United States of America v. Antonio Carrazco-Martinez

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2819
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
A NTONIO C ARRAZCO-MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-cr-00351-2 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED D ECEMBER 12, 2025 — D ECIDED FEBRUARY 5, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK , J ACKSON-A KIWUMI, and LEE , Circuit
Judges.
LEE , Circuit Judge. Antonio Carrazco-Martinez was sus-
pected of drug trafficking as part of an operation based in Chi-
cago with connections to Mexico. Authorized by warrants, the
government gathered evidence against him using a cell-site
simulator as well as a closed-circuit television (“CCTV”) cam-
era hidden in the garage of a house that he and his associates
used to package and distribute illegal drugs and proceeds.

-- 1 of 13 --

2 No. 24-2819
Following the investigation, Carrazco-Martinez was
charged with participating in a narcotics distribution conspir-
acy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and possessing with intent
to distribute cocaine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a). He asked the district court to suppress the evidence
obtained from the cell-site simulator and CCTV camera, but
both motions were denied. During the trial, Carrazco-Mar-
tinez objected to a jury instruction that permitted the jury to
convict him without finding that his offenses involved a spe-
cific quantity of drugs. But this objection too was unsuccess-
ful, and the jury ultimately convicted him of both charges.
On appeal, Carrazco-Martinez challenges the district
court’s denial of his motions to suppress. He also contends
that the court should have sustained his objection to the jury
instruction. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
I
The Drug Enforcement Agency began investigating a drug
trafficking operation involving Carrazco-Martinez in May
2016. A few months later, in October, a confidential source for
the government started communicating with Carrazco-Mar-
tinez, who had recently arrived in Chicago. Through these ef-
forts, the government was able to identify and monitor Car-
razco-Martinez’s cell phone, but about a month later and after
a major drug seizure, his phone went dark.
To identify his new phone and continue tracking his activ-
ities, the government applied for and received a warrant to
use a “pen register” for thirty days. In a footnote and header,

-- 2 of 13 --

No. 24-2819 3
the application specified that the type of pen register the gov-
ernment intended to use was a cell-site simulator.1
A cell-site simulator (sometimes known by the brand
name “Stingray”) works by mimicking a cell tower and forc-
ing devices in its vicinity to connect and transmit their signal-
ing information to it. See United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540,
542–43 (7th Cir. 2016). Once connected, the simulator obtains
identifying information of the device, such as the telephone
number or subscriber number. A cell-site simulator is a
marked evolution from more traditional pen registers and
trap-and-trace devices that merely record dialed numbers. In
addition to telephone numbers, simulators may also collect
calls, texts, and images. In re Warrant Application for Use of Can-
vassing Cell-Site Simulator, 654 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703–04 & n.11
(N.D. Ill. 2023). In its brief and at oral argument, the govern-
ment represented that, per Department of Justice policy, the
1 The November 21, 2016 warrant application noted:
[B]ecause a cell-site simulator constitutes a “pen register”
device within the meaning of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 3127(3), in that it is “a device or process which
records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signal-
ing information transmitted by an instrument or facility
from which a wire or electronic communication is trans-
mitted,” and because the information it obtains does not
include the contents of any communication, … it is be-
lieved that … the information likely to be obtained from
the use of a pen register device in the form of electronic
investigative techniques that capture and analyze signals
emitted by cellular telephones is relevant to the ongoing
criminal investigation.
Dkt. 363-1 at 2–3 & n.1. “Dkt.” refers to the docket number in the dis-
trict court record.

-- 3 of 13 --

4 No. 24-2819
simulator’s ability to collect any information beyond simple
identifying information was disabled,2 and if any such infor-
mation had been collected, it was deleted without review.3
Once law enforcement officers were able to locate Car-
razco-Martinez’s whereabouts through surveillance, they de-
ployed a cell-site simulator six times over a two-day period
near his location. And, by comparing the phone numbers col-
lected on those occasions, the agents were able to identify Car-
razco-Martinez’s new phone number and obtained permis-
sion to track it.
Using this information, the officers identified a single-fam-
ily home with an attached garage in Carpentersville, Illinois,
that Carrazco-Martinez used as a stash house. The agents then
applied for and received a warrant to install a CCTV camera,
which recorded video but not sound, in the garage for thirty
days. The warrant was extended twice, ending in February
2017 when Carrazco-Martinez left the house.
2 The government also filed a post-argument letter clarifying that
“government counsel is unaware and the record is silent as to whether any
cell site simulators, let alone the one used here, can intercept contents of
communications. Even assuming the cell site simulator used in this case
did have such capability, however, the record suggests that any such ca-
pability would have been disabled or otherwise made nonfunctional.”
App. Dkt. 40 at 1. “App. Dkt.” refers to the docket number in the appellate
court record.
3 The warrant application states that the government will delete “any
information from a cellular device other than any cellular telephone being
used by [Carrazco-Martinez]” and will “make no investigative use of it,
absent further order of the Court.” Dkt. 363-1 at 4–5.

-- 4 of 13 --

No. 24-2819 5
In 2019, Carrazco-Martinez was charged with conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute drugs in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846. In 2021, Carrazco-Martinez moved to suppress
the evidence from the cell-site simulator4 and the CCTV cam-
era.5 The district court denied the motions, holding that the
good faith exception precluded suppression of evidence from
both. In 2022, the government filed the Second Superseding
Indictment and added a charge of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
Carrazco-Martinez’s trial began on April 17, 2023. As the
parties finalized jury instructions, the government proposed
a non-pattern instruction (referred to as “Instruction 28”).
This instruction informed the jury that the government was
“not required to prove … the specific quantity” charged in the
indictment in order to prove Carrazco-Martinez’s guilt as to
the two counts. Rather, it provided that the government only
needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the counts
involved “some measurable quantity of a controlled sub-
stance.”
Carrazco-Martinez objected, arguing that the instruction
was unnecessarily confusing, especially alongside Instruction
29, which directed the jury to “determine the amount of co-
caine and heroin the government has proven was involved in
4 Whether the use of the cell-site simulator constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search remains an open question, but we analyze it as such
because the government applied for a warrant as if it were.
5 Carrazco-Martinez also moved to suppress evidence collected via a
pole camera installed across the street from the Carpentersville house. Be-
cause he does not appeal the district court’s denial as to this evidence, we
do not discuss it.

-- 5 of 13 --

6 No. 24-2819
the [particular] offense.” Additionally, in his view, the in-
struction violated Alleyne v. United States where the Supreme
Court held that any fact increasing the mandatory minimum
sentence for a crime “constitutes an element of a separate, ag-
gravated offense that must be found by a jury.” 570 U.S. 99
(2013), 115 (2013). The district court overruled the objection.
The jury eventually convicted Carrazco-Martinez of both
counts. He subsequently filed a motion for a judgment of ac-
quittal and a new trial pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 29 and 33, respectively. The district court denied
the motion.
II
Now on appeal, Carrazco-Martinez contends that the dis-
trict court erred by denying his request to suppress the evi-
dence gathered from the cell-site simulator and CCTV cam-
era. He also believes that Instruction 28 is contrary to law.
A. Suppression Motions
When considering a district court’s denial of a suppression
motion, this Court reviews the district court’s factual findings
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See United
States v. Eymann, 962 F.3d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 2020) (citations
omitted).
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. To “compel respect for [that] constitutional guar-
anty,” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011) (citation
omitted), the Supreme Court has fashioned the exclusionary
rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly ob-
tained evidence at trial, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,

-- 6 of 13 --

No. 24-2819 7
139 (2009). But, because the exclusionary rule “is designed
primarily to deter unconstitutional conduct,” United States v.
Curtis, 901 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2018), it does not apply when
law enforcement has relied in good faith on a facially valid
warrant, United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 384 (7th Cir.
2021) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)).
What is more, “an officer’s decision to obtain a warrant
creates a presumption that the officer acted in good faith.”
United States v. Woodfork, 999 F.3d 511, 519 (7th Cir. 2021)
(quoting United States v. Yarber, 915 F.3d 1103, 1106 (7th Cir.
2019)). Overcoming this presumption is a “heavy burden,”
which a defendant can meet in one of several ways. He can
show that the affiant “misled the magistrate with information
the affiant knew was false or would have known was false but
for the affiant’s reckless disregard for the truth.” United States
v. Matthews, 12 F.4th 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United
States v. Rees, 957 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 2020)). A defendant
can also rebut the presumption by establishing that “the judge
issuing the warrant abandoned his detached and neutral
role,” Woodfork, 999 F.3d at 519 (citations omitted), that “the
warrant was so lacking in probable cause that the officer’s be-
lief in its existence was entirely unreasonable,” id., or that “the
warrant was so facially deficient in particularizing its scope
that the officers could not reasonably presume it was valid,”
Matthews, 12 F.4th at 653 (quoting Rees, 957 F.3d at 771).
Two warrants are at issue here—one for the cell-site simu-
lator and another for the CCTV camera. So, because both war-
rants were issued by a judge, we presume that the agents who
relied on the warrants when gathering the evidence in

-- 7 of 13 --

8 No. 24-2819
question acted in good faith. The question then is whether
Carrazco-Martinez has successfully rebutted this presump-
tion.6
Turning first to the cell-site simulator warrant, Carrazco-
Martinez posits that the government misled the judge into
thinking that it was seeking to use a run-of-the-mill pen reg-
ister when it actually intended to employ a Stringray device.
But the warrant application expressly requested authoriza-
tion to use a cell-site simulator and explained how it fell
within the statutory definition of a pen register under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3127(3).7 Dkt. 363-1 at 2–3 & n.1.
As for the CCTV camera, Carrazco-Martinez argues that
the warrant was facially overbroad, exceeded any probable
cause the government offered, and failed to comply with the
requirements of Title III as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518. That
6 Carrazco-Martinez does not argue that the good faith exception does
not apply to evidence obtained using cell-site simulators or CCTV surveil-
lance. Thus, despite some disagreement on the issue, see Patrick, 842 F.3d
at 552 (Wood, C.J., dissenting) (collecting cases), we do not reach it here
and assume the exception applies to both warrants at issue in this case.
7 That provision states:
[T]he term “pen register” means a device or process
which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information transmitted by an instrument or fa-
cility from which a wire or electronic communication is
transmitted, provided, however, that such information
shall not include the contents of any communication[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).

-- 8 of 13 --

No. 24-2819 9
said, the only argument he meaningfully develops is the last
one.
As we have noted elsewhere, “because television surveil-
lance is potentially so menacing to personal privacy, we want
to make clear our view that a warrant for television surveil-
lance that did not satisfy the four provisions of Title III that
implement the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of particu-
larity would violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v.
Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984). Among the four is the
requirement that the warrant application contain “a full and
complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too danger-
ous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c); see Torres, 751 F.2d at 883–84. In
Carrazco-Martinez’s view, the government’s warrant applica-
tion for the CCTV camera falls well short.
Carrazco-Martinez notes, for instance, that by the time the
government submitted its application, it had already identi-
fied at least eighteen other individuals involved in the drug
trafficking operation. Furthermore, the government had ac-
cess to a pole camera across the street from the stash house
and had used it to surveil numerous persons going into and
out of the house. In short, Carrazco-Martinez argues, the gov-
ernment “greatly overstated” the necessity of having a CCTV
camera in the garage and failed to explain why its other in-
vestigative efforts “reasonably appear to be unlikely to suc-
ceed.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).
Carrazco-Martinez does not explain precisely how the
purported lack of necessity rebuts the government’s good
faith reliance on the warrant, but his argument seems to be
that, by overstating the need for the CCTV camera, the

-- 9 of 13 --

10 No. 24-2819
government misled the judge with information it knew to be
false or should have known to be false. But, contrary to Car-
razco-Martinez’s contention, the government’s affidavit ex-
plains why it believes the CCTV camera was necessary. For
example, the affidavit notes the government’s belief that the
international scope of the operation rendered traditional in-
vestigative techniques less effective in identifying the perpe-
trators. The supporting affidavit also indicates the govern-
ment’s belief that although it was able to obtain information
about persons who were involved in the transportation of the
drug proceeds by intercepting electronic communications
and conducting physical surveillance, it needed more infor-
mation regarding those who actually handled and trans-
ported the drugs to prosecute the offenders. Carrazco-Mar-
tinez offers no facts contradicting these statements and thus
falls short of satisfying the heavy burden to overcome the pre-
sumption of good faith. In other words, he offers no evidence
that the government misled the issuing judge with false infor-
mation or disregarded the truth in its statements.
Carrazco-Martinez likewise fails to offer any evidence that
the issuing judge abandoned neutrality, that the warrants
were so lacking that it would have been unreasonable for an
officer to believe there was probable cause, or that the war-
rants were so deficient in particularizing their scope that an
officer could not presume their validity. As such, Carrazco-
Martinez has failed the rebut the presumption of good faith
as to either the cell-site simulator warrant or the CCTV cam-
era warrant.
B. Jury Instruction
Turning to the jury instruction, we review de novo whether
the instruction “fairly and accurately summarize[s] the law.”

-- 10 of 13 --

No. 24-2819 11
United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 753 (7th Cir. 2010) (ci-
tation modified). “If it does, we examine the district court’s
particular phrasing of the instruction for abuse of discretion
[and] … we will reverse only if it appears both that the jury
was misled and that the instructions prejudiced the defend-
ant.” United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir.
2013)) (citation modified).
Instruction 28 states:
The government is not required to prove that the of-
fenses charged in [the relevant counts] involved the
specific quantity of a substance alleged in those counts
in order to prove a defendant’s guilt on any of those
counts. However, the government must prove that
each of these counts involved some measurable quan-
tity of a controlled substance.
It was followed by Instruction 29, which told the jury that, if
it found Carrazco-Martinez guilty of either drug count with
which he was charged, it must also determine “the amount of
the cocaine and heroin the government has proven was in-
volved in the offense.”
Finding the two instructions confusing when read in tan-
dem, Carrazco-Martinez argues that Instruction 28 violated
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and to a
fair trial by an impartial jury. See United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (“We have held that these provisions re-
quire criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination
that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.”). For sup-
port, he points to Alleyne, which requires the jury to find

-- 11 of 13 --

12 No. 24-2819
beyond a reasonable doubt every necessary element of the
charged offense, including any fact that increases the manda-
tory minimum sentence. 570 U.S. at 116; see also Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
The problem with this argument is that drug quantity is
not an element of either 21 U.S.C. § 846 or § 841(a). See United
States v. Martinez, 518 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008) (“As we
have said repeatedly, the drug quantity is not an element of
the crimes defined by § 846 or § 841(a)(1).”). Rather, drug
quantity is a sentencing factor that must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt when it increases the mandatory
minimum sentence. See United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d
699, 708 (7th Cir. 2013) (reaffirming that “a defendant’s man-
datory minimum sentence must be determined by the drug
quantity described in the jury’s special verdict form.”). Thus,
in order to trigger the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), the government had to prove
(and the jury had to find) beyond a reasonable doubt that Car-
razco-Martinez’s offenses involved at least five kilograms or
more of a mixture and substance containing a detectible
amount of cocaine or one kilogram or more of a mixture and
substance containing a detectible amount of heroin. Thus, In-
structions 28 and 29 were correct statements of law, and there
is no reason to believe that the jury disregarded them. See
United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113, 1123 (7th Cir. 2015) (we

-- 12 of 13 --

No. 24-2819 13
“assume that the jury follows the instructions given” absent
“anything in the record to overcome that presumption”).8
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
8 As Carrazco-Martinez points out, the district court was initially con-
cerned that Instruction 28 might confuse the jury but it eventually con-
cluded that, in conjunction with Instruction 29, it adequately informed the
jury about the governing law. We think such statements of concern signify
a careful judge, not a careless one.

-- 13 of 13 --