United States of America v. Charles G. Denton, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 3, 2026*
Decided March 23, 2026
Before
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1201
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHARLES G. DENTON, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 4:20-cr-40048-JEH-1
Jonathan E. Hawley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Officers executed a search warrant at Charles Denton’s home, where they found
various drugs, a gun, and ammunition. After a bench trial, he was found guilty of
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the conviction. He argues that the proximity of the unloaded gun to the drugs is
insufficient to infer that the gun was used in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. But
* By prior order, we granted the parties’ joint motion to waive oral argument.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 25-1201 Page 2
the evidence presented at trial established a sufficient nexus between the gun and the
drug-tracking offense, so we affirm.
In 2020, a confidential source informed the Rock Island Police Department that
Denton was selling methamphetamine from his home. After conducting surveillance
and a controlled buy from Denton, officers executed a search warrant at Denton’s home.
When officers entered the bedroom, they found Denton weighing methamphetamine on
two scales next to his closet. Denton, upon seeing the officers enter his room, dropped a
plate containing cocaine at the threshold of the closet. A search of the home revealed
methamphetamine, cannabis, cocaine, packaging supplies, cash, a phone, a semi-
automatic pistol, and ammunition. The gun and ammunition were discovered wrapped
in cloth inside of a bag hanging in the bedroom closet.
During the search, an officer interviewed Denton, who admitted to having sold
methamphetamine for about four months and to possession of the drugs and supplies.
And while he admitted to having a gun in the house, he told the officer he could not
remember where it was, initially saying it might be in his car. The officer asked three
times whether the gun was for self-defense, and Denton answered affirmatively.
Officers eventually found the gun in the closet, and Denton confirmed that it was his.
Officers later conducted a forensic extraction of the seized phone. The extraction
revealed several messages arranging for drug transactions. One message sent two
weeks prior to the search of Denton’s house contained a photo of the seized gun and
three rounds of ammunition with the accompanying text “600 $.”
A grand jury indicted Denton on three charges: possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine, crack cocaine, and cannabis, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C), and (b)(1)(D) (Count One); possession of a firearm in furtherance of
drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Two); and felon in possession of a
firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2), and 924(e) (Count Three). Denton pleaded guilty
to Counts One and Three.
The court held a bench trial on Count Two. As relevant on appeal, officers
testified as to the gun’s location in the apartment and their interview with Denton
during the search. One officer stated that it would take about one minute to load the
gun and that drug dealers typically have guns to protect “their drugs and their
business.” Further, in explaining why he asked Denton if he had a gun in self-defense,
the officer testified that because dealers are frequently robbed, they often have guns for

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 25-1201 Page 3
protection. The officer also stated that there had been several robberies and homicides
of drug dealers in Rock Island.
The court found Denton guilty on Count Two, the Section 924(c) charge. In its
explanation, the court noted the close proximity of Denton’s “workstation” (the
bedroom dresser) to the closet where the gun was found. The court reasoned that “a
fact-finder reasonably may infer that a defendant’s possession of a gun was intended to
‘further’ his drug operation if he ‘strategically placed’ the gun near a cache of drugs,
making the gun readily available to protect ‘himself, his drugs, and his ongoing drug
trafficking business.’” United States v. Beard, 187 F. App’x 608, 609 (7th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2005). The court also appeared
skeptical of Denton’s claim that he did not know where the gun was, observing that two
weeks earlier he had sent pictures of the gun and ammunition to a potential customer.
The court sentenced Denton to 120 months’ incarceration on both Counts One
and Three to run concurrently, and 60 months’ incarceration on Count Two to run
consecutively. It also imposed 60 months’ supervised release on Counts One and Two,
and 36 months’ supervised release on Count Three, all to run concurrently.
On appeal, Denton challenges his conviction for Count Two, contesting the
sufficiency of the evidence that he possessed a gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
crime. In raising a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, he faces a heavy burden.
See United States v. Farmer, 38 F.4th 591, 602 (7th Cir. 2022). This court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and overturns a conviction only
if “no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Medina, 969 F.3d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Denton argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to support
his conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A). Specifically, he contends that the government failed
to provide evidence linking his firearm to drug dealing. See United States v. Huddleston,
593 F.3d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding there must be a sufficient nexus between the
firearm and the drug-selling operation). Denton’s appeal focuses on the accessibility of
the firearm and its proximity to the drugs, highlighting that the gun was found
wrapped in a bag inside of the closet, and that there was no evidence of the gun being
used during any transactions. To distinguish between mere possession of a firearm and
possession in furtherance of a drug crime, courts may consider factors such as:

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 25-1201 Page 4
(1) the type of drug activity that is being conducted; (2) accessibility of the
firearm; (3) the type of weapon possessed; (4) whether the weapon is stolen;
(5) the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal); (6) whether the gun is
loaded; (7) proximity to drugs or drug profits; and (8) the time and
circumstances under which the gun is found.
United States v. Maxwell, 143 F.4th 844, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).
But looking at these factors holistically, as the court must, see United States v.
Perryman, 20 F.4th 1127, 1134 (7th Cir. 2021), there was sufficient evidence for the
district court to find that Denton possessed the gun “in furtherance” of his drug crime.
Officers found Denton in his bedroom with several controlled substances that were
packaged individually for sale. The substances and other drug-dealing accoutrements
were found on his dresser next to where he was standing and inside the closet. Officers
found the gun and ammunition in the bedroom closet, located directly next to the
dresser. See, e.g., Perryman, 20 F.4th at 1134–35 (concluding that a gun in a closet “three
to four steps away” from narcotics was used to protect the drugs). Denton was close
enough to the closet that when officers entered, he dropped a plate of narcotics into the
threshold of the closet. And although the gun was not stolen, his status as a felon made
its possession unlawful. While Denton argues that the gun was not immediately
accessible, it was close enough that the factfinder could rationally conclude it was
“strategically placed” near his workstation and thus in furtherance of a drug operation.
See Castillo, 406 F.3d at 815–16.
And though Denton contends there is no evidence that the weapon was ever
used during a drug transaction, Count Two alleges possession with intent to distribute,
not distribution. Thus, the required “nexus” between the firearm and the drug-
trafficking crime, see Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 602, is broader than transactions alone.
United States v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 777 (7th Cir. 2010). The evidence needs to show
only that the “possession of the gun was intended for the protection of his money and
his stash.” Id. at 778.
Here, the evidence shows that when an officer asked about the weapon, Denton
confirmed that it was for self-defense. And at trial, officers testified that it is common
for drug dealers to have a gun to protect themselves and their drugs. Based on this
evidence, a rational factfinder could find that Denton possessed the gun to protect
himself and his drugs in furtherance of his drug-trafficking enterprise.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --