Tony Cole v. Joseph C. Faulkner

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 20, 2026*
Decided January 21, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
Nos. 25-1449 & 25-2029
TONY COLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH C. FAULKNER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 24 C 12117
Jorge L. Alonso,
Judge.
O R D E R
This case arises from Tony Cole’s eviction from a building in Chicago that he
alleges was improper, retaliatory, and based on a fraudulent transfer of the property.
He sued his former landlord, a property company, and other persons for retaliatory
eviction under the Fair Housing Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 3617, due process violations under
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Nos. 25-1449 & 25-2029 Page 2
the Fourteenth Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state-law claims of fraudulent
transfer, retaliatory eviction, and legal malpractice. The district judge dismissed Cole’s
claims. We affirm.
I.
The procedural background for this case, involving multiple proceedings in state
court, is complicated. The backdrop is a property near Chicago’s Wicker Park
neighborhood, at 1205 North Milwaukee Avenue. In April 2018, Cole leased a second-
floor residential unit at this address from Jin Lee, who also lived in the unit. On the first
floor, the building featured a commercial space, which Cole used for his various
businesses. According to Cole, Lee (a defendant in the federal suit here) orally agreed to
sell him the entire property for $475,000.
Lee twice—in 2022 and March 2023—commenced state-court eviction actions
against Cole to remove him from the property’s commercial and residential units. Both
actions were dismissed. Lee v. Cole, No. 20221709496 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 20, 2023); Lee v.
Cole, No. 20231704999 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 18, 2023).
In April 2023, Cole filed a wide-ranging lawsuit against Lee in state court,
alleging among other things attempted illegal eviction and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. After a joint bench-and-jury trial, the state judge entered judgment
against Cole. Cole v. Lee, No. 20231108836 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 6, 2025). Cole’s appeal in that
case is pending.
Several months later, Cole filed another state-court lawsuit against Lee, this time
for breach of contract, seeking to enforce the oral-purchase agreement. A state judge
dismissed this suit because it involved the same parties and claim for relief as Cole’s
other case against Lee. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Cole v. Lee, No. 1-24-1231,
2025 WL 1010398 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2025).
In December 2023, Lee sold the property to 1205 Milwaukee LLC. That
company’s sole member is Southern Capital, LLC, which in turn has two members,
Joseph Faulkner (a defendant here) and one non-party person.
In February 2024, 1205 Milwaukee, represented by Christopher Acuna (also a
defendant here), filed two separate state-court lawsuits seeking to evict Cole from the
commercial and residential spaces, respectively. The commercial-eviction case
proceeded to a jury trial, and in July 2024, a state court judge entered a judgment for

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Nos. 25-1449 & 25-2029 Page 3
possession in favor of 1205 Milwaukee. The residential-eviction case also went to trial,
and in December 2024, a state court judge entered a judgment for possession in favor of
1205 Milwaukee. Cole appealed multiple orders in both the residential and commercial
eviction cases, and the Illinois Appellate Court—consolidating the appeals—affirmed.
See 1205 Milwaukee, LLC v. Tony Cole, Nos. 1-24-1434, 1-24-2224, 1-24-2234, 1-24-2611,
2025 WL 3161979 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 10, 2025); 1205 Milwaukee, LLC v. Tony Cole, No. 1-
24-1467, 2025 WL 253062 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 21, 2025).
In the meantime, in July 2024, 1205 Milwaukee filed another lawsuit in state
court against Cole for slander of title and quiet title. Cole counterclaimed, asserting
fraudulent transfer, slander of title, breach of contract, and abuse of process. 1205
Milwaukee, LLC v. Tony Cole, No. 2024CH06317 (Ill. Cir. Ct. case disposed Nov. 19, 2025).
The case is ongoing.
Around this same time, Cole also brought two similar lawsuits against Lee’s
attorney, David Yanoff (also a defendant here), for legal malpractice. Both suits were
dismissed because the state judge deemed Yanoff to be protected by the Illinois absolute
litigation privilege. The state appellate court affirmed those judgments. Cole v. Yanoff,
No. 1-24-1017, 2025 WL 354700 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 31, 2025); Cole v. Yanoff, No. 1-24-1230,
2025 WL 432981 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 7, 2025).
In November 2024, the Cook County Sheriff evicted Cole from the commercial
space.
That same month, Cole filed this federal lawsuit against Lee, Faulkner, 1205
Milwaukee, Yanoff, and Acuna for retaliatory eviction under the Fair Housing Act,
see 42 U.S.C. § 3617, due-process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment,
see § 1983, and state-law claims of fraudulent transfer, retaliatory eviction, and legal
malpractice. Cole sought $375,000 in compensatory damages, $500,000 in punitive
damages, and $200,000 in emotional and psychological damages. He also sought
injunctive relief in the form of the restoration of utilities, a stay of “retaliatory” legal
actions, and a declaration that the property transfer to 1205 Milwaukee was fraudulent
and void.
A few months later, the Cook County Sheriff’s office evicted Cole from the
residential space.

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Nos. 25-1449 & 25-2029 Page 4
Faulkner then moved to dismiss the federal case, arguing that the district court
did not have jurisdiction over Cole’s federal claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
because Cole sought federal review of state-court judgments. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Cole countered
that his federal claims fell under the fraud-based exception to Rooker-Feldman because
the defendants had colluded with state court judges to evict him.
At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district judge dismissed Cole’s case,
concluding under Rooker-Feldman that the court lacked jurisdiction over Cole’s federal
claims for damages and injunctive relief because his case was inextricably intertwined
with the state-court proceedings. The judge, quoting our decision in Hadzi-Tanovic v.
Johnson, 62 F.4th 394, 405 (7th Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted), also ruled that there
was no fraud-based exception to Rooker-Feldman because “no matter how wrong a state
court judgment may be under federal law, lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction
to review it.” The judge next determined that Cole did not adequately state a claim
under the Fair Housing Act because he did not allege what right he was exercising
under the statute that triggered its anti-retaliation provisions. The judge declined to
exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims.
Cole then filed two post-judgment motions. He moved for the judge to recuse
himself on grounds of bias. In a separate filing, Cole also sought reconsideration, mostly
rehashing arguments he made in response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. In a
single order, the judge denied both motions. The judge determined first that Cole’s
disagreement with adverse rulings did not warrant recusal. As for the motion for
reconsideration, the judge corrected his previous order and ruled that Rooker-Feldman
did not preclude Cole’s federal claims for damages arising from the harms of the state-
court proceedings. See Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 793
(7th Cir. 2024) (en banc). The judge, however, stood by his prior rulings. He reaffirmed
the dismissal of Cole’s claims for injunctive relief because there was no fraud-based
exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Regarding Cole’s claims under the Fair
Housing Act, the judge reiterated that Cole failed to allege what right he was exercising
under the statute that triggered its anti-retaliation provisions. As for Cole’s § 1983 claim,
the judge explained that Cole could not allege that the defendants were acting under
the color of law because they did not become state actors for § 1983 purposes merely by
pursuing eviction or other state-court proceedings against him.

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Nos. 25-1449 & 25-2029 Page 5
II.
On appeal, Cole raises two related challenges to the district judge’s application of
Rooker-Feldman to bar his claims for injunctive relief from the state-court eviction
judgments. He argues, first, that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because he alleges
“fraud” in the state litigation. But we have rejected the notion of a “fraud exception” to
Rooker-Feldman because claims of corruption in a state court proceeding require federal
courts to evaluate and vacate state-court judgments. See Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 783–84.
Cole also argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because final judgments in
his state cases had yet to be issued when he filed his federal lawsuit. See id. at 766. But
even if we accept Cole’s chronology of events, his attempt to overturn those judgments
is barred by the affirmative defense of claim preclusion. See, e.g., H.A.L. NY Holdings,
LLC v. Guinan, 958 F.3d 627, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2020). Under this affirmative defense,
which the defendants raised in the district court and again on appeal, “there must be (1)
a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) the
same cause of action, and (3) the same parties or their privies.” Bonnstetter v. City of
Chicago, 811 F.3d 969, 975 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). Here all three
requirements are met: The state courts issued final judgments in the residential and
commercial eviction cases; this case and the state eviction cases involve the same
parties; and the eviction cases arose out of the same group of operative facts as Cole’s
federal claims—his eviction from the property—so they are considered the same claim
for relief even if they assert different theories of relief. See Parungao v. Cmty. Health Sys.,
Inc., 858 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 2017).
Likewise, claim preclusion bars Cole’s claims against Yanoff for legal
malpractice. Cole alleges the same state-law claim for relief against the same defendant.
And the state judge’s dismissal of this claim for relief with prejudice constitutes a final
judgment on the merits.
Next, Cole takes aim at the dismissal of his § 1983 claim and argues that he
sufficiently pleaded state action by alleging collusion between the state judges, a federal
judge, and the defendants. In his complaint, Cole alleged that the defendants were
acting under the color of law because they filed “baseless eviction lawsuits” and relied
on “state judicial mechanisms” to evict him from the property. But Cole had to “identify
a sufficient nexus between the state and the private actor to support a finding that the
deprivation committed by the private actor is ‘fairly attributable to the state.’” L.P. v.
Marian Catholic High Sch, 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). And his “mere allegations of joint action or a

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Nos. 25-1449 & 25-2029 Page 6
conspiracy do not demonstrate that the defendants acted under color of state law and
are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 616
(7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 458 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Turning next to the dismissal of his claim under the Fair Housing Act, Cole
argues that the judge erred by dismissing his claim of retaliatory eviction. Cole argues
that to state a claim under the Fair Housing Act, he had to allege only that he was
retaliated against for asserting his housing rights. But that formulation is incomplete. To
state a claim of retaliatory eviction under the Fair Housing Act, Cole needed—but
failed—to allege that he was subjected to discriminatory housing practices based on his
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability. See Block v.
Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 2009).
Cole also renews his charge of bias against the district judge based on rulings
against him and the denial of many of his motions as moot. But he provides no evidence
to support this assertion, and judicial determinations alone almost never establish bias.
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994).
Last, Cole argues for the first time that his rights under the First Amendment
were violated when a state court judge held him in criminal contempt after he
announced his intention to file a federal civil rights lawsuit. But Cole waived this
argument by not raising it in the district court. See Bradley v. Vill. Univ. Park, 59 F.4th
887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).
We have considered Cole’s other arguments, and none merits discussion.
AFFIRMED

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