Chariot Campbell v. City of Galesburg, Illinois

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 10, 2026*
Decided February 11, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1402
CHARIOT CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF GALESBURG, ILLINOIS,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 4:22-cv-04013-SLD
Sara Darrow,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Chariot Campbell sued the City of Galesburg, Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS), Lutheran Social Services of Illinois (LSSI), and employees
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1402 Page 2
of these organizations, among others, for constitutional violations related to her child-
custody cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the lawsuit. We affirm.
In January 2022, Campbell filed a lawsuit alleging that several entities and
employees of those entities violated her constitutional rights. She sued the City of
Galesburg and four of its police officers for ignoring her complaints about crimes
committed against her, pointing a gun at her head, and filing false reports that led to a
DCFS investigation. Campbell also sued DCFS, her caseworker, and the caseworker’s
supervisor for ignoring her complaints about domestic violence, failing to return her
calls, and writing a false report. And she sued LSSI and four of its caseworkers—who
had been assigned to support Campbell with assessments for domestic violence,
substance abuse, and mental health—for failing to assist her and blocking some of her
visits with her children.
The district court granted motions to dismiss filed by DCFS and LSSI. The court
explained that DCFS and its employees, acting in their official capacity, were protected
by sovereign immunity. In their personal capacities, the court determined, the DCFS
employees were protected by qualified immunity. The court also concluded that, even if
LSSI and its employees had engaged in state action, Campbell had failed to state a claim
against them for violating her constitutional rights.
Campbell filed an amended complaint, which named several new defendants
and purported to bring claims on behalf of her children and her mother. The complaint
largely restated and expanded on the allegations in Campbell’s original complaint: The
defendants wrongfully removed her children and falsified information about her, and
LSSI and DCFS failed to provide Campbell with a case plan.
The district court dismissed the amended complaint. It concluded that Campbell
could not litigate an action pro se on behalf of her children or her mother. The court also
dismissed six of the individual defendants because Campbell did not serve them. The
court dismissed the claims against LSSI and its employees because Campbell failed to
allege sufficiently that they were state actors; it dismissed the claim against DCFS based
on sovereign immunity; and it dismissed the claim against the City of Galesburg
because Campbell did not allege that an official policy or custom caused any
constitutional violation, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Campbell responded by filing another amended complaint, which the court
construed as a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. In the proposed
amended complaint, Campbell raised many of the same allegations and asked the

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No. 25-1402 Page 3
district court to intervene in ongoing child-custody proceedings in state court. She later
sought to add an additional claim that multiple defendants had committed
manslaughter and reckless homicide related to her mother’s death.
The district court denied Campbell’s motion and dismissed the action against all
defendants. The court reiterated that Campbell could not represent her children and her
mother, and it concluded that Campbell’s allegations either repeated previously
dismissed claims or were frivolous.
Campbell appeals, but her arguments are difficult to parse. She appears to
contend that the district court should have allowed her to add her children and her
mother as plaintiffs. But the court correctly concluded that Campbell, as a pro se
litigant, could not bring claims on behalf of her mother or children. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654;
Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A nonlawyer can’t
handle a case on behalf of anyone except himself.”); Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 705
(7th Cir. 2010) (non-attorney parent may not bring suit based on § 1983 or state tort law
on behalf of minor child).
Campbell also challenges the district court’s denial of her requests for counsel,
but we see no error. The court properly dismissed the first motion because Campbell
did not show that she tried to find counsel on her own or that she could not do so.
Thomas v. Anderson, 912 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2018). And the court properly dismissed
the second motion because Campbell already had shown that she could argue the
relevant issues and gather evidence to support her claims. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d
647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Lastly, Campbell mentions several other errors that she believes the district court
committed, including some related to docket management. For example, she argues that
the court erred by sealing certain documents and granting the defendants’ motions to
extend deadlines. She also asserts that the court should have directly intervened on her
behalf in state court. But these arguments are all perfunctory and undeveloped, so they
are waived. Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016).
AFFIRMED

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