United States of America v. Farhan Sheikh

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1011
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FARHAN SHEIKH ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 19 CR 655 — Mary M. Rowland, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 5, 2025 — D ECIDED J ANUARY 13, 2026
____________________
Before R IPPLE , KIRSCH , and LEE , Circuit Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Farhan Sheikh of
threatening to kill doctors, patients, and visitors at a Chicago
abortion clinic in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). On appeal,
Sheikh challenges his conviction by arguing that § 875(c) is
unconstitutional, the grand jury that indicted him wasn’t ad-
equately informed about the law, and that improper evidence
was admitted at trial. Because these arguments fail to per-
suade, we affirm.

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2 No. 25-1011
I
In August 2019, Farhan Sheikh was a college student with
a part-time job and was a regular user of the social media app
iFunny. iFunny users frequently shared humorous content on
the platform, some of which involved dark humor that made
light of serious subjects. Sheikh typically posted non-humor-
ous content on iFunny, including soccer photographs and
videos, and his account was public, meaning that anyone
could view it. On August 13, he posted the following:
I am done with my state and thier bullshit abor-
tion laws and allowing innocrnt kids to be
slaughtered for the so called “womans right”
bullshit. Ive seen nothing but whores go out of
the way to get an abortion, but no more. I will
not tolerate this anymore. Im DONE. On Au-
gust 23rd 2019, I will go to the WOMANS AID
CENTER in Chicago on peterson. I will proceed
to slaughter and murder any doctor, patient, or
visitor i see in the area and I will not back down.
consider this a warning for anyone visiting…
The Women’s Aid Center is a real clinic in Chicago that pro-
vides abortions and other services. Sheikh later commented
on the same post that, “This is not a joke…” and wrote sepa-
rately, “To all the fbi agents in this app, I am NOT a satirical
account. I post what I mean and i WILL carry out what I post.”
He also wrote, “August 23 2019 Womans aid center on Peter-
son if you know, you know…” and, “If killing babies is a right
and practicing your freedom of speech isnt, then what kinda
society is this? I do not care anymore, may god forgive me for
what I am going to do soon…[.]” In private messages, Sheikh
discussed how to access the clinic and wrote that, “I can make

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No. 25-1011 3
it in, it’s fine if I can’t make it out.” He told another user, “I
might be going to jail” and, “I will not back down.”
An iFunny user reported Sheikh’s posts to the FBI. The FBI
investigated and learned that Sheikh had saved a screenshot
of a Google search result of the Women’s Aid Center in Chi-
cago. Law enforcement officers quickly warned the clinic
about the threat, and the clinic canceled its appointments for
the day. An employee who heard about Sheikh’s posts left
work and took the next several days off. The clinic decided to
improve its security, installing additional cameras and a panic
button.
Officers arrested Sheikh, and a grand jury indicted him
with transmitting a threat through interstate communications
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Sheikh then moved to dis-
miss the indictment, arguing that § 875(c) was facially uncon-
stitutional and (relatedly) that the government failed to
properly instruct the grand jury. The district court denied that
motion and held a trial.
Among other evidence, the government introduced the
testimony of two clinic employees and images of security im-
provements the clinic made in response to Sheikh’s posts. The
employees testified about the clinic’s services and location,
their reactions to learning about the threat, and the steps the
clinic took to enhance security. Sheikh took the stand and tes-
tified that he never intended or prepared to carry out an at-
tack but had instead posted about the clinic to gain popularity
in the iFunny community. After the jury convicted him,
Sheikh moved for a new trial, but the district court denied that
motion, too. This appeal followed.

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4 No. 25-1011
II
A
Sheikh argues that the district court should have granted
his motion to dismiss the indictment because § 875(c) conflicts
with the First Amendment. Specifically, Sheikh argues that
§ 875(c) is unconstitutional on its face because it fails to re-
quire (1) that only a true threat be punishable, and (2) that a
punishable threat must be made with some level of subjective
intent. We review the constitutionality of a federal statute de
novo. United States v. Rush, 130 F.4th 633, 635 (7th Cir. 2025).
Section 875(c) says that:
Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign com-
merce any communication containing any
threat to kidnap any person or any threat to in-
jure the person of another, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Sheikh is right that the statute doesn’t ex-
plicitly require that punishable speech be a true threat, mean-
ing “a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of un-
lawful violence to a particular individual or group of individ-
uals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). The statute
also lacks an express requirement that punishable speech be
made with criminal intent.
The absence of these express requirements doesn’t matter.
That’s because § 875(c) can and must be interpreted to implic-
itly include these requirements. See United States v. Hansen,
599 U.S. 762, 781 (2023) (“When legislation and the Constitu-
tion brush up against each other, [a court’s] task is to seek har-
mony” between the two.). In United States v. Stewart, we held

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No. 25-1011 5
that § 875(c) criminalizes only true threats and not constitu-
tionally protected speech. 411 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (cit-
ing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)); see also
United States v. Khan, 937 F.3d 1042, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019). And
Sheikh’s objection about a mens rea requirement similarly
fails because the “mere omission from a criminal enactment
of any mention of criminal intent should not be read as dis-
pensing with it.” Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 734
(2015) (citation modified). Instead, courts must generally in-
terpret “criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scien-
ter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not
contain them.” Id. (citation modified).
We apply that approach to mens rea in § 875(c). Id. at 737–
42. More specifically, § 875(c) punishes threats that are made
at least recklessly. See Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 73–
82 (2023) (considering a state-law prohibition on true threats
and holding that in such cases a mens rea standard of reck-
lessness satisfies the First Amendment); United States v.
Garnes, 102 F.4th 628, 637 (2d Cir. 2024) (finding that, after
Counterman, a showing of recklessness is sufficient to violate
§ 875); Voneida v. Johnson, 88 F.4th 233, 238 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2023)
(same); United States v. Ehmer, 87 F.4th 1073, 1120 n.16 (9th Cir.
2023) (same); United States v. Nformangum, No. 24-20515, 2026
WL 18900, at *4–6 (5th Cir. Jan. 2, 2026) (same); United States
v. Franks, No. 24-11546, 2025 WL 2732412, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept.
25, 2025) (same). Insofar as our previous cases, including
Stewart, suggested that a higher level of subjective criminal
intent was required to violate § 875(c), Counterman supersedes
that precedent: recklessness is now the standard.
To prevail on this facial challenge, Sheikh needs to show
that “a substantial number of [§ 875(c)’s] applications are

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6 No. 25-1011
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly le-
gitimate sweep.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723
(2024) (citation modified). We read § 875(c) to include the sub-
jective intent and true threat requirements that Sheikh identi-
fies as necessary, and so the law does not run afoul of the First
Amendment in the ways that Sheikh argues.
Sheikh objects that the grand jury that indicted him wasn’t
informed about the true threat and mental state requirements
under § 875(c) and wasn’t allowed to consider the context for
his speech. The district court carefully considered and cor-
rectly rejected these arguments. And even if the district
court’s analysis was flawed in some way (Sheikh fails to tell
us how), the kinds of errors in a grand jury proceeding that
Sheikh speculates about are harmless now, after the trial jury
reached a guilty verdict. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66,
70–71 (1986).
B
Moving to the trial itself, Sheikh objects to the admission
of the clinic workers’ testimony and the images of security im-
provements. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion and will reverse only if we reach “the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” that was
not harmless. United States v. Smith, 150 F.4th 832, 847 (7th Cir.
2025) (citation modified).
As noted above, the government needed to prove that
Sheikh’s posts conveyed “a real possibility that violence
[would] follow.” Counterman, 600 U.S. at 74. In this inquiry,
“both the victim’s response to a statement and the victim’s be-
lief that it was a threat” are relevant. United States v. Parr, 545
F.3d 491, 501 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation modified); see United

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No. 25-1011 7
States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570–71 (7th Cir. 1990). Here,
what Sheikh’s posts meant to those who were threatened and
the actions they took in response tend to show that Sheikh
made a true threat. See Counterman, 600 U.S. at 74.
Sheikh makes three objections: that the clinic workers
learned about the threat from law enforcement; that they
didn’t view the iFunny posts themselves; and that law en-
forcement encouraged the clinic to implement security
measures. The employees’ lack of first-hand knowledge of the
posts or their context and the possibility that law enforcement
encouraged security improvements means that the probative
value of this evidence was diminished. Yet there’s no dispute
that law enforcement accurately conveyed the gist of what
Sheikh wrote, and what the workers believed and did as a re-
sult was still relevant to the seriousness of the threat. See Parr,
545 F.3d at 501–02 (noting that “the reaction of the target of a
threat even when the speaker did not communicate the threat
to the target” was relevant to the true threat determination).
On cross-examination, Sheikh was free to point out the limits
of these witnesses’ knowledge and law enforcement’s role in
prompting changes at the clinic. But even imperfect evidence
is generally admissible. See United States v. McKibbins, 656
F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence
do not limit the government to the most probative evidence;
all relevant evidence is admissible and the Rules define rele-
vance broadly.”) (citation modified).
Sheikh’s final argument—that the clinic workers’ testi-
mony and images were unfairly prejudicial—is undeveloped
and unsupported by the record. A district court may exclude
relevant evidence when the probative value “is substantially
outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid.

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8 No. 25-1011
403. Because the application of Rule 403 depends heavily on
context, “we give special deference to the district court’s find-
ings and reverse only when no reasonable person could take
the view adopted by the trial court.” United States v. Frazier,
129 F.4th 392, 405 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
Evidence can be unfairly prejudicial if it would make it
likely that a jury would decide the case based on emotions,
rather than the evidence presented. See Barber v. City of Chi-
cago, 725 F.3d 702, 714 (7th Cir. 2013). In this case, however,
the clinic workers’ testimony was largely matter-of-fact.
Even if the district court erred in allowing the workers’
testimony and the images, however, the evidence of guilt—
the specificity of the initial post, testimony from an iFunny
user who interpreted Sheikh’s posts as threats, and Sheikh’s
subsequent iFunny conversations and posts expressing a se-
rious intent—means that any error was harmless. See Smith,
150 F.4th at 848. The images and clinic workers’ testimony
were relevant to the truth of Sheikh’s threat, were not unfairly
prejudicial, and didn’t turn the tide with the jury given the
strength of the government’s case.
A FFIRMED

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