United States of America v. Jackie Edwards

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v.
JACKIE EDWARDS ,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 17 CR 757 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 23, 2023 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 17, 2025
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and S YKES and PRYOR ,
Circuit Judges.
S YKES , Circuit Judge. Jackie Edwards came to the attention
of federal law enforcement when a Title III wiretap of an
associate’s phone produced evidence of drug-trafficking
activity at his home outside Chicago. Agents with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) obtained authoriza-

-- 1 of 22 --

2 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
tion to expand the wiretap to include Edwards’s phone. In
addition to information about drug transactions, his phone
calls showed that he was worried about being set up for a
robbery and that he kept a pistol.
Edwards was forbidden to possess firearms based on his
criminal history, which includes two federal felony drug
convictions and an Illinois conviction for voluntary man-
slaughter. When he left his home the day after the conversa-
tion about the pistol, the agents followed him.
Surveillance continued to a location on the south side of
Chicago where Edwards made five consecutive right turns
in rapid succession—a telltale countersurveillance technique.
The agents initiated a stop to investigate, pulling in behind
Edwards and approaching his vehicle with firearms drawn.
One carried an AR-15; the other three drew their sidearms.
They told Edwards to show his hands and exit the vehicle.
He did not comply; instead he leaned on the horn and
reached toward the center console. The officers removed him
from the car, but he resisted a frisk. They took him to the
ground, handcuffed him, and returned him to his feet. He
continued to resist, rotating his body as if to hide something
on his right side. An officer eventually stabilized Edwards
and recovered a handgun from his right coat pocket.
Edwards was charged with possessing a firearm as a
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to
suppress the gun, arguing that the officers’ show and use of
force converted the encounter into an arrest without
probable cause. The district judge disagreed and denied the
motion. A jury found him guilty, and the judge denied his
posttrial motions for acquittal or a new trial.

-- 2 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 3
On appeal Edwards takes a kitchen-sink approach, chal-
lenging everything from the denial of his suppression mo-
tion to the sufficiency of the trial evidence to several of the
judge’s trial rulings that formed the basis of the failed
posttrial motions. His arguments are uniformly meritless.
The government cross-appealed, arguing that the judge
incorrectly concluded that Edwards’s conviction for volun-
tary manslaughter is not a qualifying predicate for an en-
hanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”). The government’s point is well taken. In United
States v. Teague, 884 F.3d 726, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2018), we held
that the current version of this Illinois crime—now called
second-degree murder—qualifies as a “crime of violence”
under the ACCA’s parallel provision in the Sentencing
Guidelines. Edwards was convicted under the predecessor
statute, but there is no material difference in the language of
the old and new versions. We therefore affirm Edwards’s
conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentenc-
ing.
I. Background
Edwards surfaced on the DEA’s radar based on infor-
mation obtained from intercepted phone calls in a Title III
wiretap investigation of a St. Louis heroin dealer. After
checking Edwards’s criminal history, which includes two
federal felony drug-dealing offenses and a 1982 Illinois
conviction for voluntary manslaughter, agents obtained
authorization to tap his phone.
Task Force Officer Patrick Budds and other DEA agents
monitored Edwards’s calls for 12 days, intercepting
conversations in which he used coded language to discuss

-- 3 of 22 --

4 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
purchases of marijuana in distribution quantities. The details
are largely unimportant—this is a firearm-possession case,
not a drug-trafficking case. As relevant here, Officer Budds
learned the following from the intercepted phone calls: (1) a
man named Thayer Daineh was supplying Edwards with
quantities of marijuana at Edwards’s home in Richton Park
just outside Chicago; (2) Edwards worried that he was being
targeted for a robbery; and (3) he sought help from his
Chicago-based associates in identifying the robber.
Things came to a head when Edwards was overheard
planning a trip into the city and discussed the need to “get”
the would-be robber. It was in this context that he men-
tioned his gun, saying: “Nothin’ I needed I wasn’t takin’ to
no police station with me shit, my pistol there[,] my mother-
fuckin’ everything there.” In another phone call that same
day, Edwards and Daineh made plans for the latter to come
to Edwards’s home the next morning to pick up payment for
an earlier drug sale.
Budds relayed this information to Chicago-based DEA
Agent Jola Lech and Task Force Officer Doug Savarino. He
directed Savarino to establish surveillance of Edwards’s
home to watch for Daineh’s arrival. The next morning
Savarino cautioned the surveillance team, which included
Agent Lech and Officer Keith Billiot, that Edwards was
heard “bragging about having a firearm” and that he “has a
conviction for homicide” in addition to his narcotics-related
convictions. After establishing a surveillance perimeter
outside Edwards’s house, Officer Savarino again warned the
other officers that Edwards kept a gun.
Daineh arrived at Edwards’s home as expected. The
agents watched him enter the house with a brown bag and

-- 4 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 5
emerge a few minutes later with the brown bag and a white
plastic bag. Some members of the surveillance team then
followed Daineh. They were joined by officers from the
Illinois State Police, who stopped Daineh on the interstate
and seized about $30,000 in cash from his car.
Based on the evidence seized from Daineh and gathered
from the wiretap and in-person surveillance, Officer Budds
directed Savarino to apply for a search warrant for
Edwards’s house. Meanwhile, Budds—still monitoring the
wiretap—overheard Edwards indicate that he was leaving
his house for Chicago. Officer Budds conveyed this
information to Agent Lech, who in turn notified Officer
Billiot. Based on Officer Savarino’s prior communications,
Billiot expected that Edwards would likely be armed and
shared this concern with the team.
When Edwards left his house, four officers—Billiot,
Agent Ramon Santiago, and Task Force Officers Cortland
Campbell and Joe Ryczek—followed him in two unmarked
vehicles. Edwards was driving a white SUV with tinted
windows. The officers followed him for about half an hour
as he drove 26 miles from his home in Richton Park to the
intersection of West 69th Street and South Racine Avenue on
the south side of Chicago. Edwards then made five consecu-
tive right turns around the block, a countersurveillance
maneuver known to law enforcement as “squaring the
block.”
After the last of the right turns, Edwards pulled over to
the curb near the corner of 69th Street and Racine Avenue,
where he had a laundromat business. Officer Billiot pulled in
behind him and activated his emergency lights to initiate an
investigative stop. The stop was captured on video, which

-- 5 of 22 --

6 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
was admitted and played at trial. The following account is
drawn from the video evidence and the officers’ testimony at
the suppression hearing and trial.
Wearing a DEA vest and carrying an AR-15 rifle, Officer
Billiot approached the driver’s side of Edwards’s SUV. He
identified himself and ordered Edwards to put his hands out
of the window, which at that point was about halfway open.
Edwards initially complied but then reached toward the
center console of the vehicle. Officer Billiot told Edwards to
get out of the car; he did not comply. Instead he leaned on
the car horn. The other three officers approached the vehicle
with their sidearms drawn but pointed at the ground.
Edwards then began to close his window. Officer Billiot
responded by attempting to strike the window with the
muzzle of his rifle. He missed; the muzzle went through the
open window, nearly striking Edwards in the head. About
ten seconds later Edwards unlocked his door, and the offic-
ers pulled him out of the car.
The officers attempted to frisk Edwards for weapons, but
he resisted, shifting positions to evade the search. Specifical-
ly, he spun his body away from the officers in an apparent
attempt to hide his right-side coat pocket. When he contin-
ued to resist the frisk, the officers took him to the ground,
placed him in handcuffs, and returned him to a standing
position. He continued to resist the search, rotating his body
so that his right side was up against the car, a technique that
Officer Campbell described as “blading”—an apparent effort
to avoid the discovery of something hidden on that side. As
Edwards continued to move about, Officer Campbell felt a
hard object on Edwards’s right side. After stabilizing the
situation, Campbell recovered a handgun from Edwards’s

-- 6 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 7
right coat pocket. The entire encounter—from the moment
Edwards pulled to the curb to the recovery of the gun—took
less than six minutes.
A grand jury indicted Edwards for unlawfully possessing
a firearm as a felon in violation of § 922(g)(1). Edwards
moved to suppress the gun. He argued that the agents
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him and that
their show and use of force at the scene converted the en-
counter into an arrest without probable cause. The district
judge initially denied the motion on the papers but later
granted Edwards’s request for reconsideration and sched-
uled a hearing to take evidence.
After a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the judge again de-
nied the motion. She held that the encounter remained an
investigative stop, not an arrest, and that the officers reason-
ably suspected that Edwards was unlawfully carrying a
firearm. Among other things, the judge pointed to the
following evidence as justification for the investigative stop
and frisk: (1) the intercepted phone calls indicating that
Edwards was engaged in drug trafficking; (2) Daineh’s
collection of payment at Edwards’s home that morning and
the recovery of a large amount of cash from him when he
was stopped soon after leaving the home; (3) the intercepted
phone calls from the previous day indicating that Edwards
was worried about a robbery, planned to travel to Chicago,
and intended to carry his pistol; and (4) Edwards’s felony
record, including his convictions for narcotics trafficking.
The judge also explained that the officers’ show and use of
force did not convert the stop into an arrest but instead was
a reasonable response based on the information known to
them and Edwards’s behavior at the scene.

-- 7 of 22 --

8 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
Though the case against Edwards was quite straightfor-
ward, the trial was characterized by evidentiary skirmishes
stemming from his effort to mount a defense that the officers
had planted the gun on him, and relatedly, his attempt to
paint the officers’ use of force as excessive. The “plant”
defense was at best implausible; the excessive-force argu-
ment was simply irrelevant. As is often the case, the judge
was called on to manage the trial in a fluctuating environ-
ment as the defense evolved and the government responded
to shifts in defense strategy and emphasis. Based on the
patchwork of arguments Edwards raises on appeal, some
detail about the trial is necessary.
As relevant here, the evidentiary disputes centered on
the extent to which the government could elicit testimony
from its witnesses regarding the background wiretap inves-
tigation. Before the trial started, the parties agreed in princi-
ple that the government would not introduce evidence
relating to the drug/Title III investigation. But the prosecu-
tion expected the defense to argue that the officers had no
reason to stop Edwards and that he was randomly—and
improperly—targeted for a stop. Accordingly, the govern-
ment sought to preserve its option to elicit limited testimony
about the investigation as background for the stop and
recovery of the gun. Edwards objected. The judge sided with
the defense, excluding any testimony about the investiga-
tion.
The first challenge to the scope of that ruling came late
on the first day of trial. During the government’s opening
statement, the prosecutor began his description of the case in
a routine way, telling the jurors that they would hear testi-
mony that “four agents and officers of the Drug Enforcement

-- 8 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 9
Administration” were on duty and following Edwards’s
SUV at 69th Street and Racine Avenue on the date in ques-
tion. The defense objected to the reference to the DEA. The
judge overruled the objection but at sidebar told the prose-
cutor to avoid the terms “Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion” and “DEA” until further notice. The defense attorney’s
opening statement emphasized the officers’ use of force
during the stop and signaled the defense theory that they
planted the gun on Edwards.
The next day, before the jury returned to the courtroom,
defense counsel moved for a mistrial and dismissal of the
indictment with prejudice, accusing the prosecutor of mis-
conduct for referring to the DEA in his opening statement.
The judge denied the motion but instructed the government
to use the term “federal agents” instead of “DEA agents,”
unless the defense opened the door to specifically identify-
ing the law-enforcement agency involved in the case.
The prosecutor then raised a counterpoint about the de-
fense attorney’s opening statement, arguing that her empha-
sis on the officers’ use of force was irrelevant and would
leave a misleading impression about the agents’ conduct
unless the jurors could hear limited testimony about the
investigation as background—particularly the lawfully
intercepted phone call in which Edwards discussed carrying
his pistol. The judge responded that both sides’ opening
statements were “problematic” and said she was considering
striking them. Neither attorney objected. When the jurors
returned to the courtroom, the judge reminded them that
“opening statements are not evidence.” She then went a step
further, saying: “[I]n fact, don’t give them any consideration
at all. We’re going to just start with the evidence today. Do

-- 9 of 22 --

10 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
not focus on what you heard yesterday.” Again, neither side
objected.
The issue arose again during the defense attorney’s cross-
examination of Officer Campbell, who had found the gun in
Edwards’s pocket. After a lengthy cross-examination
attempting to lay a foundation for an argument that the
officers had no reason to believe that Edwards was carrying
a gun—setting up the defense theory that they planted the
gun in his pocket—the prosecutor objected. He argued that
the defense was using the shield of the judge’s pretrial ruling
as a sword, creating the misleading impression that the
officers had randomly targeted Edwards, lacked any basis to
suspect him of carrying a gun, and used excessive force. The
prosecutor asked the judge to reconsider her pretrial ruling,
arguing that counsel’s cross-examination of Officer
Campbell had opened the door to the admission of at least
some evidence about the background investigation.
The judge agreed with the prosecutor, but the extent of
the latitude she granted the government remained unclear as
testimony resumed. After some additional twists and turns
in the evidence, she paused to review the transcript of the
phone call in which Edwards had discussed his pistol. She
eventually settled on a very narrow modification of her
pretrial order that heavily favored the defense. She main-
tained her previous order excluding evidence regarding the
investigation, including the “pistol” phone call. But she
permitted the government to call Agent Lech to testify that
(1) she was the supervising case agent and in that capacity
was the clearinghouse for information in the case; and
(2) prior to the stop, she advised the surveillance team that
Edwards might have a gun.

-- 10 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 11
In closing argument Edwards’s counsel stuck to the orig-
inal defense theory, arguing that he “never possessed” the
gun and that the officers must have planted it on him. The
jury rejected this theory and found him guilty. After an
extended interruption because of the pandemic, the case
proceeded to posttrial motions. Edwards moved for judg-
ment of acquittal and, alternatively, a new trial under
Rules 29 and 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The latter motion focused on the evidentiary disputes we’ve
just described and raised what the judge characterized as a
“litany of purported judicial errors.” The judge denied both
motions.
At sentencing the parties disagreed over whether
Edwards was subject to enhanced penalties under the
ACCA, which imposes a 15-year minimum sentence for a
§ 922(g)(1) violation if the offender has three prior convic-
tions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). As we’ve noted, Edwards’s criminal
history includes two federal drug-trafficking convictions and
a 1982 Illinois conviction for voluntary manslaughter. The
federal drug convictions unquestionably qualify as serious
drug offenses, as the probation officer concluded in the
presentence report (and everyone agreed). But the probation
officer concluded that the Illinois voluntary-manslaughter
conviction is not properly classified as a “violent felony”
under § 924(e)(2)(B) and thus recommended against an
ACCA-enhanced sentence.
The government challenged the latter conclusion, argu-
ing that the Illinois crime of voluntary manslaughter is a
qualifying ACCA predicate. For support the government
relied on our decision in Teague, which held that the current

-- 11 of 22 --

12 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
version of the offense—now called second-degree murder—
is a qualifying “crime of violence” under the provision in the
Sentencing Guidelines that mirrors the ACCA. 884 F.3d at
729. The judge rejected this argument, accepted the proba-
tion officer’s recommendation, and imposed an unenhanced
sentence of 60 months in prison.
II. Discussion
A. Suppression Motion
Edwards first challenges the judge’s denial of his sup-
pression motion, arguing that the agents’ conduct during the
investigative stop converted the encounter into a de facto
arrest unsupported by probable cause. Alternatively, he
argues that even if the encounter remained an investigative
detention, the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to stop
and frisk him.
The second argument is borderline frivolous. The Fourth
Amendment secures the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. C ONST. amend. IV. The Amend-
ment generally requires probable cause to support a seizure,
but the Terry investigative stop is a prominent exception to
the probable-cause rule. United States v. Eymann, 962 F.3d
273, 282 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)). The Supreme Court’s decision in Terry authorizes
police officers to briefly detain a person for investigative
purposes “based on the less exacting standard of reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Id. (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 21–22).
“Reasonable suspicion” is not a high bar. To comply with
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement as
construed in Terry, officers must have “specific and

-- 12 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 13
articulable facts” that when “taken together with rational
inferences from those facts” warrant a brief intrusion on
personal liberty for investigation purposes. Terry, 392 U.S. at
21. The standard is objective: it considers the totality of the
circumstances and “requires more than a hunch but less than
probable cause and considerably less than preponderance of
the evidence.” United States v. Reedy, 989 F.3d 548, 552 (7th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 845 (7th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). At bottom,
reasonable-suspicion determinations are “based on
commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
The information known to the agents easily satisfies this
standard. We note first that under the collective-knowledge
doctrine, the officers who followed and detained Edwards
could conduct the stop even though they did not have
firsthand knowledge of all the facts contributing to reasona-
ble suspicion. Eymann, 962 F.3d at 284. When law-
enforcement officers or agencies “are cooperating in an
investigation, … the knowledge of one is presumed shared
by all.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 n.5
(1983)). So the agents who conducted the stop could rely on
information provided by other officers involved in the
investigation. United States v. Kahn, 937 F.3d 1042, 1052–53
(7th Cir. 2019).
That information was plentiful and came largely from
Edwards’s intercepted phone calls, which established that he
(1) was engaged in drug trafficking; (2) expressed concern
about being targeted for a robbery; (3) solicited help from
Chicago-based associates in identifying the would-be robber;
and (4) wanted to “get” the robber. Against this backdrop,

-- 13 of 22 --

14 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
Edwards’s calls also established that he planned to travel to
Chicago and likely would be carrying his pistol when he did
so. The agents also knew that Edwards was a twice-
convicted drug trafficker with a manslaughter conviction
and that one of his suppliers had collected a $30,000 drug
payment from him that morning. Finally, the agents person-
ally observed Edwards carry out a maneuver known to them
as “squaring the block,” a countersurveillance measure. This
information, together with rational inferences drawn from it,
gave them ample reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry
stop.
That brings us to Edwards’s claim that the officers’ con-
duct during the stop—primarily their display and use of
force—converted the encounter into a de facto arrest. It did
not. Edwards’s argument to the contrary is meritless.
The line between a de facto arrest and a Terry stop can be
subtle. Whether it has been crossed depends on the context
and the circumstances confronting the officers. To general-
ize: “A Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion can ripen
into a de facto arrest that must be based on probable cause if
it continues too long or becomes unreasonably intrusive.”
United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011).
However, because “Terry stops often place law enforcement
at great risk of physical danger,” it is well established that an
officer’s display or use of force will not automatically trans-
form an investigative stop into an arrest. United States v.
Olson, 41 F. 4th 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2022).
Once again, the inquiry considers the totality of circum-
stances and the justification for the officers’ conduct.
“[W]hen officer safety is in question or a weapon may be
present,” officers may draw their weapons and use a degree

-- 14 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 15
of force—including handcuffing the suspect—without
converting a Terry stop into a de facto arrest. Id.
Finally, “there is no litmus-paper test for determining
when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop
and becomes an arrest.” Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1016 (quotation
marks omitted). The inquiry turns on “whether the sur-
rounding circumstances would support an officer’s legiti-
mate fear for personal safety.” Olson, 41 F.4th at 799
(quotation marks omitted).
Applying these general principles here, the agents had
good reason to suspect that Edwards might be armed and
dangerous, and their use of force was a reasonable response
to the circumstances they faced. We do not need to repeat
the information known to them and the steps they took to
respond to Edwards’s resistance. It’s enough to note that they
were confronting a twice-convicted drug trafficker who—by
his own words captured on the wiretap—was likely carrying
a handgun and who, once stopped, resisted commands to
show his hands and get out of his car and physically thwart-
ed their efforts to frisk him for weapons.
We have long recognized that drug crimes often involve
guns. United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 507 (7th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that there is “inherent danger” in stopping
people “suspected of drug trafficking, for which guns are
known tools of the trade”); see also Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1016
(holding that it was reasonable for officers to handcuff the
suspect “[g]iven that officers were conducting a search for
drugs” and “[d]rug crimes are associated with dangerous
and violent behavior and warrant a higher degree of
precaution”). Here the agents had much more than just an
inference about the connection between drug crimes and

-- 15 of 22 --

16 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
guns. Edwards was heard on the wiretap talking about
locating the would-be robber and carrying his pistol with
him when he went into the city. Based on this background
and Edwards’s resistance at the scene, the agents’ use of
force was reasonably calibrated to the escalating risk they
faced and did not convert the stop into an arrest.
Finally, the duration of the stop did not cross the line into
an arrest. There is no “bright-line time limit” on Terry stops:
officers may reasonably “graduate their responses to the
demands of any particular situation.” Reedy, 989 F.3d at 553
(quotation marks omitted). Relevant considerations include
the law-enforcement purposes for the stop, the time reason-
ably needed to accomplish those purposes, and the officers’
diligence in pursuing the investigation. Bullock, 632 F.3d at
1015.
Here just six minutes elapsed between the agents pulling
in behind Edwards’s SUV and Officer Campbell recovering
the gun from his pocket. By any measure, that is well within
the scope of a reasonable Terry stop, whatever its purpose.
Even if a six-minute Terry stop could be characterized as
excessive (it cannot be), Edwards has only himself to blame
for any extra time it took the officers to gain control of the
situation. It was his own conduct, not the agents’ actions,
that increased the time needed to secure the scene for a Terry
investigation. In short, the stop was not transformed into a
de facto arrest. The judge properly denied the suppression
motion.
B. Rule 29 Motion; Sufficiency of the Evidence
Edwards next challenges the denial of his Rule 29 motion
for judgment of acquittal. He insists that the evidence was

-- 16 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 17
insufficient to convict him. This claim faces “a nearly insur-
mountable hurdle”: we “defer heavily to the jury’s findings,”
view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the gov-
ernment,” and “will reverse only where no rational trier of
fact could have found the defendant guilty.” United States v.
Armbruster, 48 F.4th 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks
omitted). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor
second-guess the jury’s credibility determinations. United
States v. LeBeau, 949 F.3d 334, 346 (7th Cir. 2020).
Edwards argues, in essence, that no evidence supports
the jury’s verdict that he possessed the gun recovered from
his pocket—or put slightly differently, that it was irrational
for the jury to reject his theory that the officers planted the
gun on him. This argument is frivolous. The jurors watched
the video of the encounter and heard testimony from several
agents and officers who participated in the stop and frisk, all
of which gave them an ample basis to reject the “plant”
defense, credit the government’s case, and return a guilty
verdict. The verdict has abundant evidentiary support.
C. Rule 33 Motion for a New Trial
Edwards also argues that the judge wrongly denied his
Rule 33 motion for a new trial. As relevant here, the motion
challenged the judge’s decision to strike the defense attor-
ney’s opening statement and several of her rulings concern-
ing the government’s requests to elicit limited testimony
about the underlying drug investigation.
Rule 33 permits the district court to vacate a judgment
and grant a new trial in a criminal case “if the interest of
justice so requires.” We review Rule 33 rulings for abuse of

-- 17 of 22 --

18 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
discretion. United States v. Hamdan, 910 F.3d 351, 357 (7th Cir.
2018). In this context, appellate review is “highly deferential,
recognizing that the exercise of power conferred by Rule 33
is reserved for only the most extreme cases.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391, 399 (7th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts have ordered
new trials under Rule 33 “in a variety of situations in which
the substantial rights of the defendant have been jeopardized
by errors or omissions during trial.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted).
As explained in our account of the trial, the rulings
Edwards challenges were actually quite favorable to the
defense. Before trial, the judge broadly excluded evidence of
the underlying drug/Title III investigation. Then, responding
to the skirmish over the opening statements—including the
prosecutor’s reference to the DEA—the judge struck both
opening statements and directed the prosecutor to use the
term “federal agents” and not refer to the DEA. Later, the
judge concluded that the defense had opened the door to at
least some background testimony about the underlying
investigation. Even so, she stuck to her original ruling
excluding evidence of the underlying drug investigation and
permitted only tightly circumscribed testimony from Agent
Lech—namely, that she was the case supervisor and had
advised the surveillance officers that Edwards might have a
gun.
These rulings were, if anything, noticeably protective of
the defense. The judge was on solid ground in denying the
Rule 33 motion for a new trial.

-- 18 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 19
D. Sentencing
The government’s cross-appeal concerns the judge’s deci-
sion not to sentence Edwards pursuant to the Armed Career
Criminal Act’s system of enhanced penalties. Under the
ACCA, offenders with three prior convictions for a “violent
felony” or a “serious drug offense” are subject to enhanced
penalties for § 922(g)(1) violations. § 924(e). Edwards has
two federal drug-trafficking convictions, which everyone
agrees are ACCA predicates. The government argued at
sentencing that his 1982 Illinois conviction for voluntary
manslaughter is a “violent felony,” qualifying as the third
predicate for an ACCA-enhanced sentence. With support
from the probation officer, Edwards disagreed. The judge
sided with him and declined to impose an enhanced sen-
tence under the ACCA. The government challenges that
conclusion.
We review de novo whether an offense qualifies as a
crime of violence under the ACCA. United States v. Hampton,
585 F.3d 1033, 1042 (7th Cir. 2009). As relevant here, the
ACCA defines the term “violent felony” as “any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year … that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of anoth-
er.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
Classifying crimes under the ACCA’s so-called “elements
clause” requires a categorical approach, which means that
we look only to the statutory text of the crime of conviction
to determine whether its elements meet the federal standard.
Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 424 (2021). In Borden the
Supreme Court held that the elements clause in the ACCA’s
violent-felony definition does not include offenses criminal-

-- 19 of 22 --

20 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
izing reckless conduct (or by necessary implication, negli-
gence). Id. at 429.
The statute under which Edwards was convicted in 1982
provided as follows:
A person who kills an individual without law-
ful justification commits voluntary manslaugh-
ter if at the time of the killing he is acting
under a sudden and intense passion resulting
from serious provocation by: (1) The individual
killed, or (2) Another whom the offender en-
deavors to kill, but he negligently or acci-
dentally causes the death of the individual
killed.
38 I LL. C OMP. S TAT. 9–2 (1961). The statute has since been
renumbered, and the crime previously known as “voluntary
manslaughter” is now called “second-degree murder,” but
the definitional language remains unchanged.
In Teague we addressed the current version of the statute
to determine whether it qualifies as a “crime of violence”
under the ACCA’s parallel provision in the Sentencing
Guidelines, which contains the same “elements clause” as
the violent-felony definition in the ACCA. 884 F.3d at 728–
29. The district court in Teague had “focused on the language
‘negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individu-
al killed,’” which led the court “to conclude that the offense
did not include as an element the intentional or knowing use
of force.” Id. at 729.
We reversed, noting that the statute codifies the principle
of transferred intent. Citing the Illinois Appellate Court’s
decision in People v. Thompson, 730 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ill. App.

-- 20 of 22 --

No. 21-3114 & 21-3094 21
Ct. 2000), we explained that the statutory language “only
refers to situations in which a person has the intent to kill
one person but his actions result in the death of another.”
Teague, 884 F.3d at 729.
In other words, the statute applies when a person intends
to kill one person “but kills an unintended victim.” Id.
(quoting Thompson, 730 N.E.2d at 123). The offense thus
remains an intentional crime even though the actual victim
was an unintended target. Id. We held that “[b]ecause an
offender cannot be convicted of second degree murder
without the government proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the offender acted with the intent or knowledge that
[his] actions would cause the death of another, the offense is
a crime of violence under the elements clause” in the Guide-
lines. Id.
The same conclusion applies to the predecessor statute
under which Edwards was convicted, which as we’ve noted
contains the same language in all material respects. Con-
temporaneous Illinois caselaw confirms this conclusion. See,
e.g., People v. Leonard, 415 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ill. 1980) (“The
offense of voluntary manslaughter has commonly been
described as ‘[a]n intentional homicide’” with mitigating
factors.); People v. Moore, 513 N.E.2d 87, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(“Voluntary manslaughter is not … an unintentional
crime. … [It] is unlike involuntary manslaughter, for exam-
ple, in that it does involve an actual intent to kill.” (emphasis
removed)).

-- 21 of 22 --

22 Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094
Our conclusion should not come as a surprise.1 In Teague
we traced the history of this Illinois crime, explaining that
“[i]n 1986 Illinois restructured its criminal code and the
offense of ‘voluntary manslaughter’ was renamed ‘second
degree murder.’” 884 F.3d at 729. We noted that although the
language was “modified somewhat[,] … the core offense
remained the same—murder plus mitigation.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, Edwards’s 1982 conviction for
voluntary manslaughter is an ACCA predicate. The judge
wrongly concluded otherwise.
For these reasons, we A FFIRM the § 922(g)(1) conviction
but VACATE the sentence and R EMAND for resentencing.
1 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held that “second-degree murder
in New York … is a crime of violence” under a similar provision of the
ACCA. Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423, 433 (2025).

-- 22 of 22 --