United States of America v. Donald A. Stenson

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2166
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DONALD A. STENSON ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:19-cr-127 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 10, 2024 — DECIDED F EBRUARY 17, 2026
____________________
Before SYKES, H AMILTON , and LEE, Circuit Judges.
LEE, Circuit Judge. Donald Stenson pleaded guilty to two
counts of sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), (c), and 1596(a)(1). He moved to with-
draw his plea, arguing that he had felt rushed to sign the plea
agreement and his anxiety medication had materially im-
pacted his cognition. The district court denied the motion af-
ter an evidentiary hearing. Stenson appeals, arguing that the

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2 No. 23-2166
court abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw
his guilty plea. We affirm.
I
According to the government, Donald Stenson made mul-
tiple visits to the Philippines over the span of several years to
solicit minors between the ages of eleven and seventeen to
perform sex acts. He, along with co-defendant John
Burgdorff, purportedly offered these minors money, gifts,
and food in exchange for oral and vaginal sex.
A grand jury charged Stenson with seven counts of travel-
ing in foreign commerce to engage in sexual activity with mi-
nors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) and (e). He was also
charged with seven counts of sex trafficking of a minor in vi-
olation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c), and
1596(a)(1).
At his change-of-plea hearing, Stenson pleaded guilty to
two counts of sex trafficking of a minor. At the start of his plea
hearing, the district court informed Stenson that he was re-
quired to answer the court’s questions truthfully and that fail-
ure to do so could lead to a separate prosecution for making
false statements. Stenson replied that he understood.
During the plea colloquy, Stenson stated that he was
pleading guilty because he realized that doing so was his most
sensible option. He responded to the court’s questions appro-
priately and even asked for clarification when he did not un-
derstand a particular question. He also told the court that he
had reviewed his plea agreement with his lawyers; he under-
stood its terms; he was “very satisfied” with his lawyers’ ef-
forts; and he was pleading guilty voluntarily.

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No. 23-2166 3
In his plea agreement, Stenson similarly represented that
he had reviewed the agreement in its entirety with his attor-
neys, fully understood it, entered the agreement voluntarily,
and was satisfied with his attorneys’ assistance. He also af-
firmed that he was not under the influence of any drug or
medication that could impair his ability to understand the
agreement or its terms.
After the district court entered his guilty plea, however,
Stenson moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that it
was not knowing and voluntary. Relevant to this appeal, he
claimed that he had felt pressured to sign the plea agreement
the morning of the hearing. He also asserted that, earlier that
morning, he had taken an anti-anxiety medication,
Clonazepam, which had made him feel anxious, distraught,
and compliant. In support, he referenced the website,
Drugs.com, which listed Clonazepam’s potential side effects.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the mo-
tion in a written order, which Stenson now appeals.1
II
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to with-
draw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Barr,
960 F.3d 906, 917 (7th Cir. 2020). But we review “factual find-
ings, including whether a plea was entered knowingly and
voluntarily, for clear error.” United States v. Kamkarian, 79
F.4th 889, 892 (7th Cir. 2023).
Where, as here, “an elaborate written plea agreement is
present in a case where a defendant is represented by counsel,
1 Although Stenson filed a pro se motion to reconsider the court’s rul-
ing, he later withdrew it.

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4 No. 23-2166
our review of the proceedings will include a look at that
agreement itself as well as the judge’s Rule 11 colloquy.”
United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997); see
United States v. Mitchell, 58 F.3d 1221, 1223 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It
is elementary that this court will look to the entire record of
proceedings[.]”).
Stenson contends that the district court abused its discre-
tion in denying his motion because his guilty plea was not
knowing and voluntary. He felt rushed to sign the plea agree-
ment, Stenson claims, and the court failed to confirm that he
had had sufficient time to review it with counsel. Stenson also
leans on his own affidavit and a list of Clonazepam’s side ef-
fects he found online to argue that his medication had mate-
rially influenced his decision to plead guilty.
“Guilty pleas are to the criminal justice system what motor
oil is to automobiles; you can’t run one without the other. And
guilty pleas are in abundance because the overwhelming ma-
jority of defendants (around 90 percent) resolve their cases
without trials.” Akinsola, 105 F.3d at 332. For this reason, once
a district court accepts a guilty plea, a “defendant does not
have an unlimited right to withdraw the plea.” United States
v. Milquette, 214 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 2000).
Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show a “fair and
just reason” for withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “This
court has recognized three broad reasons that may justify al-
lowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea: (1) the defend-
ant is innocent, (2) the defendant received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, and (3) the plea was not knowing and

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No. 23-2166 5
voluntary.”2 Kamkarian, 79 F.4th at 892 (citation omitted). “But
the defendant bears a heavy burden of persuasion in showing
such a reason exists.” United States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 834
(7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
Here, Stenson takes the third route, arguing that his guilty
plea was not knowing and voluntary. But, because he told the
district court the opposite at the plea hearing, “he faces an up-
hill battle in persuading the judge that his purported reason
for withdrawing his plea is fair and just.” United States v. Mes-
sino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, in such cases, “the district court is
generally justified in discrediting the proffered reasons for the
motion to withdraw and holding the defendant to [his] ad-
missions at the Rule 11 hearing.” United States v. Groll, 992
F.2d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 1993).
A. Reviewing the Plea Agreement
First, Stenson asserts that he felt pressured into signing the
plea agreement on the morning of the plea hearing and that
the court failed to confirm that he had had enough time to
2 As we explained in United States v. Merrill:
Ineffective assistance of counsel that leads to the involuntary or
unknowing entry of a guilty plea can be such a reason. In as-
sessing whether a defendant received ineffective assistance, this
court applies the familiar standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), asking whether the
attorney’s performance was objectively unreasonable and
whether, but for the deficient performance, the defendant would
not have pleaded guilty.
23 F.4th 766, 769–70 (7th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).

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6 No. 23-2166
consult his lawyers about it. To make his case, he points to the
following exchange:
THE COURT: And you’ve had enough time to talk to
your lawyers? You’re satisfied with their efforts?
DEFENDANT: Very satisfied, Your Honor.
But, even if that passage somehow supported his argument
(which is questionable), he ignores what followed:
THE COURT: All right. I have a plea agreement here. I
assume you went over this with your lawyer. You came
to an understanding of it, and you signed it?
DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
The district court relied on this exchange when it denied
Stenson’s motion to withdraw his plea. If Stenson had indeed
felt that he was given insufficient time to review the plea
agreement, the court reasoned, he had the opportunity to say
so. Furthermore, the district court observed, Stenson had
acknowledged in the plea agreement itself that he had re-
viewed the entire agreement with counsel and understood it.
In short, the district court relied on Stenson’s own admis-
sions, both in person and on paper, to find that his guilty plea
was knowing and voluntary. This was not clear error.
B. Influence of Medication
Next, Stenson contends the district court erred by ignoring
the adverse impacts his medication, Clonazepam, had on his
ability to understand the consequences of his actions. But,
when denying his motion to withdraw his plea, the district
court indicated that “nothing in [Stenson’s] demeanor or the
content of his responses suggested that he was anxious or dis-
traught, or simply responding yes to every question.” When

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No. 23-2166 7
Stenson did not understand a question, he asked for clarifica-
tion. And when the court asked Stenson whether he found his
counsel’s work to be satisfactory, rather than offering a mon-
osyllabic response, he replied, “Very satisfied, Your Honor.”
What is more, in his plea agreement, which he had signed
shortly before the hearing, Stenson acknowledged that he was
not “on or under the influence of any drug [or] medication …
which would impair [his] ability to understand the terms and
conditions of this agreement[.]”
Focusing on this last point, Stenson contends that the dis-
trict court’s conclusion about when he signed the plea agree-
ment was mistaken. But Stenson’s own affidavit attests that
he signed the amended plea agreement that very morning.
And Stenson’s contention that he felt rushed to sign the agree-
ment the morning of the hearing corroborates this finding.
Admittedly, the district court did not expressly ask Sten-
son during the plea colloquy whether he had taken any drug
or medication that might impair his understanding of the pro-
ceedings. And we certainly encourage district courts to cover
this topic during a plea colloquy. See United States v. Fountain,
777 F.2d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[A] dialogue between the
court and the person making the plea is the best method for
establishing the factual basis of a plea as well as its voluntari-
ness.”). But the district court observed Stenson firsthand and
perceived nothing about his demeanor indicating that he was
confused, anxious, or mindlessly responding to questions. See
Collins, 796 F.3d at 834–35 (“Crediting the judge’s impressions
over a defendant’s subsequent bare protestations prevents the
entry of a plea from being some empty ceremony, a mere trifle
that defendants may elect to disregard.”) (citation modified).
When we add the assurances Stenson gave during the hearing

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8 No. 23-2166
and in the plea agreement regarding his comprehension of his
change of plea, we cannot say that the district court’s finding
that Stenson’s guilty plea was voluntary was clearly errone-
ous. See Fountain, 777 F.2d at 356 (“[I]t is axiomatic that the
required dialogue will vary from case to case.”) (citations
omitted).
Turning to Stenson’s reliance on the list of Clonazepam’s
side effects from Drugs.com, which included “memory prob-
lems” and “confusion,” the district court found this argument
unpersuasive, citing United States v. Hardimon, 700 F.3d 940
(7th Cir. 2012). In that case, the defendant tried to withdraw a
guilty plea by providing an email from his psychiatrist stating
that Prozac could (on rare occasions) affect a person’s ability
to think and make decisions. Id. at 942. But, as we explained,
“[t]hese drugs are taken by millions of people, and it can’t just
be assumed from the fact that someone is taking them that
[they] can’t think straight.” Id. at 944. Thus, we held, “[t]o
make a case for being permitted to withdraw his guilty plea
when the judge’s inquiries at the plea hearing had been ade-
quate and had revealed no impairment of the defendant’s
ability to think, the defendant needs to present the affidavit of
a qualified psychiatrist” to describe any adverse impacts and
indications of impairment. Id.
Stenson argues that Hardimon is distinguishable because
there, unlike here, the district court had specifically asked the
defendant whether he had taken any medication. Id. at 941–
42. But, given the district court’s observation of Stenson’s de-
meanor during the hearing and his many assurances, the ab-
sence of this one question does not render the overall colloquy
inadequate. See Fountain, 777 F.2d at 356 (recognizing the
case-by-case nature of a plea colloquy).

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No. 23-2166 9
Stenson also asserts that the medication in Hardimon, Pro-
zac, is designed to help a person think more clearly, while his
medication, Clonazepam, is not. But neither Stenson nor the
district court has the necessary expertise to weigh these dif-
ferences, which is precisely why a qualified psychiatrist’s af-
fidavit is necessary.
As for Stenson’s own testimony that his medication im-
paired his comprehension, the district court gave it little
weight in light of the many indications to the contrary. This
too was well supported by the record and not clearly errone-
ous. See United States v. Peterson, 414 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir.
2005) (“Judges need not let litigants contradict themselves so
readily[.]”).
* * *
The judgment is AFFIRMED.

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