CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION , LOCAL 1, AFT and MOSELEAN PARKER v. Educators for Excellence, Inc .

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2649
C HICAGO T EACHERS U NION , LOCAL 1, AFT and M OSELEAN
PARKER ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
EDUCATORS FOR EXCELLENCE, I NC .,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-02659 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 4, 2025 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 2025
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and K OLAR and
M ALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN , Chief Judge. The Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 prohibits a union or employer
from spending money to promote a candidate for union of-
fice. 29 U.S.C. § 481(g). The question here is whether a private
individual or union may sue to enforce that proscription.

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2 No. 24-2649
I. Statutory Structure
Union elections can be influenced by employers. An em-
ployer may spend significant sums to promote its preferred
candidate, who, if the candidate wins, could favor policies
that benefit the employer rather than union membership. So,
to “insure ‘free and democratic’” union elections, Congress
enacted the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (“LMRDA”). Chao v. Loc. 743, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 467
F.3d 1014, 1016 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wirtz v. Loc. 153, Glass
Bottle Blowers Ass’n., 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968)).
Section 481 of LMRDA regulates union elections.1 For ex-
ample, § 481(b) requires local labor organizations to elect their
officers no less than once every three years. Loc. No. 82 Furni-
ture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 529 (1984).
At issue here is § 481(g), which states: “[n]o moneys
received by any labor organization … and no moneys of an
employer shall be contributed or applied to promote the can-
didacy of any person in any election.” Section 481(g) generally
prohibits a union or employer from spending money to pro-
mote candidates for union office. Chao, 467 F.3d at 1021–22.
Section 481 is enforced through § 482. The latter section’s
structure reflects Congress’s preferred method for resolving
union disputes. An aggrieved member of a labor organization
must first exhaust the “remedies available under the constitu-
tion and bylaws” of his organization. § 482(a)(1). This first
step shows Congress’s preference for “allow[ing] unions
great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies.”
1 “Title IV (also known as subchapter V) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 481–483, is entitled ‘Elections.’” Id.

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No. 24-2649 3
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964). If the dispute re-
mains unresolved, a union member may then file a complaint
with the Secretary of Labor. § 482(a). The Secretary “shall in-
vestigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to be-
lieve that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has
not been remedied … bring a civil action against the labor or-
ganization as an entity in the district court of the United
States.” Id. at (b). The reason for this second step is “to utilize
the agencies of Government most familiar with union prob-
lems to aid in bringing about a settlement through discussion
before resort[ing] to the courts.” Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140. Im-
portantly, these are post-election (not pre-election) remedies
enacted so as “not to permit individuals to block or delay un-
ion elections by filing federal-court suits for violations of
[§ 481].” Id.
There is, however, one pre-election remedy available.
Section 481(c) instructs unions “to comply with all reasonable
requests of any candidate to distribute … campaign litera-
ture … to all members … of such labor organization.” 29
U.S.C. § 481(c); Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots v. Brown,
498 U.S. 466, 475 (1991). To enforce § 481(c), Congress permit-
ted private pre-election suits. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140 n.13.
II. Background
Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 (“the Union”) has 25,000
members that include teachers, aides, and support staff in
Chicago public schools. The Union scheduled an election for
late May 2022. One member, Moselean Parker, ran for a posi-
tion.
Educators 4 Excellence (“Educators”) is a non-profit cor-
poration whose goal is to limit the power of teacher unions.

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4 No. 24-2649
Educators sought out candidates for the election who would
attempt to limit the power of teacher unions and their ability
to collectively bargain over certain issues.
The Union sued Educators, arguing it contributed money
to recruit and promote candidates in the May 2022 election.
The Union also claimed Educators would continue to contrib-
ute money to candidates and interfere in future elections.2
The complaint alleged causes of action under § 481(g) and Il-
linois law. Educators moved to dismiss the complaint, argu-
ing in part that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
The district court agreed with Educators. After finding ju-
risdiction, the court considered whether the Union and Parker
had a right of action under § 481(g). It concluded that “no-
where in Sections 481 or 482 is there an express private cause
of action for the pre-election relief that [the plaintiffs] seek.”
And “there is nothing to suggest that Congress … created an
implied pre-election private cause of action to enforce
[§ 481(g)].” That is because § 482 is the exclusive means of en-
forcing § 481, except for § 481(c)—which has an express right
of action. The state-law claims were also dismissed because
they hinged on the dismissed federal-law claims. Plaintiffs
timely appeal. A court reviews de novo a grant of a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Proft
v. Raoul, 944 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2019). “We construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept-
ing as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all pos-
sible inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. (citation modified).
2 The Union and Parker filed an initial complaint a day before the May
2022 election. After Educators moved to dismiss, the Court granted the
Union and Parker’s motion to file an amended complaint.

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No. 24-2649 5
III. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction first. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998). The Union’s complaint submits it has
an implied right of action under § 481(g). That satisfies federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 89; McCready v. White, 417
F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 2005). Whether a plaintiff has a right of
action goes to the merits, not jurisdiction. Id. (“That [plain-
tiff’s] theory may be bad substantively does not negate that
jurisdiction.”).
A statement in International Union of Operating Engineers
Local 150 v. Ward suggests the opposite: “For purposes of ex-
ercising federal jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1331, such a
claim ‘arises under’ federal law if the law in question creates
a federal cause of action.” 563 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 2009).
Instead of following this language, however, we choose to ad-
here to Supreme Court precedent. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682 (1946) (“Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated as re-
spondents seem to contend, by the possibility that the aver-
ments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners
could actually recover.”); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 95–96; see also
McCready, 417 U.S. at 702–03 (interpreting Bell and Steel Co.).
We have jurisdiction to decide the Union’s case.
B. Implied rights of action
The Union and Parker contend § 481(g) contains an im-
plied private right of action.3 Before evaluating that argu-
ment, we tour the jurisprudence of implied rights of action.
3 Educators do not dispute that they are “employers” under § 481(g).

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6 No. 24-2649
“[P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be
created by Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286
(2001). There are two types: express and implied. E. Cent. Ill.
Pipe Trades Health & Welfare Fund v. Prather Plumbing & Heat-
ing, Inc., 3 F.4th 954, 958–59 (7th Cir. 2021). An express right
of action is stated in a statute’s text. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
By contrast, an implied right of action is judicially inferred—
courts consider whether Congress intended to provide a pri-
vate right of action in the statute. Prather Plumbing, 3 F.4th at
959. The latter is at issue here.4
The common law historically applied the equitable rule
ubi jus, ibi remedium: where there is a right, there is a remedy.
A NTONIN SCALIA & B RYAN A. GARNER , R EADING LAW: THE
I NTERPRETATION OF LEGAL T EXTS 313 (2012); Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 176–77 (2008) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (reviewing history of the Supreme Court’s
recognition of implied causes of action). Guided by this prin-
ciple, courts at times have provided a remedy when a statute
created a right. See e.g., Stearns v. Atl. & St. Lawrence R.R., 46
Me. 95, 95 (Me. 1858) (“To hold that there is no remedy would
be, in effect, a denial of the right to recover”); SCALIA &
GARNER , supra, at 313 n.2 (collecting cases). Perhaps the most
famous invocation of the principle was in Marbury v. Madison:
“every right, when withheld, must have a remedy.” 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).5
4 The Union’s brief appears not to contest the district court’s conclu-
sion that the Union lacks an express cause of action.
5 As is well known, in Marbury the Supreme Court held that Mar-
bury’s legal right to his commission did not entitle him to the remedy of
mandamus.

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No. 24-2649 7
Courts later began “assert[ing] a similar power to create
private claims to accompany statutory prohibitions.” SCALIA
& GARNER , supra, at 313. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964), the Court held that private parties may sue under
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even though
“Congress made no specific reference to a private right of ac-
tion in [§] 14(a).” Id. at 431. The Court inferred Congressional
intent from the statute’s purpose. “[I]it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose.” Id. at 433.
Cort v. Ash retreated from Borak. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Rather
than a statute’s purpose, four factors are to be weighed:
whether (1) the plaintiff belonged to the class for whose espe-
cial benefit the statute was enacted, (2) Congress intended to
create or deny such a remedy, (3) creating a right of action was
consistent with the statute’s purposes, and (4) the cause of ac-
tion is traditionally relegated to state law. Id. at 78. The Court
later applied these factors to hold that a private right of action
existed to enforce Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688–89 (1979).
The Cort factors have been sapped of their strength. In the
same year as Cannon, the Court in Touche Ross & Co. v. Red-
dington concluded that § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1934 did
not contain a private right of action. 442 U.S. 560, 567 (1979).
Acknowledging Cort’s four factors, the Court observed that
Cort “did not decide that each of these factors is entitled to
equal weight.” Id. at 575. Instead, the “central inquiry remains
whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by
implication, a private cause of action.” Id.
Alexander v. Sandoval provides the Court’s current frame-
work for implied rights of action. 532 U.S. at 275. The question

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8 No. 24-2649
there was whether private individuals could sue to enforce
disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 278. The Court held that
individuals could not. “The judicial task is to interpret the
statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays
an intent to create … a private remedy.” Id. at 286. Congres-
sional intent was revealed through the text and structure of
Title VI. Id. at 288. For example, “rights-creating” language
was “completely absent” from § 602 of Title VI. Id. And the
statute’s text spoke to the regulating agencies, not the pro-
tected individuals. Id. at 289. Further, an enforcement mecha-
nism other than a private right of action already existed, and
the “express provision of one method of enforcing a substan-
tive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”
Id. at 290.
Our court has recognized “[a] strong presumption exists
against the creation of such implied rights of action.” W. Allis
Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1988); see
also SCALIA & GARNER , supra, at 313. This court and other
courts of appeals have walked back from Cort’s four factors
by focusing on the second factor, congressional intent. Ward,
563 F.3d at 285; see, e.g., Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294,
299–300 (3d Cir. 2007); Yoshikawa v. Seguirant, 74 F.4th 1042,
1047 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc).6 Sandoval’s instruction that
courts look to Congress’s intent, therefore, governs our in-
quiry. 532 U.S. at 286.
6 See also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (“It could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v.
Ash analysis.”).

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No. 24-2649 9
C. Whether § 481(g) has an implied right of action
These principles in mind, we turn to the question here:
Can private individuals sue to enforce § 481(g)’s ban on em-
ployer expenditures promoting candidates for union office?
We hold that Congress did not intend § 481(g) to allow for
such suits.
Most revealing of Congress’s intent is that § 481(g) already
has a method of enforcement: § 482. “The express provision
of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that
Congress intended to preclude others.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at
290. This “canonical” rule means “when legislation expressly
provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not
expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other reme-
dies.” Teamsters Loc. Union No. 705 v. Burlington N. Santa Fe,
LLC, 741 F.3d 819, 824 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Pas-
senger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974)); see also Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Emps., 489 U.S. 527,
533 (1989).
That rule applies with particular force here. For 60 years,
the Supreme Court has recognized § 482 as the exclusive rem-
edy to enforce § 481 violations. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140. It is
the Secretary of Labor who brings civil actions on behalf of
aggrieved union members. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b). That exclusivity
strongly, if not dispositively, suggests that Congress inten-
tionally omitted a private right of action as an alternative way
to enforce § 481(g).
Further, as the exclusive method of enforcement, § 482
permits individuals to file complaints with the Secretary post-
election. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140. Yet the Union seeks to en-
force § 481(g) pre-election. Greenlighting pre-election suits

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10 No. 24-2649
disrupts Congress’s legislative choice “not to permit individ-
uals to block or delay union elections by filing federal-court
suits for violations of Title IV.” Id. Congress’s chosen enforce-
ment scheme is entitled to respect. Cf. Advoc. Christ Med. Ctr.
v. Kennedy, 605 U.S. 1, 20 (2025) (“We must respect the formula
that Congress prescribed.”).
Consider too that a different provision, § 481(c), has an ex-
press pre-election private right of action. Dunlop v. Bachowski,
421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975), overruled on other grounds by, Crowley,
467 U.S. at 539 (“Certain LMRDA provisions concerning pre-
election conduct … 481(c), are enforceable in suits brought by
individual union members.”); Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140 n.13. So
Congress knew how to make an express pre-election cause of
action in § 481. Cf. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571–72 (“[W]hen
Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it
knew how to do so.”). We presume therefore that Congress
intentionally omitted a pre-election private cause of action in
§ 481(g). “Atextual judicial supplementation is particularly in-
appropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows
how to adopt the omitted language.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589
U.S. 8, 14 (2019).
Concluding that § 481(g) lacks an implied right of action
puts us in good company. In McBride v. Rockefeller Family
Fund, 612 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam), the Second Cir-
cuit held that § 481(g) contains no implied right of action be-
cause Congress intended to funnel union complaints to the
Secretary of Labor with his “special knowledge and discre-
tion.” Id. at 35–36. We could not find, nor did the parties cite,
any cases concluding that § 481(g) has an implied right of ac-
tion.

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No. 24-2649 11
The Union sees things differently. To argue that § 481(g)
does include a private right of action, it relies on Crowley, 467
U.S. at 539. That case discussed Title I of LMRDA, which pro-
vides union members a “Bill of Rights” enforceable in court.
Id. at 536 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 411–15). Here, the Union first
plucks from context a statement in the opinion that Title I and
Title IV (29 U.S.C. §§ 481–483) “protect[] many of the same
rights.” Id. at 539. Second, the Union claims that in Crowley,
the Court recognized that union members should be able to
sue their union for interfering with Title I rights. Thus, the ar-
gument runs, given the “symmetry” between Title IV and Ti-
tle I, union members should be able to sue employers for § 481
(Title IV) violations. To the Union, this “parallel remedy” fur-
thers LMRDA’s purposes.
But Crowley reiterated that § 482 provides the exclusive
remedy for § 481 violations. Id. at 540–41, 550. That repeated
emphasis conveys that the Court did not believe § 481 in-
cluded another method of enforcement, like the private right
of action the Union requests here. So although Crowley did
discuss the overlap between Title I and Title IV, the case can-
not be read as expanding enforcement of § 481.7 See Driscoll v.
7 As further evidence of a pre-election implied right of action in § 481,
the Union cites a statement by Senator John F. Kennedy: “Prior to the day
of an election an individual can sue in a State. The day after an election the
Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction.” Id. at 542 n.18.
Instead, we have long disclaimed a legislator’s statements as evidence
of original meaning. “The text of the statute, and not the private intent of
the legislators, is the law. Only the text survived the complex process for
proposing, amending, adopting, and obtaining the President's signature
(or two-thirds of each house). It is easy to announce intents and hard to
enact laws.” Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Work-
ers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990).

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12 No. 24-2649
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Loc. 139, 484 F.2d 682, 685–86
(7th Cir. 1973) (“Title I allows a private suit … and Title IV
provides for complaint to and an action brought by the Secre-
tary of Labor to vindicate Driscoll's right of candidacy for un-
ion office.”).
Next, the Union believes that the explicit remedy, filing a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor, is inadequate. After a
filing, the Secretary brings “a civil action against the labor or-
ganization.” § 482(b). But here, it is the employer alleged to
have violated § 481(g)’s proscription, so it should be subject
to the Secretary’s enforcement. And even if the Secretary
could sue the employer, the available remedies cannot thwart
future violations of § 481(g). For these reasons, the Union
maintains, it makes good sense to infer a private right of ac-
tion. That way, a union and its members can preemptively
prevent employers from violating § 481(g).
Yet, it is for Congress to address the Union’s concern. “The
determination of who can seek a remedy has significant con-
sequences for the reach of federal power.” Stoneridge Inv. Part-
ners, 552 U.S. at 165. Such consequential decisions are “for
Congress, not for us.” Id. The Union’s argument sounds in
Marbury’s aspirational statement that every withheld legal
right has a legal remedy. 5 U.S. at 147. That view aligns with
the “ancien regime” of courts judicially inferring rights of ac-
tion in the 1960s and 1970s. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287; Comcast
Co. v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 334
(2020). Though that “may be a proper function for common-
law courts,” federal courts do not “raise up causes of action
where a statute has not created them” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287
(citation modified). That is true no matter how “desirable it
might be as a policy matter or how compatible with the

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No. 24-2649 13
statute.” Id. at 286–87 (citation modified). Indeed, it is not un-
common for legal wrongs to lack a remedy. See e.g., Goldey v.
Fields, 606 U.S. 942, 944 (2025) (per curiam) (No Bivens remedy
for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violation); Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (Qualified immunity “provides
ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.”). The Supreme Court
“swor[e] off the habit of venturing beyond Congress’s intent,”
and we too decline the Union’s “invitation to have one last
drink.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287.
Finally, the Union points to Ward. There, this court in-
ferred a right of action in § 501 of LMRDA. 563 F.3d at 277.
The court began with the statute’s text. Id. at 285. Section 501
“articulates a series of specific fiduciary duties,” including
that a union officer must hold the union’s money and prop-
erty for the benefit of membership. Id. These “explicit, affirm-
ative fiduciary obligations” conferred federal rights because
“[a] statute that imposes fiduciary duties necessarily implies
corresponding rights in the beneficiaries.” Id.
An accompanying right of action could also be implied by
§ 501’s text. The statutory duty to “‘account to the organiza-
tion for any profit received’ fairly implies that the union has a
specific remedy.” Id. at 287. And § 501 voids any “exculpatory
provision in the union’s organizational documents or resolu-
tions that purports to relieve any union officer of liability for
breach of the duties declared in the statute.” Id. (citation mod-
ified). An exculpatory clause exists as a defense for a union
officer sued by a union for a § 501 violation; “nullif[ying]” that
defense suggests the union can sue in the first place. Id. (“[it]
follows that the union must have a statutory remedy for

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14 No. 24-2649
liability for breach against which this sort of defense might
potentially be asserted”).
Ward’s holding was thus based on the specific language of
§ 501. But no similar language appears in § 481. No provision
voids any exculpatory clause. Nor is there language like “ac-
count to the organization for any profit received” that was
critical to Ward’s holding. Id. at 286. And § 481(g) does not
create a set of “explicit, affirmative fiduciary obligations.” Ra-
ther, the provision forbids unions and employers from spend-
ing money to promote their preferred candidate. Chao, 467
F.3d at 1021–22. We agree with the district court that Ward is
distinguishable.8
IV. Conclusion
The Union and Parker ask this court to infer a private right
of action in § 481(g). But § 482 is the exclusive method of en-
forcement for § 481. We therefore conclude that Congress did
not intend private individuals to have a second path to en-
force § 481. That § 481(c) has an express right of action but-
tresses this conclusion. If Congress wanted to include a right
of action in § 481(g), it knew how to craft one. The district
court is A FFIRMED.
8 The district court also properly dismissed the state-law claims of the
Union and Parker, which largely hinge on their federal-law claims. Fur-
ther, the authority they cite, Van Daele v. Vinci, 282 N.E.2d 728 (Ill. 1972),
is distinguishable as a due process case.

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No. 24-2649 15
MALDONADO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
The majority opinion reaches the correct result in finding that
there is no implied right of action under § 481(g). But on its
way, the majority opinion unnecessarily dates the doctrine of
implying a private right of action firmly in the past. Op. at 12–
13. I have reservations with that gloss such that I cannot join
the opinion in full. While no longer en vogue, the doctrine of
implied rights of action remains alive and has been employed
by this circuit and the Supreme Court in more recent years,
including in the primary case relied on by CTU, Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 286–89 (7th Cir. 2009).
See also Ind. Prot. and Advoc. Servs. v. Ind. Fam. and Soc. Servs.
Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 375–81 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(interpreting the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals
with Mental Illness Act “based on its language, structure, and
purpose” to imply a private right of action); Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005) (extending
implied private right of action to retaliation claims under Title
IX). Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the judgment.

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