. We agree and affirm.
I
On September 22, 2015, Klein learned that his new employer had sent some
paperwork to his old address, 504 Benco Court, in the northwest Indiana Town of
Schererville. This posed a problem because Klein’s then-wife, Leanne Salatas, had
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 25-1099 Page 2
secured a protective order barring him from that property. Klein called the Schererville
Police Department for advice and eventually went to the police station with his mother.
Klein’s mother swears that, when they arrived, the police dispatcher told her
“to proceed to 504 Benco Court with [Klein] and that an officer would meet [them] there
to retrieve the mail.” But Officer Daniels heard a different account. He called dispatcher
Kelly Wynkoop, and she told him on a recorded line that she had advised against going
to that address. She added that she thought Klein might still show up anyway. So
Officer Daniels made his way to the house.
As the dispatcher had suspected, Klein and his mother drove to 504 Benco Court.
They parked down the street, and Klein stayed in the car about 150 feet from Salatas’s
home. See Klein Dep. at 69:14–17, Dkt. No. 85-4. Klein’s mother walked up the
driveway and met Officer Daniels and Salatas’s father. Daniels then learned that Klein
was in his mother’s car. Daniels said Klein should leave. Klein’s mother initially
responded by sharing that she “had been told by the Schererville Police Department
that [Klein] was allowed to come to 504 Benco Court to meet with an officer for the sole
purpose of obtaining his mail.” But she and Klein eventually heeded Officer Daniels’s
instruction and left.
Klein returned to the police station later that day, only to be arrested by Officer
Daniels for violating the protective order. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(2). Daniels
then asked Klein why he went to 504 Benco Court. Klein responded that dispatch had
told him to go there to meet a police officer. For his part, Klein also recalls Officer
Daniels then confirming that “he knew of the communication and direction [Klein] had
received involving dispatch.” Klein Aff. ¶ 25, Dkt. No. 93-1.
Officer Daniels later summarized the basis for the arrest in a probable cause
affidavit. (That affidavit’s procedural context does not matter for this appeal.)
Daniels explained that the protective order required “the accused to … stay away from
504 Benco Ct” and restrained him “from having contact with Steven & Cheryl Salatas.”
Officer Daniels stated that Klein violated that order by “showing up in front of the
home & yelling at Steven and myself.” The affidavit never mentioned Klein’s mother
telling Daniels about the dispatcher’s permission.
Klein sued Daniels under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for what he alleged to be malicious
prosecution. Daniels moved to dismiss, and the district court denied the motion as to
this claim, construing it as a Fourth Amendment unlawful pretrial detention claim. In
time the district court entered summary judgment for Officer Daniels.
Klein now appeals.

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No. 25-1099 Page 3
II
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment without deference.
See Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1012 (7th Cir. 2006). “In order to prevail
on a claim of an arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, … plaintiffs must show
that they were arrested without probable cause ….” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d
526, 537 (7th Cir. 2009). “Probable cause is a common-sense inquiry requiring only a
probability of criminal activity; it exists whenever an officer or a court has enough
information to warrant a prudent person to believe criminal conduct has occurred.”
Young v. City of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “This is not a high
bar.” Id. (cleaned up). “Probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, but need not
be based on evidence sufficient to support a conviction, nor even a showing that the
officer’s belief is more likely true than false.” Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 556 (7th
Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). We assess probable cause objectively based on information
known to the officer. See Young, 987 F.3d at 644.
Officer Daniels had probable cause to conclude that Klein violated the protective
order. Daniels knew that the order barred Klein from being present at 504 Benco Court.
And he saw Klein near the house in a car parked at the end of the street, within
approximately 150 feet. See Klein Dep. at 69:14–17. Dispatcher Wynkoop had also told
Officer Daniels that she had recommended that Klein not go to the house because of the
protective order. These facts provided probable cause. See Hendricks v. State, 649 N.E.2d
1050, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding defendant knowingly violated a protective
order by coming within 1,000 feet of the property after being told of the order).
Klein urges a different analysis, but his arguments fall short.
First, Klein contends that Officer Daniels could not have reasonably found a
knowing or intentional violation of the protective order. He emphasizes that his mother
told Daniels that the dispatcher sent them to 504 Benco Court. We accept this fact as
true for the purposes of summary judgment. See Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770
(7th Cir. 2003). But Klein still comes up short because Officer Daniels did not have to
believe Klein’s mother’s summary. See Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 725 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“Many putative defendants protest their innocence, and it is not the responsibility of
law enforcement officials to test such claims once probable cause has been
established.”). On these facts, Officer Daniels could reasonably trust his own
dispatcher’s version of events over a contrary account from Klein’s mother.
Second, Klein insists that Officer Daniels confirmed after the arrest that “he knew
of the communication and direction [Klein] had received involving dispatch.” Klein Aff.
¶ 25. He asks us to infer that this knowledge came from the police dispatch rather than

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his mother. But we need only draw inferences in Klein’s favor if they are reasonable.
See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 427 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2005). And his
position is unreasonable given the recording of the Schererville police dispatcher telling
Officer Daniels in clear and unequivocal terms that she had just given Klein the
opposite instruction.
Third, Klein alleges that Officer Daniels violated the Fourth Amendment by
submitting a misleading probable cause affidavit. That requires identifying a false
statement or omitted information that is material. See Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d
640, 647 (7th Cir. 2019). We evaluate materiality by “eliminat[ing] the alleged false
statements, incorporat[ing] any allegedly omitted facts, and then evaluat[ing] whether
the resulting ‘hypothetical’ affidavit would establish probable cause.” Betker v. Gomez,
692 F.3d 854, 862 (7th Cir. 2012). Klein contends that the affidavit falsely reported that
he yelled at Officer Daniels and Salatas’s father. He also asserts that the affidavit
incorrectly stated that the protective order prohibited him from talking with Salatas’s
father. But omitting those facts would not alter the probable cause determination that
Klein violated the protective order by showing up at and getting too close to the house.
Klein also maintains that the affidavit should have mentioned that the police dispatch
directed him to go to 504 Benco Court, presumably because his mother told Officer
Daniels about the direction. But we have already explained that Daniels did not have to
credit Klein’s mother’s summary more than that of his own dispatcher.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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